

TITLE PAGE

**IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AND JUST WAR IN ISLAM IN
NIGERIA**

BY

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REG. NO.: PG/Ph.D/12/64680**

**DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION AND CULTURAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA**

AUGUST, 2019

REQUIREMENT PAGE

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION AND CULTURAL
STUDIES, FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA,
NSUKKA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN RELIGION AND SOCIETY**

SUPERVISOR: REV. PROF. AGHA UKA AGHA

AUGUST, 2019

CERTIFICATION PAGE

We hereby certify that the candidate Ukandu, Ikechukwu Maxwell with registration number PG/Ph.D/12/64680 has duly effected the corrections suggested by the external Examiner

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Supervisor

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Head of Department

DECLARATION PAGE

I, Ikechukwu Maxwell Ukandu, a postgraduate student of Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with Registration Number PG/Ph.D/12/64680, have satisfactorily completed the entire requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) Degree in Religion and Society.

The work embodied in this project report is original and has not been submitted in part or full for any other Diploma or Degree of this or any other University.

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Supervisor

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Head of Department

DEDICATION PAGE

This work is dedicated to the memory of my late dad, His Royal Majesty, Eze Isaac Ukandu Uko Agu, the Ebiri of Amaukwu-Ebiri, Igbere.

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In all honesty and with a sense of appreciation, I want to return all the glory and say a trillion thanks to the Almighty God, the source of all true knowledge and the doer of every good and perfect thing. His enduring grace and predetermined verdict has come true in my life and family in this light. Also, my Supervisor, Rev. Professor Agha Ukah Agha, who, as a trans-generational giant, has committed himself to academic excellence and the task of raising his kind for the now and foreseeable future. A tool in God's hand you are, my Prof. I thank you for allowing yourself to be used by Him.

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ABSTRACT

Radicalism, militancy, insurrection, insurgency, and terrorism are phenomena that point to the fact that there is an upsurge in violent rebellion in global human society. The near a decade long menace of *Boko Haram* terrorism has triggered a wide range of implications and pushed Nigeria to the precipice. Regrettably, the various government officials, policy makers, media practitioners and public commentators that spoke or responded to the issue gave the ethical component little attention. In fact, not much research has been done on the moral conduct of *Boko Haram* in the context of its challenges in Nigeria. It is this salient dimension and gap that this work seeks to fill. Thus, the research discusses the implications of *Boko Haram* terrorism and evaluates their moral conduct from an Islamic just war perspective. The study adopted the phenomenological design and the descriptive research methodology. Data were derived from primary and secondary sources. The primary source was obtained through structured and in-depth interviews. The secondary sources of data were derived from text books, journal articles, news papers, and policy documents. Descriptive analysis was used in the interpretation and analysis of data gathered and the data discussion was done socio-ethically. A number of causative factors were behind *Boko Haram* terrorism such as Islamic revivalism and expansionism, government's high-handed military response to the group, guaranteed transcendental reward and the quest for social significance, financial and logistical supports, and influences from transnational jihad groups. Military and non-military approaches were adopted by the federal and other foreign governments to manage the menace. Various religious and community leaders equally contributed to the management of the challenge. The core negative implications are psychological, economic, agricultural, political, health, educational, humanitarian, human rights, religious and international. While the positive implications comprised of increased security consciousness, economic and political developments in the area, legal reforms and judicial developments, and calls for the establishment of state police. Though the group fell short of some of the justice before war (*jus ad bellum*) and justice during war (*jus in bello*) criteria, the principle of necessity (*Al Darura*) in Islamic ethics and laws of war absolves Muslim fighters from any moral burden during war on the grounds of necessity. It makes the unlawful to become lawful and as such bequeaths morally rightness to their actions. The research recommends that for sustainable peace to prevail, total Sharia can be implemented for Muslims provided the federal system is restructured.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANPP	All Nigerian Peoples Party
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb
AQLIM	Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
BH	Boko Haram
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CNPP	Conference of Nigerian Political Parties
DHQ	Defense Headquarter
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSS	Department of State Security
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IED's	Improvised Explosive Devices
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JDPC	Justice Development and Peace Commission
JNI	Jama'atu Nasril Islam
JTF	Joint Military Task Force
JWT	Just War Theory
LGA	Local Government Area
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
NE	North East
NEF	Northern Elders Forum
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGF	Northern Governors Forum
NIREC	Nigerian Interreligious Council
NPF	Nigeria Police Force

NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSCDC	Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PFN	Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria
POW	Prisoners of War
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RD	Relative Deprivation
RNSA	Religious Non-state Actors
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEMAs	State Emergency Management Agencies
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SSS	State Security Services
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Education Fund
UNIMAID	University of Maiduguri
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WOT	War on Terror

LIST OF FOREIGN WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS

Actus Reus	The word is of Latin origin. It has to do with the guilty act of a crime
Ahkam	It is an Arabic word for legal injunction regarding peace and war in the Qur'an
Al-Harb	It is of Arabic origin and it means war
Al-Qaeda	It is an Arabic word that means the base, foundation or fundament. It is used by a militant Sunni Islamist multinational organization once headed by late Osama Bin Laden
Aman	The word is of Arabic origin and it is used to describe a contract for the protection of persons or property of enemy state. It is the concept that gives life to Musta'min which finds expression in quarter and safe conduct
Amin Mumini	It is an Arabic word that means commander of the faithful
Ansaru	It is Arabic word which means vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black lands. It is an Islamic jihadist militant organization in North Eastern Nigeria and a splinter group of Boko Haram
Al-Bara'at	This Arabic word means immunity
Boko Haram	It is an Hausa word which loosely translates as western education is a sin, forbidden or not permissible
Casus Belli	It is a Latin word which means reasons or circumstances for beginning a war
Dar al-Harb	It is of Arabic origin and it connotes house, abode or territory of war. Used to refer to territories not under Islamic rule because divine will is not observed
Dar al-Islam	It is of Arabic origin and it connotes house or abode of Islam or peace
Dhimmis	It is an Arabic word for a non-Muslim people living in an Islamic state with legal protection. It is a word used to refer to protected person who have certain rights and with some restrictions in an Islamic state and it is obligatory for them to pay the poll tax (<i>Jizyah</i>).
Genima	It is an Arabic word for spoil or war booty
Hadith	It is Arabic word which means news or story. It is a record of the traditions or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and highly revered as a source of

	religious law and moral guidance and it is second in authority to the Qur'an which is the Holy book of Islam
Hamas	Its root is Arabic. It is Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist organization which organization which has served as the ruling authority for Gaza Strip
Hisbollah	An Arabic word used by a radical Shiite Muslim organization in Lebanon engaged in guerrilla warfare against Israel
Ignoratio elenchi	It is of Latin origin and it connotes a logical fallacy which consists in apparently reputing an opponent while actually disproving something not asserted. It is popularly known as missing the point as it fails to address the issue in question
Ijma	It is of Arabic origin and means the consensus or agreement of the Muslim scholars on religious issues. It is used for an opinion or command of Islam where all the good and respected scholars of Islam are unanimous in their ruling
Insha Allah	It is an Arabic word that means God willing or if God wills so.
Jihad	It is an Arabic word that means striving or struggling in the way of God. It has come to mean any conflict waged for principles or belief in Islam and is often translated to mean holy war
Jizyah	It is an Arabic word for poll tax or fee paid for protection provided by the Muslim ruler to non-Muslims. It is for the exemption from military service for non-Muslims, for the permission to practice a non-Muslim faith with some autonomy in a Muslim state. More importantly, it is a material proof of non-Muslims' submission to the Muslim state and its laws.
Jus ad bellum	It is of Latin origin and the phrase means justice before war
Jus in bello	It is of Latin origin and it means justice during war
Jus post bellum	It is of Latin origin and it literally means justice after war
Justum bellum	It is of Latin origin and it means just war
Madrassas	It is the Arabic word for any type of educational institution, whether secular or religious. It is a place where learning and study take place. It simply means school at all levels and forms of organization in Arabic language.
Mallam	It is an Arabic word that means teacher and preacher

Mal in se	It is a Latin word that has to do with an act that is bad, wrong or immoral in itself.
Mal Prohibit	It is of Latin origin. It means an immoral or wrong act that is sanctioned or prohibited by law
Mens rea	It is a Latin word by origin and it means the guilty mind and intention to commit a criminal act
Musta'min	It is the Arabic word for a non-Muslim foreigner who only temporarily resides through a short-term safe conduct. Such a person or group of people (<i>musta'min</i>) enjoy the protected status of the dhimmis without having to pay the poll tax (<i>Jizyah</i>). Students, business men, and messengers are among people that enjoy this kind of privilege.
Mutatis mutandis	It is a Latin phrase used to connote the necessary changes having been made or once the necessary changes have been made
Numero uno	It is an Italian word which means number one. It has to do with the best or most important person or thing
Qital	It is the Arabic for fighting. It has relevance to jihad when we are speaking of armed jihad as a lesser jihad
Shariah	It is an Arabic word for the Islamic Law principally derived from the Qur'an and the Hadith
Sirah	It is of Arabic origin and means the biography of the Prophet Muhammad.
Summa Theologica	It is a Latin word for a book written by Thomas Aquinas, a Christian Theologian. It means a theological summary. This unfinished book is one of the classics of the history of philosophy and an influential work of Western literature.
Ummah	It is an Arabic word for community. It is a supra-national community with a common history used to describe the global Muslim faithful.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study:

The introduction of Islam, in the territory now called Northern Nigeria, by traders of the Saharan trade route in the eleventh (11th) century marked the beginning of the religious interaction between the people of the various kingdoms and the Islamic missionaries and merchants, thereby making Islam to assume a prominence in the political and religious history of the country (Udoidem, 1997). First to contact these Islamic traders and missionaries was the Kanem-Borno kingdom.

Established in the 9th century (891AD) as an empire, Kanem-Borno adopted Sharia system in the 11th century due to the activities of Mai Kume. The political and religious systems were correspondingly adjusted to reflect a holistic religious authority and political control in the office or stool of the Shehu of Borno (Ani and Ajaegbo, 2014). Despite being the first to receive Islam in Nigeria, Kanem-Borno society came to play a secondary role in the proper institutionalization of Islam and its propagation in the region. The establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate was a major development in the history of Islam in Nigeria and by extension, West Africa.

With this new religion in the area, the culture of the various indigenous peoples and their traditional belief systems became eroded as the new religion, Islam, set the context for their entire social system, economic relations, morality and law alongside their spirituality. Islam is indeed a religious, political and cultural system, that is, a total way of life or a civilization. Various societies in the North were transformed and with the revival and reformation carried out by the religious cum political reformer, Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio in the year AD. 1804, the

religious identity and destiny of the region became vehement and safeguarded in the Sunni version of Islam, with special emphasis on the Sufi tradition while not neglecting its Sharia, Hadith and Sunna foundations (Williams, 1997).

Map 1: Map of Nigeria Highlighting Hausa Land from Other Ethnic Groups



Retrieved from www.thepoint.com/ethnic-map-of-nigeria/ on 25-09-20117.

This theocratic system of government (Caliphate) came as a result of the level of corruption in the Hausa City-states. Dan Fodio, a Fulani man, was highly critical of greed and violations of the standards of Sharia law among Hausa elite, and he made efforts to encourage literacy and scholarship among his followers. He purged the Hausa rulers and their peoples

through the jihad (holy war) and gave flags to the fourteen war chiefs- all Fulani but one, who marched and conquered the Hausa forces and after this defeat they (Fodio's army) became the emirs (rulers) of Hausaland and till date their various descendants are the leaders that occupy the thrones in northern emirates and paying perpetual allegiance to the Sultan of Sokoto (Udoidem, 1997).

Dan Fodio was widely recognized as the "Commander of the Faithful" and his son, Muhammed Bello continued as Sultan of Sokoto with its legitimacy accepted and stretching from Bukina Faso to Cameroun (Forest, 2012). This Sultanate became the *numero uno* (number one) in Islamic authority and Sharia administration in the region with the Shehu's authority being the second in hierarchy and that of Kano Emirate as the next in command—both considered as direct subjects of the Sultan of Sokoto. According to Hill, the Sokoto Caliphate as a religious community, distinguished by its faithfulness, and its leader, the Sultan of Sokoto, claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed (Thomson, 2012).

It is worthy of note that with the amalgamation of these two culturally, ethnically, religiously distinct entities—the Northern and Southern Protectorates—, the powers of the Sultan of Sokoto was perceived to have been grossly battered. This took a gradual effect from the year 1904, when the Caliphate was compelled to practice only Islamic civil law with special emphasis on the family law. Criminal jurisdiction was not accorded the Sharia Legal system. Its elimination by the colonial administrators was to set a meeting point for the Northern and Southern units to be joined together.

Hazen (2007) narrates the long existence of Sharia but decried its non-conformity with secular constitutional provisions of its penal outlook when he observes that,

Sharia is not new in Nigeria; it has governed civil and personal matters in northern states, e.g. on issues such as divorce, for well over a century. The change has come in the extension of the jurisdiction of Sharia courts to criminal cases, and the handing down of Sharia sentences such as amputations, stonings, and death sentence (p. 19).

The attempt to re-introduce criminal Sharia into the criminal justice system of the country has been a subject of intense religious, political and legal debate. The religio-political and judicial change, its non-inclusion has orchestrated in the country has limited the powers of the Sultan. For some time now, many charismatic, reformists and revolutionary Islamic teachers have sought to restore the Sultanate to her previous place of pride and envy in Africa. From the Maitasine riot in the early 1980s, various “so termed” religious riots across Northern Nigerian towns and cities, the Sharia crises of early 2000’s culminating in the Boko Haram insurrection pursued through terrorism as a strategy of war.

For example, on July 26th, 2009, there was a violent uprising in Northeastern city of Bauchi which left 1,000 people dead. Within that same period, precisely the following day (on the 27th) of that same month, the group extended her violence through Yobe, Borno, Bauchi and Kano states and over 800 causalities were recorded (Bazza, 2013). By 2010, the following year recorded higher death tolls, greater brutality and unrestrained brigandage from members of this group. A major prison break at Bauchi was recorded and the escape of over 700 prison inmates confirmed (Ekanem, Dada and Ejue, 2012).

Even on the 2010 Independence Day celebration of the country, members of the dissident group could not spare Nigerians and her international friends from fear. The pleasure of peace, safety and security was denied the general public when 12 people were killed by Boko Haram.

Bazza (2013) captured the December 24th to 29th of 2010 attacks which occurred concurrently at the cities of Jos and Maiduguri and which left 94 precious human lives destroyed.

The story of subsequent years is not different, rather, members of the group displayed commitment, capacity and mastery of human and material destruction. Their attack on the INEC secretariat in the town of Suleja, Niger State and the killing of 14 persons on the 3rd of March, 2011 was surprising as it reveals the reach of the group. Thus, their August 26th attack of that same year on the United Nations' Abuja office through bombing which took the lives of 24 UN staff, really called the attention of the world to the group's activities (Adagba, Ugwu and Eme, 2012).

The group displayed real capacity for violence when on January 20th, 2012 they attacked the offices of the Nigeria Police, Immigrations, State Security Services (SSS), and Customs formations in Kano and left over 200 people dead including officers (Bazza, 2013). Bazz recorded that churches were not spared from these attacks. For example, there was a June 3rd 2012 killing of 15 church-goers through bomb attack at Bauchi. Also, in August 2012 there were sporadic shootings inside an evangelical church in the North-central state of Kogi that recorded the death of 19 persons and the June 17th suicide bombing of three churches in Kaduna that took the lives of over 50 people in that same year.

All through the years of 2013 through 2017, Boko Haram carnage continued across Northern Nigeria with greater violent attacks recorded around the North-Eastern states. Within this period, the group has shown no sign of respect for human life and its dignity, as they have made a mess of human rights, thrown open a wide range of humanitarian emergencies, and subjected Nigerians and their government to incalculable material loss.

This wave of conflict, violence and acts of terrorism as witnessed within the geo-political enclave of Nigeria have brought to the fore the place of ideology, belief and value as the core of perennial security decadence in the country. Admix all of these violence and acts of terrorism in the country, especially when one considers their sources, agenda, networks, core agitations and principal theological leanings that support it, it becomes a great source of worry. Similarly, the time it has lingered, despite government's efforts at combating it with a cross-section of her armed forces, intelligence and security agencies through a militaristic approach, a need arises to rethink and look towards an alternative direction for a new framework or strategy to better understand the conflict and possible management of it.

The group's call for Sharia law or Islamic jurisprudence in the governance and administration of the country due to their decay of widespread corruption, injustices and influences of western culture, remains a challenge to scholars, policy makers and public commentators especially when attempts are made to reconcile their actions with the lofty ideals and ethical demands of Islam. One way to make sense of this is to interrogate the theory of just war.

Just war is an approach to war that stands at the middle ground between realism and pacifism. While realism approves of war and denies any place for morality in its conduct, pacifism totally rejects war as entirely evil and immoral. Just war being a synthesis of these two extreme approaches, maintains that there are moral grounds to engage in war provided justice before war (*jus ad bellum*) and justice during war (*jus in bello*) criteria or requirements are taken seriously and met. Islam is one ethical system that has influenced and contributed to this tradition through her ethics and laws of war. Thus, considering through the just war theory of Islam if the actions of the sect, *Boko Haram* meets the standards of justice both in terms of cause or decision

to make war/fight (*jus ad bellum*) and conduct in fighting a war justly and lawfully (*jus in bello*), is both timely and strategic.

1.2 Statement of the Problem:

A close observation of Nigeria's North especially the North-Eastern states in the past eight years would reveal a high level of insecurity of human life and property at the individual and communal levels. Boko Haram sect is the group that currently poses this threat to Nigeria and her citizens. The group's contempt for individual and collective human life knows no bound, as the country has witnessed an unprecedented lapse into barbarism, unrestrained brutality and untrammelled bloodbath at its hands.

For example, on the 7th of May, 2013, members of Boko Haram killed 55 persons and freed 105 inmates in a coordinated attack on Army Barracks, a Prison and Police post in Bama town in Borno state (Oropo, 2015). Similarly, the Islamist shot at and killed 42 persons mostly students in a school at Yobe state on the 6th of June, 2013. According to Sahara Reporters (2016) on November 28, 2015, members of the group destroyed a military base (157 Battalion) and 107 soldiers were believed to be missing in action in Borno.

Also, 200 people were killed when suicide bombers sneaked into a crowd in Dalori and detonated explosives. It was such a planned attack that the suicide bombing was preceded by sporadic shootings from gunmen on motorcycle and 2 vehicles that also burnt houses on February 2, 2016. On the following day, in the same Borno, Christian worshippers were forced into a Mosque and 30 of them were shot dead on the 3rd of February, 2016. The lives of soldiers were not even spared as 7 of them were killed by members of the group when troops of Operation Lafiya Dole fell into a Boko Haram ambush in Ajiri village in Borno on the 10th of February, 2017. The situation became more gory and helpless as members of the sect even accessed killed at least 8

persons and injured 14 other in a suicide bomb attack in an IDP camp at Dikwa Local Government Area of Borno State, on the 28th of July, 2017 (Toromade, 2017).

From the early days of Boko Haram's scourge in North-East of Nigeria, a number of thinkers, scholars and researchers have devoted some attention to the phenomenon, especially with an aim to profile its nature, causation and possible remediation. While some see it as a purely political activity, others ascribe religious causation to these acts of terrorism in Nigeria. Irrespective of one's persuasion and the divide one falls on in these two camps, there seem to be a common ground in their condemnation for the violence either as emanating from politics or religion. Although, the purview of this work is a synthesis of politics and religion in that the terrorism is religio-political. This is because the research construes of it as a religiously motivated acts that is pursued towards a political end. Yet, its focus is on the moral judgement raised over the group's activities.

The moral condemnation for terrorism as perpetuated by the Boko Haram sect without adequate understanding and proper evaluation of the conception of Islamic ethics of war is glaring. Regrettably, the various government officials, policy makers, media practitioners and public commentators that spoke or responded to the issue gave the ethical component a wave of the hand. In fact, not many researches have studied from an Islamic perspective the moral conduct of *Boko Haram* members within the context of its implications in Nigeria. It is this salient dimension and gap that this work seeks to fill.

1.3 Purpose of the Study:

The general aim of this research is to understudy the implications of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and evaluate it from an Islamic just war perspective. Our specific aims are,

- i To examine the causes of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, without downplaying on the country's socio-political, economic and religious dynamics as precursors.
- ii To investigate the various efforts at eliminating or mitigating Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria
- iii To examine the implications of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.
- iv To evaluate the conformity or otherwise of Boko Haram's terrorism in Nigeria

1.4 Research Methodology:

The phenomenological research design was adopted and a descriptive methodology was employed in this work. The methods of data collection involve both the primary and secondary sources of data collection. The primary source was obtained through structured and in-depth interviews and focused group discussions. As a qualitative research, this work intends to focus primarily on non-statistical means of both the design on the one hand, and data gathering and analysis on the other hand. Thus, the respondents to these interviews were selected through non-probability sampling, as there were no statistical determination of either the sampling size or method of choosing the respondents. Rather, through random sampling, knowledgeable individuals were identified and interviewed. While the secondary sources of data collection were used to augment the former as were derived principally from text books, journal articles, newspaper reports, Policy documents, and Project works among others.

Descriptive analysis was used in the interpretation and analysis of data gathered because it was envisaged that this type of descriptive data analysis would help foster greater understanding of the terrorist acts in a bid to ascertain its conformity or otherwise to stipulated

injunctions from Islamic moral standards on war. The data discussion was done socio-ethically to describe and critically examine religion-based terrorism as a key sociological concept.

1.5 Significance of the Study:

This work is pursued vigorously as a result of its manifold relevance in Nigeria. The work is significant because:

It is hoped that the study will contribute significantly to improving the state of awareness of the government and various non-governmental organizations of the root causes and more importantly the multi-dimensional effects of Boko Haram terrorism. This no doubt will serve as an essential background towards any meaningful humanitarian intervention and management of the scourge.

The media has remained a key tool for information storage and dissemination, thus making it a form of voice for both government and its peoples. In this light, a proper understanding of this research's purview may aid better reportage on religion-based violence and terrorism to Nigerians.

For policy makers and other government agencies saddled with formulation, analysis, and implementation of policies and programmes, especially in the security and peace building sectors, this work intends to throw new light on terrorism and the ethics of war. More importantly, it will be useful in strengthening and evolving more robust national security policy and peace architecture.

Members of the Intelligentsia, Armed Forces and other security agencies would benefit from this study by getting information that may better position them to develop tactics and

strategies towards countering violent extremism and sustaining their gains in terrorism operations, especially if the calls of this research are heeded.


It may close some gap regarding the dearth of literature on religion, conflict and peace. Thus, library users may find the work very relevant and helpful in their literature review and other component parts of their research. As a contemporary literature, the work will serve an academic purpose with broad application to researchers from the Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law who will find it very invaluable.

1.6 Scope of the study:

The research will examine the implications of terrorism in Nigeria's Northern region with greater emphasis on the North-Eastern States and ethically evaluating it. The time frame will focus on post-colonial era Nigeria experience within the context of contemporary terror attacks. Precisely, it will begin from the year two thousand and nine through two thousand and seventeen (2009-2017) and the government's institutional response to it.

The reason for this period is premised on the fact that this was the time when Boko Haram's violence gained public, especially media attention and became a national discourse in the country and elsewhere in the world. Also, the study will of necessity x-ray the mode of Muslim-Christian relations, religious freedom violation and the extent to which social peace and national survival are compromised due to the religio-ethical and legal quest of Boko Haram which has given rise to terrorism in the country. In this sense it will be approached socio-ethically.

Map 2: Map of North Eastern States of Nigeria



Retrieved from AOA and NWGAV (2013)

1.7 Definition of terms:

An academic work of this nature often requires clarification of concepts. This is done for the sole aim of clarifying the intended meaning of various words in their respective contexts. Thus, terms like Terrorism, War, Just War, Islam, and Religion will be given some brief clarification.

A) Terrorism:

In the social world, terms and concepts hardly enjoy universal acceptance and terrorism is no exception. This is the case as one man's terrorist is often another man's freedom fighter. A thin line exists between rebel and saint, all depending on one's ideological leanings, social location and interest. Definitions of terrorism hold no sway across socio-cultural groups neither do they receive acceptance from diverse nation-states; hence, the term is no less loaded with culturally-specific meanings (Jackson, 2006). Since a conception of terrorism by one body or government may be adjudged as sharply against the sensibility of others with respect to what is recognizable as an act of terror that should be condemned morally, proscribed socially and sanctioned legally, the phenomenon is influenced by historical, social, and cultural contexts.

Combs and Slann (2007) define terrorism as "a synthesis of a war and theater, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence—that which is perpetrated on innocent victims—played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear for political purpose" (p. 321). Also, on fear as the targeted outcome of terroristic action in a dramatic sense, Wilkinson (2007) cited in Njoku (2011) defines terrorism as,

A systematic use of coercive intimidation usually to serve political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence and to publicize a cause as well as to coerce a target into assenting to aims (p. 6).

According to Njoku (2011) the Nigerian government has very recently provided a definition for terrorism. While citing *The Nation* Newspaper of (February 2011) he asserted that a terrorist is,

Anyone who [is] involved or who causes an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to a government or public facility, transport system, an infrastructural facility including an information system, a fixed platform located on the intercontinental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss (p. 3).

Although, bodily harm and property destruction are components of acts of terrorism, the focus of the above mentioned is overly concerned with critical national facilities in a security sense. This above definition is at the expense of reflecting over true intention or motivation to acts of terrorism. Thus, the definition provided by Comb and Slann (2007) is adopted in this work.

B) War:

Anyam (2011) gives the etymological root of the term war as derived from the old English term *Wyrre*, the old North French *Were*, and the proto-Germanic *Werso*. The original sense of the term connotes "to bring to confusion". The Spanish, Portuguese and Italian term *guerre* are from the same source. The current use of the term war in English is closely tied to the German word *Werre*.

Firestone (1999) gives more explanation to the concept of war as "an organized purposeful activity directed by one established group against a rival group that involves actual or potential application of lethal force" (P. 11). War for Eneh (2001) is portrayed in the light of a violent activity in which every employable means of destruction are used for military necessity. Similarly, Hehir and Mottahedeh (2001) elaborate on the idea of war as the systematic, organized, purposeful, conscious taking of human life. Orend (2005) sees war as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities (either states or groups that intend to become a state).

Terrorist organizations might be considered a political community because they are association of people with political purpose and many of them aspire to statehood or to influence the development of statehood. Igwe (2007) in this light observes that war is “an armed conflict between states or any other actors, intended to compel a change in the nature of their political and other relations” (P. 468). The act of war is executed by mobilizing a group of combatants and their support called an army if on land; a navy, if at sea; and an air force, if in the air to engage in the use of force, violence, and use of arms against an opposing group known technically as an enemy (Anyam, 2011).

Thus, Anyam (2011) sees war as act of applying the use of arms or violence in order to force an enemy to comply with one’s will. For him, war may also be seen as the employment of organized violence to kill, destroy property and subjugate with the aim of having one’s way politically, economically, socially or even religiously. This definition by Anyam (2011) best captures our sentiments on the idea of war.

C) Just War Theory:

Just war theory has its origin from the synthesis of classical Greco-Roman and Christian values. The triad of Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine are the philosophers and theologian that gave the foundation of this very important and arguably most influential purview on the ethics of war and peace. This tradition is the building brick of most international laws governing armed conflicts (such as The United Nations Charter, The Hague and Geneva Conventions) and it was codified due to its moral and legal dominating relevance.

Igwe (2007) defines just war as a war fought in self-defence, waged in accordance with the principle of proportionality for the restoration of a right or property, conducted with lawful means and for lawful purposes not in contravention of international law even if not expressly supported

by it or, in ancient times, a war “which God Himself ordains” in other words, a holy war. From Igwe’s definition it becomes clear that the idea of just war in Christian conception can be distinguished from the holy war.

Although, the just war theory has a Christian origin, it has come to occupy a very important place in Islamic writings as the basis for doctrines, teachings, theology and jurisprudence. It is pertinent to note that the Islamic concept of *jihad* is more complex than the Christian idea of just war. In Islam, a war is either just or unjust and that justness depends on the ends of war. The ends of a just war are to fulfill God’s divine purpose. Not only should such a war have a holy purpose, it must be a just war in order to be a holy war (Naqib al Misri, 1997).

A just war is understood as a morally justifiable Qur’anic warfare that is engaged for a just cause by respecting justice in the decision to make war (*jus ad bellum*) and fought legally in the sense of just manner (*jus in bello*) in conformity with the way of Allah, for divine purposes and the ends of Islam (Myers, 2006-07). This stand of Myer on Just war indicates that holy war and just war in Islam are invariably the same. It shows that one cannot speak of a holy war without meeting the demands of moral rightness, justness. Thus, the Islamic view on just war is a morally based religious violent action and struggle that meets Allah’s demands as well as helps in the expansion of the Islamic religion.

In this work, Islamic war can only be said to be holy when the just war (*jus ad bellum and jus in bello*) criteria are met. If not, such a war, though, Islamic in appearance, content and purpose may run the risk of being declared or termed un-Islamic. The implication is that when a group of warriors or combatants that understands their battle as divinely sanctioned but does not meet the moral standards required in the engagement or propagation of such warfare, they have committed

an unjust war. Being unjust, they equally lose the holiness or divine backing and justification for their violent action.

D) Islam:

Aderibigbe (2016) observes that Islam as a word has been interpreted in different ways to both capture its essence and proper understanding as a religion. Aderibigbe identifies two outcomes in the definition of Islam and they are obedience or submission and peace. Thus, the etymological roots from the Arabic words are *silm* from where *salima* which means submission and *salm* from where *salaam* which means peace is derived. Ahmad (1972) gives a consensus position of Islamic scholars when he observes that Islam can be interpreted to mean both submission and peace. Thus, Islam is submission to the will (laws) of Allah and being at peace with Him and all men.

Ruthven (2002) has it that almost every account of Islam will explain the word “Islam” (self-surrender) as derived from the same root as *salam* (peace). Thus, Islam is primarily a religion of peace. For him the problem does not lie in the mere idea of peace as a goal, but in the means deployed to achieve it. Ruthven (2002) concludes on this idea of peace in Islam as conditional on acknowledgement of the Islamic idea of God.

E) Religion:

In the human and social sciences, concepts are often faced with lack of consensus in their meaning. Thus, from this sense definitive attempts are fraught with positions and contrary positions because perception, experience and approaches differ broadly in these fields. Religion is one of such concepts that fit perfectly into this nomenclature. Although, the enigmatic phenomenon of religion has captured the interest of curious, critical and learned minds over the ages, a consensus definition has continued to elude them.

Similarly, in the academic cycles, the search for a generally acceptable definition is inconclusive. Despite this challenge, the phenomenon of religion has been portrayed in many respects. Geertz (1973) from a social anthropological perspective maintains that,

It is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aural of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (p. 90-91).

Okwuwze (2004) affirms that it is,

A regulated pattern of life of a people in which experiences, beliefs and knowledge are reflected in man's conception of himself and in relation to others, his social world, the physical as well as the metaphysical world (p. 3).

Emphasizing the social context of religion, Iwe (2003) gives a definition from a social institutional perspective as, "an institution characterised by a core belief in a supra-human Entity (God), a body of doctrines, an ethical code and a system of worship, with a definite organizational structure" (p. 3).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section, in-line with the age-long practice of reviewing related literature in an academic research work, analyzed the existing literature on the subject matter. Our approach will be to organize the work thematically under the following sub-headings: (a) Approaches to War and Just War Theory (b) Islamic Just War Theory (c) Terrorism (d) Theories of Terrorism Causation (e) Theoretical Framework and (f) Summary of Literature Review. It aims to show the very meaning and ways that terrorism is perpetuated and some explanatory theories discussed. But above this, while it understands terrorism as a type of war strategy, focus on the historical just war theory and concludes with the criteria of the theory of just war in Islam as a religiously defined ethical and legal stipulation on war declaration and its engagement.

2.1 Approaches to War and Just War Theory:

Orend (2005) identified three (3) hegemonic traditions of thought that dominate the ethics of war and peace. They are realism, pacifism and just war theory. Although, he acknowledged that there are other perspectives to war and peace but added that they often cannot resist ultimate classification into one of these three approaches to war.

A) Realism:

Orend (2005) posits that realism is most influential among Political Scientists, as well as scholars and practitioners of International Relations. While realism is a complex and often sophisticated doctrine, its core propositions express a strong suspicion about applying moral concepts, like justice, to the conduct of international affairs. Realists uphold that moral concepts should be employed neither as descriptions of, nor as prescriptions for, state behaviour on the international plane. Realists emphasize power and security issues, the need for a state to

maximize its expected self-interest and, above all, their view of the international arena as a kind of anarchy, in which might is right and domination enjoys primacy.

Referring specifically to war, realists believe that it is an inevitable part of an anarchical world system; that it ought to be resorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest; and that, once war has begun, a state ought to do whatever it can to win. In other words, “all is fair in love and war.” During the grim circumstances of war, “anything goes.” So if adhering to the rules of just war theory, or international law, hinders a state during wartime, it should disregard them and stick steadfastly to its fundamental interests in power, security and economic growth.

Orend (2005) identified some prominent classical realists as including Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Modern realists include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Reinhold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger, as well as so-called neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz.

According to him, it is important to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive realism. Descriptive realism is the claim that states, *as a matter of fact*, either do not (for reasons of motivation) or cannot (for reasons of competitive struggle) behave morally, and thus moral discourse surrounding interstate conflict is empty, the product of a category mistake. States are simply not animated in terms of morality and justice: it's all about power, security and national interest for them. States are not like “big persons”: they are creations of an utterly different kind, and we cannot expect them to live by the same rules and principles we require of individual persons, especially those in peaceful, developed societies. Morality is a luxury states cannot afford, for they inhabit a violent international arena, and they have got to be able to get in that game and win, if they are to serve and protect their citizens in an effective way over time.

Morality is simply not on the radar screen for states, given their defensive function and the brutal environment in which they subsist.

Orend (2005) while referring to Walzer (1992) gives an argument against this kind of realism, contending that states are in fact responsive to moral concerns, even when they fail to live up to them. States as the creation of individual persons, want to act morally and justly and it could not be otherwise. Walzer goes so far as to say that any state which was motivated by nothing more than the struggle to survive and win power could not over time sustain the support from its own population, which demands a deeper sense of community and justice.

Walzer argues that all the pretence regarding “the necessity” of state conduct in terms of pursuing power is exaggerated and rhetorical. States are not frequently forced into some kind of dramatic, do-or-die struggle: the choice to go to war is a deliberate one, freely entered into and often hotly debated and agonized over before the decision is made. And this is leaving unspoken the argument regarding the defiant, Machiavellian amorality behind certain kinds of realism, and the moral calibre of the actions it might recommend on this basis.

Prescriptive realism, though, need not be rooted in any form of descriptive realism. Prescriptive realism is the claim that a state ought (prudential “ought”) to behave amorally in the international arena. A state should, for prudence's sake, adhere to an amoral policy of smart self-regard in international affairs. A smart state will leave its morality at home when considering what to do on the international stage. Its conformity to moral standards will lead to exploitation by other states that are more ruthless. And contends that it is better to stick to the sober calculus of national interests and leave ethics out of it.

McKeogh (n.d.) holds that for realists, morality does not apply to the issue of state use of force. Amoral realism as he calls it emphasizes state resort to war for any reason or to further

their national interest in any way. Thus, moral rightness or wrongness does not apply to war or perhaps they do not apply to any affairs of states. McMahan (1991) finds the position of political realism which stipulates that moral norms do not apply to the conduct of states, which should be guided by national interest, objectionable. For him, how can individuals who have limits suddenly be limitless because they have formed themselves into a political society, state. He sees the enjoyment of rights by the state that were not hitherto enjoyed by her component individuals abnormal. He depicts realism as a moral nihilism that should not apply to the state. McMahan did not deny the popularity of this approach to war but maintains that their position is not defensible.

B) Pacifism:

McMahan (1991) contends that most people believe that the justification for war depends not just on considerations of actual or expected consequences, but on what are often called matter of principle. For him, the rightness or wrongness of an act may be in part a function of the inherent nature of the act itself that is considered differently from its consequences. He conceives of pacifists as absolutists because they believe that there are certain acts which can never be justified because of the kind of acts.

Orend (2005) takes the position of Teichman definition of pacifism as “anti-war-ism” which is the literally and straightforwardly, a rejection of war in favour of peace. It is not violence in all its forms that the most challenging kind of pacifist objects to, rather, it is the specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which the pacifist objects to. A pacifist objects to killing (not just violence) in general and, in particular, she objects to the mass killing, for political reasons, which is part and parcel of the wartime experience. So, a pacifist rejects

war; she believes that there are no moral grounds which can justify resorting to war. War, for the pacifist, is always wrong.

Walzer (1992) contends that pacifism's idealism is excessively optimistic. In other words, pacifism lacks realism. More precisely, the nonviolent world imagined by the pacifist is not actually attainable, at least for the foreseeable future. Since “ought implies can”, the set of “oughts” we are committed to must express a moral outlook on war less utopian in nature. While we are committed to morality in wartime, we are forced to concede that, sometimes in the real world, resorting to war can be morally justified. It's hard to see, examples of how anything but war could have defeated the Nazis.

An objection to pacifism is that, by failing to resist international aggression with effective means, it ends up rewarding aggression and failing to protect people who need it. Pacifists reply to this argument by contending that we do not need to resort to war in order to protect people and punish aggression effectively. In the event of an armed invasion by an aggressor state, an organized and committed campaign of non-violent civil disobedience—perhaps combined with international diplomatic and economic sanctions—would be just as effective as war in expelling the aggressor, with much less destruction of lives and property. After all, the pacifist might say, no invader could possibly maintain its grip on the conquered nation in light of such systematic isolation, non-cooperation and non-violent resistance. How could it work the factories, harvest the fields, or run the stores, when everyone would be striking? How could it maintain the will to keep the country in the face of crippling economic sanctions and diplomatic censure from the international community?

Though one cannot exactly disprove this pacifist proposition—since it is a counterfactual thesis—there are powerful reasons to agree with John Rawls that such is “an unworldly

view” to hold. As Walzer points out, the effectiveness of this campaign of civil disobedience relies on the scruples of the invading aggressor. But what if the aggressor is utterly brutal, remorseless? What if, faced with civil disobedience, the invader “cleanses” the area of the native population, and then imports its own people from back home? What if, faced with economic sanctions and diplomatic censure from a neighbouring country, the invader decides to invade it, too? We have some indication from history particularly that of Nazi Germany that such pitiless tactics are effective at breaking the will to resist of even very principled people. The defence of our lives and rights may well, against such invaders, require the use of political violence. Under such conditions, Walzer says, adherence to pacifism might even amount to “a disguised form of surrender.”

Pacifists respond to this accusation of “unworldliness” by citing what they believe are real world examples of effective non-violent resistance to aggression. Examples mentioned include Mahatma Ghandi's campaign to drive the British Imperial regime out of India in the late 1940s and Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights crusade in the 1960s on behalf of African-Americans. Walzer (1992) replies curtly that there is no evidence that non-violent resistance has ever, of itself, succeeded. This may be rash on his part, though it is clear that Britain's own exhaustion after WWII, for example, had much to do with the evaporation of its Empire.

Walzer's main counter-argument against these pacifist counter-examples is that *they only illustrate his main point*: that effective non-violent resistance depends upon the scruples of those it is aimed against. It was only because the British and the Americans had some scruples, and were moved by the determined idealism of the non-violent protesters, that they acquiesced to their demands. But aggressors will not always be so moved. A tyrant like Hitler, for example, might interpret non-violent resistance as weakness, deserving contemptuous crushing. “Non-

violent defense”, Walzer suggests, “is no defense at all against tyrants or conquerors ready to adopt such measures.”

McKeogh (n.d.) describes pacifism as the view that war, by its very nature is morally wrong and that people should resolve conflicts peacefully. He posits that pacifism is a moral approach to political violence that rejects violence in some form and all forms. He acknowledges that there are degrees of pacifism. He identifies five (5) forms of pacifism. They are non-resistance to evil, passive resistance to evil, non-violent active resistance to evil, non-lethal violent resistance to evil and anti-war.

For him, pacifism ranges from rejection of any form of resistance at its strictest form to the ruling out of war (anti-warism). But the most absolute sort is when violence is wrong always and everywhere for everyone. He maintains that not all pacifists hold the absolute form because that would have made the idea more difficult to embrace and much easier to dismiss. In fact, he affirms, that the shades or degrees of pacifism makes it resilient to criticism. Though violence and lethal violence can be used with exception to war, it is excluded because of the size, scope of the violence or the nature of the people killed.

2.1.2 Just War Theory (JWT):

Moseley (2009) sees just war theory as dealing with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The justification can be either theoretical or historical. The theoretical aspect is concerned with ethically justifying war and the forms that warfare may or may not take. The historical aspect, or the “just war theory” deals with the historical body of rules or agreement that have applied in various wars across the ages.

Both the theoretical and historical aspects of the just war theory has been a part of the worlds’ major civilizations and religions.

A) Origin and Evolution of Just War Theory:

Orend (2005) contends that just war theory is probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace. Although, and as with most philosophical doctrines and ideologies in human history, just war theory is not a singular doctrine with one broad idea. Rather, it is a doctrine with contending ideas from different sources and scholars. As Nardin (2006) observes that, “there is no monolithic just war tradition, but at best competing traditions of just war theorizing”. Every era of human history and people facing diverse forms of armed conflicts and peculiar shades of wars have contributed to this doctrine from their distinct nuances and experiences. Rigstad (n.d.) is open to this historical reality when he argues that, “Every age from which recorded examples have been preserved has yielded distinctive patterns of just war thinking and has many different theories as original theorists.”

Despite the various contributions of thinkers and theorists from various times and periods in history on how best to distinguish between what is ethically justifiable and not in warfare, the common challenge to theorists remains the grounds to engage in violent armed conflict in terms of its cause, conduct in war and questions about the ethics of post conflict settlement. Thus, the scope of the doctrine spans from approaches to the ethics of war and peace and as May (2006) would add, “Ranging from contingent pacifism to self-righteous militarism”.

Moseley (2009) notes that, “the just war tradition is indeed as old as warfare itself. Early records of collective fighting indicate that some moral considerations were used by warriors to limit the outbreak or to rein in the potential devastation of warfare.” Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian is acknowledged as the first to write on the morality of warfare in his popular master piece, “The Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 BC)”. He narrated a scenario of an Athenian commander with his overwhelming military might giving an option to his adversaries,

demanding that they surrender and avoid blaming their actions on the grounds of justice. He rather suggested that it is in the place of the weaker side to consider this incontestable fact and surrender (Snodgrass, 2007). Snodgrass observes that these men understood quite well that war against one's enemy required a different order within a political order and that war does not fit in to the moral framework of restraint. This school of thought was referred to as the "Reality school".

Another early concept with regards to the morality of war is pacifism. This doctrine is anchored on the belief that all violence is unjustifiable and taking of human life is wrong. Snodgrass (2007) was informative to disclose that, "...By about 500 BC, Jainism has taken root in India espousing the doctrine that all killing of life, human and nonhuman, was simply unacceptable". Though pacifism has no direct equivalent in Ancient Greece outside their limit to violence between individuals, the concept was highly operational in the Mediterranean world from the time of the advent of Christianity around the first century AD.

It was against this backdrop that two early Christian writers, Augustine of Hippo (AD 354-430 and Thomas Aquinas (AD 1225-1274) wrote to oppose this practice of "love your enemies and to turn the other cheek" as was admonished by Christ (Snodgrass, 2007). Moseley (2009) argues that Greeks may have paid lip service to the gods, but as with the Romans, practical and political issues especially interest of state or realpolitik tended to characterize their consideration for declaring and waging war. Unlike the just war theory in Christian conception with a long history that is hinged on a just cause consideration based on divine intervention.

Eneh (2001) was unequivocal when he descriptively argued that, "Jesus Christ and the forerunner of Christian pacifists, was the greatest and most influential moral philosopher... was against violence and wars... His followers and believers are supposed to be peace-loving

adherents” (p. 110-111). Though, the stance of Eneh remains valid, yet, the attempts of these Christian theologians and jurists are not a negation of Christ’s pacifist deposition as their stand was not to utterly jettison the admonition, rather to quantify it and give a Christian explanation that will see violence allowed to counter injustice in specific instances. Thus, Snodgrass (2007) sees the peace works of Mennonite, Quakers, and Amish groups as an outcome of this thinking because it is a continued legacy of Christ’s pacifist admonition.

Snodgrass (2007) acknowledges that views on just war had earlier featured in Rome when one of its statesmen, Cicero (106-43 BC) first formulated a just war theory though less advanced than what the later Christian doctrine made of it. The emphasis of Cicero’s explication for a justified war was two-fold namely to defend oneself or one’s community from danger, and defend one’s community’s honour. These ideas really seem elementary as it purports to assert self preservation and portrays it only in the sense of a last resort.

The construct of Augustine at a time when the socio-political standing of Christians had received a boost in the Roman Empire and many of them were occupying important positions in the government of the Empire, was an expression of dissatisfaction with the postulations of Cicero. Augustine gives Christian just war theory on the ground that nowhere in the gospel did Christ forbid his followers from defending one’s love from life threatening attack or danger.

Moseley (2009) corroborated the place of St. Augustine as providing the morality of war from the Christian perspective as did some Arabic commentators in the intellectual thriving between the 9th and 12th centuries but acknowledge that the most elaborate and systematic exposition in Western tradition and one that still commends the admiration of many is the work of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century titled, “*Summa Theologica*” which presents the general outline of what became the traditional just war theory as discussed in modern universities.

Snodgrass (2007) explicates that the Catholic Church theologian Thomas Aquinas, the protestant Jurist Hugo Grotious (1583-1645 AD), and two other Catholic Jurists Franciscus De Victoria (1480-1546 AD) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617 AD) prominent among others, gave more elucidation to the ideas of Augustine's Christian just war theory. The collection of the works of later writers and building on the bricks of pioneer works became the corpus of Western thought on the just war. The later day international and humanitarian laws which are deeply enshrined in the United Nations Charter owe their source principally to this tradition.

Romeijn-Stout (2010) sees the import of Christianity in the just war tradition as owing to its roots in Judaism and its contact with other pre-Christian societies like Greece and Rome. For him, two similar grounds exists for Christians to engage in war. They are referred to as holy war and the just war. While the holy war focuses on armed conflict that borders on disputation for the sake of the faith, for ideas and have been waged on the authority of God or a religious leaders acting in the name of God (like the Pope). The just war generally entails armed conflict engaged in for more mundane or earthly things of life like land, economic resources among others or righting a wrong and it is done under the authority of a secular and political figure in the name of the state.

The historical violence and mass murder of the Jews by Hitler and the cloud of war which was set all over Europe immediately after the First World War's carnage in the 1930's, induced a sharp disrepute for this lofty doctrine of pacifism. As a rational policy for individual and state action, this doctrine suffered neglect and critical reflection in the face of these times of uncertainty. This challenge gave rise to a seeming middle path between the reality school and that of pacifism because the pacifists' school failed to protect the lives of innocent nonviolent people neither has it ensured peace. Just war theory became a necessity.

B) Aspects of the Just War Theory:

The Christian faith and its ethical and philosophical components was instrumental for the evolution of contemporary and popular conceptualization of the Western just war theory. The doctrine has two main components in terms of its construct in theory and application. Thomas (2012) notes that Just War theory as a western philosophical tradition which dates back to some 1,600 years, outlines the moral and legal basis for using military warfare contains justice in war (*jus in bello*) which involves the means and methods used in waging war and moral legitimacy to waging war in certain circumstances referred to as Just War criteria (*Justum bellum*). Thomas further explains that the *jus ad bellum* exists in the realm of the politician, and *jus in bello* in the realm of the soldier and maintains that decisions made in one realm affects the other. The third aspect involves the justified ways to peacefully come out of a war.

Generally, and as Moseley (2009) maintains, the just war theory offers a series of principles that aim to restrain a plausible moral framework for war. From the just war (*Justum bellum*) tradition theorists distinguish between the rules that govern the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) from those that govern just and fair conduct in war (*Jus in bello*) and the responsibility of warring parties after the war (*jus post bellum*).

Moseley furthered by noting that, the three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines in particular wars. It can be summarily seen as the attempt to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed violence, since it aims to determine how arms might be confined, made more considerate and finally bring about lasting peace while upgrading societal justice.

2.1.2.1 Justice before War (*Jus Ad Bellum*):

This criterion for justified declaration of war is called *Jus Ad Bellum* in the Latin language. It has a number of principles for its justification. While about six are generally acknowledged as the standard demands, others include one more or two to make it eight in total. They are under enumerated and explained;

A) Just Cause:

For Hehir in Hehir and Mottahedeh (2001), Just Cause question takes care of the “why” or necessity of conflict. Snodgrass (2007) speaks of it in terms of self-defense and protection of innocents as the just demands to engage in war. The observation of Moseley (2009) throws more light into this self-defense justification for involvement in war as he opines that the principle of just cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of *jus ad bellum* (justice before war consideration).

Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a besieged group the just cause to defend itself. The consensus is that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient reason for just war. As such aggressive war is only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed against a group (for example, to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an anticipated attack against them.

B) Last Resort:

War must be declared only as a last resort when all other options for resolving the matter have been tried but failed. Moseley (2009) is of the opinion that last resort as a *jus ad bellum* principle connects intimately with the criteria of just cause in that all other forms of solution must have been attempted before the declaration of war. He gives economic consideration among other concerns as a major reason why theorists advised that war should not be lightly accepted in

society. He opines that, “once unleashed, war is not like a sport that can be quickly stopped at the blow of a whistle and its repercussions last for generations. This option is adopted after other options have been judiciously considered, although not necessarily tried.

C) Legitimate Authority:

Proper authority is also a major criterion for declaring war. Sharma (2008) captures the view of Augustine when he discloses that, the natural order, which is suited to peace of mortal things, requires authority, deliberation and for war to be embarked upon under the control of a leader. Affirming this position, Hehir and Mottahedeh (2001) note that not everyone can declare or make a people to go to war. It takes a leader who has the prerogative of preserving the public good to declare war. Moseley (2009) gives answer to the question when he avers that, “The notion of proper authority seems to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state”. This consensus on the state’s legitimate right to embark on war is not a concluded debate among scholars and theorists.

Johnson (2006) while reflecting on the stand of Aquinas notes that his categorization of the bases to engage in war apart from right intention and just cause is that sovereign authority is a major consideration. For Aquinas only the person in sovereign authority and not any private individual has the right to resort to force. Meaning that it is only in the place of the sovereign to weigh if the situation required and the level of force required in quelling it. This activity is to be done to address an injustice that may have existed.

On a separate note, Moseley (2009) acknowledges that the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to be considered. After all, the notion of proper authority requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and its government from not just a secular political theory but also

with religious considerations. The modern realities at the international society offered Johnson (2006) a clue to the legitimate authority debate. For him, the Security Council of the United Nations, regional security alliances and individual state in contemporary or modern world order holds the answer.

Some responsibilities are placed on such leaders that can declare war. For Johnson (2006) “those who have this authority and responsibility must first determine whether the use of force would satisfy the primary moral requirements of just cause and right intention and the purpose of restoring peace”. He further asserts that right intention is in line with a just cause. Some wrong intentions are to dominate, the lust for power, lust for cruel revenge among others.

D) Just or Right intent:

With thorough explication on just cause and last resort principles or criteria of *jus ad bellum*, Moseley (2009) considers the possession of right intention as ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept for him is that, “a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement”. He was unequivocal to denounce reasons of national interest as paramount or overwhelming pretext for fighting aggression. Rather, “right intention” like Kant observes in his ethico-philosophical analysis must possess good intent which will constitute the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may have.

Johnson (2001) asserts that war when undertaken out of right intention will not do injustice to another but will seek to preserve or establish peace. He gives a delineation of right intention as “defense of the common good against injury, recovery of something wrongly taken, or punishment of wrong; and...not aggression, domination, impeccable enmity, just plain cruelty

or the like, but the intention to protect, restore, or establish peace” (p. 169). As Aquinas maintains in Romeijn-Stout (2010) that, “it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”

In an armed conflict, right intention should not be for the purpose of mere revenge as it will not be morally right or legally acceptable to have such as the motive for a war. Right intention can be accepted on grounds of restoring a previously peaceful order (Cook, n. d.). This is generally the intention to bring justice and peace.

E) Probability of success:

There must be a reasonable probability of success before wars are engaged in. Moseley (2009) sees this principle as being consequentialist in that the cost and benefits of a campaign must be well calculated. The thrust of the reasonable success principle as a *jus ad bellum* criterion emphasizes that human life, financial and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously be an uneven match against the enemy or aggressor. A way out can be for a (weaker) nation threatened by invasion, to adopt other forms of retaliation or defense available to them like civil disobedience or even forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds (Moseley, 2009).

For Snodgrass (2007) there should be a moral possibility of success. By all means people should not go to war unless they can put ends and means to block violence which is going to be futile. A moral possibility of success requires that one does not go into war unless one can put ends and means together in a successful formula. An exception to this consideration was given by Moseley (2009) with the historical war in 1940 between Germany as the aggressor and Britain in a position of self-defense. That the motivation from and uncommon bravery of leaders

can help in resisting a powerful enemy despite the lack of presence of the probability of reasonable success.

F) Macro-proportionality Criteria in Justice before War:

This principle is a bridge between the *jus ad bellum* and the *jus in bello* criteria of war. It considers the desired end or purpose of a war and tries to reconcile it with the means or how the war is prosecuted. This morality attempts to weigh the expected universal good to accrue from its prosecuting the war against the expected universal evils that will result from it. This principle is based on equal or similar measure in the ratio of retaliation in a war scenario. The focus is on balance and moderation in the prosecution of war.

Hehir (2001) sees this as not doing more harm than evil already being done. He gives an example that the kind of questions we thought of in the 1950s. Some argue that the Soviet invasion of Hungary should have been resisted on moral grounds, but not with nuclear weapons. We did not want to go to nuclear way to resolve the Soviet invasion of Hungary. It was disproportionate.

G) Principle of Necessity in Justice before War:

Snodgrass (2007) analysis from the Christian just war perspective compelled him to affirm that failure to meet the standards in any of the individual *jus ad bellum* criteria means the entire *jus ad bellum* justification is invalid. However, a second stipulation is that *jus ad bellum* (justice before war) and *jus in bello* (justice during war) are separate and distinct sets of criteria. But in reconciling his position, he concludes that, failure to meet the standard in either of the *jus in bello* criteria (i.e., how the war is fought) does not nullify the *jus ad bellum* justification for the war itself. This is because as Moseley (2009) enthuses, the theory (just war) thus permits the judging of acts within war to be dissociated from its cause.

They were simply making the case for a valid and morally justifiable ground to embark on a war on one hand and that failure to pursue this war through acceptable standards with respect to its lack of conformity to the justice during war critical, on the other hand. His submission is valid and quite agreeable because as against the statement that ‘the end justifies the means’, one may have a justified justice before war but a very poor and unacceptable justice during war because of how one conduct one’s self in the prosecution of such a war. Thus, this will not necessarily make the attempt for example to defend one’s self unjustified.

2.1.2.2 Justice during War Criteria (*Jus in Bello*):

Moral theorists do not just consider the necessary conditions to be met before declaring war against an enemy; they also evaluate or prescribe ways that a war can be morally engaged in. This level of war concerns itself with the ‘how’ of a war. Thus, justified conducts in the cause of war is what is referred to as *jus in bello* in the Latin language. These conditions are about three in number. To them we turn;

A) Principle of Micro-proportionality:

Maiese (2003) in his explication observes that, “just war theory, sets forth a moral framework for warfare and rejects the notion that “anything goes” during time of war”. There should be restraint to the weapons of war. After all, morality in war acknowledges that human life and some crucial fundamental human rights are worth safeguarding despite engagement in war. Hehir and Mottahedeh (2001) corroborate this position because for them one cannot even use tactics in ways that cause disproportionate harm.

Similarly, Snodgrass (2007) maintains that the use of a particular weapon or tactic in the prosecution of a war should be weighed. This should be done to ensure that it is proportional to

the threat in the circumstance. Moseley (2009) rightly sees this principle as concerning how much force is morally appropriate in the prosecution of war.

B) Principle of Discrimination in *Jus in Bello*:

This principle concerns those who are the legitimate targets in war, if they are government officials, her combatant officials or civilian population. And how do we distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in war operation or prosecution. Moseley (2009) observes that in waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since non-combatants or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper. Immunity from war can be reasoned from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the essence of war, which is the killing of combatants. Since killing itself is highly problematic, the just war theorist has to proffer a reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the first place, and whether their status alters if they are fighting a just or unjust war.

Maiese (2003) posits that individuals have a moral standing independent of and resistant to the exigencies of war. That just war theorists are saddled with the responsibility to provide an account of when soldiers can become legitimate for attack. Individuals with combatant identity will have to forfeit some of their rights when they become soldiers, as that is the basis for their death to be justified in warfare. Therefore, individuals who have not forfeited such rights should not be targets of death in war. Maiese also throws light on the fact that residential non-combatant or military bases, schools and worship places should not be legitimate targets. This point makes it clear that only military objectives should be targeted with special care not to deliberately attack women, children and the aged.

In his explication, Hehir (2001) maintains that if war is to be limited, two principles need to be abided by. One, it is never permissible to go to war against a whole society. It is only

permissible to go to war against those who purposefully, consciously carried out evil that needs to be resisted. This idea of Hehir speaks of discrimination in popular conception.

Moseley (2009) throws more light on discrimination by maintaining that in joining an army, the individual is said to renounce his or her rights not to be targeted in war. This is because the bearing of arms takes a person into an alternative moral realm in which killing is the expectation and possible norm. This is a world removed from civilian structures and historically has evolved rites of passage and exit that underline the alteration in status for cadets and veterans.

Maiese (2003) avows that a major challenge to this principle of discrimination is the issue of doctrine of double effect (DDE) which has to do with the justification of civilian death on the grounds that is not intended thus merely accidental. He further notes that this kind of death will be a secondary result from indirect and unintentional outcome. The term “collateral damage” is used to explain a situation when destruction comes to non-combatants who are in close proximity with a military significant target. To create a distinction between combatant and non-combatant in an armed conflict, Johnson (2006) observes that one of the contemporary evil features of many contemporary armed conflicts is the issue of terrorism that do not just ignores discrimination but seem to specifically pursue and target at non-combatants in their prosecution of war.

C) Principle of Responsibility:

This has to do with knowing where responsibility lies in war. *Jus in Bello* requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions. When soldiers attack non-combatants, pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable or violate other rules of fair conduct, they commit not acts of war but acts of murder (Maiese, 2003). Maiese observes further that if a soldier obeys

order that he knows to be immoral, he must be held personally accountable for his actions. And war crimes tribunals are meant to address such crimes.

The issue of criminal responsibility is considered by Sharma (2008) in Stahn and Kleffner (Eds.), when he opines that military personnel are responsible for crimes in war (*Jus in bello*). Moseley (2009) gives a good account of this principle when he explains that, “the justification of going to war involves responsibility as well as the acts ordered and committed in war”. Thus, soldiers or fighters generally are to suffer prosecution when they commit crime in the field of their operation.

2.2.2.3 Justice after War (*Jus post Bellum*):

This entails justice after war and it accounts for the third aspect of the jus war tradition. Orend (2008) in Stahn and Kleffner (Eds.) opines that this topical aspect of the tradition has been seriously underdeveloped compared to the first two categories. He saw a possible reason for this relative neglect in the fact that, “just war theory began along the two established tracks of thought regarding *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, and there has been a rather unreflective unwillingness to break out of the two categories.” He furthers that popular theorists like Aristotle, Victoria and Walzer tend to subsume the *jus post bellum* under *jus in bello*. An example in hand is the comment of Walzer that in the face of a just cause war as a result of aggression, the *just post bellum* will be focused on defeating and repelling the aggressor by successfully defending one’s community and that will be all.

It goes beyond mere intention to a detailed procedure for justice in war to be attained especially when the justice during war is seen as separate from the justice after war. Moseley (2009) gives the likely outcome following the cessation of war, three possibilities emerge which are either the enemy has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire and

the principles of justice is applied to these three aspects. These are what guide the justice after war principle.

A) Discrimination in Punishment:

Orend (2008) maintains that distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country one is negotiating with. For him, anyone who did not partake in a war, a civilian or non-combatant should not be made to suffer punishment as an outcome of war. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war measures. This rules out, he believes, sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-conflict punishment.

On the other hand, the victors have won a just war against an aggressor, Locke argues that the victor's right does not extend to the aggressive nation's civilian population, but that it does extend to all those engaged in the aggression and that it extends absolutely: that is, the just conqueror has absolute rights of life and death over the defeated aggressors. The aggressor, one who initiates war, puts the individual or the community into a state of war, he argues, and so the defender has an absolute prerogative to use whatever force necessary to secure freedom and peace, accordingly, in victory, the victors may enslave or kill the aggressors (Moseley, 2009).

B) Criteria for Punishment:

Punishment is an important aspect or principle in the justice after war (*jus post bellum*) consideration. Orend (2008) gives three reasons why punishment is very important after a war has come to its end. Deterrence, proportional punishment, and disrespect are shown when punishments are committed. The purpose of deterrent is to punish for the aim of future restraint on negative behaviour, proper punishment satisfies the need for atonement and it is also rehabilitative process for the aggressor.

Failure to punish the aggressor degrades and disrespects the worth, status and suffering of the victim in question. This idea of punishment is a worthwhile action to consider in bringing a war to its end. The need to assume both collective and individual responsibility is engrained in this idea. For example, soldiers who may engage in a war will be cautious of their actions as war crime charges will not elude them.

C) Rights of the Defeated:

For Moseley (2009), victory has provided the winners with the means of exploiting the defeated nation and for claiming rights over its lands and people whether in the form of enslavement or in monopolistic mercantile contracts; sometimes an appeal to divine justice is made; at other times, the supremacy of one's nation, race, creed, or political order is lauded over the defeated. Economic exploitation is not the only means of subjugating the defeated: new political or religious frameworks can also be imposed sometimes as a means of "rehabilitating the defeated" or as a means to avoid the circumstances (political or economic) that may bring about further warfare.

The just war theorist is keen to remind warriors and politicians alike that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable and morally ordered and that victory should not provide a license for imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial interests should not dictate the form of the new peace. Similarly, imposing an alternative political or religious order is not likely to be conducive to peace.

D) Criteria in the Claim of Victory:

Moseley (2009) observes that victory in war should not provide the winners with a means of exploiting the defeated nation and for claiming rights over its lands and people whether in the form of enslavement or in monopolistic mercantile contracts. He sees this event occurring

sometimes as an appeal to divine justice, and in other occasions over the supremacy of one's nation, race, creed, or political order is lauded over the defeated. Thus, Claims of victory as a just peace requirement in the end or settlement of a war means that consideration must be made on the demand for reparations.

A defeated aggressor may just be asked to pay for the damage incurred by the war as justice demands of criminals that they pay for their crimes and this should be done (Moseley, 2009). Orend (2008) renders this idea in this light, "financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. A post-war tax on civilians is thus generally impermissible and there needs to be enough resources left so that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction." An important comment on compensatory claims which if not heeded to will pose future volatility is as Orend mentions, to beggar thy neighbour is to pick future fights.

This call by Orend should be heeded because any attempt to exploit the defeated enemy and aggressor of a victim group in economic terms will serve as a new contention that would make them ignore their original guilt and cause them to strive for a pound of flesh from the new aggressor, though formal victims. The reality of claims of victory to be misunderstood especially when it is excessively done is always there that is why proportionality is often required in most moral arguments.

E) Rehabilitation and re-education of Aggressor:

In the pursuit of a just peace, there should be an ethical exit strategy from war and this should be clearly thought out (Orend, 2008). After disarming and demobilizing combatant and disengaging their targets of warfare, and in order to arrive at a just war settlement, parties to a conflict, especially the aggressor should be made to comply with certain terms of exit from

warfare. And in their inability to comply with them, sanctions of varying degrees can be made against them.

Also, their fellow disputant may see this refusal as a ground to resume hostility. Orend sees the prosecution of a just war as not just necessary to rectify fundamental rights and freedom like right to life, but as an opportunity to rehabilitate the aggressor in the process. Victims of aggression will become better through this just war of liberation.

Peace education curricula are a major way of ensuring rehabilitation in the mental realm. As this can help in purging out certain violence and propaganda generating ideas in the minds of the political class, military personnel and some non-combatant civilians but who are active in influencing and formulating opinions in aggressor enclave.

2.2 Theory of Just War in Islam:

Most of the world's religions have a well thought out ethical system that have serviced social interactions and promoted human relations over the ages. Agha (2010) argues that morality, not only flows from religion, it also has its sole basis and justification in religion. It has remained for a long time and across various cultures, civilizations and geopolitical land spaces a major source of moral justification and ethical approval for human conducts.

Okereke (2012) opines that this ethical component of most religions is often derived from purported supernatural revelation or guidance. Simon (2001) cited in Okereke (2012) saw the intrinsic connection between religion and ethics when he avers that,

For many people, ethics is not only tied up with religion, but is completely settled by it. Such people do not need to think too much about ethics, because there is an authoritative code of instructions, a handbook of how to live (P. 103).

Similarly and in corroboration to Simon (2001), Agha (2010) avows that, morality and religion have been closely connected in the history of human race. Religion provides the conviction that what is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature. Thus, without religion there can be no effective morality, for its content and form are rooted in the supernatural. Agha's conclusion which this work finds agreeable on the inseparability of religion and morality as evident in his position that moral philosophy must go hand in hand or side by side with religion.

Religious ethics, therefore, is the systematic postulation of acceptable right and wrong, good or bad conduct and what one ought or ought not to do based on religious beliefs, precepts and rationale. These bodies of rules from religion have served and continually serve as an element of society's striving towards a better social order. It touches on individual (private) and group (public) acceptable behaviour since it impinges and shapes the moral judgment of people.

In this regard, Ojo (2003) acknowledges religious laws as embodiment of ethical norms. No wonder, religious ethics have not shied away from prescribing authoritatively the acceptable conduct for a harmonious and cordial social equilibrium. As such, discourse on the limits of war, conduct in war and the peaceful end of war as a human activity did not go beyond the scope or 'social-eye' of various world religions due to their ethical components.

Gopin (1997) from a comparative religious sense with special reference to the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) quips that, no major religion that is thousands of years old, with millions of adherents, has not had broad experience with ethics, politics, and the psychology of war, peace and interpersonal relation. The broad statement by Gopin is relevant to the Islamic world. The notion of just war is therefore an aspect of the foundational narrative of Islam with respect to war and peace. Jihad as the equivalent of Just War theory in Islam when

applied to violence closely parallels the Christian concepts of holy and just war though it can also be referred to a personal spiritual pursuit in the views of Romeijn-Stout (2010).

According to Peters (1979) cited in Reyschler (2010) a just war or just revolution discourse is also alive in the Muslim world. Modernist authors have argued that the doctrine of 'jihad' can also be considered as a theory of *bellum justum*. The Islamic sources of justification of war are gathered principally from the Qur'an, the Prophet's Sunnah (Hadith) and the interpretative works of Islamic jurists (*Ijma*). According to Al-Dawoody (2009), three words were used in the Quran to describe the act of war. They are *qital* (fighting, murder, killing and infanticide), *Jihad* (struggle, striving, and war) and *harb* (war) and with their various usages in the biography of the Prophet (*Sirah*), the Quran and Hadith of the Prophet.

2.2.1 Justice before War (*Jus Ad Bellum*) in Islam or Islamic Justification for War:

The hostilities that ensued between the Prophet and people of his clan and tribe in Yathrib particularly and Mecca generally, show that from its inception Islam has been faced with cultural and inter-tribal conflicts. As a result of his message and preaching among his people, the Prophet (pbuh) was forced to flee from Mecca to Abyssinia and finally to Medina. These among others are the bases for the discourse of Islamic justification of war or Islamic *Jus ad Bellum*. They are categorized under the following;

A) The Principle of Just Cause:

Just cause is well discussed in the Quran, Hadith and the various commentaries and critical interpretations by scholars of the Islamic law (Jurists). It is instructive to note that a combination of all these sources is what is referred to as Islamic law (Sharia). In Sura 6:151 it states, "Do not kill the soul sanctified by God, except for just cause". As Syed (2002) posits that the classical sources of Islamic legal theory maintain that all kinds of warfare are outlawed

except the jihad, which is an exceptional war waged by Muslims to defend the freedom of religious belief for all humanity, and constitute a deterrent against aggression, injustice, and corruption.

According to Joffe (2010) warfare for Islam is licit (Just cause) to protect the practice of Islam. Like Sura 6:151 and 25:68, maintains, “Do not kill the soul sanctified by God, except for just cause”. Myer (2007) sees the theory of war in Islam as meant to, advance God’s purpose on earth, and invariably they are defensive in character. For him this means that everywhere the message of God and Islam is or can be hindered from expansion, resisted or opposed by some obstruction, Islam is intrinsically entitled to defend its manifest destiny.

In this sense, a just cause is one that is engaged in to promote or preserve the things of God or his people. It is rendered in a sense to depict preservation of religious freedom. Peace in this regards is achieved when justice and faith in Allah is observed everywhere. Islam permits both defensive and offensive warfare. Though, offensive seem like aggression, but in Islam there are two grounds to engage in offensive warfare. They are for the sake of Allah (in the way of Allah) and for the sake of subjugating people under oppression of certain power (Ibrahim, 2014).

According to Sura 9:29, Al-Tauba (Repentance) or Baraat (immunity) Muslims were admonished to fight those who believe not in Allah, nor the last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and the Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the people of the Book, until they pay Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. Syed (2002) observes that the Quran should be reconciled with the fact that the same Holy book maintains that there should be no compulsion in religion.

Another area of just cause written in the Qur’an is the redress of acts of injustice and oppression. Myers (2007) gives a rationale for this when he notes that, “man is the slave to God,

and defying God is treason under Islamic law. Those who defy God should be removed from humanity like a cancerous growth”. In this sense, it becomes clear that jihad in its military dimension is between Muslims and non-Muslims and not actually between states. Since the Muslim community, *Umma*, is a people that have submitted and are obedient to the will of Allah, the only ground approved for a war with fellow Muslims is if their leaders become tyrannical, oppressive or disobedient to God and His rule.

Arguments have been made by some Islamic jurists that though wars are engaged based on the preservation of religious freedom i.e. for the purpose of protecting God’s people, in the case of death, heavenly reward will accrue to the warrior. Assurances are given too that material enhancement will be met.

B) The Principle of Right Intention:

In Islamic law, right intention in engaging in warfare implies that a people (Muslims) will not fight for the purpose of personal benefits rather for the aim of protecting Islam and not imposing it (Joffe, 2010). For Myers (2007) preservation of life is not the ultimate end or greatest good in Quranic warfare. Ending “tumult and oppression,” achieving the war aims of Islam through jihad is the desired end. This understanding is accountable for why dying in the cause of God brings direct link to heaven. And death is never feared.

Sachedina (1999) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) notes it is not unbelievers as such who are the objects of force, but unbelievers who demonstrate their hostility to Islam by, or for example, through their persecution of Muslims. This position directly reveals an intention in the declaration of war in Islam. This is the case as the predisposition evident in enmity, ill-will or unfriendly nature of unbelievers is a major reason or rationale for engaging in war in Islam and

not necessarily fighting unbelievers because they are not part of the Muslim community of believers (*Umma*).

It becomes clear at once that Muslims—people who have submitted and are obedient to God—are not prejudiced or antagonistic to unbelievers unjustly and whenever they fight them they do so to quell their aggression. Like Sura 2:256, 10:99, 16:93 and 18:29 would instruct that war and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated belief in religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart. This means that Muslims are merely reacting to such hostility or offensive action. No wonder, Al-Qaradawi (1999) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) concludes that, there is no justification for going into war against those, whether unbelievers or people of the Book, who are not hostile to Muslims.

This is against the view that Muslims prosecute war to convert, get virgins (sexual motive) or get payment of a poll tax (*Jizyah*) as the real *casus belli* (reason or circumstance for beginning a war). While these may result from their bellicose actions, it is not their intention. Rather, intention for war in Islam is to protect, defend, the religion of God and only non-Muslims in defense of any attempt to prevent them from preaching and worshiping God.

The defense of aggression is a just ground to fight in the way of Allah. The fact that Muslims are meant to stop their fight with their enemy when they (the enemy) stop their aggression, shows the intention of war in Islam. As Sura 2:191-192 reads, “And fight them wherever you find them and expel them from wherever they expelled you, and persecution is more grievous than killing, ...But if they cease then, indeed, God is Most Forgiving, Most Merciful”.

Although, some scholars have argued that this idea of stopping war when persecution or oppression ceases is not clear. The debate seems to be centered on either stopping when

aggression as cause of war is over or when non-Muslims submit to the sovereignty of Allah and convert to Islam or better still pays the compulsory poll tax of people under the Islamic state control. Al-Dawoody (2009) observes that this debate seem unresolved though the best ground for an end to a war is the mercy of God conditioned upon them seizing from their unbelief. This is stipulated for the people of the Book and pagans generally. Example of this can be found in the Quran according to Sura 8:61, “And if they incline to peace, then incline to it; and put your trust in God, it is He who is the All-Hearing, the All-Knowing”.

Another ground to go into war in Islam is to defend Muslim minority who are under persecution or oppression. Al-Qaradawi (1999) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) was in support of this rationale when he opines that the Islamic state should also go to war to rescue non-Muslim minorities if they require its help and if it is able to rescue them. This moral obligation to intervene in the affairs of others even non-Muslims who face oppression shows a dimension of the intent of war in Islam.

The Quran attests to the role played by the Prophet Mohammed in changing the intent and objective of war in Islam by raising the sphere of war to a Godly plane and purpose which is the proclamation and spread of Islam as against what use to exist that war is simply a policy of the state (Myers, 2007).

C) The Principle of Legitimate Authority:

Simon (2008) posits that war in Islam was conducted on behalf of the community's leader who is a representative of the Prophet and his legitimate successor. These leaders usually have overriding authority over the community. Al-Buti (2006) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) observes that the decision to initiate war must be taken by the legitimate authority. The Da'wah Institute of Nigeria (2009) maintains that war can only be declared by the head of an Islamic

state. It is this head of state that serves as the commander of the armed forces known as the Amin, Caliph or Sultan. In Shiite tradition of Islam, the Imam can also declare a war on behalf of the faithful. They insist that it is necessary for an Islamic leader to declare a war so as to ensure the state responds to its threat in a policy-driven, tactical and united manner.

Joffe (2010) while acknowledging that it is duty of the Caliph to declare a war observes that this is to preserve temporal society in consonance with Islamic principles. Without the presence of a just Muslim ruler, a just war cannot be declared by the Muslim state or community of believers. Though, Islam does not believe in the sovereignty of a nation, since Allah alone is the only sovereign in whom all authority vests, yet, these offices mentioned are considered to be leaders after the Prophet (pbuh) and other rightly guided Caliphs that are administering the people of God (*Ummah*).

D) The Principle of Last Resort:

The defensive stance of Islamic War is always emphasized. According to Myers (2007) in Islam, war is waged to establish supremacy of the Lord only when every other argument has failed to convince those who rejected His will and work against the very purpose of the creation of mankind.

Islam requires believers to invite non-believers to the fold of Islam by using persuasion and beautiful methods (Myers, 2007). In the context of a last resort, militant jihad (war) is a collective responsibility of all Muslims (*Ummah*) and is not restricted to soldiers only.

Islamic Scholars seem to be in consensus over the idea that Muslims can go to war if the message of Islam is not accepted by non-Muslims and above that when such message is prevented by them. When a peace treaty between the Islamic states is broken by non-Muslims, they are permitted to fight them. Al-Buti (1992) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) speaks of jihad's

nature as either peaceful missionary activity or military struggle. This change of strategy is based on the response from the non-Muslims.

2.2.2 Justice in the Conduct of Islamic War (*Jus in Bello*):

Jus in bello has to do with the Islamic defined limits or regulation of the conduct of war. These norms are derived from the rules set by the Quran and specific ways how the Prophet acted both makes a binding law among Muslims.

A) Non-Combatant Immunity or Target Discrimination:

The Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed are replete with admonishments against killing civilians (Wiktorowicz, 2005). On humanitarian ground, the Prophet was prohibitive of targeting some categories of persons in times of war. They are; women, children, the aged, the clergy and any hired man (worker). According to Al-Dawoody (2009) these categories are derived from the Prophet's *Hadith*. These became the scope for later jurists' debates and interpretation of who and under what circumstance will these group of persons enjoy these exemption or privileged right. The need to distinguish between legitimate targets or combatants and illegitimate targets or non-combatants was explored to better appreciate the enemy.

Women and children are generally not legitimate targets during war since they do not pose any threat to the Muslim army. Combat is only allowed against those who are waging war and those who are acting unjustly to suppress Islam or violate its holy places (Hayward, 2014). This is a general norm in Islamic warfare and Muslim jurists are unanimous on this fact. They tend to rank women and children in similar light of volatility. The age for children is well debated but a consensus is placed on less than fifteen (15) years of age or one that has not experienced puberty. This age of fifteen (15) is also the entering point for military service. Also,

people whose gender is not clear, in the sense of hermaphrodite are left unharmed for fear that they could be women (Al-Dawoody, 2009).

Women's exemption from target or their non-combatant immunity is as Al-Ghazali (1997) cited in A-Dawoody (2009) observe, they are not fit for fighting owing to their physical inability to engage in hostilities. Generally, the instruction to fight was against those that fight against them and women are not in such category. Thus they are not seen as enemies in the military sense of it. Another ground for their exemption is the fact that they can be used as exchange for Muslim prisoners of war in the sense of ransom after they have been enslaved for that purpose.

Some instances where women and children can be made legitimate targets were covered by Islamic jurisprudence. These grounds include when they partake in the actual fighting, pose a real treat to Muslim combatants by compromising their security or kill a Muslim army (Al-Shirazi (1995) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). When a wealthy woman utilizes her wealth in the prosecution of a war, she becomes a legitimate target at that level. If a queen or a child is the king of the enemy combatant, they become qualified for such target especially when they come to the battlefield with their identity.

Clergies who focus on worship of their God and do not partake in any form of hostilities are not targets during war. Islam does not approve of harm coming to them due to the Prophet's command to an army leader. This command was later reiterated by Abu Bakr (Malik (Al-Dawoody (2009)). The basic idea for this is because like women and children, clergies do act as combatants during war. But they can lose this status if they support the army of the enemy. Most jurists agree with this non-combatant immunity of the clergy safe for a few who demand that

they be made to pay the compulsory poll tax or they must become Muslims (Al-Dawoody, 2009).

The aged are part of the groups that enjoy non-combatant immunity in the Islamic doctrine of war regulation. Discrimination for Almaf (2004) in Islam has to do with civilian non-combatants, like women, slaves, the environment, religious building and the elderly should not be targeted like Sura 2:190 directs. The age for this exemption is about fifty or fifty one (51) and such a person must have or possess such old looks. But like Al-Shawkani (1973) in Al-Dawoody (2009) observes, they can lose this immunity when an aged person partakes in the planning and strategizing of a war or going to the battle ground.

Also, the sick, blind, incapacitated and people suffering from mental illness are excluded from harm in Islamic conception of war regulation. According to Al-Dawoody (2009) it was the Islamic jurists that gave this criterion from their understanding of immunity because there was no such mention of this group in neither the Quran nor the *Hadith* of the Prophet. Although, Abu Bakr, the Caliph was reported to have commanded his soldiers not to target the sick and blind or the incapacitated and the insane as Al-Kasani (1982) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) would add.

Farmers, craftsmen and traders are partakers of the Islamic non-combatant immunity provided they are hired persons, visitor or under paid service in the area. These persons are free from being legitimate targets provided they focus on their primary duty and not involve themselves in any stage of the war. The Prophet in the *Hadith* equates this group with women and children. Muslim jurists used the idea of hirer to include farmers, craftsman and traders in this immunity provided they don't in any way involve in the war which will rob them of this covering. Muslims are cautioned to fight only those that fight them and this must be in accordance with the way of Allah. This means in a permissible way to avoid God's punishment

in the other life since as Johnson (1999) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009) puts it, there is no justification of warfare directed intentionally against noncombatants.

Malik (1992) gives a comprehensive list of people that restraint should be made towards in accordance to the Islamic ethics of war. These people for him are given such exemption by the holy Prophet and the early Caliphs of Islam. They are women, minors, servants and slaves, the blind, monks, the hermits, the old, the physically deformed, and the insane or mentally deficient. Though, these categories of persons are free generally from war prosecution and are avoided as legitimate targets of war, they can be killed on some situations too. Despite these permissive grounds, Malik is still convinced of the idea that humanitarianism lies at the very heart of the Islamic approach to war (P. 51).

B) Caution against Human Shield:

Human shields are also given some juristic consideration in Islam. This is seen in the context of vulnerable people or Muslims captives who are in the fortress of the enemy been given consideration for not attacking such place. Caution was given to carefully launch an attack against such enemy in this circumstance or if such care cannot be guaranteed, attack should not be made at all. Women, children and the aged are seen as the main reason for observing human shield immunity. Also, when Muslims are used in this sense, restraint is called. Consideration was also given for individuals who are under a country that has a valid peace treaty with the Islamic state (Al-Nawawi (2000) in Al-Dawoody (2009). Although, on grounds of military necessity it is usually allowed to have such collateral damages instead of the Muslim army to be defeated especially when the human shields are not many in the enemy's confines.

C) Prohibition of Night Attack:

The need to avoid night attacks in order that non-combatants will not suffer casualty was properly outlined in Islamic law of war. The lives of enemy and friends alike were properly considered in Islam. The Prophet was never in support of attacking any enemy at night. Reasons behind this rule are stipulated as; to avoid surprise in the darkness of the night and the fact that the enemy may be asleep (Lane (1968) cited in A-Dawoody (2009)). This was a norm in the life time of the Prophet. People were not attacked without giving them a third option of accepting Islam or get terms for a peace treaty with the Muslims.

Both classical and modern jurists in the understanding of this rule gave some clarifications why it is not permissible to attack at night. They see it as not favouring their intention of avoiding the casualty of women, children and other non-combatants who are not to be made targets in war. Also, the possibility of Muslims killing themselves in the dark as a result of the enemy's ambush was seen as a reason for the Prophets disapproval of this act by Al-Shafi'I (1973) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009). Some jurists have argued that the death of women and children among other vulnerable people that enjoy Islamic immunity may be allowed on the grounds of collateral damage. The presence of Muslim prisoners of war was also equated with the life of women and children as this imposes a sort of restraint on their part from attacking an enemy at night.

D) Caution against Resort to Mutilation:

Muslims are commanded not to betray or mutilate during war. A number of voices are lent to this issue. The prophet, his successor, classical and modern jurists all made comment on the need to avoid mutilation of the enemy's body. Although, on one occasion the Prophet swore to engage in the act as a reciprocal action when his people suffered such from an enemy, yet he condemned the act generally. According to Saqr (1990) Abu Bakr was quoted to have cautioned

one of his governors not to mutilate in war as it is a sin and a disgusting act (Al-Dawoody, 2009). Animals are also not meant to be killed in a way suggestive of mutilation. In fact, the Prophet's *Hadith* has it that, God curses the one who mutilates animals and anyone who kills birds, or insects among others will give an account of them in the Day of Judgment.

Some grounds for engaging in mutilation were given by jurists. The first is that the Muslim army can resort to the act against an enemy that first used it on the Muslims. A second point by some jurists is if mutilating the bodies of the enemy will help in giving them military advantage that will lead the enemy to capitulate easily. In addition to this, Muslims are not permitted to accept any form of material return from enemies over the return of dead bodies or prisoners of war.

E) Restriction on the Use of Weapons:

Weapons that kill indiscriminately or cause a certain type of death on its victims are carefully considered in Islamic law of war. The use of poisonous arrow, fire or oil tipped arrows was clearly not approved in Islamic warfare due to the fact that Muslims may in turn be treated with similar measure (Al-Shaybani (1975) in Al-Dawoody (2009)). Weapons that can burn to death and cause uncontrollable loss is not allowed in Islamic law. The avoidance of harming or killing non-combatants and the destruction of the enemy's property were the reasons behind this rule according to some jurists.

Various schools of jurisprudence have their opinions on this matter. For example the use of fire in warfare is seen by some as a punishment that mortal men are not qualified to use. This is because fire is what man's creator, God will use to punish in the last day (Al-Bukhari (1987) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). For this reason the burning of people for the purpose of overcoming them in a battle is forbidden (Hashmi, (2004) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). Flooding

the enemy's fortifications is permitted on the grounds of necessity of war to incapacitate them. This view is not favoured by most Jurists because they see the same logic of non-combatant immunity as been threatened in this instance. Since women, children and other vulnerable persons will have their lives under real threat.

Polluting a water source or poisoning it is not permissible in Islamic warfare. So it is with the cutting of a supply out rightly is not approved as a measure against the enemy. Although, some jurists are not in agreement with this rule, as they permit the use of this extra measures on the grounds that the aim is to compel the enemy to give up and surrender and not by any means to kill them in the process (Al-Shaybani (1975) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). This is the purpose of it, if at all it is permitted to allow them (the enemies) come out of their fortifications and not to bring about their large scale death (Al-Hindi (1993) in Al-Dawoody (2009)). For example, an injunction by the Quran in Sura 16:126 has it that, "...if ye do catch them out, catch them out no worse than they catch you out". This gave rise to an understanding that Muslims can use any weapon provided their enemies have such in their arsenal in the spirit of reciprocity.

F) Regulation against Property Destruction:

The Islamic law does not permit Muslims to destroy the property of their enemy. In Sura 59:5 Muslims were clearly told, "Whether ye cut down [O ye Muslim!] The tender Palm-trees, or ye left them standing on their roots, it was by leave of Allah, and that He might cover with shame the rebellious transgresses". Scholars are in two camps on this issue. One group holds the command of the Prophet that to do harm to enemy's property as a military necessity is allowed and the other group which restrains Muslims from doing any harm to the enemy's property based on Abu Bakr's injunction. Abu Bakr, the first Caliph and a close companion of the Prophet, did not approve of such harm on enemy property. This variance in the stand of the Prophet has

brought about uncertainty and lack of consensus in the rule. Since as Hazm concludes, it is optional to follow this prohibition and in his own thought this act is both permitted and prohibited at the same time.

As a result of the moral logjam, the debate was rendered in a new form by modern jurists of Islam. This time, it no longer became if it is permissible or not to cause harm to the property of the enemy but, on destruction of animate or inanimate property of the enemy. This new face of the subject in ethico-legal sense was easier for jurists to debate the matter better. They generally agree that harm can be brought on the lifeless property of the enemy but such should not be done to the animate property of the enemy which feels pains since animals and other living creatures or things are the creatures of God. The grounds given to harm such animate creatures are if they are used in the prosecution of the war, things like camels, horses, bees et cetera. Another ground is for military necessity. The argument is that when animals are used in a war, they become weapons in their function and as such are legitimate targets for destruction.

The plants or crops of the enemy should be spared except on grounds that they will be consumed by the Muslim army as food. Trees can be cut down if they pose as obstruction to the Muslim army operation. And if their property is destroyed by the enemy, they should reciprocate in like manner. Religious sites from this rule are not meant to be attacked or destroyed but some Muslim jurists approve of the destruction of books and other materials that do not express believe in Allah (Al-Shafi'i (1973) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009). This is in acknowledgment that religious sites are a major cultural edifice that should enjoy protection in times of armed conflict.

G) Quarter and Safe Conduct:

In Islamic international relations conception, contract for the protection for persons and property of enemy belligerents or any other citizen of a state are provided (Fatani (1998) cited in

Al-Dawoody (2009)). *Aman* is used to describe this idea. This idea carries in it two related components. They are Quarter and Safe conduct. Quarter is a contract of protection that is granted an enemy during the time of war which covers persons and property of an enemy fighter, a small group of fighters, people in a particular defensive system (fortification) or an entire enemy army or its city. The classical Islamic jurists see this contract as a form of demand often made by enemies of the Muslim state when they give up their arms and embrace other means of resolving their conflict.

Al-Dawoody (2009) explains the concept of “safe conduct” as a contract of protection granted to any non-Muslim citizen of a country that is technically in a state of war with the Islamic state, though not necessarily in the process of undertaking hostile action. Al-Dawoody maintains that it is a particular type of protection given to any individual who desires to enter the Islamic state for purposes of business, education, tourism or any other aim other than for conducting military acts such as espionage in the Islamic state. This concept is somehow likened to the modern day use of Passport or Visa as the required document to enter a foreign land. This temporary official protection exempts the holder from tax liability.

The word *Aman* is used for both category and the person or people who enjoy either of these privileges are referred to as *Musta'min*. It is worth observing that people in either of these categories are not from a Muslims territory (*dar al-Islam*) but are accommodated in the Islamic state on a temporary basis for specific purposes. It is this category of non-combatant with such immunity (*Baraat*) that the Quran seem to be talking about in Sura 9:6, “If one amongst the Pagans ask thee for asylum, grant it to him, so that he may hear the word of Allah; and then escort him to where he can be secure”. This *aman* seem to work like a general amnesty as Al-Dawoody (2009) observes. Since its holder are not made legitimate targets in times of hostility.

Normally, it is the duty of the Islamic head of state or his representative to offer this immunity to a city or region but for smaller groups or persons, individual Muslims can grant it. Some jurists agree that women can grant this pardon or immunity to individual but subject to the approval of the head of state (Al-Shawkani (19840) in A-Dawoody (2009). In other instances, children, slaves, prisoners of war or non-Muslims can in specific conditions issue the immunity. While non-Muslims and prisoners of war can through what seem like false pretence lay claim to *aman* and in that circumstance be granted the privilege. Scholars seem to take various positions on the validity and permissibility of any of these persons granting such temporary immunity to others or themselves.

This immunity from legitimate target from war is enjoyed for about a year. When the *Musta'min* want to stay beyond this time, he or she will when granted start paying the poll tax (*jizyah*) like every other person who are under the dominance or protection (*Dhimmis*) of the Islamic state. The Islamic state allows them to enjoy justice in their relationship with other *Musta'min*, *Dhimmis* and Muslims generally. Considerations were also made on the nature of crime or type of punishment that can be melted against *Musta'min*. According to Al-Shaybani (1975) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009), jurists make distinction between crimes committed against the rights of God and crime against the rights of men. Crimes against God are not punished by the Islamic state while crimes against man are punished by the Islamic state.

H) Permissible conditions in the handling of Prisoners of War (POW):

Several conditions are stipulated on the handling of prisoners of war. Islamic law is not ignorant of the conduct of warfare with respect to prisoners of war. Jurists generally define the adult male as the legitimate enemy combatant that can be made a prisoner of war. It excludes women and children who should simply be used as exchange or enslaved to get Muslims

prisoners back (Al-Shafi'i (1973) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). Sura 47:4 has it that, therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers [in fight], smite at their necks; at length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly [on them]: thereafter [is the time for] either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its burdens.

The Quran was explicit to avow that enemy can be used for ransom or allowed to go conditionally or otherwise. But nothing in this sacred text or Holy Scripture portrays the enemy combatant as women or children, since Islamic warfare does not allow them to be legitimate targets except on special conditions. Malik (1992) offers a detailed analysis of the above scripture. In his exegesis, he observes that Muslims are directed not to make subjugation of the enemy their priority as against taking of prisoners of war. Those prisoners of war can only be taken only when they have been subdued and finally they should be treated humanely with generosity (free return) and ransom (return on payment of stipulated amount) as the available options open to the Muslim fighter.

Al-Dawoody (2009) observes a major controversy in the activities of the Prophet with regards to his dealings with prisoner of war. The idea or fact that he initially executed, released, exchanged and later enslaved prisoners of wars made it unclear the precise action of Muslims in this condition. Like the Quran observes in Sura 9:5, "...then fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem [of war]". With these ideas in mind, various Islamic schools of law may present and emphasis one or a couple of these options available to them from the Prophet's action. For example, the Hanafi jurists advocate that the Islamic head of state has the prerogative to either kill or enslave the prisoners of war in line with the interest of the Muslims (Al-Shaybani (1975) in Al-Dawoody (2009)).

It is vital to note that apart from these four options available to Muslims in their treatment of the prisoners of war, the Maliki's school of law added a fifth category. For them, the Islamic state can permit prisoners of war to live and stay in the domain provided they pay the poll tax (*Jizyah*) in return for pardon (Al-Qarafi (1994) cited in Al-Dawoody (2009)). This stand of the Maliki school of Jurists is what really makes them different from the other three classical legal schools in Islam because they maintained that without payment of *Jizyah* prisoners of war cannot be released.

2.3 Overview of Terrorism:

In this section of the review, we looked into the nature of terrorism and conclude by understanding some of its tactics, patterns and trends in contemporary times.

2.3.1 Nature of Terrorism:

Intellectual challenges are encountered by scholars of the human and social human sciences whenever attempts are made at defining terrorism. Similarly, there is often a lack of consensus that manifests when an all-embracing resolution fails to emerge from the efforts of scholars. Despite these limitations, terrorism is a modern-day scourge alongside other debilitating challenges like climate change, human rights violation, global poverty and arms proliferation.

Combe and Slann (2007) agree to this reality as they affirm that there is still a lack of consensus for what precisely terrorism is, although there is general agreement on certain primary features, such as the targeting of civilian noncombatants, the intent to create a mood of fear and intimidation in a population, the use of violence, and the advocacy of a political or social cause. This nature of terrorism was corroborated and elucidated by Karacasulu (2005) when he avers

that terrorism is an act of violence committed against innocent persons or non-combatant (sic) that are intended to achieve political end through fear and intimidation (p. 8).

Okoro (2010) briefly observes that, “terrorism is an unpredictable use of violence against individuals, groups, community or nation to attain the goal of the perpetrator” (p. 552). Boylan (n.d.) corroborated this idea when he avers that, “the use of indiscriminate violence against civilian targets is not only central to the strategy but is also their defining characteristics” (P. 3). The fact that as a strategy, terrorism seeks to utilize violence in the pursuit of their aim is one major aspect of the taxonomy of the terrorist act in human society.

Scholars have generally acknowledged it as one of the violent crimes in human society that directly impinges on a state’s sovereignty. Thus, Lippman (2010) is of the opinion that terrorism stands among other crimes against the state such as treason, espionage, sedition and sabotage. As a violent crime, the notion of terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon relies on its capacity to induce fear and intimidation in non-combatants and irrespective of its tactics, motivations or justifications, aims to seek redress for particular grievances or influence certain government policy.

Terrorism is a violent crime. This is because the criminality of the terrorist act is not in contention since the demands of “*Mens Rea*” and “*Actus Reus*” are adequately met. Okonkwo (1980) agrees to the presence of these components but he further elaborates on them by noting that the concepts are of Latin origin. For him “*mens rea*” is the intention to commit a crime, in other words, the state of mind, the guilty mind, or the criminal intention that accompanies a criminal act. While “*actus reus*” on the other hand means, the guilty act which is a necessary first feature of every crime in violation of criminal law.

In this vein, one can argue that no terrorist can claim to accidental action, opportunistic or situational crime, rather, it is a well thought out action. Thus, it stands as a purely human act and not an act of man. Morally, therefore, in terms of moral turpitude, terrorism is both a *Mala in se* and *Mala prohibita* crime. Rush (2002) gave explication to these ethical terms. He opines that it is a *Mala in se* crime because it is an act that is bad, immoral or wrong in itself, and at the same time a *Mala prohibita* because it is a crime that is sanctioned as illegal by most jurisprudence in the world.

The dramatic nature of the terrorist act is an aspect that did not fail to capture the critical eyes of several scholars. The idea that the direct victims of a terrorist violence are not their actual target rather they are used dramatically to reach their real targets who are often the government. They are reached through their citizens whose pains and ordeals are direct messages to the government in question. Stuckrad (2006), a proponent of this school of thought rightly contends that, the actual intended objects of terrorism are less the persons directly affected, or their pain, than those in whom the pain or fear of terror inspires its own terror; this result is ulterior intent in the minds of the terrorists (P. 1861).

Similarly, Combs and Slann (2007) were unequivocal when asserting that terrorism in this regard is a crime of theater, as its effectiveness requires the communication of actions and threats to their audience as quickly and dramatically as possible. This they do because, they, (terrorists) are relatively very small population of society and the number of dead and injured persons as a result of their actions are usually insignificant. So, the utilization of mass media is a major boost to terrorist activities, as it covers a vast audience.

A peculiarity can be drawn from terrorism among other violent crimes in society. This was the view of Goldstein (2007) when he decisively highlights a distinction between terrorism

and other violent crimes by portraying terrorists as often well trained and state-supported. He observes that the terrorist either male or female has a specific goal in mind, often more symbolic than opportunistic. In contradistinction, he notes that, it is a fair statement that the “ordinary” criminal is one who seeks opportunistic targets, has little backing, is selfish, lacks discipline and may be deterred relatively easily.

In his submission, Goldstein concludes that terrorist unlike other normal violent criminals have a higher propensity for violence and destruction of human and material resources. He notes that they can even choose to die if need be over the cause they pursue. In agreement to Goldstein’s (2007) position, White (2006) reiterates the deep commitment terrorists’ exhibit when he opines that unlike other violent criminals who take cover after their act of violence, terrorists in their case would seek publicity through media acknowledgements and claim to their actions. White includes the fact that terrorists often strive to cover a wider geography in their operations.

2.3.2 Tactics, Patterns and Trends of Terrorism:

Scholars with a good sense of history and social evolution have not shied away from the various terrorist events all over the world. In this work, tactics speaks of the mode of attack and strategy of operation of terrorists, while patterns of terrorism imply the ways and the structures that are exhibited or utilized during acts of terrorism in global society. These patterns constitute a well planned task, mode of approach and execution that can be known through empirical observation because of their recurrent patterns. They are x-rayed here below.

A) Guerilla Warfare (Unconventional Warfare):

According to Comb and Slann (2007) at its basic level, guerrilla is a civilian who attacks a regular army. Guerilla warfare also known as unconventional warfare has a long history in human society. It has been used to prosecute wars irrespective of the contentions and factors at play in the conflict. Though, the origin of this tactic can be traced to the activities of Fabius Maximus when he engaged Hannibal's forces during the second Punic War (218-201 BC), other wars have reflected this tactics as belligerents have given great patronage to this tactic of warfare. The term guerrilla means "little war" evolved from Spanish resistance to the invasions of Napoleon in 1808. Now, struggles by revolutionary movements, insurgent and terrorist groups utilize the guerrilla tactics.

Similarly, Comb and Slann (2007:113) observes that guerrilla warfare is, essentially, an insurrectionary protest, implemented by means of selective violence. To the extent that the violence remains "selective" and the choice of targets military rather than civilian, they argue, it is possible to distinguish between guerrilla warfare and terrorism. This tactics of warfare is based on ambush, deception, sabotage, and espionage to undermine an authority through long, but relatively low-intensity confrontation. Guerrilla warfare is the armed engagement by a smaller group of combatants with an objective that its mobility will help to defeat a larger (less mobile) army.

Its members are an irregular army fighting a stronger, regular (army or armed force) group by sabotage, harassment and hit-and-run strategy. Merari cited in Chaliand and Blin (2007) made it clear that guerrillas try to compensate for their inferiority in manpower, arms, and equipment by adopting a very flexible style of warfare, based on hit-and-run operations. To achieve this, guerrillas utilize the terrain to their advantage, blend into the population, or sometimes, launch their attacks from neighbouring countries.

In our highly globalizing world, it would seem that guerrilla warfare has become a seeming universal banner of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism. The most prominent practitioner of

this type of warfare is the Muslim groups of Al-Qaeda and of recent the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This group has attracted religious fanatics from a number of countries, people who seemingly have without reflection carried out vicious terrorist attacks, of which the most notable is the attack carried on the United States of America on September 11 of 2001. This goes to show that guerrilla warfare in modern time is conceived of as an elaborate and integrated process with a doctrine, organization, skills and propaganda capacities.

This tactic gives advantage of flexibility, since it is not static in its approach. Also, the tactic is characterized by a clear sense of political objective for the sole aim of looting. Thus, guerrilla warfare has assumed an important place throughout history. Outside being a strategy or weapon of protest employed to rectify real or imagined wrong done to a people, it has more actively been used as an aggressive tool against people in authority. It is worth noting that a major motivation for this tactic is its usefulness in demoralizing an enemy, while raising the morale of the guerrilla fighters. By this, it becomes clear that this tactic is very bold and confrontational.

B) Suicide Bombing:

Suicide, self-destruction, free-death, self-immolation, human bomb, suicide terrorism, homicidal self sacrifice or by whatever name the phenomenon goes, has had a long history dating back to distant time past. The dysfunctional act has featured prominently in recent times as one of the social vices of human society. Anyam, (2011) construes of suicidal behaviour as not just the act being performed but the intention as well. Gere (2007) explains on these two components by asserting that homicidal self-sacrifice (suicide) is a situation when a human being intentionally kills himself in an attempt or process of killing other human beings.

The notion of suicide-homicide perfectly describes the nature of the act which is to kill oneself, while bringing death to adversaries. This goal is pursued with an intention to cause a

favourable change in the relationship among material and moral forces within a conflict. In Gere's view the use of suicide-homicide by Muslims is best understood as an altruistic act carried out in the service of a cause that is infinitely more important than an individual human life. It is as such transforming oneself into a weapon for destructive purposes. One can conveniently say it is the 'weaponization' of humans in order to kill other human beings.

Comb and Slann (2007) identify key components of suicide terrorists bombings as including the use of suicide belts and explosive devices, access to a crowded location be it in a vehicle, market place, restaurant, or any other place with a sizeable human population. This is done to maximize the effects of the blast and ensure loss of lives in the enclosed area or location. Despite the success of its perpetrators, this act which connotes the killing or murder of oneself is condemned by both religion and law from where it gains its social meaning.

Stuckrad (2006) maintains that the suggestion of a moral value in the discourse of suicide spawns from religion, philosophy and law. As an intentional or human act, killing of one's self (suicide) is an indication of lack of faith in the Supreme Being and creator of man. It is as such a mortal sin which calls to question man's finitude and creative abilities. Stuckrad (2006) has it that this is the stand of Pope Nicholas I, in his papal encyclical. In Islam, suicide is rejected in the Prophet's Hadith. Sura 4:29 has it that, "... Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful".

The possibility of losing entrance to heaven is a major caution for people who contemplate suicide. Despite these religious scriptural provisions, suicide bombers are given a pride of place in Islamic communities and societies. Though a relatively recent phenomenon, Stuckrad (2006) asserts that the act often receives legitimacy from spiritual authorities making it a virtuous act and an act of martyrdom. It, as such transforms this mortal sin to a thing of pride, and a duty in the

name of God. The fact that humans can engage in suicide terrorism is an attestation that people are willing to die for their belief.

Combe and Slann (2007) do not see suicides in the name of religion as anything new, but the rapidly growing number of willing suicide bombers committing terrorism for their faith, they acknowledge as unique. This stand by Comb and Slann may go further to confirm the notion that religious belief is the prime motivator and a key replacement of all ideologies in the 21st century. The use of bombs in suicide terrorism is a tactic practised by the world's deadliest terrorist organizations. For example, Islamic militants such as Hamas, *Hizballah*, *Al-Aqsa* Martyr Brigade, Al-Qaeda which claimed the 9/11 terror attack on the US and *Boko Haram* which has continually guaranteed the continuous death of Nigerians in the Northern states are groups that regularly sponsor and commit terrorist acts through suicide bombing tactics.

A thing that runs through most of the aforementioned terrorist organizations is the fact that they are inspired by religious doctrines. The concept of martyrdom is highly implicated in this matter. Martyrdom which speaks of the death of a person as a result of their religious belief is often claimed to have been achieved. That martyrdom is a quick channel to paradise, is a major motivating factor for Muslim jihadists. They also do not perceive this act as an end in itself, rather, as a vital but temporary tactic to achieve (other implicit objectives of) their aim.

C) Armed Assault:

Armed assault is a category of threats that include a wide range of weapons and tactics traditionally associated with terrorist activities. It encompasses car bombing, kidnapping, sabotage, and assassination (Carafano, 2008). As a tactic that is trending in terrorism, Carafano observes that the higher levels of violence in the terrorist act are as a result of the instruments of armed assault.

These instruments provide the violent criminal (terrorist) an easy way to inflict fear and bodily harm on victims. For example, assassination is a well favoured tactic that utilizes assault.

The unlawful capturing and carrying away of people to an unknown destination against their will and in gross violation of their freedom of movement, is a major tactic employed by terrorists. According to Ukandu (2011), Ugwu disclosed that, people often have to be terrorized first of all before they succumb to a kidnapping encounter. With Ugwu's view it is clear that a synergy exists between kidnapping and terrorism since it takes a measure of the latter to compel a person to fall victim to the former.

As a tactic of assault, kidnapping is well utilized by perpetrators of terrorist violence across the globe. On the spate of kidnapping at the global arena for the year 2014, Cordesman (2015) provides statistics to show that terrorism is a violent act that is intrinsically tied to kidnapping as a tactics. He observes that, more than 9,400 people were kidnapped or taken hostage and more than 60% of all terrorist attacks took place in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Nigeria.

D) Social Class Insensitivity:

It is common knowledge that crimes are generally perpetrated by people of lower socio-economic status in society. Siegel (2005) is of the opinion that the incentive to commit certain crimes is highest among people in the lower rungs of the social structure. Although, Ganes, Kaune and Miller (2001) were insistent that traditional official crime statistics are readily available to corroborate this claim, yet, in contemporary times, a serious drift seems to be noticed in the violent crime of terrorism especially when religion features conspicuously as the ideological motivation and justification for such acts.

The financial involvement, level of organization and mode of execution of such acts depict the terrorist as people in lower classes of society. Siegel (2004) argues that well to do individuals may populate the ranks of financiers and planners of terrorism, sometimes their foot soldiers may fit perfectly or closely to the traditional expectation. And as such, when investigations are ongoing and arrests made, the people caught may as well be the “poor”. It is likely that police may devote more time and other material resources in the arrest and prosecution of the relatively poor than middle and upper class individuals.

The position of Siegel is agreeable for two reasons. First, people at the upper class are not immune from ideological and criminal motivation. Their social placement only gives them an opportunity to manipulate the system and provide safe havens for their members. That even in situations when such members are apprehended, the law enforcement institutions and agents may find it difficult to prosecute them. Secondly, success in social movements generally and criminal networks in particular (to which terrorists belong) depend so much on division of labour and commitment to one’s duty post. So, different sets of people discharge their duties and at whatever line of operation that they are exposed, others take cover and try to cover all trials. Thus, they display a high level of secrecy.

E) Use of Sophisticated Small Arms and Light Weapons:

Amnesty International and Oxfam International (2003) have disclosed that more than one thousand, one hundred and thirty five (1, 135) companies, in more than ninety eight (98) countries worldwide are involved in some aspects of production of small arms, ammunition and their components. For them, at least 60 of them are involved in legal export of small arms. Ewa (2006) confirms these activities but added that in recent times that this figure has been

increasing. One may go as well to add that the number of countries producing small arms may have almost doubled.

Ewa (2006) similarly argues that majority of these small arms producing companies are located in and owned by European countries. The huge small arms production is one of the factors feeding the uncontrolled grey market in small arms and their transfers into irresponsible recipients across the world. Reinhide (2005) pinpoints the financial difficulty faced by most of these countries in the 1990s as a result of the downsizing of both military forces and equipment which culminates at reductions in production and changes in ownership of such organizations.

Naagbanton and Ogale-Nchia (n. d.) identify these reasons as responsible and the propelling factors that led countries like Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic to have gained the reputation of being ruthless traders selling arms to anyone who is able to buy. The various regions of Nigeria are awash with dangerous Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Yet, their use in the Northern especially in the North Eastern geo-political zone is gory and progressively brutish.

This view of Naagbanton and Ogale-Nchia is a little inconclusive and misleading. Their argument that arms are sold and bought is inadequate because beyond the procurement of these weapons, there still exist other means by which people lay hold or gain possession of them. Thus, it becomes logical to argue that both international and local sales of arms alongside, pilfering from the armories of military and other organizations that use guns, rental of weapons from designated personnel's and local manufacturing of some weapons have all contributed in giving a boost to the fear and intimidation caused by terrorists in contemporary times.

The spate of frequency and the traumatic rate of occurrence of terrorism is an attestation to the availability of arms for human and material destruction. The lethality of terroristic violence is

an attestation to the use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in its execution. Vendley and Ali (n. d.) moved the discourse to its ethical plane. They maintain that guns in particular have a functional lifetime of many decades and that small arms change the dynamics of a conflict instantly. This is because they are lethal; they are meant to kill. The volatility of these weapons were also captured by them as they acknowledge that, they can even transform a simple argument into a tragedy, and be used against civilians seeking to protect themselves.

Vendley and Ali (n.d.) disclosed a fact on the amoral nature of SALW in themselves that violence does not necessarily begin with a weapon, but it increases dramatically when weapons are present, particularly in already volatile environments rife with poverty, mistrust or injustice. The propagation of war through terrorism strategy and tactics is characterized by the preponderance of lethal violence.

2.4 Theories of Terrorism Causation:

Scholars in the human and social sciences have come up with various postulations on the perceived causes of terrorism as a political violence in human society. We shall turn to some of these theories that have been propounded by scholars in order to understand the unique act of war and violent crime of terrorism as a scourge in human affairs.

2.4.1 Psychological Perspective:

The traditional view on the psychological approach on terrorism, as it is with crime generally is the distinction between psychobiological and psychoanalytical theories. Psychobiology focuses on the middle ground between biological and psychological traits. Schmallegger (1997) portrays the emphasis of psychobiology as the role of chromosomes in the determination of criminal behaviour. In this vein, he put forward the solution to such crime in the modification of body chemistry for a more desirable behavioural change and adjustment. On the

other hand, psychoanalysis was originated by Sigmund Freud who posits that humans possess inherent drives and urge that lead to criminal tendencies in them. Haskell and Yablonsky (1970) cited in Igbo (2007) were unequivocal on their stand that criminal behaviour is a result of inner conflict, emotional problems, unconscious feeling of insecurity, inadequacy and inferiority. This urge is a major motivating drive for a violent crime as terrorism.

For the above reasons and more, Ozdamar (2008) sees terrorists as abnormal people who need help due to their psycho-pathological challenges. This mental illness which the psychological perspective utilizes to depict terrorists is the crux of psychological approaches to terrorism. Their focus or concern is on terrorist's profile or personalities, beliefs, motivations and careers as terrorists. On the contemporary stance, Ozdamar went ahead to observe that psychological approaches categorize terrorists as fanatics. It sees the reward pursued by terrorist as ideological and political as against financial in the economic sense.

Wikinson and Steward (1987) cited in Ozdamar (2008) discloses that fanatics are of two types. One is the religious and the other is the single-styled fanatics. While the religious fanatics is interested in the entire polity with a demand to involve religious ideas, beliefs, practices and ethics in the running of a government, the single-styled fanatics on the other hand are simply focused on specific issues which torches on a human or social problem with policy relevance like abortion, gay right movement, gender-based advocacy, animal right and the like. Summarily, this contemporary psychological perspective sees terrorism as not a pathological disorder that requires profiling, rather, it suggests that the terrorist mindset is obsessed with a peculiar perspective about the world. This obsession can no doubt prompt them to violent acts when they are so influenced in a powerful way by it.

2.4.2 Rational Choice Theory of Terrorism:

Swatos (1998) acknowledge Adam Smith as the father of the modern theory on utilitarian individualism or rational choice theory as contained in his 1776 classical publication entitled “On the wealth of the Nations”. In similar manner, the rational choice theory of terrorism emerged from economics and applied mathematics especially the game theory. This theory applies to instances in which individuals or groups can gain or benefit only at the expense or loss of rivals, called zero sum game. This theory stipulates that, “terrorist acts usually emanate from rational, calculated, conscious decisions... these decisions represent an optimal strategy to fulfill the sociopolitical goals of these perpetrators.”

According to Ozdamar (2008), this theory of rational choice, terrorism might not represent pathological or illogical behaviour but, could represent the best means to fulfill personal needs in some circumstances. Members of terrorist organizations seem rational and even educated. In fact, terrorists and terrorist organizations are rational to the extent to which they undertake actions that run in line with their goals and give consideration to who and by when they are attacked.

Also, terrorists are rational to and make their decisions in strategic interactions with actors. Violence is understood to be intentional for the terrorist and their organization. It depicts the fact that terrorists are not lunatics who violate for the mere purpose of violation. Thus, the act is a deliberate action aimed at changing government policies (Ozdamar, 2008).

The extent to which terrorists satisfy their strong desire to make gains through this strategy is the concern of rational-choice terrorism. Berrebi (2009) gives an elaborate scope of sources of satisfaction for terrorists and terrorist organizations. For him, terrorists engage in violence as a result of, “the need to allow for a flexible form of utility function that could include satisfaction from perceived altruism and tangible psychological or social rewards including expected rewards in the afterlife”.

Violent groups with this mission often have a good understanding of their cost and benefit analysis and the probability of success is well considered, except when intentions are to commit suicide in the process. It is worthy of mention that terrorist acts are seen as major gains because of the achievements they make through terror. Implicated in this cost-benefit analysis by terrorists is the attitude of greed and the need to find opportunity to have it met. Omale (2013) was unequivocal as he favours the idea that terrorism is the outcome of rational individual choices to maximize economic, social or political benefits. With a porous security network, large youth population, high level of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy the ground and brick is provided for aggression, and terrorist violence generally as a rational choice from other peaceable and income-generating ventures.

2.4.3 Relative Deprivation, Strain and Grievance Theories of Terrorism:

Interest in economic research has made or prompted scholars in the field and others who utilize their methods and approaches to investigate the cause of terrorist behaviour and equally sought for its solution through economic considerations and incentives. This is why it is investigated economically. Thus, terrorism from an economic stand point is rooted and caused by certain poor or unfavourable conditions which result in terrorist violence. Scholars majorly argue that conditions such as economic (poverty, income inequality and lack of economic opportunity), to political (representation and access to power) and social (religious, ethnic, geography) are the precise causes of specific acts of terrorism or a combination of these factors.

These factors make it easier for people to be recruited into terrorist organizations. According to Richardson (2011), Gurr has it that, relative deprivation as a term is... used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction and that disposes men to violence. This lack of satisfaction is what scholars call

frustration. Gurr did not lose sight of this reality when he argues that, the primary source of human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism that is the anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.

Relative deprivation has long been acknowledged as a source of frustration which culminates in aggression or terrorist violence. A dimension to this and highly implicated by the relative deprivation is the strain theory. This criminological theory explains how people are likely to commit crime when they cannot get what they want through legitimate channels. McLaughlin and Munice (2001) affirm that their frustration and anger may push them to engage in criminal activities, vent their anger on others and in some cases use illicit drugs. The disconnection between expected and achieved welfare are a major condition in the relative deprivation and strain theories of terrorism in particular and crime generally.

Thus, relative deprivation or exclusion in social, economic and political spheres is the ground for grievances which are often let out through aggressive and terroristic violence. Omale (2012) made a good explanation of the Nigerian case when he maintains that many people in Nigeria call for restorative justice paradigm because they are ‘aggrieved and hurt’ socially, politically and economically; and could not explain why a people who stand in plenty of water should wash their hands with spittle. This painted picture by Omale is a serious ground for violent terroristic behaviour in an environment where material existence is a stark negation of natural and other human available resources. The pain of settling for far less, when so much is available is no doubt annoying and provocative.

Relative deprivation in Nigeria, from the perspective of northern Muslims seems more of a deprivation from a cultural necessity as against material exclusion or deprivation. In the global

practice of Islam, the place of Sharia in the governance of the community of believers (Ummah) is fundamental. Sharia as a divinely sanctioned law has two major components. The civil and the criminal aspects of the Islamic law made it holistic in the administration of human affairs. Regrettably, Muslims in the Sokoto Caliphate and beyond, who are entitled to civil and criminal Sharia in-line with Islam, but only civil Sharia is allowed in the North.

This was done to create a sort of common-ground between Muslims in Nigeria who were pro-East and pro-Arabic, and the Christians in Nigeria who were pro-West and with a deep Judeo-Christian background. For the Islamic extremists, fundamentalists, moderates, and liberals alike, the removal of criminal Sharia was not a welcome idea and this was seen as the basis for corruption and all manner of injustices in the Muslim North and equally the reason behind lack of control and evil in the country.

The denial of power to administer justice to God's creatures through His divine law, Sharia, is considered an act of deprivation and aggression. The West and by extension, Christians are to be blamed for this anomaly. During the pre-amalgamation days of what later became known as (Northern) Nigeria, this was the meeting of Northern and Southern regions of the country with all its cultural diversities, religious pluralities, social systems difference and ethno-linguistic divergence.

2.4.4 Terrorism as a Dysfunctional Theory of Religion:

Religion as a hermeneutical and cosmological tool involves how a people perceive their world, interpret reality and the corresponding behaviour emanating from such religious beliefs. Fox (2006) argues that these worldviews are not just philosophical or intellectual constructs. Rather, they are the tools human beings use to understand and interpret reality. They define the nature of the world and our place in it. Religious scripture which is a document that records the

beliefs and expected or prescribed behaviour of a religious community (adherents) is widely referred to.

The contents and interpretation of a religious scripture may lay credence to either peace or war. This is the position of Dorn (2010), as for him, religious scriptures have often been used to either justify or oppose the use of armed force. As an aberration, or abuse, religion-based terrorism is a negative function devoid of the genuine purpose of religion as a human and social institution. In this sense, interpretation given to the scripture of a religious tradition is done in ways that the essence of religion is experienced in a negative light.

According to Okoro (2010), it was the opinion of Avolos that religious dysfunctionism when expressed in violent acts of terror is, “caused by religions or rather that religion creates an imagery supply of sacred resources over which human beings contend. Avolos furthers that, “scarce resources are the things that religion specifically supplies, which include the favour of God, blessing and salvation”. Extreme religious ideologies help in shaping these violent ideas. In Islam, scholars have observed that, “extreme religious ideologies play a central role in indoctrinating Muslims into following Islamic terrorist networks” (Whitehair, n.d.). Little would one wonder that jihad is often emphasized by Islamic terrorist organizations and martyrs are made of people who die in this struggle for their religion, Islam.

Forest (n.d.) sees the need to bring about change as the basis for religious-oriented terrorism. He observes that they try to effect changes in-line with their particular religious group (cult) and violence comes in because they do not assume that such intended changes can come through nonviolent means. He concludes that, as a catalyst for change, very few belief systems can rival or match religion’s power of ideology. Thus, the intention to propagate a religious ideology is a key motivation for religious terrorism and other brands of violence in human society.

Freamon (2003) opines that, religion is the mother of war. For him, this is because conflicts involving religion are among the most intractable of human disputes. Yet, until recently, wars motivated or influenced by religious ideologies have been confined to small well-defined theaters. Using the Classical Islamic case, Khadduri (1995) cited in Freamon (2003) stressed the idea that when non-Muslims adversaries seriously threaten Islam or Muslim communities—because of their Islamic identity—Muslims are entitled to go to war to defend their religion, the community, and the *Dar al-Islam*.

Religious mal-function as a subject of ethical concern is a social reality, because religion which is a typical human feature and a cultural necessity in one of its dimensions is a promoter of ethical conducts by religious adherents. Thus, the theory of religious dysfunctionism is clearly an issue of neglect of moral standards and religious injunctions in a particular religious tradition.

2.5 Theoretical Framework:

Despite the plethora of theories put forward by scholars and theorists alike as explanations for causation of terrorism, this work adopted the theories of relative deprivation and religious dysfunctionism. This work acknowledges the deprivation of Muslims in Nigeria of a core component of their religion as the foundation of terrorism in Nigeria. The need to practice Sharia in its holistic sense (civil and criminal) and the administration of the state through the purview of Islam is at the center of the *Boko Haram* menace in the country. It is as a result of the absence of this religious and cultural essential that the religion is playing a negative role in society.

Thus, the theory of religious dysfunctionism reinforces the former because deprivation is now a basis for motivation, justification and recruitment of persons into terrorist groups and networks. The choice for this dysfunctional theory of religion is because religious zeal goes with a desire to bring about socio-political changes through the lens of the religiously inclined. Religion

as a vibrant identity marker and an enduring source of social legitimization in society deeply shapes the conduct of its adherents and conditions human affairs in general and this is what Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria seek to establish and violently guard against its destruction.

2.6 Summary of Literature Review:

The review of literature has attempted to interrogate the related themes and issues in this topic. The researcher's beginning point was to x-ray the core approaches to war and explicate on the theory of just war. Also, the Islamic concept and criteria for a just war was dealt with.

The just war tradition as a Judeo-Christian heritage of the West was also understudied in this literature review. Its origin and evolution and the three aspects—*jus ad bellum* (justice before war or the legitimate grounds for war), *jus in bello* (justice during war or ethical conduct in war) and *jus post bellum* (justice after war responsibilities)—of the theory were properly considered. It was glaring that though war is undesired and never prayed for, yet there are grounds for a justified war in line with some ethical standards as several scholars have noted.

The connection between Judeo-Christian and Islamic just war doctrines goes beyond land proximity—as they originate from the ancient near East in Asia—to theological orientations but above this it has its locations in war and peace tradition. Islam as one of the monotheistic and universal religions has a very rich ethico-legal component for war involvement and prosecution with sources drawn from the Qur'an, Sunnah and other Islamic legal documents especially through explication from *Ijtihad* (innovative reasoning in line with essential principles of Islam).

From the review, the central idea in Islamic war is that wars are to be engaged in for the cause of Allah and they should be fought in the way of God as a matter of religious duty. Similarly, Islam, though a religion of peace, with various pacifist inclinations obviously has legitimate grounds for the declaration and conduct of war and at the same time has been the

motivation and justification for terrorism (especially for the offensive Jihadist) in Nigeria and other parts of the world.

Terrorism was investigated with special reference to its nature, tactics and patterns. Then it was observed that by its very nature, terrorism is a violent crime, a strategy, a crime of theater, and overbearing psychological. Similarly, some tactics and patterns of terrorism as categorized by scholars revealed guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, armed assault, social class insensitivity, and use of sophisticated weapons.

Some relevant theories of terrorism causation were reviewed. A broadly conceived psychological perspective was studied in relation to its classical and contemporary postulations. The rational choice theory of terrorism causation was also given due attention. This effort yielded some fruits as it debunks the allusion that terrorism is as a result of pathological disorders or any form of mental impediment. Rather, it is born of a valid thought process of decision making which gives due consideration to cost and benefits, in the rational and politico-economic sense.

A closely related set of theories were collectively examined. Relative deprivation, strain and grievance theories of terrorism were viewed as accountable for the social condition of material lack and its resultant frustration that predisposes people to violent acts of terrorism. In addition to this interrelated theory, religious dysfunctionality as a theory of terrorism was equally studied. The powerful grip of religion on human consciousness and its pervasive roles in society gives it a ground to contribute and serve as a key motivating factor to terrorist violence. Religion's worldview, its identity-making ability and its nature as a meaning providing element of culture are among others, instrumental for its negative roles in society.

Regrettably, what came as a surprise was the gross dearth in literature on the implications both positively and negatively of terrorism in Nigeria and more importantly how the theory of just war in Islam can be used to evaluate this religion-based terrorism as witnessed in Nigeria. This gap in literature will necessitate our study. Our modest attempt will be to fill this gap discovered in the literature by explicating whether or not the war by Boko Haram militant Islamists fall short of the just war tradition, despite their persistent claim to do so in the name of Allah, God.

CHAPTER THREE

ORIGIN, CAUSES OF, AND COUNTER EFFORTS AT BOKO HARAM TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

3.1 Origin of Terrorism:

In this section of our research, attempts are made to situate chronologically the phenomenon of terrorism as a global, African and Nigerian scourge. Similarly, a history of Boko Haram origin is specifically discussed.

3.1.1 Global, African and Nigerian Origin of Terrorism: An Overview

On the origin of terrorism, Anyacho (2009) observes that “the term originates as a description of the reign of terror (1793-1794) during the French Revolutions” (P. 116). He further emphasizes that, “though the term originated in the 18th century, the act is as old as man” (P. 116). Hence, world history is not new to the social reality and phenomenon of terrorism. This social malady has featured conspicuously in human affairs as a means for meeting certain aims or ends. Though, terrorism is a violent activity, the concept has been used in the sense of weapon of the weak. As Comb and Slann (2007) have it that,

Terrorism is not certainly, a phenomenon of modern times; it has occurred throughout the ages in a wide range of forms. Many nations have had a deal with terrorism by individuals, groups, cults, militias and corrupt state officials for centuries (P. XI).

The act of terrorism is a long-term human problem, with a number of human societies facing the challenge from the hands of different groups. In a related note, Chaliand and Blin (2007) state that,

Terrorism exists only in a cultural and historical context...the same applies to the entire history of terrorist movements shaped by the political context in which they are born,

live, and die... These days, the importance of the cultural component is more evident in terrorist movements of religious inspiration than those of a nationalist or strictly ideological bent. It is the religious movements that are making themselves heard (P. 6).

Similarly, Okoro (2010) claims that,

Terrorism, though as old as human history, has taken a new dimension in the recent period, taking its demeanor from September 11, 2001, when the whole world was shocked with the destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, both representing the economic and military powers of USA and by extension the global community (P. 552).

Terrorism is above all a tool or, if you will, a technique. This technique is as old as a warfare itself, contrary to the widespread notion that terrorism was that offspring of nineteenth-century nationalist movements. The confusion may be a result of the late appearance of the term in the French Revolution and its terror (Sevilian, 2011). The purpose of this age-long technique was painted in this light, “as a tool, whether it be top-down or bottom-down, terror espouses the same strategic principles to bend one’s adversary’s will while affecting his capacity for resistance” (Chaliand and Blin, 2007:7).

According to Comb and Slann (2007) “modern terrorism, however, has set new pattern of lethality and endurance, with unique patterns of network, forming across natural borders, linking peoples by ethnic identity, religion, and hatred of a common enemy” (P. XI). In this sense, terrorism has emerged as one of the most important political discourse of our modern age. The recent and on-going wars in various Muslim dominated polities like Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan among others is an attestation to the violent social reality of terrorism. Okoro (2010) asserts that, “Outside the fields of wars, military and civil dictators that violate human rights and

life, the most threatening social acerbic is the contemporary terrorism in its diverse forms and manifestation” (P. 552).

Blixen (1989) cited in Tiechman (2006) opines that, “in colonial times in Africa, Masai warriors used to attack Kikuyu villages, stealing women as well as food because many of their women had become sterile as a result of venereal diseases imported from Europe” (P. 6). Similarly, in the African continent, colonial attacks and violent attempts at subduing the various peoples prompted the indigenous peoples in the face of such attack to endorse or utilize means that can fit into the modern conception of terrorism as a tactics.

Subsequently, in Africa, terrorism and other questionable terror-like activities have occurred over time. The Mau-Mau rebellion of Kenya in the 1950’s, the Algerian independence struggle between 1950’s through the 60’s in contemporary times, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, Militia and rebel groups in Sudan, the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tuareg Militias in Mali and Nigeria (sic), Senegal and Somalia (Isyaku, 2013). From the African examples of terrorism, it becomes glaring that, “terrorist organization virtually by definition is opposed to the state apparatus... and the nature of that opposition often defines a movement’s character” (Aron, 2007).

Nigeria is not new to the scourge of terrorism in Africa. The multi-national state has had signs and symptoms of terrorism in the words of Omale (2013). Though isolated in occurrence and widespread in geography, various aspects of activities that constitute terrorism have been perpetrated, beginning with the letter bomb of Dele Giwa in 1986 according to Obene (2012) cited in Omale (2013). Obene further discloses from a retrospective purview that this incidence marks the beginning of both violent killings and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the country. Other early incidences of terrorism in Nigeria are the hijacking of a Nigeria

(Airways) aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of the Chief M. K. O. Abiola's presidential election by the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy, the Ilorin stadium witnessed a bomb blast in August 1994.

Isyaku (2013) construes the new wave of terrorism in Nigeria as gaining its motivation beginning from 1999-2012 when "former President Obasanjo drastically reduced the northern influence over these areas by instituting sweeping reforms to embrace the minorities and other sectional views in advance to the Nigeria constitution" (P. 19). This, according to Isyaku is not just occasioned by Obasanjo's Christian leanings, rather the emphasis was the perception that he was a friend to the West and traditionally the western sympathy over the state of Israel by the US and other western nations, which majority of the northern Muslims consider him to be a western stooge aimed at destroying their already built empire, to replace it with foreign interest and domination to favour the West (Ali, 2002 cited in Isyaku (2013).

Omale (2013) identified other cases of terrorist acts in Nigeria before 2011 as including sectarian violence in Jos in year 2004, 2010 and 2011, series of bombs and killings in Maiduguri since 2004 till date, Abuja Mammy market Military Cantonment, Mogadishu that experienced bombing on the 31st of December (New Year's Eve) 2010. The terror attack that really shook the government and people of Nigeria was the notable May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in Abuja alongside the 1st October 2010 bombing at the venue of the country's 50th Independence Anniversary. These two incidences are of great essence to the country's sovereignty as it questions the legitimacy of not just the Nigerian state but also that of its political leaders. Successes in these acts of terrorism at the national levels gave adequate impetus for attacks all over the length and breadth of the country especially in the Northern states.

3.1.2 Origin of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria:

Cook (2011) asserts that,

The roots of Boko Haram lie in the Islamic history of northern Nigeria, in which for some 800 years, powerful sultanates centered around the Hausa cities close to Kano and the sultanate of Borno (roughly the region of the states of Borno and Yobe together with parts of Chad) constituted high Muslim civilizations (P.1).

The desire to safeguard the northern society from Christian political domination beyond the fighting between Sufi and Salafist ideology was central to the foundation of the movement. In fact, Cook (2011) maintains that continuous growth of Christianity from the President Olusegun Obasanjo through Goodluck Jonathan's administrations was repelled through this movement first by the political elite (through imposition of Sharia law in the year 2000) and later from the commoners (through the formation of Boko Haram).

The Da wah Coordination Council of Nigera (2009) had rightly avowed that, members of the Boko Haram sect identify themselves as "Ahl as-sunah wa alJama ala minhaj as salaf" which means "people of the way of the prophet Muhammad and the community, in line with the earliest generation of Muslims" The group can also be identified as Yusuffiya or Jama' atu Ahlis Sunn Lidda' await Wal-Jihah (Udeagha, 2011.) Boko Haram colloquially translates into "Western education is sin" (Johnson, 2011). The group's focus is a reawakening to the early 7th century Islamic practices, hence, a call to fundamentalism on her members especially against the backdrop of western education, civilization and cultural infiltration of their core Muslim society.

For Bazza (2013) the consensus position maintained by commentators is that Boko Haram is an upshot of Shabaab, a Muslim Youth Organisation that had Mallam Lawal as the leader in the year 1995. He observes that, "When Lawal left to continue his education, Mohammad Yusuf took over leadership of the group" (p. 7). With his training as a salafist,

jihadist or radical Muslim, Yusuf won the hearts of the members of the group initially made-up of under-educated and unemployed youths. This was the context upon which Mohammad Yusuf came into the picture and opened the group to political influence and popularity (Okemi, 2013).

With his education, oratory skills, and competence in the Islamic language (Arabic) and teachings, Yusuf radicalized the Shabaab group and made efforts to spread their message across Northern Nigeria from Maiduguri. Neighbouring states like Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, Kano, Kaduna and Sokoto, were reached with executive members constituted under commanders identified as Amirs (Bazza, 2013). In the year 2002, the group was officially founded in the city of Maiduguri, Borno State.

This period marked the early beginnings of the group's activities in Nigeria. Their affront to the Police due to their proscribed and outlawed activities of public violence gradually made them known to the larger society, especially through media platforms. The presence of a religious complex (Markas) with a Mosque and school where many poor families within the country and from neighbouring ones could come and access free education, gave them attention and patronage. Indeed, people from Chad, Niger Republic among Nigerians benefited from this offer. The complex was later moved to Yobe, in Yusuf's village of Kanamma near Niger boarder (Bazza, 2013).

According to Ukandu (2011) *Limin Islamiyya* which is Islamic education, since the years following Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad turned out millions of graduated in this system of education across the Northern States and even communities and cities that have a sizeable Muslim population across the length and breadth of Nigeria. Regrettably, societal transformation has provided no opportunity for graduates of the aforementioned educational system and majority of such students that went through the scheme are caught up in the poverty cycle that depends

mainly on *Zakat* (alms). Students of this system popularly known as *Almajiris* have constituted a standing army that now provide the required force for most violence as experienced in Northern Nigeria, and Boko Haram bought into this pool of ‘helpless youths’.

Although some members of the group are also drawn from other well to do individuals both in academic, social, political and economic terms, the access to the helpless and unemployed youths have really characterized and sustained the Boko Haram movement. Agbiboa (2013) observes that, “Boko Haram’s membership comprises of university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris, and migrants from neighbouring countries” (p. 4). This is so that, even though there are several employed workers (in both private and public sectors) and politically empowered members of the group, the unemployed remains the foot-soldiers and engine-house of Boko Haram.

A religious cosmological exclusivism characterizes their ideology. This exclusivist worldview predisposes to a psychological outlook of seeing only themselves as true Muslims, indeed as the arbiters of the faith (Thurston, 2016). This parochialism, fundamentalism and extremism which characterizes the group’s ideology finds expression through such stance as the forbidden interaction with the Western World, hostility to scientific claims on the shape of the earth, the Darwanian theory of evolution and even the fact the rain originates from evaporated water, and discrimination against fellow Muslims who don’t share in their beliefs and practices, some notable Islamic preachers were suspicious of their activities and made efforts to call the attention of the authorities (Bazza, 2013).

The protest of the group members against law and public order especially the government’s policies on the wearing of helmet was one incident that set the context for the groups’ complete radicalization and eventual extra-judicial killing of their leader, Mohammad

yusuf. At the time of his death, Yusuf was the commander-in-chief (Amir Ul-Aam) of Boko Haram. He had deputies (Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I and II) and each state and local government where they existed had its own commander (amir) (Agbiboa, 2013). Premised on their belief that the creation of Nigeria by British colonialists had imposed a Western and un-Islamic way of life on Muslims, the group violently challenged the government's security forces Felter (2018) quips that,

A flash point for the group came in 2009, when a police crackdown set off an armed uprising in Bauchi State that soon spread in the northeast. Government forces killed more than eight hundred people, including many suspected Boko Haram members, in ensuing protests. Following the uprising, Yusuf was murdered while in police custody (p. 2).

A taskforce known as Operation Flush II in Maiduguri confronted the sect in 2009 and wounded at least 17 members of the sect. The leadership of the sect was angered and denounced the security forces. There was violent campaign that stretched for five days. Police Stations were attacked and there were gun engagement and the military eventually brutally cracked down the violence (Smith, 2017). The sect went underground for about a year after the uprising but resuscitated and re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of the former Deputy of Yusuf Mohammed, Abubakar Shekau. The attacks grew more deadly and sophisticated, particularly with the use of explosives, suicide attacks and other forms of hit-and-run or guerrilla tactics.

In order to establish an Islamic polity, members of the group adopted terrorism as a strategy of war in the year 2009. Since 2009, Boko Haram's campaign of terror has been the biggest security challenge facing Nigeria (Onouha and Oyewole, 2018) and their violent activities have pitched them against the Nigerian state especially her security institutions and

agencies. They have killed Christians and Muslims they deem to be insufficiently pious in order to achieve their goal of Islamization of the country (Guitta and Simcox, 2014). The group's near a decade-long bloodbath and brigandage has triggered a wide range of implications for both individual and collective lives. In fact, they have grossly compromised societal peace and exposed Nigerians to diverse forms of human miseries.

3.2 Causes of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria:

It will be pertinent to reiterate that by terrorism, this work intends "religious terrorism". Hence, the root and immediate causes of the war pursued through terrorist strategy in Nigeria will be considered in this section of our work. A number of causative factors can be derived from the various complaints, actions and disclosed aims of the violent Islamists' groups in Nigeria. They include the following under-enumerated;

3.2.1 Islamic Revivalism and Expansionism:

Born in 630 AD in Arabia, Islam became one of the world's religious cultures with a monopolistic and universal vision. On arrival, Islam announced its finality in human salvation and pronounced the Holy Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) as the last and greatest Prophet counting from the Judeo-Christian account or genealogy. Islam is much more a culture and civilization as it is a religious and political system. Its near holistic concern for things that patterns to human, material, moral, legal and spiritual affairs is an attestation to the fact the religion has a broad scope in its doctrine and evident in its wide practices.

The quick expansion of the religion from Mecca to the Ancient Near East, Africa, Europe and later to the Americas, within a very short space of time, gave credence to its claim of authenticity. The fundamental work of the Holy Prophet and the four guided Caliphs were indispensable in this regards. Multiple achievements were recorded in this Empire and its

civilization. The successes recorded during this period earned it the title of “Golden Age”. But following the rise, ascent and domination of the Muslim state by foreign powers, the lofty and heydays of Islamic civilization were not only retarded, but equally despised by the West. Cultural antagonism, civilization clash, religious subjugation, scientific scrutiny and widespread suspicion became the order of the day.

The desire to surmount these challenges and relive the golden age became topmost in the hearts of Islamists, both moderates and extremists alike. This was pursued with the anchor point being the Qur’an and submission to the will of Allah as its clear yardstick. This desire is both domestic and global in focus. In a number of Muslim dominated polities, this has prompted violent reactions against agents of oppression and domination as the Palestine, Iraq and Syria cases show. Suicide bombing, arson and kidnapping availed themselves as the most viable tools for this end. Accusations and counter-accusations often characterize such events. The cases of *Hesbollah*, Al Qaeda, and Taliban notably among others are a quick reminder to this fact. Domestically, *Maitasina*, and now *Boko Haram*, *Ansaru* and others are championing this cause in Nigeria.

Any group that opposes, neglects or are indifferent to this cause are considered as liberals, unbelievers and apostates (for those Muslims who have fallen out of the faith). The concept of fundamentalism is used to describe the idea of a desire to return to an earlier practice or belief. In this sense, Islamists see the world as liberal, and progressives as godless, drained of meaning and satanic (Gopin, 1997). The religio-political history of Islam in Nigeria is a continuous source of pride for the Muslims in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The Sokoto Caliphate which lasted in its majestic state for almost hundred (100) years was truncated by the forces of Western colonization; business merchants and her religious agents.

The Islamic law on crime and its stipulated punishments were abrogated as a necessary requirement for the joining together of Northern and Southern protectorates. From that time till date, Muslims have sought via various means to restore her past glory and implement Sharia (especially the criminal aspects) in its enclave at least but persistent opposition has faced their attempts based on the assumption that Nigeria is a secular polity, constitutionally. This has brought about animosity, shame and vengeance on the part of violently oriented Muslims and in this direction they have sought to use militaristic means to achieve their aims after they were faced with failure from their earlier political and legal attempts (the year A.D. 2000 Sharia crises).

As a result of this need to expand the frontiers of Islam, Christians have been killed with reckless abandon in Nigeria's Northern states. According to Lane (2013) last year more Christians were killed in Nigeria than any other country. This gave Nigeria the distinction of being the nation with the highest Christian death toll. The figure was placed above nine hundred (900) Christians who were killed in the year 2012. To fully revive the religious ideas of Islam, they even kill moderate Muslims and others that attempt to criticize them or are sympathetic to the Christian cause and are called infidels, equally. Gregory Lar, an international human rights attorney sees these actions as a new resurgence, a form of Islamic awareness in the need to propagate their religion (Lane, 2013).

3.2.2 Supremacist Ideology Embedded in Islamic Political Theology:

It is vital to note that like other religious cosmologies especially among monotheist religions, Islam is exclusivist and parochial on matters patterning to salvation and belongingness to its religious community. Ukandu (2014) has it that, "various adherents to (sic) religious tradition see in their own mind's eye, the only genuine source of religious belief and truth" (P.

8). He further quips that, “A misguided or false sense of religiosity and a deep seated cosmetic vision often springs from this monopoly of universal truth claims...” (P. 8). An essential theme in the academic study of Islam as a sub-field of Religion and Cultural Studies is the issue of political Islam. The concept is an attestation to the lack of separation between the religion as a belief system and as a political system. The *Ummah* is at once a political community of believers who are submissive to Allah’s authority and sovereignty.

In Nigeria, the historical privilege given to and maximized by the Muslim dominated Northern region of the country was a framework for the expression of the desire to be supremacist. Ukandu (2014) quips that,

The gentleman agreement between the colonial agents beginning from Lord Lugard and the Muslim authorities was one that frowns at any form of Christian encroachment in the region... this line of thinking encourages the Muslim faithful in a bid to preserve their hegemony and religious monopoly to feel provoked and threatened when Christian missionaries proselytize adherents from their area, as was increasingly the case after the independence of the country (p.11)

Describing Nigerian Christians, Iruonagbe (2012) observes that they, “...still harbour fears of political domination by the Northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani people. They remember the Jihad movements of the nineteenth century that promoted a new exclusive, intolerant and militant Islamic orientation (An-Na’im, 1997; Isichei, 1983). Nor have they forgotten the Islamization policy of “One North, One Islam” of Northern Muslim leaders during the First Republic of the early 1960s (Ohadike, 1992).

The acting leader of the *Boko Haram* Jihad group, Abubakar Shekau, immediately after the death of Mohammed Yusuf revealed the extent of supremacist consciousness in their purview of Islam. According to Vanguard News Paper cited in Liolio (2012) this he did by observing that,

First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western Education is a sin’ as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means Western Civilization is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our believe (sic) in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education (p. 9).

The acting leader on this same occasion demands that,

...The aim is to Islamize Nigeria and ensures (sic) the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one...The bombing will not stop until *Sharia* (sic) and Western Civilization is wiped out off from Nigeria...That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of *Sharia* in Nigeria and ensure that the infidels does (sic) not go unpunished (p. 9-10).

In confirmation of the threat message by the violent sect’s leader, PMNEWS (2013) notes that, “Boko Haram—whose shifting demands include the creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria’s mainly Muslim North—had chased out local officials in some areas and removed the Nigerian flag”. It is for reasons as this that the former Senate President, David Mark, maintains that the insecurity in the north is as a result of religious fundamentalism thereby rejecting the excuses of

poverty, unemployment and illiteracy being cited as cause of the current spate of violence by the Boko Haram Jihad group (Umoru and Nnabugwu, 2012).

3.2.3 Domestic Desire to Dominate and Control Political Economy in the Face of Underdevelopment:

A deep sense of triumphalism depicts Muslim disposition to matters patterning to political economy in Nigeria. From the early days of pre-independence through to post independent Nigeria, they have exhibited both covert and overt intentions towards the fruits accruable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The relatively low economic buoyancy and resources ownership gives them a commitment concern for Nigeria's economic power.

Though Sharia is the main demand of the *Boko Haram* group, Muslim youths equally strive for improvement of their influence in Nigeria in terms of the political economy. Olojo (2013) has it that, "For many years, this demand resonated with the religious aspirations of many young Muslims who were drawn by the group's assurance of political and economic emancipation" (P. 8).

Zumve, Ingyoroko and Akuva (2013) were very precise and authoritatively declare official corruption and state neglect of her citizens as the sole cause of terrorism in Nigeria. In their pontification,

Contemporary terrorism in Nigeria is a latent function of prolonged failure of the Nigeria State to deliver purposeful good governance. When the Federal, state and Local Governments steal all the money allocated for building schools, hospitals, industries, etc, the greater percentage of citizenry especially the youths are denied good education, employment and good health. These youths are therefore affected socially, psychologically and economically (Pp. 123-124).

In their view these are the conditions that move the youths towards frustration, dejection and hopelessness and for these reasons they can easily be brainwashed or indoctrinated with false doctrines and conscripted into illegal societies or groups. Thus, perceived injustices and poverty were the fruits that culminate at underdevelopment and all manner of economic woes of the people in the area.

3.2.4 Human Rights Violation and High-Handedness in Government's Response to the Group:

The military response of the federal government to the members of Boko Haram sect in the early years of their emergence has been pointed as a major reason for the radicalization and drift of the group from a mere fundamentalist movement to a terrorist one. Since its radical changes in 2009, Boko Haram sect has undergone a number of significant transformations in both their strategy and determination. Like (Wikipedia, 2013) has it that, "Boko Haram was founded as an indigenous group, turning itself into a jihadist group in 2009".

Their violent encounter with the federal forces alongside the government of Yobe State caused them to relocate to Kanama, a remote village near the border with Niger Republic. Their strong desire for revenge and retaliation caused them to launch attack on the residence of local government heads, regional officials, and divisional police in Yobe State on 24 December 2004 (Maianqwa and Uzodike, 2012). With the success they recorded during these attacks, they moved to Bauchi where they attacked a police station and released many of their members who were detained there.

On 30 July 2009, following Mohammed Yusuf's declaration that democracy and Western education in Nigeria must change, military forces stormed the home of Boko Haram in Maiduguri and captured Yusuf, its founding leader. Yusuf was later found dead while still in

police custody. The failure to prosecute those security personnel who were responsible for the extra-judicial killing of the Boko Haram leader represents one of the primary grievances of the members of the sect, and can be seen as fanning the embers of the Boko Haram terrorist campaign against Nigerian security forces and authorities (Maianqwa and Uzodike, 2012).

At the end of the July 2009 uprising, the surviving members of the sect, including the present leader, Abubakar Shekau, fled to Niger Republic and Chad respectively to regroup and mobilize more support. This form of mobilization can be likened to the flight (*hijra*) of the Prophet (PBUH) as recorded in Islamic history and practiced by a number of militant Islamists groups like Al-Qaeda.

Agang (2015) corroborated this fact when he asserts that,

As the military crackdown intensified, the group has become even more aggressive and militant. It has resorted to more desperate measures, which include burning school buildings, kidnapping students, attacking telecommunication stations, blowing up bridges, the kidnapping and slaughtering of foreigners and so on (p. 25).

Thus, the extra-judicial killing of the leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigeria Police Force and the brute force employed, remains a cause, at least a remote one, for their core terrorist tactics and excessive violence, subsequently experienced.

3.2.5 Psychology of Guaranteed Transcendental Reward, Quest for Social Significance and Material Gains:

The act of intentional taking of one's own life as practised by some members of the Islamic militants, Boko Haram, who perpetuate acts of terrorism in Nigeria, is a major cause or motivating force behind *jihad*. This is as a result of three related reasons. First is transcendental reward in the life-hereafter. The perpetrators of suicide terrorism have intentions of living

forever and this stands as a major motivating factor in their choice of the tactic (Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011). Eggers (2011) claims that, “the promise of paradise in the afterlife motivates these radicals to commit martyrdom in the name of Islam” (P. 7).

Martyr is a reward for bravery in this world. The psychology of martyrdom is one that induces a sense of worthlessness on people who don't have member of the family in the front-line to live in dissatisfaction. Families even boost of their demise, those who paid the supreme price for the sake of Allah. This is the case because as Danjibo (n.d.) has it, “Ideologically, any member who fought and died for the cause of an Islamic/Sharia state by destroying modern state formation and government establishment would automatically gain “Aljanna” (paradise or heaven)” (P. 7). He further narrates of a former governor of Borno, Governor Ali Modu Sherriif, when he disclosed that a former commissioner of his cabinet who resigned his appointment and joined the violent *jihadi* group. This said ex-Commissioner told him that this will be the only way to merit heaven since politics is already corrupted.

Socially speaking, some sorts of relevance accrue to *jihadists* who prove their worth in the cause of Allah. For a people who are deprived or excluded from the scheme of things owing to their lack of suitability in a market driven economy, they see a parallel route in ideas. Ideas that transcend the human person in relevance are often favoured as a form of self actualization.

Secondly, participation in a group that fulfills these yearnings is an access to significance because it brings appreciation in their social status and sometimes complementary material gains. This is the case because the use of suicide to gain significance in their society and praiseworthy entitlement in their close circle of extremists is a reality. It should be known that suicide terrorism is an extreme means and the perpetrators are hailed as giving the ultimate sacrifice (Kruslanski, 2011). The perception of injustice and deprivations from various fronts are key

indicators for this kind of feeling to join a group that boost the self-worth of a person so deprived.

In the instance that one kills him or herself, he or she gains a prestige that is rear and near impossible in their social class. This achievement is rarely the case in an entire life time of such persons (Kruglanski, 2011). This extreme case of humans not working for self-preservation or personal interest is based on the reward accruable to them. The religious sense of justice, moral rightness and a seeming larger than life feeling of repercussion for wrong is employed in this instance to deal with the enemy who is responsible for their suffering.

Thirdly, material rewards are given to family members of the departed hero. Promises are even made to their spouses on the fact that the group would not let them suffer in this world and Allah world not allow same in the world beyond, paradise. This means that beyond transcendental and social concerns, material gains or interest often motivates. At some point, motivation may differ across rank and file in a social movement or *jihadi* organizational movement. Javaid (n.d.) observes from the Pakistani experience that, “the leader who plans the killings and motivates the youth is working for money but the man who actually kills is being motivated on religious passion”.

This desire to gain immaterial reward has motivated a number of skilled and unskilled workers to render their services in the violent sect’s operation. By implication, recruitment for some was a matter of personal volition and right judgment. The confession of one of the sect’s member who was apprehended by the Police force after heavy gun battle will be instructive in this regards. According to Eriye (2013) in the Nation News Paper of October 27, 2013 has his confession as follows,

We have qualified doctors who are active members. They were not forced to be in the group, they are more elderly than us...We have mechanics, we have welders, we have carpenters, we have professional drivers, we have butchers, security experts, gun instructors and so on (p. 2).

3.2.6 Access to Financial, Military and Logistical Supports:

According to Cleaves (2015)

Boko Haram is a well-financed organization, but determining the specifics of that financing is difficult...There are some evidence that Boko Haram historically received funding from al-Shabaab and other al-Qaeda affiliates. Boko Haram has found new financiers in Borno and in Cameroon's northern region...These benefactors provide weapons and become intermediaries in negotiating with the Cameroonian government for ransom payment. Boko haram's recent pivot from al-Qaeda to swearing allegiance to ISIL may have much to do with practical financing concerns as a major shift in ideology (P. 17).

Cleaves (2015) has it that, "The most identifiable and possibly the most lucrative funding sources are Boko Haram's criminal activities. Beginning in February 2013, Boko Haram began kidnapping as a means of increasing revenues, creating distrust of the government, and discouraging Western business interest in Nigeria" (P. 16).

Availability and access to relevant materials for the prosecution of violence is a boost to their end. A number of financial sources are open to violent Islamist groups in Nigeria. They have international access to funds—from foreign governments, charities and wealthy individuals, local donors from state governments, businesses and individuals and in some occasions when these sources cannot suffice, they take to other criminal activities to raise needed financial

resources. Yacubu (2005) seem to have given echo to this reality when he asserts that, “insurrection and terrorism can occur only if the rebels and terrorists have previously taken care to acquire firearms, ammunition and explosives. These can of course only be acquired unlawfully” (P. 62).

As Yacubu (2005) has it, it is a fact that, “the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms has led to the emergence of groups of armed individuals operating across and beyond state borders: rebels movement, private militia, terrorists, drug traffickers, armed robbers etc” (P. 54). This is definitely true in the Nigerian context as the,

Weapons in the Boko Haram inventory are difficult to definitively determine. Boko Haram has been successful in capturing weapons and ammunitions during attacks on military facilities. The group can be assumed to have any number of heavy weapons and equipments as well as small arms and ammunitions included in the Nigerian military inventory (Cleaves, 2015: p. 16).

He continues that, “Boko Haram also has access to a robust arms-smuggling network and unregulated and unguarded cross-border transit routes. It has not been able to fully capitalize on weapons it now holds” (P. 16). No doubt, chief among these are gotten through robbery, drug sales and kidnapping for ransom. As Leigh (2011) cited in Agbiboa (2013) has it, “Boko Haram also derives its finances from robbing local banks...on 12 January 2010, four members attempted to rob a bank in Bakori local Government Area of Katsina State” (P. 74).

It is worthy of mention that, “Boko Haram’s strength and training are generally inferior to that of massed Nigerian security forces, although the group is collecting an arsenal of weapons that, in some instances, is greater than resource-deprived outpost” (Cleaves, 2015:10) of military

formations. This is because religious fundamentalists and militants fight with wild passion (Yacubu, 2005).

Politicians, senators, businessmen, among others are equally involved in the sponsorship of these Islamist militants. Olojo (2013) corroborated this precondition and challenge when he states that, “In addition to allegations of financial proceeds from local politicians, businessmen and organized criminal networks, suspicions have increased with regard to Boko Haram’s interception of charity funds generated by the UK-based aid organization Al-Muntada Al-Islam Trust” (P. 9)

In the face of all these alliances, the security apparatus, other legislative, judicial and executive efforts aimed at preserving security are currently strained beyond the borders of toleration in Nigeria. The highest threat to security in the country is terrorism perpetrated by religious militants. Through their violent extremism, they have opposed the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and dealt a heavy blow on her citizens.

This goes to corroborate what Deen (1999) cited in Onouha (2011), discloses about the opinion of the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor, when he warned that there is a significant rise in religious extremism and intolerance throughout the world. According to Amor, “at the national and international levels, unjust economic, social and political systems which really constitute violations of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, contribute to the birth and/or nurturing of extremism”.

The level of extremism displayed by religious militants in various Islamist groups as *Boko Haram*, *Ansaru* and others have prevented them from knowing any limits in their propagation of their *Jihadi* violence. As such not only government facilities, public places,

business arenas, educational centers but also Churches and Mosques have suffered similar fate in their hands due to the extremist and zero-sum nature of their pursuit.

3.2.7 Porous Border and Difficult Terrain:

Militant Islamism in Nigeria as a whole exists in the context of a complicated confluence of socioeconomic and political grievances that have remained unaddressed over a long period of time. Furthermore, unlike the political violence in the south, the violence in the north has also been fuelled by pervasive insecurity among Muslim communities about their religious and moral well-being, based in part on the fading influence of religious authority in the region (AOAV and NWGAV, 2013). AOA and NWGAV (2013) further claim that,

The militant Islamist group Boko Haram is at the heart of Borno's insecurity. The insurgents still control some regions, especially areas bordering Cameroon, Chad and Republic of Niger, where difficult terrain confounds efforts by the Nigerian military to establish control (Lines. 361-363).

Prior to the advent and full violent expressions of the Boko Haram group in Nigeria, Adejo (2005) had long observed the vastness, porosity of Nigerian borders and the challenge it portends for the operatives to effectively man it. He avers that,

In Borno State, for example, owing to the porous nature of the border with Cameroon, the border may be crossed at any point by various means of transport during the dry season, thus rendering all the efforts to curb the activities of illegal aliens, bandits and smugglers ineffective (P. 94).

Similarly, Tracking Terrorism (2012) has it that, "*Boko Haram* exploits Nigeria's borderlands with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon to smuggle weapons, recruit new members from neighbouring countries, and find refuge beyond the reach of Nigeria security." PMNEWS (2013) has it that,

“the remote, thinly populated region of northern Nigeria has porous borders where criminal groups and weapons have flowed freely for years, and the army has deployed troops to seal border crossings”. Thus, the free flow in human and other deadly materials across the various borders of the country have spelt doom for human and material well-being.

Olojo (2013) averse that,

In June 2013, the Nigerian government’s Joint Task Force (JTF) arrested a major recruiter for Boko Haram as several militants reportedly fled from Maiduguri towards Niger Republic. These terrains beyond Nigeria’s borders also harbor camps where Boko Haram militants have trained in the past (P. 10).

Isyaku (2013) avows that,

The unchecked activities of terrorists across the borders in the north, and banditry in both northern and western borders..., the overwhelming security concern over the years where silent criminal activities have been perpetuated in Nigeria with authority having less concern to aftermath where smuggling of small and medium weapons are being shipped into the country and movement and activities of unscrupulous elements and groups... are seen moving freely in most Nigerian cities (P. 21).

Kehinde-Balogun (2015) reports of the Africa Global Development for Drastic Change (AGDDC) call on the newly inaugurated President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari to checkmate the various porous Nigerian borders. The group notes that the three borders shared with the country’s North East have been a source of target by insurgents. In the report, the Secretary of the peace-centered organization urged the new president to pay close attention to the borders especially on the free movement of illegal immigrants into the country. She made a comparison of the country’s borders with those of Ghana which were filled with various check points and

manned by disciplined officers of Customs. Unlike what is obtainable in Nigeria where Customs officers will collect bribe and allow these illegal persons into the country and later they will perpetuate heinous crimes within the country.

3.2.8 Over-dependence on Islamic and Arabic Studies without Scrutiny:

The premium or over-emphasis on religious knowledge and sacred language competence at the expense of other complimentary aspects of education holistically conceived is a thriving challenge among extremist and moderate Muslims alike. The utility of studying about the last and final religion for mankind (Islam) is not subject to any scrutiny. Rather, it is a case of one-sidedness in the approach to education. Normally, the world as we know it is made of physical and the spiritual realms.

In similar vein, sciences as spheres of knowledge or human learning are the physical (natural, environmental, agricultural, biological, chemical, health and medical, technological and engineering) and social (metaphysical, humanistic, behavioural, legal, management and educational). This one-sidedness and neglect of physical and other aspects of social sciences education has placed the people of northern Nigeria on some disadvantage of some sort. To make worse is the fact that we live in an increasingly market oriented economy where capitalist model, mass production and quality service delivery are the hallmark of economic vibrancy.

While discussing some of the reasons why Northern Nigeria is predisposed to the emergence of groups like BH, the Da'wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (2009) observes that,

Many Muslims in northern Nigeria are poorly educated and very ignorant about Islam from its authentic sources. This makes it easy for some charismatic personalities to abuse the freedom of expression. There are also very few well-learned and exposed Muslim scholars of Islam (P. 27).

The Council added that, “no regulations or minimum qualifications required in northern Nigeria for anyone who wants to speak about Islam”. For them, “this absence of any minimum standards in the competence and character of preachers, and the absolutely unregulated public preaching of Islam, have made it easy for fanatical groups to gain uninterrupted momentum and spread in predominately uneducated societies” (P. 27).

Danjibo (n.d.) seem to corroborate the aforementioned social realities when he asserts that,

The leader of the *Boko Haram* movement, Yusuf, was a secondary school drop-out who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study Qur'an. While in the two countries, he developed radical views that were abhorrent to Westernization and modernization. Like the late Maitatsine, Yusuf got back to Nigeria and settled in Maiduguri and established a sectarian group in 2001 known as *Yusufiyya* (p. 6).

Similarly, Kabiru Sokoto, the mastermind of the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, a 38-year old father of two is equally a product of Islamic education which qualifies him as an Islamic scholar (Tsa, 2013).

The deep commitment of Muslim governments at various levels, well-to-do companies, religious and traditional leaders and wealthy individuals in sponsoring Islamic education in and out of the country, has served as a boost to the religion-centered education. In pre-independence era, colonial authorities' in-line with the wishes and aspirations of the north prevented the Muslim north from the influences of Western education and culture.

Ahmed, Gregoire and Nathan (2012) in their explication on the historical and political background to Boko Haram evolution, have it that, “Islam flourished in both the cultural and educational contexts as northern elites and politicians deepened their relationships with the wider

Islamic world and received financial support from oil-rich Arab countries for promotion of Islam.” According to Paden (1986) cited in Danjibo (n.d.) “Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, boasted of establishing over 2 million Koranic schools scattered in all parts of Northern Nigeria” (P. 8).

This near dependence and preference of *madrassas* is a reason for the growth of religious militancy and their various organizations in Nigeria. Javaid (n.d.) discloses from a Pakistani perspective that “*madrassas* were established as institutions of higher studies, where law, Islamic studies and philosophy were taught”. He further states that *madrassas* and Islamic militancy have become identical. Caution was not taken to discriminate between religious schools that aim to indoctrinate and those with no such intention.

Transnational contacts are often made through educational transfers. Muslim students from Nigeria have for a long time now maintained links with foreign educational institutions for higher learning on Islamic and Arabic studies. This practice by well-to-do families and indigent students alike—whose sheer brilliance and the availability of charity sponsorship may grant them access to such places of learning—beyond the shores of Nigeria for *madrassas* training is a seeming age long practice. A by-product of this practice is the radicalization of such students who return with not just Islamic knowledge evident in Qur’anic recitation in the language of Arabic, but with a totally changed mindset, military tactical training and access to funds for allied cause.

Javaid (n.d.) notes that after such trainings, they “send the students to other places to get training in the use of weapons and guerrilla warfare”. Teachers (*Mallams*) of the Islamic religion and its sacred language— Arabic, and the various donor agencies and individuals that sponsor these schools often see their activities as charitable to alleviate illiteracy rate and foster moral

and spiritual development. But in reality, some of these religious centers are breeding grounds for bigots, extremists and unparallel fanatics. They are playing the role of a recruitment ground for *jihadist*. It is instructive to note that *Jihadists* are resounding tools for violence and immense terrorism in the northern regions of the country. The curricula of such schools are laden with extremist, sectarian and *jihadi* contents.

Odiogor and Agande (2012) made this cause of terrorism very clear when they infer that, Since the early 1990s, Muslim faithful have travelled to countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, India, Iran, Syria, for technical trainings, and received funds for education including Koranic studies from the so called madras' (sic), which are known for religious indoctrinations. The content and the curriculum of the education that was being offered to our citizens were not scrutinized (P. 2).

They went further to assert that all these were done under different forms of bilateral technical cooperation agreements and enthuse that,

Some of the recipients of these programmes were given funds to execute all kinds of projects which the Federal Government at that time did not bother to scrutinize because the leadership of the country has been concentrated in the northern part... The result is that so many graduates of these programmes are being indoctrinated and exposed to ideologies of hate and to kill other people who have opposing religious and cultural world view (P. 2).

3.2.9 Influences from Transnational Jihad and Terror Movements:

Far more than ethnic affiliation or linguistic similarity, religious identity has shown itself to be at the core of globalization as it transcends state boundaries. This situation is more so the case with Islam, a proselytizing and universal religion. As a transnational phenomenon, Islamic

ideas, loyalty and materials have moved beyond the boundaries of nation-states. From Asia to Africa, Asia to Europe, the Americas, Australia and other continents in the modern world. Regrettably, it is within the gains of these structures and networks that violent extremists can be situated. Sometimes they transact via Islamic charities and on other occasions they name their organization based on their intention and religious aims. In this sense there are charities, *Da'wah* (non-violent proselytizing groups), liberation movements, and militant reformist or revolutionary movements.

Not only youths are open to these sources of opportunity to travel abroad for Islamic and Arabic studies education and the financial gratifications that mark their efforts when violent *jihadi* ideologies are impressed on them. Opportunity, sources for fund and sponsorship are also open to political and public officers from Northern region in propagation of Islam. Odiogor and Agande (2012) throw light on this reality when they disclosed that,

Some political leaders especially those in public offices, including members of National and State Assemblies, State governors, received financial support from radical Arab leaders including late Libyan Leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi, with a promise that they would Islamize Nigeria when they get to power (P. 2).

They furthered that these same leaders who after collecting these monies amidst assurances on the said aim failed to deliver on their promise. Thus, they are made legitimate targets of *Boko Haram* violence. Since the sect is a *jihadist* army and the militant wing of their faith working to accomplish the goal of turning Nigeria into an Islamic country.

The Associated Press (2012) opins that, diplomats and military officials acknowledge the fact that the sect (*Boko Haram*) has links with two other Al Qaeda-aligned terrorist groups in Africa. Members of the sect also reportedly have been spotted in northern Mali which Tuareg

rebels and hard-line Islamists seized control of over the past month. According to Odiogor and Agande (2012) the Commander of the United States Africa Command, Gen. Carter Ham, disclosed the level of threat posed by *Boko Haram* due to their links with North African al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb by sharing explosives and funds. This places the group and its violent activities as a transnational religious phenomenon since it is linked to international networks of lik-minded groups that pursue a common goal (Fox, 2006).

Acknowledging its international leanings, according to Liolio (2012) the acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru has it,

That the Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of Al-Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah (P. 9).

This goes to affirm allusion of some opinion leaders and school of thought that *Boko Haram* utilizes its foreign connections with *jihadists* and *jihadist* organizations to further its capabilities to achieve their domestic objectives in Nigeria.

The technological dynamics of globalization is well internalized by contemporary Islamic movements. They increasingly preach and teach *jihad* as an end and thereby attempt to make for themselves holy warriors (Waseem, 2004). Tracking Terrorism (2012) claims that,

Boko Haram members have acquired weapons and training from militant groups in Sahel, including al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), and since the demise of Muammar Qaddafi, Libyan arms caches have made their way from the Sahel to Nigeria with the help of AQIM'S smuggling networks in the Sahel region.

Small arms and light weapons were in abundance for use, training from foreign lands on bomb and explosives making were available and a widespread knowledge. Danjibo (n.d.) records the comment of This Day News Paper of Thursday the 3 of September 2009, has it that one Abdulrasheed Abdullahi confessed to a police that he and others of his group were trained on the art of bomb and explosive making from Afghanistan.

Sahara Reporters (2013) cited in Olojo (2013) asserts that,

In May 2013, security agencies in Nigeria discovered an arms warehouse at the residence of a Lebanese national in Kano State. The cache of weapons located in an underground bunker beneath the master bedroom and investigations points towards the existence of a Hezbollah terrorist cell in Nigeria with links to Boko Haram (P. 9).

There was also another case of an Algerian and a UK-based Charity organization that financially support the violent militant *jihadi* group, the *Boko Haram*. During the confession of Kabiru Sokoto, on December 25th of the 2011, St. Theresa's Catholic Church, he mentioned the name of a certain Algerian organization that funds them judiciously. Also, members of Yusuf's family revealed that forty percent (40%) of the group's funding came from outside the country. The three most fingered countries are Chad, Niger and Cameroun, the same people that have their suicide bombers fully involved in the destruction of human lives and material goods in the north. The family concludes that, it would be difficult to crush *Boko Haram* because of their capacity to reach out beyond Nigeria's territory (Olojo, 2013). Access to firearms, funds and foreign fighters has made the religious terrorism as championed by Boko Haram a deeply rooted transnational phenomenon.

3.3 Counter and Anti-Efforts at Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria:

From the early days of Boko Haram emergence and unceremonious flight to media dominance occasioned by their persistent violent methods, various groups have always reacted to their actions and made attempts to counter them. One of these groups is the government; another is various non-governmental organizations and finally the religious and traditional leaders. To them we turn for explication.

3.3.1 Efforts of the Federal Government:

Political theory has well accounted for the origin, meaning, roles/functions or purpose, and limits of government in the management of the political society (state). The rights and duties of the state are well articulated by the works of political theorists and political philosophers. The crux of their postulations is that the state has it as its core duty to maintain law and order and equally protect lives and property of its citizens as well as provide for their welfare. As the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) rightly confirms in Chapter II, Section 14 and Sub-section 2(b) that, “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. It is within the confines of this constitutional and political framework that the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has made several attempts to return the peace in the affected Northern states.

A) Military Approach:

Alao, Atere and Alao (2012) were convinced that,

The operation of the Boko-Haram initially was not given a serious attention by the Federal Government prior to 2009... The reason was believed to have been premised on the assumption that Boko-Haram initially started as an Islamic organization whose teachings were the purification of Islam and it was not the only one with the same

objective in the Northern axis of Nigeria... the effort to tread softly was governed by the need not to turn the issue into religious or ethnic conflict (P. 7).

The stand of these three scholars was that the government failed to respond promptly and adequately to the security threat which the group posed to the Nigerian State. Their stand was premised on the grounds that the government often resorts to security approach in their quest for peace. For them the government's early sign of wake-up from their seeming slumber and embrace of their responsibility was her arrest of several members of the sect in Bauchi in the year 2009, an action that set the stage for violent confrontation between the sect and members of the public and her government. This resolve to military solution was effective in their view as they maintain that the use or application of force is not required in a socio-political issue.

In all these, the use of military power as a legitimate right of the state was and is still being given priority attention by the successive governments of Nigeria from the Late Umaru Yar'adua led administration, the Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan and that of Retired General Muhammadu Buhari. Despite the government's willingness and commitment to dialogue with these religiously motivated extremists groups that have dealt violently with citizens of the country (affecting foreign nationals, various businesses and non-profit making organizations), it has approached the terrorist violence with overt military overtures.

This over-dependence on military approach has been queried by many a social analyst and critic. For example, Liolio (2012) taking his cue from the American War on Terror (WOT) avers that, it is apposite to therefore say that, terrorism has increased since the Bush Administration declared war on terror... so government must really think twice and possibly coin out other mechanisms to address insurgency". Liolio (2012) avers that,

Before the government crackdown, Boko Haram's capabilities were limited to drive-by shooting and improvised explosives. After the crackdown, the group started targeting churches, police stations, news outfits and are now chiefly into suicide bombing. As bomb and gun attacks in Northern Nigeria have shown, Boko Haram—once a small religious sect—is now a flexible dynamic organization capable of changing tactics (p. 16).

Despite the relative experience of the Nigerian military in guerrilla warfare and other forms of infantry combat, that has seen them at the fore front of African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions around the world, Ahmed, Gregoire and Nathan (2012) observe that the former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika while addressing a Defence Conference he organized concludes that, “the armed forces were not equipped or trained to handle this hybrid terror insurgent threat”. This negative remark alongside other persistent calls from the executive arm of government must have called the attention of some well-to-do countries of the world with efficient military sophistry in terms of intelligence and hardware.

Ahmed, Gregoire and Nathan (2012) were not supportive of the hard-line military approach of the Goodluck Administration at a time when men are ill-equipped to effectively overturn the negative tide of terrorism in the country. Their worry was chiefly anchored on the absence of political sophistication of the government. It was within this purview that the military campaign against the militant *jihadi* group—Boko Haram, that a number of personalities have decreed fowl play on the part of the armed forces and police. This was the case as various human rights organizations and even ethnic and regional bodies fingered the Joint Military Task Force of operating below the demands of rules of engagement. In obedience to orders, some officers have prosecuted their war in ways that made the locals to dread them more than the militant Islamist.

One body, the Borno Elders Forum has even gone ahead to call that the Army Chief should be charged to International Criminal Court (ICC) on grounds of war crime.

Similarly, the government has been accused of ignoring the root causes to conflicts especially violent ones in favour of her military powers in quelling a domestic uprising. The government's focus on violence is because "violence often catches the attention of government and the need to ensure security rather than finding lasting solution to problems are the primary considerations" (Alao, Atare, and Alao, 2012: p.8). Thus, governments scratch conflicts from its surface and drift far away from the real issues of such conflict. They further observe that when government miss this mark of critically exploring peace proposals and adoption of non-violent actions, they reach a wrong conclusion that peace has been restored when they deal dirty blow on important personalities and players or alleged sponsors of terror.

This has obviously been the case as the government has on several occasions announced to the world that they have won the war against terror in the North Eastern region of the country. Surprisingly, within a very short space of time they will reaffirm the misplacement of strategy and consequently refute their claims. In such instances, attacks from the terrorists are often more deadly and gory to ensure they make rubbish of any earlier claim from the government.

B) Declaration of a State of Emergency:

A strategic legal action of the Federal Government of Nigeria during the Goodluck Jonathan led administration was to declare a state of emergency in three of the most affected states of the religious insurgency. These are Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. The declaration came on the 14 of May 2013. A major concern and source of criticism for many was the style the President adopted. He allowed the various States and Local Government Chairmen and respective legislative arms of government at those levels to remain in their various offices and did not place any Sole

Military Administrator as is the usual practice in such extreme situation. Dandada (2012) sees this declaration as one of the containing measures of the Federal Government and it is a measure intended to give members of the security agencies unhindered power to deal promptly with the situation.

This declaration came as a direct reaction to checkmate the rapid rate of growth of the militant Islamist group that utilizes the terrorist tactics in their insurgent agenda. For the first time, the sect gained control over about ten municipalities in the affected area of northeastern Nigeria and the government was bent on destroying them from their stronghold in the border axes of Niger, Chad and Cameroun (Zenn, n.d.). Zeen observes that though the efforts of the army yielded some fruits for a short while, but by the end of that same year (2013), the group had resumed a more deadly and brutal massacre on Nigeria.

A card-carrying member of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) from Adamawa State, Professor Jubril Aminu, a cardiologist, a former Minister of Education, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, a one-time Vice-Chancellor of the University of Maiduguri and two times Senator of the Federal Republic, in an interview with the Assistant Editor of the Nations News Paper, Mr. Obogo observes that,

I would have preferred the emergency declaration to be more thorough so that the effects will be on the insurgents and maybe on the politicians. Like now, it looks to me that it is only the security agencies that have been gingered up and their heavy might will ultimately fall on the ordinary people... However, I still think that unless care is taken, once more, the people who will feel the effect most, apart from the insurgents that they are looking for, will be the ordinary law-abiding citizens (P. 24).

This kind of comment by a personality as Professor Jubril goes to a large extent to show that the declaration of state of emergency is defeatist at worst and misplaced at best. The precise mention of politicians shows that he acknowledges the fact that politicians are deeply involved in the birth of the insurgent terrorism.

3.3.2 Non-military Intervention:

The Federal government of Nigeria has made other efforts to engage, stop or at least reduce the impact of terrorism in Nigeria. These efforts are considered as non-military in their approach as the use of brute force was not exercised in this realm.

A) Evolving of a Legal Framework on Terrorism:

The first non-military intervention of the Federal government of Nigeria was to legislate on a legal basis for the determination, prosecution and punishment of criminal offenders of terrorism. The legal efforts in this instance became known and referred to as the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011. Danbaba (2012) has it that, “before the advent of full blown terrorism in Nigeria, there was no known law in our statute books that could serve as a guide for security operatives in prosecuting offenders of terrorist acts”.

The outcome of this legislative process was not easily arrived at. The then Senate President, David Mark, was personally pushy and enthusiastic at bringing an end to the ‘religious insurgency’ as the mindless violence and terror breeding activities of BH and allied *jihadi* groups were later referred as. This Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) was passed in June 2011 with an aim that it will usher in a framework for defeating the Boko Haram threat and terrorism in the country (Udounwa, 2013).

The Nigerian former National Security Adviser, General Owoye Azazi stated in 2011 that Nigeria’s security infrastructure was inadequate to deal with Boko Haram threat. On the part of the

Goodluck Jonathan led Administration, all the necessary support were accorded this executive bill that was earlier sent and adequately sponsored by the executive arm of government and beyond this, as the United States Department of State (2011) cited in Udounwa (2013) disclosed that the Presidency also created the position of national counter-terrorism coordinator (NCTC).

B) Negotiation:

Despite the overt dependence on military approach to quell the violent rebellion from various well motivated Islamists groups especially Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria's north, the federal government also engaged in negotiation with their members, representatives and trusted peace-brokers (mediators) of the groups. Negotiation or dialogue was an integral part of the amnesty offered the militant Islamists groups if they are willing to stop the physical, psychological and emotional damages inflicted on the citizenry and government of the country.

A major outcome from this negotiation was the idea of granting amnesty to the dissident violent activists. This was the case because amnesty was severally demanded by some northerners especially the Sultan of Sokoto, who remains the head of all Muslims in the geopolitical enclave called Nigeria.

On one occasion, the then Vice President, Architect Namadi Sambo, on a representative capacity was at Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the group. Saudi was a choice for the Jihad group for reasons that border on religious heritage, ideological center and funds for sponsorship of radical thoughts. The result of this attempt was fruitless as the level of distrust and mutual suspicion was high on both sides of the negotiating interlocutors.

A particular human rights activist was picked by the Jihad group for the preservation and protection of their interests. Ahmed played this role on several occasions and was even employed at a time by the federal government to help negotiate with a group of BH members that held

hostages and demanded for ransom. All these were done in furtherance of soft power in the intervention efforts of the federal government of Nigeria.

Regrettably, the demands of the Jihad group were zero-sum and showed that they occupy an advantageous position in the negotiation. They seem very confident of their violent prowess since they have by far killed more people in the prosecution of their ideas and succeeded to a large extent to cause more fear among the local populace. Thus, they bargained from a position of strength noting that they have held the federal government in her jugular and exposed her under-belly as a result of that.

Udounwa (2013) avers that the, former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo attempted to mediate between the Nigerian government and the group in September 2011 with two major outcomes. They are first the offer of amnesty to the group by the Nigerian government in October 2011 and a proposal for dialogue with the insurgents in January 2012. These brought little or no achievements due to mistrust evident in leakages of details to the local media. No wonder, Agekameh (2012) cited in Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012) was never in support of any form of “carrot and stick” approach via negotiation with the dissident group.

The trio affirm that, “...rather than recourse to dialogue at this stage, as being suggested in certain quarters, government should engage the sect in a battle royale. Otherwise, other groups may suddenly spring up like mushrooms and expect government to pamper them”. For Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012) dialogue (and even amnesty grant) will only worsen the security condition in the country by producing nefarious groups. As such the government should show its might and capacity to keep the peace as it is only then that Nigerians can lay claim to having a government that is responsible.

C) Offer of Amnesty:

According to Nwozor (2013)

In the face of apparent failure of the various joint military task forces to bring the menace of Boko Haram under control, it was not surprising that the Federal government decided to extend the olive branch to the sect as part of its non-military strategies to bring the human and psychological trauma, which the sect has engendered, to an end (p. 9).

Nwozor was convinced that the conditions of the Niger Delta Militants amnesty and the proposed government grant of amnesty to the Jihad group is not one and the same. In his words, he called the Boko Haram case “*non sequitur*”. This means a solution that has no bearing or relevance to the premises or problems that preceded it. For him, Boko Haram terroristic violence has no semblance as the violence of Niger Delta Militants and as such they don’t need nor deserve any amnesty granted to them since the government could not possibly placate “ghost terrorists”.

Nwozor was very convinced that by no means will the BH case for amnesty ever pass the “justice impact assessment” demands. This stand of his was premised on the ground that the fundamental rights and expectations of people will not meet the demands of justice through amnesty as a matter of multiplier effect. The multi-layer losses of the people must be reconciled with such desire to grant amnesty. Such as injury, loss of livelihood and psychological trauma suffered by the people. In this sense, it seem like the amnesty grant is a congratulatory grant for a job well done and as such, self-defeatist.

Nwozor (2013) was not oblivious of the fact that amnesty as “a political tool deployed to address issues which military actions may not resolve satisfactorily, it has elements of justice” (P. 10). He concludes that, “The logic associated with the proposal to grant amnesty to Boko Haram

insurgents is patently deficient as it does not appear to address the issues of justice, morality and ethicalness contingent upon the extension of amnesty to the sect” (p. 10).

Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012) in their reflection on the amnesty demanded by some Nigerians with Islamic inclinations and offered to the BH sect was premised on the fact that the Niger Delta militants benefited from an amnesty programme, as such, members of the sect should be given same. Hence, for them, the demand by pro-amnesty advocates revealed ethnic and religious biases because it does not portray any coherent logic in terms of rationalism, patriotism and objectivity. They liken such demand as purely a fallacy of irrelevant conclusion (*ignoratio elenchi*).

Though, Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012) did not question the government’s right of offering an amnesty to the group, as they acknowledge that, “amnesty as an executive act is contained in section 175 of the 1999 Constitution as prerogative of mercy...the president can exercise this power but does this group of terrorists deserve it?” (P. 242). They see the offer as discomfoting because BH activities are against toleration, freedom of religion and worse still, a source of anarchy in the country.

D) Educational Approach:

The terrorism in Nigeria is not a state terrorism or political assassination of individual rulers. Rather, it is terrorism by a revolutionary group. It is an organized non-governmental group (BH) inspired by politico-religious ideals and violently committed to socio-political changes in the polity (Tiechman, 2006). This religious non-state actor (RNSA) is dependent on ordinary and vulnerable citizens and people forcefully co-opted into their fold. As Tiehcmman (2006) has it, “conscription is the tap-root of militarism” (P. 173). Belligerents have often been recruited for the propagation of this war through terrorist stragegy since its inception.

They are made up of young boys and girls conscripted to play various complimentary war-time roles. While the males were sent to battle grounds pursuant to their miliatarist and political end, sexual slaves were made out of the females and over time they grow to become accomplices of their captors and kidnappers, as suicide bombers. As Cleaves (2015) has it, “kidnapped women and girls are used as slaves, intelligence gathers (sic), and to lure targets into a kill zone” (P. 17).

Prior to the involvement of the aforementioned categories, a readily available army that is perpetually on standby in northern Nigeria for a long time do exist. They are popularly knowned as ‘almajiri’. *Almajiri* is a word borrowed from Arabic for someone who leaves his home in search of knowledge in Islamic religion (Padio-yola, 2011). In other words, they are students of the religion of Islam and its sacred language under the tutelage of a Mallam (teacher). Padio-yola (2011) has it that,

The ancient tradition, whereby poor families from rural areas across northern Nigeria send their children to Islamic boarding schools (almajirchi) has denigrated into a security threat to Nigeria. The almajiri menace may soon defy both legal and political solution, especially given its Boko Haram connotation (P. 1).

The Boko Haram Islamic terrorist sect has been classified as the most deadly terror group in the world by the Global Terrorism Index. Similarly, herdsmen operating in and around Nigeria are listed as the fourth most deadly terror group. While these statistics steers the global community on the face and directly challenge the legitimacy of the President Goodluck Jonathan administration, His Excellency swung into action.

While acknowledging the importance of education in informing the hearts of man and shaping his character, the Federal Government of Nigeria embarked upon an educational program to help her bring to its end Islamic extremism as championed by the violent jihadists, Boko Haram

in Nigeria. One hundred and sixty five (165) Almajiri elementary and high schools were established in each of the nineteen (19) states of Northern Nigeria to combine Islamic education with Western education (Ogbonna, 2017). *Almajiri* or nomadic education was vigorously pursued by the President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's administration. The challenge of out-of-school children was placed at 9 million in the country according to the President's National Address on Democracy Day of May 29, 2012.

Padio-Yola (2011) corroborated this effort of President Jonathan's administration when he opines that,

Now that President Jonathan has declared full support for the implementation of the integration of Quranic education system into the regular school system, authorities therefore, must match words with action because ignoring these vulnerable children could be dire. States where the Child Right Act has been signed into law should wake up and ensure that the act is implemented. Those yet to pass it into law should consider those innocent children and pass the law to afford them at least the Universal Basic Education (P. 3).

The educational imperative of enlightening the almajiris in pursuit of anti-terrorism ends is self-evident. As Padio-Yola (2011) puts, "this is necessary because they are a real threat, a real problem to the society and may take over the control of this country in a very unpleasant manner; they are truly a violent threat to Nigeria, but first its victims. The fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of wisdom" (P. 3).

E) Establishment of Small Arms Proliferation Taskforce:

The closure of several international borders in northern Nigeria to checkmate human movements and curtail the activities of people whose illegal visit (immigration) and stay in the

country can and indeed has posed and continues to pose serious security threat to Nigerian citizens. Danbaba (2012) opines has,

Recent arrest of some members of the Boko Haram sect by Security Agencies in Plateau, Kano, and Kaduna States respectively have shown that most members of the Sect that were arrested with their Nigerian counterparts are nationals of some neighbouring countries, such as Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.

The other part of this human threat is the movement of arms and ammunition for the devastation and decimation of human population.

No doubt, the overwhelming availability of illicit arms and ammunitions are tonics that boost and lure unscrupulous elements in their violent garb to perpetrate violent crimes which are morally despicable and socially dehumanizing (Udeagha, 2011). It has often been decried that insecurity continues to spread because of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), as without these gadgets violence can hardly find expression especially in its physical and bodily forms.

The availability of weapons in the hands of the wrong people has impacted negatively on security in the Lake Chad sub-region (Oluwadare, 2016). For Oluwadare (2016) these arms were construed to have been smuggled into the area through the un-policed and porous borders which have been used to commit crimes against the state. This is neglecting the locally manufactured ones and the category gotten from the country's military and other arm-wielding personnel upon dislodgment and defeat.

The possession of these weapons, their relative good use in the hands of the enemy and their exploits over the Nigerian state, made the issue of small arms and light weapons a course for concern at various quarters. In the Nigerian state's response or reaction if you may, a National

Taskforce to Combat Illegal Importation/Smuggling of Small Arms, Ammunition, Light and Chemical Weapons (NATFORCE) was established. Though, the idea for this agency originally came from the Importers Association of Nigeria (IAN), conceived as a private-public initiative and was inaugurated by the former Minister of Trade and Investment, Olusengun Aganga and later supervised by the Ministry of Interior under the Office of the National Security Adviser (Nwokolo, 2016).

The newly approved government agency was saddled with the responsibility of monitoring, locating, retrieving and destroying all illegal arms, ammunition and light weapons within the territory of the Nigerian state. They exist to put a stop to all such deadly materials that give easy aid to human torture, destruction and death.

3.3.3 Foreign Governments' Efforts:

Several friendly foreign governments and their organizations or agencies were concerned about the plight of victims of the war pursued through terrorist strategy in Northern Nigeria, hence, their commitment to help put an end to the politico-religiously motivated insurgency. Their efforts will be examined through their military support or assistants. To them we turn:

A) Military Support:

Our globalizing, interconnected and mutually dependent world is characterized by corporation, indifference and hostility in the relations among sovereign nations. Thus, cooperation exists not only in commerce, science, technology and human capital development through training and capacity building but, also in security and defense framework for support. All of these are guided by the instrumentality of international laws, international organizations and courts for their enforcements.

It is on the bases of these international realities that Falode (2016) admits that, “to Nigeria, externalizing the conflict ensured international support to check the insurgency...internalizing the conflict especially connecting it in terms of a war on terror, has allowed Nigeria greater access to foreign military hardware, know-how and funds” (Lines 16-17).

Though, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in the year 1994 to combat trans-border banditry in northern parts of Nigeria and comprises troops from Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin, a recent treaty or agreement was signed with the aforementioned countries safe for Benin to fight Boko Haram at the border areas with the common platform of a joint security patrols (Falode, 2016). This bilateral agreement on terrorism was entered to ensure joint fight against the disturbers of the peace.

After a meeting with his French counterpart, Francois Hollande in Paris, the President of Benin, Thomas Boni Yayi was very equivocal that with the determination of President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, they are going to put an end to odious phenomenon of insecurity through a Joint Military Task Force. This news came as a result of the proposed meeting by various Heads of State in Africa. The Benin President pledged his willingness to send troops for this mission in the Nigerian soil provided there will be adequate United Nations Security Council backup through legislative Resolution that will allow countries to participate in it.

As a part of the global response to terrorism or the “war on terror” as it is popularly called, the United State Government formed an organization to combat the local threat of terrorism in the African continent. The formation of AFRICOM in February 2007 by the US government was the need “to prevent if not stop terrorist being brought up in Africa’s ailing economy, weak, failing and failed states attacking America and its Western ally’s (sic) interest

globally” (Muhammad, nd: 32). Muhammad further disclosed that, “AFRICOM’s stated mission is therefore to prevent conflicts by promoting stability regionally and eventually prevail over extremism by never letting its seeds germinate in Africa” (P. 34).

With the global posture of the U.S. exhibiting both economic and military might and with Nigeria’s long relationship with her, the successive governments of Nigeria have depended so much on the greatest world power of modern global history, the United States of America with various expressions from the leading country of the free-world. This level of dependence exhibited by the Nigerian state has led a top U.S. official in Nigeria by name, Garett to bring to remembrance to Nigerians that, “it is Nigerians responsibility, first and foremost, to provide for the safety of its citizens” (Meek and Hughes, 2014).

In the face of Nigerian government’s search for international support, the U.S. State Department said it has been working to help counter Boko Haram for years. It did this through the provision of critical tools and support, like rendering support to the Nigerian military via training her personnel in countering of the threat. Also, they maintain that they have helped the Nigerian law enforcement agencies to better investigate and assist in hostage situations and through economic assistance by job creation; training and education to stem the tide and causes of extremism (Meek and Hughes, 2014).

Meek and Hughes (2014) opine that the conversation between the United States of America and Nigeria was full of accusations and rebutters from both sides. A former top diplomat for Africa, in the Obama’s administration, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, maintains that the Nigerian record was one longstanding factor in rendering aid to them. Obajir (2015) highlighted some reasons why the U.S. does not trust Nigeria’s military because of their human rights records, corruption, and the ease at which they lose weapons to the enemy. It got up to a

point that training of some Nigeria Army battalions by the U.S. was discontinued alongside the U.S. blocking Nigeria's efforts to buy arms to fight the insurgents.

In the U.S. government's response, they defended their stand when they said they have supported Nigeria to the extent their law can permit but did not fail to accuse the security forces of Nigeria of human rights violations. They maintain that their law does not allow sales of arms to countries with such human rights records (Obajir, 2015). Obajir further asserts that, defense analyst believe another possible reason why the U.S. refuses to sell arms to Nigeria was because it feared sophisticated military hardware could end up in the hands of Islamist insurgents. Indeed, Boko Haram militants have on numerous occasions seized arms from fleeing Nigerian soldiers.

Cooper and Searcey (2016) corroborated the above mentioned accusation with an Amnesty International Report which has it that, "149 people had died this year in detention in Nigeria military's Giwa barrack in Maiduguri...Among the victims were 11 children under the age 6, including 4 infants...The prisoners died of disease, starvation, dehydration or gunshot wounds". In their characteristic manner, the Nigerian military's rebuttal called the report, "completely baseless, uninformed and source-less with intent of denting the image of the Nigerian Armed forces".

Moving from the President Goodluck Jonathan to the Muhammad Buhari's administrations, barely two (2) years of blocking a sale of American-made helicopters to Nigeria from Israeli government, the Obama administration committed itself to selling up to 12 light attack aircraft to Nigeria in their support to fight the country's war against the Boko Haram militant group (Cooper and Searcey, 2016). Despite the improvement in their relationship and transactions, a measure of scrutiny and suspicion still characterizes the U.S. military relations with Nigeria this is evident in the attempted procurement of the Super Tucano attack warplane.

The U.S. bypassed the Nigerian government and instead chooses to work directly with the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Cooper and Searcey, 2016).

3.3.4 Religious Leaders, Traditional Rulers and Elders' Efforts:

There are three main approaches of involvement by religious leaders, traditional rulers and elders' on the terrorism in Nigeria. Their efforts are enumerated below:

A) Call for an Offer of Amnesty:

The Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of Nigerian Muslims in Nigeria, Alhaji Said Abubakar, was very apt to advise the Federal Government to give amnesty to the Islamic *jihadi* group, *Boko Haram*. But as the Cross Rivers state Resident Electoral Commission, Mike Igini observes, "...the challenge has always been who to dialogue with and the issue to dialogue on" (Ani, 2013). Igini expresses his pessimism over dialogue when he disclosed that the failed efforts of former President Olusegun Obasanjo and the gruesome murder of the supposed mediator of the sect was a major setback to dialogue.

Majority of Northerners were filled with hopes that after the president's visit sometime in March 2013 that he will grant amnesty to the dissident group in the North, *Boko Haram*. They often draw parallel from the amnesty granted by Jonathan's predecessor, late Umaru Musa Yar'adua. They presume that since Yar'adua gave amnesty to militants of Niger-Delta over the environmental pollution and ecological disaster in the area, President Jonathan should follow suit and grant amnesty to the *jihadists* from the North.

This demand or expectation by the North has given rise to a serious debate or crisis in the country. For example, Abubakar Tsav, a notable northern elder observes that, present Goodluck Jonathan is not sincere in his handling of *Boko Haram* issue. *Boko Haram* terrorists are battle-fatigued and some of them are willing to embrace amnesty in part of the country (Ejembi,

Ahmed, Orude and Omolehin, 2013). Also, Sani Yusuf Danmasani, the Secretary of Conference of Nigeria Political Parties (CNPP) Zamfara Chapter, saw the President's refusal to grant amnesty to the terrorist as born of ill advise and a major set-back for the president's future ambition. For Ani, he sees discrimination as the only reason for Jonathan's denial of the Islamic terrorists of Northern Nigeria.

Chief Abu King Suluwa similarly accuses the President of not caring for people of the North by not granting amnesty to the violent sect. Similarly, a house of Representative member from Sokoto state, Honorable Shuiabu Gwandu Gobin equally expresses his displeasure over the President's refusal to grant amnesty to Boko Haram while drawing attention to the late President Yar'adua's amnesty to the Niger-Delta militants. He observes that the government gave the pardon. Even the former governor of Bauchi state, Alhaji Garba Gobi decried the situation as unfair, for the President to refuse the advice of His Eminence, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Elders of Borno and other well meaning leaders from the North. He further affirms that some members of the violent group are willing to negotiate with the President just that the President says members of the group are faceless.

The investigation conducted by Ali, Oguntola and O'Neil (2013) shows that the Governors, Emirs, Opinion and Political leaders are backing the Sultan's call for amnesty. This may cause the Northern leaders not to back the administration's efforts at winning the war against the *jihadi* terror groups. Their anger seems to be pitched on the fact that the President Goodluck Jonathan's government did not brief the Sultan adequately and above that did not agree with His Eminence, the Sultan. They were offended that the Sultan's opinion could just be discarded with a wave of the hand. It is for similar reasoning and perception of people from the North that prompted the credibility loss and lack of legitimacy accorded the Jonathan led

administration. These two ingredients helped in the successful failure of the President at the 2015 polls and can also cost him his possible future ambitions.

On the contrary, the Executive Secretary of the Northern Christian Association of Nigeria, Professor Daniel Babaji, was of the opinion that, “it would amount to violence and criminality if such amnesty is granted to a group that is operating under cover”. He concludes that the objective of *Boko Haram* is to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, simply. Some other notable Southern leaders were vehement in opposing their Northern counterparts. Ali, Oguntola and O’Neil (2013) captured some of the vocal personalities when they mentioned the President of Conference of Ethnic Nationalities of the Niger Delta, Professor Kimse Okoko, who maintains that, “the sect had wasted too many lives and showed no remorse or commitment to dialogue” (P. 3). The president of Izon-Ebe Oil Producing Communities Forum, Mr. Edougha Moses, accused prominent northern politicians especially Alhaji Rabiul Musa Kwankwanso, the Governor of Kano state for hiding under the violence of Boko Haram to unleash mayhem on hapless Nigerians in order to gain cheap political points.

Alamu, a Columnist with the Nations national daily (news paper) in one of his articles titled, ‘The census of ghost (An Easter Combo)’ captures the discrepancy of the North-South imbroglio as touching the issue of negotiation and facelessness when he observes that,

Without any doubt, the Boko Haram sect has become the greatest threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria since the civil war. The organization, as expected of all guerilla outfits, is shadowy and shrouded in mystery. Whatever its provenance, whether secular or theocratic in inspiration, no insurgent group worth its salt goes about brandishing the names of its leaders (P. 5).

Though a statement of fact, his stand seem like a corroboration of the position of the group that does not see any need to negotiate with the Jihad group since they are not willing and are not meant to expose themselves to the government.

Map 4: **A Political Map of Nigeria Showing the North-South Divide**



Retrieved from www.nigerianinfopedia.com on 12-10-2017.

B) Public Condemnation of the Violence:

No doubt, the Nigerian militant Islamist (jihadist) and terrorist group, the Boko Haram has attracted local and global outcry due to its constant attacks on innocent Nigerian citizens characterized by bloodbath, brigandage and brutality. A number of vocal Islamic clerics have

dared to criticize the group's interpretation of Islam and their violent approach to righting the wrongs they see in the society. The groups's unwillingness to face their harsh criticisms made them to put an end to the lives of the critics despite their belongingness to the Ummah (community of believers) in Nigeria.

Sahara Reporters (2010) captures one of such killing in Maiduguri, a stronghold of the dissident group. They report that, "in the ancient city of Maiduguri, they shot and killed a prominent Islamic preacher, Sheik Bashir Mustapha just in front of his house". The source added that, "the scholar was known to be critical of the Boko Haram sect and a close ally to the then governor of the state, His Excellency, Ali Modu Sheriff".

Similarly, Sheik Ahmed Gumi, who has been very brave in speaking out bluntly against the sect and their evils, has received a number of attempt at his life and on a very close ground escaped death. Akowe (2013) in his retort on the Sheik's plight has it that, "no Islamic scholar in the north had spoken against activities of the group in such a manner and there are those who believe that his statements against the group marked him out as a potential target for attack". Another Sheik by the name, Dahiru Bauchi, a prominent scholar was also targeted by the Islamist militant along Alkali road in Kaduna. The Sheik is a consistent preacher that speaks against the activities of the sect in the North. He has repeatedly called upon the violent group to stop their violence and dialogue with the government (Lawal, 2014).

In the same Kaduna state, another prominent Islamic scholar and leader of the Salafis movement of Nigeria, Sheik Muhammad Auwal Adam Albani, a well known critic of Boko Haram movement who looks forward to a time when Muslim youths will have a mastery of Islamic jurisprudence alongside with western education so that they can imbibe the fear of Allah in everything they do, was shot dead by gunmen in Zaria (Olasope, 2014).

At the international or global level, a number of famous and prominent celebrities have spoken out against the persistent propagation of violence against the people of the country and some unlucky foreign nationals. Their calls were focused on calling the federal government of Nigeria to put the carnage to its end. Kloe Kardashian, Angelina Jolie, Solange Knowles, Boris Kodjoe, and Marlon Waynes a meaningful representation of personalities from the American pop-culture and entertainment industry had on one time or the other lend their voices to the unrestrained butchery.

For Kloe Kardeshian she says, “Can you imagine the fear that makes you let go of your child’s hand? My prayers are with you Nigeria”. She concludes that, “religion is not the focus here. The fact is any life taken is devastating and unacceptable”. Similarly, Angelina Jolie in her comment affirms that,

Each new crime committed by Boko Haram exceeds the last in brutality. This is a direct consequence of the environment of total impunity in which Boko Haram operates. Every time they get away with mass murder, rape and the enslavement of women and children, they are emboldened.

It is instructive to note that public condemnation of the terroristic violence was marked by threats and fulfilment of them. A number of persons have paid the supreme price for venturing into denouncing the atrocities committed by the seemingly misguided religious zealots.

C) Advocacy for Peace Communication:

A number of religious leaders, traditional rulers and elders who are well recognized and respected in the country for their leadership at their various levels and spheres of influence, have one time or the other used their good offices to call for peace. They repeatedly call for members

of the dreadful Islamist militants to shield their sword and come to the negotiation table or embrace peace straight-out in the interest of national unity.

The leader of Nigerian Muslims, His Eminence, Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto and Head of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in Nigeria and co-chair of the Nigerian Inter-religious Council (NIREC) has on several occasions sued for peace and a seizure to the bloodbath under the guise of any ideology, let alone religion. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was not quiet in the face of this intricate and confusing political situation.

On several occasions they have as a Christian block condemned the spate of human decimations and incalculable material destruction. The seeming unending embroilment prompted the central (umbrella) Christian group in the country to condemn, "in the strongest terms the continued killing of innocent Nigerians for no justifiable reason in different parts of the country, stating that the blood of these innocent citizens will surely cry out for justice" (Eyoboka, 2012:1).

The then National President of CAN, in the person of Pastor Ayo Aritsejafor while calling the federal and state government to put an end to the security threat, was quoted by Eyoboka (2012) to have decried that, "these heinous and barbaric criminal acts against the Nigerian state must not be allowed to break our collective resolve to remain as one indivisible entity and pursue the path of peace and progress".

Similarly, Secretary-General of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) Pastor Wale Adefarasin notes that the continuous existence of Nigeria was being threatened by the insecurity in the country. He made this comment while condemning the Christmas Day bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state by Boko Haram. For fear of neglect of the Christian population by the security forces, he concludes by urging Christians to be vigilant

during that year's yuletide and be ready to defend themselves in the absence of protection by the law enforcement agencies (Adesomoju, 2011).

CHAPTER FOUR

IMPLICATIONS OF TERRORISM AND JUST WAR IN ISLAM: AN ETHICAL EVALUATION

4.1 Implications of Terrorism in Nigeria:

The violent activities of Islamist militants in Nigeria's North have brought about untold (negative) damages to both human and material life. Similarly, as a form of response to these challenges some positive developments or activities have resultantly emerged.

4.1.1 Negative Implications:

Terrorism's ability to cause untold pain, misery and death, makes it a scourge of uncommon standing. Alao, Atere and Alao (2012) have maintained that the fall out of Boko Haram like other multi-dimensional conflicts in Nigeria have left behind an inestimable damage to every facet of life in the country. The negative implications of terrorism in Nigeria are an expression of inestimable damages and fractures on peace and holistic development and to them we turn.

A) Safety and Security Implications:

Terrorism at its very essence both in theory and as an activity (in practice) is sharply juxtaposed to security. Security which connotes a state of freedom from danger, injury, fear and anxiety has been disrupted and distorted since the wake of violent acts of terrorism in Nigeria's Northern region. The chronic and pervasive insecurity challenge that terrorism regime has brought to the various stakeholders both within and outside the affected Northern state can hardly be calculated.

Schools, Commercial banks, Churches, relaxation and recreational centers are hardly open and when they do, high senses of fear grip their operatives and would be customers. In

Chibok, Bama, Baga and other nearby towns and villages, social and economic activities are grounded. The hit and run tactic where members of the group attack villages in the dark of the night and lay waste to both human and economic resources has shown that the groups activity has defied most security strategies devised by the authorities so far.

Members of the violent group also operate in broad daylight and whisk whatever is of importance to them especially food stuffs, financial resources and young women and ‘disappear’ with them into their hideout without hindrance from security operatives. They on some occasion give notice of their visit, knowing too well that members of the security operatives will hardly stand on their way either for lack of intelligence, relevant materials and machines, morale or lack of a real desire to engage them for political or religious reasons. A level of sincerity characterizes their promises, because they hardly fail to keep to their words. Thus, they never fail to honour their words because they will always come in their terror and carry out their operation without any real opposition from Military Joint Task Force and their volunteer civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) i.e. vigilante groups counterpart.

The general perception or assumption that daylight is safer for people to move around and conduct their legitimate businesses, walk in their neighbourhood or remain in their houses and can get help if anything goes wrong from security operatives or even neighbours, has been overtaken by regrettable and deadly events in Nigeria’s North. Perpetration of acts of terrorism transcends this natural tendency to an extent that people have lost their sense of day and night as fear and terror is the only sure reality. A sort of uncertainty is evident as the clear-cut distinction between night characterized by darkness and day (light) is no longer glaring.

Isyaku (2013) quips that,

The wide scale destruction of life (sic) and properties by terrorist activities in the northern part of the country has crippled the once buoyant economic fortress of Kano and the tourism life of Plateau states, the main cities and towns in the north are now living in abject fear (P. 21).

He went further to observe that insecurity breeds fear which, "...have dominated the mindset of the people that they no longer patronize religious places of worships in their thousands, everybody is suspecting one another because no one knows who the terrorist is."

Figure 1: A Picture of Boko Haram's Mass Killings from an Early Morning Attack



As a result of the increasing wave of terrorism in the country, various foreign diplomats comprising of the High Commissioners of Trinidad and Tobago, Rwanda and Mali cried out to the Federal Government for protection. To make a case for their safety and security, they complained to the Federal Capital Territory Minister, Senator Bala Muhammad. They requested that improved security be accorded their diplomatic community in Abuja.

Figure 2: The Military, Security and Paramilitary Personnel at the Scene of a Terror Attack



The scourge of terrorism in Nigeria has proven to be a perennial domestic security concern with far more alarming and disconcerting dimension that tends not only to threaten the substratum of our national security edifice but also regional security balance. Outside the menace of violent rape, kidnapping, gory death through slow machete cuts, dagger piecing, and inhuman dissipation through suicide bombing from Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's), many residents have immigrated out of their hostile and 'death bringing' localities for want of safety and security. These induced movements have assumed the status of a 'natural disaster'.

The security of lives and property as well as welfare or provisions of social amenities are among other things the core responsibility of a government in modern societies. But in situations where all strategies put in place by government goes unproductive and grossly ineffective in face

of the technological sophistry of terrorists, is alarming. The government has introduced various models or approaches to crime control in the state but regrettably without a lasting solution to the violent crime. Military intervention has so far not been able to curb the growing menace as it merely serves as a reaction to the acts of violence.

These spates of violence often bring about breakdown of law and order. At such times, safety of human lives and security of property are compromised. Risks of various shades, dangers of been hurt unexpectedly by either the terrorist sporadic open fire or the bullets or bombardment of the Joint Military Task Force is a major caution to unrestrained movement by unarmed civilians. Unassuming citizens could even face a new threat from criminals who capitalize on the situation to now robe people of their property and any remnant valuable.

A sense of hopelessness is seen in the gory tales of the *Boko Haram* scourge in Nigeria. This is because apart from the populace that are sympathetic to the cause of the *jihadi* sect, the military and other intelligence and security agents are deep into the perpetration of violence against the defenseless civilians because they share in the violent ideologies of the terrorist. It is for knowledge of this type of personalities that the former President decried that, *Boko Haram* has infiltrated his government, emphasizing the fact that they are everywhere. For these reasons, Isyaku (2013) maintains that,

The patriotic zeal of the nation's law enforcement officials are placed under severe scrutiny because of the threat of switching allegiance and sympathy to terrorist has placed Nigeria on a dangerous path and it will take a long time before this situation can come under control (P. 21).

In the light of the aforementioned, it becomes no news to know that in 2015 some military (army) officers were accused of mutiny and subjected to outright dismissal from the service on

grounds of their show of fear in the face of their enemies. This sanction came at a time when controversies over poor working equipments and low motivation owing to lack of adequate welfare packages were decried by officers who loss some of their comrades to the war against terror in Nigeria.

In fact, it is for similar aforementioned reasons that Oluwadare (2016) decried that,

Boko Haram has also put the military to shame and revealed its inadequacies. The security situation became so precarious that the Nigerian leader became suspicious of the incompetence of their military commanders. This suspicion has led to their regular replacement (P. 47).

Oluwadare quoted the Air Chief Marshal, Alex Badeh a former Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) as validating the inadequacies and incompetence of the country's military when he states that, "the military he headed lacked adequate equipment to fight Boko Haram".

B) Psychological Implications:

Tied to security challenge at the personal (individual) and collective (group) levels is the psychological effect of terrorism. Terrorism poses a particular scourge to humans and deeply affects their psyche due to the level of fear birthed by the violent activities evident in large scale threats and actual attacks by the *Jihadi* group, Boko Haram. Because acts of terrorism lead to loss of lives and property as well as overwhelming fear as an end product, Ugwulebo's (2011) allusion stands true that "fear is the de-psychologisation of the human person" (162). This is the case as various acts of terror affect not only the physical but also the psychological well-being of its victims and the audience.

Figure 3: A Picture Depicting Damages from Terrorists acts to Human Life and Property



Retrieved from the Associated Press (2012).

Peace of mind which counts for the feeling of safety and freedom from fear is adversely threatened by the ruthless maiming and killing of innocent human lives and destruction of incalculable property. Terrorism as a canker incapacitates the individual and impairs the collective sensibilities of people in the various Northern states and beyond, because at times of extreme fear the human mind is beclouded and optimal productivity cannot be guaranteed nor verged for. Anyacho (2009) puts this idea in this light that the, “Reign of terror instills fear in the mind of the people, while threats of violence or violence itself instills greater dimension of fear and instability. A society bedeviled by fear or besieged by terrorism is a death-prone society” (P. 120).

With the level of unpredictability and ubiquity of terrorists in the area, some families took to flight for fear of death, the thoughts of watching their loved ones murdered in cooled-blood. The peoples of Northern Nigeria seem to be caught in insomnia. Whenever they experience any relief, they sleep with both eyes open. This is made worst at times of mourning, the bereaved are well drenched in the pool of widespread fear. Anyacho (2009) sees the first aspect of fear as the fear of survival. Any person can be a victim of terrorism since terrorists do not always give signals as to when they will attack. Thus terrorism creates series of fear and anxiety in people (P. 120-121).

Even among members of the Jihad group, especially those categories that were forcefully conscripted through various ploys, threat and fear are still utilized to keep them under check and bounds. Modu, a twenty two (22) year old Muslim fighter in the *Boko Haram* sect was reported to have castigated the group when he enthused that, “It is a terrible thing to be a member of the sect but many foot soldiers like me cannot leave for fear of being killed” (Eriye, 2013). He further avows that he was forced into the group but notes that the movement has many willing and educated members.

Intercepting security and safety, a serious psychological challenge was displayed by people of Anambra state. This was as a result of the Federal Government’s deployment of some 200 *Boko Haram* detainees as inmates to the Ekulobia Prison in Aguata Local Government Area of the state. The action of the Federal Government was vehemently opposed and rejected by a combined representation of clergy, religious organization, business and trade union associations and other civil society groups. The State Chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Traditional Rulers from the area were very active in the protest and peaceful march to drive home their collective grievances (Enyim and Nwaiwu, 2015). The protesters made it clear that

South East and Anambra for that matter is not home to terrorists from the north as they suspect that this was an avenue for the north to send some *jihadist* down South for terroristic purposes.

C) Economic and Financial Implications:

Ukandu (2012) earlier avers that,

The economy of any society is a wide interplay of structures, frameworks and networks in relation to production of material goods and services delivery. Broadly, speaking it is conglomerate of production, financial systems, labour and capital including human... resources for the enhancement of economic development (P. 83).

The survival of an economic system is based largely on the mutual interaction of these factors in an environment of law and order which will guarantee peace and security. Regrettably, Olojo (2013) maintains that, economic deprivation has propelled violent extremism, recruitment and support for *Boko Haram*, a deadly militant *jihadi* group in Nigeria. These violent extremists have perpetrated acts of terrorism through its various tactics and strategies like, arson, armed assault, kidnapping and bombing which have had serious negative impact on the efforts to bring about economic development in the northern regions of the country.

This is because acts of terrorism bring about loss of material resources. To make matters worse, capital flight has become the order of the day as people relocate to other parts of the state, the country or in some cases to neighbouring countries in search of secured havens. Yahaya (2012) captured this economic challenge of terrorism in Nigeria when he quips that,

Terrorism discourages economic growth in the sense of industrialization and modernization as it causes foreign capital flight since no businessman or industrialist may like to invest in an area where the safety of their (sic) investment is not guaranteed. Business activities are collapsing in some northern states like Borno, Yobe, Bauchi,

Plateau and Kaduna where acts of terrorism are being experienced on regular basis (P. 18).

The economy has progressively collapsed and people live in fear of the unknown. This kind of economic distortion will breed greater poverty and compound the existential woes of the people in the area if left unchecked. Fixed assets like lands, residential houses, business premises and other economic buildings have suffered gross decline in value evident in their prices.

The impact of terrorism is colossal and this made transactions in a war time economy no doubt a loss-loss situation. The ultimate outcome of such period is hardly unpredictable because it would precipitate a closure of investments, while their owners will experience threat on their personal and family safety, due to the increasing violent criminal act of terrorism. For example, the Maiduguri International Airport was forcefully short down by the government owing to the level of terroristic violence in the area which affected a military base and Air force base close to the civil airport (Olanrewaju, 2015). One will easily understand the level of economic loss and income distortion alongside the disruption of other crucial material values this transport change would have melted on the people. In fact, this has gone a long way to further complicate the precarious economic woes of the state among other affected ones in the northern region.

For a long time now, data from the Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics has continually recorded the very low standard of living evident in relative poverty in the northern regions. For example, in the 2010 report, they have it as South East (67.0%), South West (59.1%), while the North East (76.3%) and North West (77.7%) of relative poverty (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). AOA and NWGA (2013) corroborated this reality by affirming that,

Across a range of poverty measures, the North East performs particularly poorly. The region has the highest rate in the country of male respondents who reported having no educational attainment whatsoever, and the second highest rates of female respondents reporting they had no educational attainment. Bauchi and Yobe in the North East are among the five states with the highest rates of absolute poverty (at 84 and 81.75 respectively) (P. 1).

The mass exodus of private and corporate organizations affect not only people of the region but those of nearby countries and indeed, Nigeria in general. Investors in the face of serious threat were not ready to make investment in a crisis-ridden environment full of multiple uncertainties. The prevention of influx of foreign direct investment is a resultant effect of the massive involvement of violent youths in acts of terrorism and its allied tactics and strategies which breeds unemployment. At a micro-economic level, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) which are acknowledged worldwide as the bedrock of sustainable economic growth and development are taken aback in such ill-conducive atmosphere for productive economic activities.

Loss of profit on the part of business men and women especially those that engage in perishable items and products with short shelf-life (expiration dates) is another effect posed by terrorism in the economic sphere. In fact, the scourge of terrorism has constituted itself a salient variable to be duly considered in effective risk analysis and general feasibility study before any profitable business can be engaged in the unstable environs of North East and other affected Zones in the northern region. Already existing investments are grossly affected with abandonment on materials and machines which lay waste and suffer spoil or depreciating decay. Feasibility studies, plans and proposals simply dwindle into nothingness as the absence of law

and order as well as peace and security has hampered projects from their execution let alone completion. These have sharp consequences for wages, salaries, profit, social infrastructure, standard of living, socio-economic development and governance as key economic indicators at both micro and macro levels of economic performance.

Another issue of concern is the demand for ransom when some victims are made hostage. The payment of ransom has made it worst on the mind of these militant *Jihadists* who have considered it wisdom to extort from well-to-do families as a means of generating income for their up-keep. This negative trend can even serve as a motivation for some jobless youth to struggle to join the movement hereby enthroning a culture of violence in place of hard work, dignity of labour and contentment that characterize indigenous value systems in the area. Illiterates, people discriminated against and the economically deprived or marginalized youths (in perception or reality) are more active in this arena.

This scourge of terrorism at its economic plane has brought about reprioritization of economic needs and at some extent induced misappropriation of funds to the detriment of developmental ventures. For example, Ahmed, Gregoire and Nathan (2012) have it that, despite the President's announcement of a new strategy to combat *Boko Haram*, change of his Defence Minister and National Security Advisor in the month of June 2012, the President Jonathan equally designated an astonishing twenty percent of the federal budget on security that same year." One can imagine the disproportionate allocation of resources to the security sector at the expense of other sectors of the economy.

In addendum, Yahaya (2012) observes that,

...the financial cost of incessant terrorism means that Federal, State and Local Governments have to divert scare (sic) resources that would have served social and

economic developmental purposes into rebuilding burnt down and destroying (sic) property as well as provision of relief materials to victims of terrorism in the country (P. 9).

These monies if channeled in part to provision of portable water, agriculture, skills acquisition, and rural electrification of some sort or low cost housing schemes would have better ameliorated the age-long sufferings of the masses in those northern states. Madu-West (2013) has on his report in the National Mirror that, “the families of 91 Police officers killed by Boko Haram attacks in Kano state were yesterday presented with ₦35.7 Million by the authorities of the Nigerian police”. This payment was acknowledged as a third phase exercise as ₦12.7 Million and ₦17.6 Million had earlier been given to officers in Kano, Katsina and Jigawa States as first and second batches respectively.

It should be understood that compensation is a well entrenched principle and practice in Labour Law and Personnel Administration especially when motivation and hazard are well considered in the welfare of the workers to guarantee success in Employer-Employee Relations (Industrial Relations), but suffice it to observe that despite best of intention behind this idea which is to alleviate the sufferings of various demised and badly wounded officers’ families. But when one looks at it from the view of financial value irrespective of the condition of the officers who suffer cases related to death, partial and total permanent disabilities and incapacitation, the economic waste and misappropriation becomes glaring at once.

It should be noted that the various interventions through National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and other Humanitarian and Relief Agencies are possible only due to the level of economic and financial resources they are able to assemble through fund raising from donors and strategic partners within and outside the shores of this country. For

example, after the suicide bomb attack in a motor-park by a female *jihadist* and the other explosion that rocked a security check-point in Yobe's capital, Damaturu, on the 25th of August in the year 2015, the Governor, Ibrahim Gaidam through his Director of Public Affairs, Abdullahi Bego immediately directed the Sani Abacha Specialist Hospital to give free treatment to all victims of the disaster. He equally assured the people of the State of their safety as the hospital and the State Emergency Management Agency will do everything necessary to provide support for the victims of the attacks (Olanrewaju cited in Ukeh, 2015).

D) Food and Agricultural Implications:

The political economy of a country speaks of a macro platform for economic activities. Agriculture is one of such activity in any society and by its very nature is a large-scale farming enterprise for the sustenance of human population by meeting the very first basic human need of food. Food here is holistically conceived as all solid and semi-solid material substances that can be metabolized by any animal and will provide energy and build body tissues. The effective engagement of human and material resources for the meeting of such needs, food, has been disrupted by the emergence of *jihadi* terrorism in Nigeria's northern region. Not only are foods relatively scarce, they are costly and poor in essential nutrients.

Alao, Atare and Alao (2012) were very precise when they quip that,

The scourge of the Boko Haram if not checkmated might lead to food scarcity in Nigeria on the long run though a glimpse of such was experienced in July, 2012 when the prices of food items and vegetables skyrocketed in the south. This was as a result of the inability of traders from the north to transport commodities due to general insecurity in the north (P. 9).

Beyond the observation of Alao and others, it is pertinent to note that food terrorism is a fear equally in the country. Not only is the constraint of cost or availability of food imminent but that of safety of this essential commodity.

Nigeria's vast population in the sub-Sahara Africa makes her well positioned for generating an international food crisis if there is any challenge to her food supply (Nwoko, 2011). He has it that, "within the domestic food distribution chain, the inefficient food defence and safety measures allowed for the proliferation of unmonitored food outlets such as road side eateries, snacks shop, bar and open air canteens, exposing them as easy medium for food contamination or poisoning by terrorist" P. 160. As Owolabi (2009) cited in Nwoko (2011) continues in a similar vein that,

The circulation of fake and adulterated pharmaceutical products by some syndicate has not only jeopardizes the life of patients but has also demonstrated the intractability of the phenomenon, the vulnerability of Nigerians and the enormous challenges facing the National Food and Drug Administration and Control (P. 160).

Nwoko concludes that, the threat of food terrorism in Nigeria no doubt is more real than imagined. The development of a genuine Nigerian variant of counter-terrorism strategies cannot be over emphasized.

The land which ought to be used for productive farming is converted into battle fields and occupied by armed men from both sides of the bellicose divide (military and militants). The arable lands suitable for agriculture in Borno and other affected towns, cities and villages in Northern states where food supplies and sales ought to be going on, are fled away from. Leaving the people in hunger and squalor (Ifeanyi, 2011).

E) Implications on Tourism:

According to Muraina, Uyanga and Muraina (2014) another way in which insecurity negatively affects sustainable development is the sphere of tourism. Tourism is a viable sector with sufficient economic and socio-cultural benefits. With the presence of Lake Chad Sanctuary in Borno, Yankari Games Reserves and Wikki Lame Burra Games Reserves in Bauchi State, the Three Sisters Rocks in Adamawa, Mambilla Plateau Gashaka, Gashaka, Gampti National Parks both in Taraba State (Firs Bank of Nigeria, 2015), North Eastern Nigeria is well endowed with some of the most beautiful tourist sites in the country.

Over the years, these features have brought about aesthetic value, provided a heritage, and accrued both pride and finances to their various hosts and inhabitants. However, for any country to reap these good inherent in tourism, such a country must be free of insecurity and its concomitant threats. This is because security constitutes a sensitive aspect of tourism and Nigeria tourist centres in abundance (Muraina, Uyanga and Muraina, 2014). With these centers in the north Eastern region, one would have expected serious contributions from this sector to the economy, but that is not the case.

Regrettably, the reverse is the case. They have made negligible contributions to sustainable development due to the insecurity saga as perpetrated by the Islamist militants through incessant bombing, arson, assault among others. In fact, “these tourist centers have lost a great deal in the wake of Boko Haram, leading to unemployment as employees abandoned their various duty posts for fear of being attacked” (Oluwadare, 2016:49).

The Northeastern states of Nigeria especially Bauchi with Yankari Games Reserves, Palaces of various Emirs and their Emirate Councils among others are some of the great tourists sites in the country both in terms of cultural and eco-tourism. An ironic fact about Bauchi state is

that its slogan is ‘peace’ and equally known as the home of tourism. These very values have suffered tremendously in the country. Alao, Atere and Alao (2012) saw a major negative implication of the insurgency of Boko Haram in the area of tourism industry as it will cost the country huge losses in both foreign and local currencies that could have accrued from this sector of the economy.

F) Political Implications:

Considering the intricate connection of the state and economy especially from a macro-economic purview, it becomes obvious that the state is highly affected in terms of fostering developmental programmes and the delivery of quality governance. The exploits of militant extremists who perpetrate acts of terrorism because of their deadly methods employed in pursuance of their aims have brought about debilitating effects on the political economy of the region.

Peace and security of lives and property which are fruits of law and order (a core governmental function in a polity), no doubt stand to suffer from a continuous collapse on the economic structure if agents of disequilibrium remain unchecked or constant. Efforts by the local, state and federal governments to evolve material progress have been hampered by this terror saga. The endemic nature of violent acts of terrorism has plunged the region deeper into an irredeemable and far beyond the borders of development as everything seems to be on the halt. In fact, terrorists’ activities have done more harm than good since it provides extremists with a rear opportunity to trigger unprogressive movement in a political society.

The terrorism of Boko Haram and allied groups is a direct affront and question on the legitimacy of the government of Nigeria. It has dire consequences on the nation’s political development especially because it affects voting and campaign patterns, democratic values and

norms and delays political transition (Yahaya, 2012). The Goodluck Jonathan led administration was a clear victim and clearly depicts the revulsion of the North.

His region of origin, ethnic background, and religious affiliation were called to question and based on their lack of comformit, his right to govern or administer the geopolitical enclave, Nigeria was considered illegitimate. He was looked down upon, openly ridiculed, verbally insulted and physically assaulted in a circumscription that he functions as the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, number one citizen. The 2015 events at Zamfara and Kaduna/Sokoto are so clear in the hearts and minds of political historians, political Sociologists of religion and general observers who focus on socio-political events and issues with religious colouration.

The involvement of a similar group from the North, often refered to as Fulani herdsmen (a deadly terror group) has spelt doom for the other sections of Nigeria. This has aggravated the Boko Haram insurgency and birthed greater suspicion across the regions of the country. As a result, separatist agitations across the length and breadth of the Nigerian geography are gaining attention. There are resurgent calls for state creation or secession from Oduduwa Peoples Republic (OPR), Soveriegn State of Biafra (SSB) or the Republic of Biafra (RB), Niger Delta Republic (NDR), Lower Niger Republic (LNR) and North Central Republic (NCR).

The most dogged expression of these calls for separation is from the Igbo of Southern Nigeria. Groups like the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) notably among others are at the centre of these agitations which have affected the Nigerian politiy in no small way. The activities of Nnamdi Kalu and his IPOB organization in Nigeria and the diaspora have really challenged the federal government of Nigeria for the unrestrained violence on (Northern) Christians in the country among other grievances.

G) Implications for Human Migration:

The frequency of these random attacks and killings in the North Eastern states among others, have brought about unplanned, seemingly unwitting movement of people to places conceived of portending relative safety. Apart from movement to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps, distance relatives and friends, neighbouring towns and villages, states, proximate countries have also seen more drift into their areas.

Apart from other necessities of hosting extra persons such as food, clothing, medication, the challenge of finding sizeable and safe habitations is a real challenge. In fact, a consequence of this challenge especially for Southerners who return back to their respective geo-political zones begins with transportation cost, safety on the highway en route to their destinations, and culminates at the relative high cost of house rent that has skyrocketed. Despite the earlier challenge of rural-urban drift, the returnees from up-north have brought about gross housing deficit in many Southern villages, towns and cities.

The South Eastern states are worst hit in this regard. By the mere fact of their sheer size and migratory nature, they are found in every habitable ends of the earth, indeed in Nigeria. In Enugu metropolis for instance, a good number of these returnees go around begging and seeking for alms to begin live afresh. A particular woman narrates her experience while soliciting for material support of any kind. She made it clear that, her husband was killed and two of her children are nowhere to be found, their shop totally burnt down, their landed property of no use since it has lost whatever merger value it once commanded. And now she wants to start life anew and we should as God's children help her. N. J. Ani (Personal Communication, January 20, 2015).

In this sense, it has hampered the efforts at national integration and nation building generally since members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) especially those from the Southern and Eastern states who have suffered heavy casualty from the menace of the violent Islamic activists from the North. On several occasions, unassuming and dutiful members of the Corps are attacked without provocation and given various levels of assault and murdered in extreme cases. As Ekanem, Dada and Ejue (2012) maintain,

...the activities of Boko Haram have affected the postings of students of Southern extraction on national youth service to the north. Parents are strongly resisting the posting of their children as corpsers to the north. This, in itself is a fatal blow to the noble objective of the scheme as a unifying strategy. Indeed, the unity of Nigeria is seriously threatened by Boko Haram (P. 232).

No doubt, population drift, housing deficit and service delivery crisis have found expression through the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

H) Implications on Health Care Systems and Delivery:

Generally, the geography of Northern Nigeria is scorching at worst and extreme at best in terms of the rainfall and sunshine. This alongside other environmental factors positions the area for high rate of exposure to disease and death. To make matters worse, cultural and religious sentiments equally contribute to the woes of the people from the area. Community Medicine or Public health as it is popularly called in the north is best understood from these prisms. Morbidity especially maternal and child mortality are at their pick in this area too.

Malnourishment of children in the region is quite alarming. A statistics from the Federal Government of Nigeria and United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF) have it that, “one of every ten (10) kids in the world suffering from or dying of malnutrition is

Nigerian” (Yesufu, 2015). Yesufu adds that Community-based Management of Acute malnutrition (CMAM) housed by the Daudawaki Primary Health Centre in Kano and they have treated acutely malnourished children from six months to five years old on out-patients basis”. A major source of this malnourishment is inadequate breastfeeding and lack of readily available foods such as fruits. Apart from Gombe and Kebbi, the CMAM has been introduced in other northern states.

Nwachineke (2010) no doubt had the aforementioned traumas in mind when he disclosed that, the health of people living in perpetual fear cannot be guaranteed. They are exposed to the danger of becoming hypertensive and suffering from cardiac arrest. The terrorism saga in northern regions has heralded a sort of normlessness because the people suffer disorientation and not even the government can come judiciously to their aid. People generally experience a period of agony, anxiety and frustration as a result of the scorching scourge of terrorism in the area.

I) Social Implications:

Social relaxation or leisure has been grossly affected by the various actual violence and threat of using it in the North-East of Nigeria. On several occasions suicide bombers and hit-and-run tactics have been employed to bring harm to owners of and clients at such places.

A new sort of social challenge has bedeviled surviving wives and eldest or older children of demised victims of terrorism in the North of Nigeria. This challenge seems to transcend traditional gender roles or social norms. It is a situation where discretion and reflex, initiative are supreme determinates of human actions and conducts. Little children who require parental care and attention for material, psychological, emotional and spiritual needs, are made adult overnight as a result of the life changing violent experiences they encounter.

Yahaya (2012) affirms that:

Terrorism has resulted in the irreparable loss of human resources that could have been used for developmental purposes. The sad elimination of the breadwinners of several homes or families has forced women to take over as head and breadwinners of such families. This leads to the increase in begging, prostitution and unemployment (P. 17).

Yahaya further declares that, “Sadly still, where both parents were eliminated, the boys or girls were forced to assume a parental roles at tender ages which also have negative social implication.” Unimaginable living conditions became their lot and their lack of adequate knowledge of nutritional requirements and dietary necessities pose a health risk to them, equally.

J) Educational Implications:

Education as a core social institution of human society is very critical in the socialization, acculturation, training, and empowerment of the human population. Through education, knowledge, skills, competences, morals and spirituality are transferred to younger ones. Education relates both positively and negatively to other social institutions in the social system to say the least. Education should be understood as the bedrock of economic growth and development since the products of various educational institutions are the agents of societal development and transformation.

The challenge of militant Islamists who through their violent activism have brought about untold fear, hardship and wanton destruction on collective human groups and society in general, has affected the educational sector in no small way. Muraina, Uyanga and Muraina (2014) aver that,

Educationally, schools are not left out as parents are rejecting their children schooling in volatile north. Many schools have closed down due to Boko Haram (sic) activities,

talented lecturers, teachers have abandoned their schools for another peaceful state, leading to brain drained (sic).

They further observe that more than 800 school buildings are affected in the north leading to some students having lesson under trees and canopies.

K) Humanitarian Implications:

The 2006 National Census of Nigeria placed its population at about one hundred and sixty (160,000,000) million (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2008). It is instructive to disclose that the population of Nigeria is far in excess of one hundred and ninety (190,000,000) million, perhaps it is most likely around the boarders of two hundred (200,000,000) million. Although, the regional geographic spread and various states population are still subject of debate and political contestation, socio-demographic details like ethnicity and religious affiliation are far more contested because there are claims and counter-claims that they are not well covered or better put, willfully removed from this document in concealment of certain demographic truth and reality with deep politico-economic implications.

The frequent movements of people from their homelands to other places within the country for purposes ranging from better amenities, job, education, access to raw materials for productive ventures among others have meant that rural-urban, urban-urban and urban-rural drifts are social realities in a developing country in particular and human society in general. Families have settled in places they consider more suitable for their life style especially for economic reasons. But with the spate of committed violence evident in bloodbath, brutality, and brigandage, an induced immigration is currently going on across the country and beyond. Massive displacement of citizens who reside in these areas were and are still been witnessed in the North. Sanusi (2009) has it that, “Such displacement of population has created serious

humanitarian problems, forcing government to divert resources that would have been used to enhance economic security” (P. 96). Creation of refugee problems is a major effect of violent religious terrorism in most of Nigeria’s Northern states.

These movements often come suddenly and without any prior preparation for survival, comfort, upkeep and welfare of self and members of the family. Internally displaced peoples’ camps are usually faced with feeding challenges. On the 19th day of August every other year, the world celebrates World Humanitarian Day (WHD). The 2015 celebration of this renown yearly event which was marked all over the world to reflect over the plights of people who are in various human, environmental, medical or socially induced challenge as promulgated by the United Nations. The occasion availed various aids and humanitarian workers the opportunity to share opinions on the most pressing challenges of the humanity in the country especially its north due to the violence of *Boko Haram* terrorists.

Taiwo-Obalonye (2015) gives a concise report of this event when he opines that, the theme of the 2015 celebration is ‘Inspiring the World’s humanity’. He reports that, the humanitarian workers are faced with challenges such as logistics, funding, expertise and access to hard-to-reach locations in the region that have been cut off as a result of the destruction of infrastructure such as roads, bridge, markets, hospital, schools, homes, business center, etc by the terrorists.

M. Jubril (personal communication, January 6, 2018) decried,

What have we done to deserve this wickedness from the people of this country and from them ones from Chad and other countries that come to join them and kill our people. They don’t have mercy for women, children or even pregnant mothers... They

use guns, knives and other dangerous things to kill our people like animals. They come at night and kill without mercy.

When asked the condition of life here in an IDP camp he responded that,

We are managing here with the support of different organizations that bring relieving materials and the security that work here with them. Government people also bring materials but sometimes they steal the things and give us very small portion. I don't feel like a man anymore, because me too I live in real fear. If I have my way, I will join the Army people and defend this innocent people.

Figure 4: **Picture of Girls and young Women in an IDP Camp**



Retrieved from www.naija.ng/1142900-list-idp-camps-nigeria-locations.html on 11-01-2018.

The country Director of Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) in Nigeria, Jan Regge avows that, “Everyday brings to mind the urgent need a displaced people struggling to survive humanitarian plight in the North-East of Nigeria. This is becoming alarming with the new members arriving at the limited camps made available in the host states. The organization Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) is addressing the prevailing humanitarian crises and food security, livelihood and water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programmes targeting the IDPs and vulnerable host communities and through these three programmes over ninety two thousand (92,000) people in Adamawa, Borno and Gombe state. OXFAM’s agricultural support and WASH interventions are nutrition sensitive that focus our growing vegetable crops and promoting healthy and nutritious food for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), by promoting proper hygiene practice thereby addressing the root causes of malnutrition.

A sizeable number of agencies and aids organizations are involved in humanitarian works in the area. They are National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Action Against Hunger, Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) of the Catholic Church among other organizations.

The efforts of aid workers and donor agencies are appreciated but the residents are lost in the dreams of home and comfort. R. A. Danladi (personal communication, January 6, 2018) was unequivocal to disclose that,

I am so so scared here. We ran away from our village and nearly met the Boko Haram fighters on the road. Now we are here in this facility, I feel some little relief but we are

still facing some problems here. Good food, portable water, hygienic and proper environment especially with this cold, and security of our lives. I cannot say they are not trying for us, but you know that there is no place like home.

Similarly, B. J. Ibrahim (personal communication, November 25, 2017) expressed his regret and frustration with the situation of things when he asked a seemingly rhetoric question that,

Where can we find peace and rest in this place? Before you see, they will shout Boko Haram dey the other village and we go begin run to another place. Na watin we dey suffer until we come join the people for here.

A. S. Danyaya (personal communication, January 6, 2018) seems to express a relatively different worry. When she observes that,

Any man can come and marry me from here. This is not the kind of life I plan for. I just marry my husband last month before them kill him and his friends at the bush because they are farmers. This fighting and shooting of gun every time is not good.

And like others she agreed that, “this our place, North is not safe for person, at all at all. With my pregnancy, I need a husband and somebody to be the father of my child. God will help us and spare our lives”.

A number of conflicting figures have been mentioned on the number of dead and internally displaced persons. For example, after a multi-national Joint Task Force meeting held at N'Djamena the Federal Capital of Chad on the need to fight Boko Haram caused insecurity, the group alleged that Boko Haram has killed multiple of thousands and about 1.5 million displaced persons throughout its six-year reign of terror (2009-2015) in an attempt to establish an Islamic Caliphate with a reach that will cut through Chad and Cameroun (DailySun, 2015).

What is certain is that families are dislocated and many of them die at various locations and circumstances. For B. Imrana (personal communication, November 25, 2017)

I am the only person from my family in this place. I dont know if they are all dead especially my younger sisters, Gemila and Rukiyatu. Wallahi, make government help us with more food and work to do and survive in this life. I am even a Muslim and see my life. Insa Allah, I will survive this wickedness.

His experience is not an isolated one, M. T. Daudu (personal communication, January 6, 2018) discloses that, “All my brothers are dead. They are a part of the civilian JTF in our area but the Boko Haram come for night and kill many of them after Army people go attack them near Sambisa”. She also narrates how she almost lost her life when she opines that, “I even faint two times for road when running to this place and I was lucky to be alive. We need health workers and doctors because people dey *sicky sick* for here too much”.

Health and sanitary condition is a major concern for the residents of these camps especially the female folks. S. M. Isa (personal communication, November 25, 2017) observes that, “we cannot take care of our body as women, even when nature requires us to do so”. She added that male demand for sex is a rampant activity in their area when she said that, “Come to think of it, the men here are not helping matters. They us every opportunity to demand for sex from young girls and married women whose husbands are dead. Their trouble is more at evenings and midnight”.

Another woman seems to have given up hope for herself, but only concerned with her daughter. A. Ishiaku (personal communication, November 25, 2017) with some level of frustration discloses while pointing at a little girl playing beside her that, “...this my small daughter na just two years and na suffer me and her dey suffer since my husband die. My worry

is how she can grow to become a woman. I don't tire for this place, *Da-Allah*". P. Ayuba (personal communication, November 25, 2017) expressed both frustration and despair over the situation when she affirms that,

Hunger no dey look person for face, whether man or women, adult or young person. Hungry don finish us for here. The people wey no well and the one wey born new pikin no even get better health people or medicine to take care of them. The good people wey dey help us don try but it is not enough. We are getting desperate and for me, I can do anything to survival.

Though expressing similar desperation, others were hopeful and dependent on God for some help and liberation. For B. Yakubu (personal communication, November 25, 2017) divine intervention is expected as he has it in his words, "I dey pray make God help the military and other security people wey dey help fight this wicked people to win them. Boko Haram don scatter our life". He could not sustain this gratitude when he derailed by asking for physical help. He shouted, "See me, I bi farmer but everything I get don go. Abeg, make una help me because as I dey see small small food eat here, but I still need work to do and make money. Even if na farm work".

A level of gratitude was expressed by some over the improvement and support gotten over the season of Christmas. For example, P. Bako (personal communication, January 6, 2018) has it that,

This Christmas good for our side small. Church people and NGO come support us with plenty food stuff, clothes and some health workers come with materials. I feel God has a plan for us and the Boko Haram people will not triumph over us the children of God. It is not easy to be a Christian in this part of Nigeria, at all.

Feeling a sense of gratitude, she added that she has been supportive of the system in a number of ways. She quips that, “I support them to cook, take care of small children and teach them too. At times, I help the health people when the work is too much for them. I just assist them”.

Perhaps after listening to others and hear them make mention of religion, J. I. Yunusa (personal communication, November 25, 2017) downplayed on religiosity when he quips that “Christian or no Christian, we cannot be treated like this. After all we are human beings. The Boko Haram *self no be better Muslims*. So, *why we no fit stay for peace for this country*”.

The reportedly not less than one million five hundred thousand (1.5) people forced out of their homes to seek safety in other parts of the country, is separated from another 150,000 that have taken refuge in neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Oluwadare, 2016). Regrettably, these IDPs continue to live in cramped and unhygienic conditions and the most vulnerable of them; the young, elderly and those with disabilities have suffered significantly from the spread of poliovirus. To further complicate the ordeal of the IDPs, health workers could hardly attend to them following fear of being attacked by the insurgents (Oluwadare, 2016). Oluwadare concludes that research has shown that IDPs are targets of violence or pawns in military conflict and face armed attacks, killings, abductions, injuries, and sexual and gender-based violence.

Figure 5: A Picture of IDPs comprising of Women and Children in Borno State



Retrieved from <http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/nigeria-administrative-map.jpg> on 12-10-2017.

L) Human Rights Implications:

Humans all over the world, across the various continents and countries which administer their human populations are entitled to certain natural and inalienable rights. These rights accrue to them by virtue of their humanness which is anchored on human dignity. Human dignity has bequeathed the human race by the sheer fact of their endowment with rationality (intellect) and free will and not just as a result of man's mere biological features.

Humans are entitled to enjoy these rights as various legal documents have reinforced such rights at both international and domestic levels. High points of these rights include; right to life, right to the dignity of human person, right to freedom of movement, right to peaceful

assembly and association, freedom of religion, freedom from discrimination among others. Nigeria as a multi-national state has long domesticated it in its legal document—the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). But despite the provisions of this document, the brutal, barbaric and continuous bloodbath occasioned by terroristic violence in Nigeria’s north has undermined their efforts. Boko Haram and allied Islamist groups have violated and continually violates such rights.

Ojuku (2011) acknowledges this fact as a consequence of terrorism in Nigeria when he asserts that, “terrorism has led to varying human rights abuses”. He further states that, “terrorism as a peculiar act of criminality ranges from suicide bombing...to kidnapping of individuals which is presently gaining recognition in Nigeria”. Murder through whatever means is at once the highest form of human life abuse. The use of bombs, assaulted weapons, knives and machete has among others put an end to human life in their numbers.

Faul (2013) reports of a human rights group, the Socio-Economic and Rights Accountability Project that could not take the volume of rights abuses orchestrated by the *Boko Haram* and other terror groups in the North East when the body filed a petition to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The murder of about 43 students at an agricultural college and in similar attacks killed one hundred and forty three (143) civilians, two (2) soldiers and three (3) police. These deaths and quantum destructions came after President Goodluck Jonathan had declared a state of emergency and mobilized an emergency taskforce made-up of Soldiers, Police, Military Intelligence, Immigration and Customs officials.

Smith-Spark (2012) observes that, “some of the most notorious have targeted Christian churches, causing hundreds of deaths; markets and schools have also been bombed or burned down in attacks claimed by *Boko Haram*”. Beyond these abuses by the Islamic militant sect that

strives to impose a strict version of *Sharia* in the northern part of the country, the Amnesty International while condemning the grave rights violation by this group also pinpoints that, “Nigeria’s security forces “have perpetrated serious human rights violations”. They accused the military of arbitrary detention without charge or trial, of extrajudicial execution or subjecting them to disappearance.

Also included in the list of accusations against the Nigerian government is on willful omission. They claim that the government has failed to adequately prevent or investigate the attacks or to bring perpetrators to justice and that victims have not received prompt and adequate reparation and remedy. This kind of record has led to fears among human rights groups that the secret detention center could see more suspects disappear, deprived of the right to challenge their detentions in court (The Associated Press, 2012). In the year 2013, PMNEWS (2013) corroborated the human rights situation in the north when they aver that, “there is a risk of high civilian casualties, with Nigerian military having been accused of massive rights abuses in the past”.

M) Socio-religious Implications:

It is pertinent to recall that social systems work as an integrated system with interdependence and inter-relatedness in their operations. The socio-cultural context upon which religion is built and thrives is not immune to debilitations and distortions, indeed, change and continuity. Religion from a social purview can and do suffer from challenges both from within its tradition or as a reaction to other social forces and institutions. It is within these frameworks that religion can suffer negatively from terrorism.

As a consequence of the onslaught of Boko Haram in the country, there is this securitization of worship centers especially in the Northern parts. Madala Bomb blast among

others has meant that worship places will continue to lose their sacred space immunity in the face of insecurity and violence. This is because as Flanders (1975) cited in Oluwaseun, Fagbamila, and Abdulganiyu (2014) assert that, “religion is synonymous to militancy, weapons and ammunitions have become essential parts of religious apparels”. A sense of fear and nostalgia envelops worshippers in their places of communion with God and fellow believers. Bazza (2013) contends that,

Christians are always at the receiving end of the Boko Haram terrorism and this is indeed a great challenge to our faith. Through their activities, a lot of fear has entered the minds of Christians to the point that some no longer are able to go to Church for worship or participate at public Christian religious programmes any longer. As it stands today, Christian faith is no longer practiced in Bama, Gamboru Ngala and the desert areas of Borno State (P. 10).

No wonder, Oluwadare (2016) comments that, “people are now being denied their fundamental human rights and cannot exercise freedom of movement or worship for fear of being attacked by members of the sect” (P. 46).

This fear has given rise to a sort of heightened apocalyptic consciousness which is evident among Christian adherents in North-Eastern states in particular and Northern Nigeria generally. This is because terrorism has hampered and still hampers on religious freedom especially of Christians and some Muslims who suffer similar faith because of their critical outlook to extremist ideologies and (violent) political Islam. Resultantly, Churches and Mosques have been bombed while people were worshipping inside.

According to Allen and Silver (2011) cited in Oluwadare (2016) “the almost simultaneous bomb explosions at St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger state;

Mountain of Fire and Miracles Church in Jos, Plateau state; and Gadaka in Yobe state on Christmas day 2011 are still fresh in memory” (P. 47). What more can breed and disrupt socio-religious sanctity and peace of mind of religious faithful in their sacred places in a supposed democratic polity.

The goodness of God, the creator of humanity is often called to question. Theodicy which entails the defense of God’s goodness and justice in the face of evil now suffers impetus and clear moral scrutiny in the wake of unrestrained bloodbath, brutality and brigandage. According to Bazza (2013) the plight of a victim of terrorism in the North will drive home this point. A lady by name, Tavenye ask him saying: “Fr. Mike, where did my prayer go, my cries for mercy and deliverance? Did I have the laziest guardian angel in all of heaven?” (P. 202).

Some Christians now take these attacks on them as a deliberate attempt to extermination and a continuation of the human rights violation and hostilities they suffer in the area. It was on this ground that Bazza (2013) intones that,

Whenever we find ourselves in a precarious situation as the case is in the Northern Nigeria today vis-à-vis the Boko Haram menace, the most natural and spontaneous thing to do is to ask questions such as: Why does God permit wickedness when somewhat we have been told right from our catechism days that God is all powerful? To a lay man’s mind then, if God is all powerful, it then follows logically that wickedness exists, therefore God permits wickedness (P. 187).

Speaking of Christian plight, Bazza concludes on the persecution of Christians in Nigeria with the following reassuring words, “Boko Haram terrorism can’t stop us from proclaiming the gospel message” (P. 205).

Christian churches in the North are more than ever before willing to interact closely in the face of this common enemy and life threatening problem from a religiously motivated enemy. Ecumenism as it were has received more positive changes. Prayers are said and equally solicited for in the face of this life threatening scourge of terrorism. Their Southern brethren are not left out of this solidarity exercise of faith over a common problem which though for now is overwhelmingly a Northern plight.

A desire to react in like-manner to the violence from violent Islamists is apparent especially among the youth population of various Christian denominations and faithful. This situation has called their seeming pacifist stance to question in the face of unprovoked and unrestrained brutality. The desire to take to self-defense looms large in their thoughts and public declarations. A group of Nigerian Christian Elders (NCE) tends to stand against these challenges of Christians.

N) International Implications:

In the wake of Boko Haram's escapade in Maiduguri and Yobe axis and its transfer to other neighbouring states, the image of Nigeria among the comity of nations is dwindling and precarious. The near success of Abdulmutallab's suicide bombing attack on an American airplane with over two hundred (200) passengers on board the flight has meant that Nigeria had been trying to manage the perception of foreign governments on her as a terrorist country. This attempt saw the willful refusal to utilize the term 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' to describe her local violent extremist or the violent happenings. This was done not for want of words or for myopia on the legal framework and their categorization. Rather, it was a deliberate attempt of a less developed country to run away from the international consequences of their choices.

The government even resisted the United States government's attempt to proscribe the group as a terrorist organization. At the back of the government's mind was the need to avoid certain stringent and punitive treatment from the international community especially friendly nation-states in her good books of international relations especially trade relations. Odiogor and Agande (2012) have it that Nigeria's foreign Affairs ministry maintains that,

We have made it clear that the sectarian group is not funded by the government or being used by government and its agencies to promote a foreign policy agenda. This is an important fact because the US went to the extent of branding Nigeria as a country "with interest" in January 2010 following the Abdulmutallab episode, but Nigeria was eventually removed from the list of countries with interest in terrorism.

Sanusi (2009) acknowledges the international effect of religious violent extremism by affirming that, "This unhealthy image not only scares away investors and tourists who would have brought in much-needed capital to the country, but also undermines the country's campaigns on such issues as hosting international sporting events and representing Africa in the United Nations Security Council" (P. 96). Residents are exposed to untold human sufferings owing to the forceful shut down of farmland, markets, schools and business premises. In fact, Sanusi (2009) was unequivocal to quip that, "The displacement of persons resulted in separation of families and communities such that the fabric of society was torn apart (P. 76).

4.1.2 Positive Implications:

No matter how destructive a conflict may be, it can serve as basis for the enthronement of certain positive or good outcomes. This is the orientation of researchers in peace and conflict studies. Thus, a number of positive developments that are gaining relevance as a result of this war will be examined. They include the under-examined:

A) Increased Security Consciousness at Individual and Group Levels:

Sequel to the advent of the ruthless and mindless killings by the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria's north, a vast majority of the country's citizens are well alive to the need to keep themselves free from harm and injuries as a result of the violence of the militant group.

There has been this popular notion that Nigeria is a very blessed country free from the consuming environmental (natural) and human caused challenges as experienced by Asians, Europeans, Americans and Australians in many respects. A sort of invisibility, indeed near believe in divine exemption and protection from existential woes and pains was wide spread among Nigerians. Thus, Nigerians mainly got to know of such scenarios from mass media outlets like the Nollywood, Chinese Firms, Cable Network News (CNN), British Broadcasting Communication (BBC) and their likes.

The relative safety and security from human caused debilitations especially violent ones has reassured Nigerians of their previledge standing with their maker. It is not out of place to here people say, "it cannot happen in Nigeria" or "God cannot allow it to happen here". War among other human disasters and source of pain and misery is a reality faced by humanity without consideration for time and space, irrespective of the mentality one puts up against it. This is the case especially when conflicts or discripancies are not approached peacefully or subjected to adjudication or other forms of alternative dispute resolution.

At the individual level, people now stay clear from social gatherings and busy locations to avoid being an easy target of terrorist acts. Higher sense of responsibility is currently been displayed by youths and adult, even among teenagers that have come to the age of reason and accountability. Issues of natural disasters, large scale wars, hunger, starvations, indeed,

humanitarian crises of various types were considered alien to the Nigerian geography and territory. It is not difficult for individuals to say, ‘God forbid’.

At the institutional levels, organizations have reorganized their security architecture. Banks, businesses, schools, hospitals, military barracks and facilities, churches, have all innovated to stay safe and secured. Schools and Christian places of worship which constitute some of the most affected are very conscious of their buildings and human populations during times of operations. For example, in churches, vehicular barricades, street lights, security personnels, among notable others constitute the major components of security architecture.

In fact, there is an unspoken acknowledgement of the internationalization of violent conflicts. The fact that a local conflict can be funded or planned from a distant land is a new reality in Nigeria’s perception of conflict dynamics. Transnational links between *jihadi* groups in Nigeria with Al-Qaeda, ISIL and indeed Boko Haram, more or less posed as a shocker to the people of the country. It was commonplace to see Nigerians reject with a seeming ‘righteous tune’ some of the challenges of our global village and highly connected world.

B) Economic and Political Developments:

President Muhammadu Buhari signed into law the North East Development Commission (NEDC) Bill 2017 in solidarity to the devastation suffered by the residents of the geopolitical zone. The Act gives the North-East Development Commission the mandate to coordinate the Federal Government and International donor agencies for the resettlement, rehabilitation, integration and reconstruction of roads, houses and business premises of victims of insurgency. The funding of the Commission will come from various sources including Federal Government of Nigeria, International bilateral donors, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN, The European Union, USAID, UKAID/DFID, as well as local donors.

Before the advent of NEDC, a number of initiatives were operational and supportive in the region. They include the Victims Support Fund (VSF), Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) and the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI). Beyond these, are a wide range of local and international non-governmental organizations actively working in this theatre of war, the North-East. With this array of organizations, the challenge has moved away from resources, personnel or readiness to intervene but it is now pitched on the multiplicity of actors and the variety in their approaches to the challenges confronting the people.

Thus, Kieghe (2018) sees this challenge as how to ensure that the activities and solutions that various actors bring are culturally appropriate. The NEDC is coordinating the activities of NGOs in close consultation and partnership with states and local governments in the area. Also, the United Nations Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) currently is operating in the area.

On the part of civil society organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) popularly called, there are a number of them that engage in human empowerment of various types. Though, some of these organizations are secular, others are religious or faith-based. Popular faith-based humanitarian and development organizations are Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), the Nasrul-II-Faith Society of Nigeria (NASFAT), National Council of Muslim Youth Organization (NACOMYO), among other Muslim groups. On the Christian side are Christian Rural and Urban Development (CRUDAN), Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), the Urban Ministry (UM), People Oriented Development (POD) of ECWA, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to mention but a few have played key roles in this regard.

It is vital to note that a sizeable number of job opportunities especially with non-governmental organizations now operating in the area now exist. These jobs equally go with very good remunerations due to the volatility and high risk prevalent in the domain. In fact, the Nigerian Army University Biu (NAUB), a military University was also established in Borno state.

In addition, there have been a number of appointments of sons and daughters of the area into sensitive offices in federal ministries, agencies, and departments. Adamawa had Alh. Muhammadu Bell as the Minister of FCT, Bauchi had Malam Adamu Adamu as the Minister of Education, Borno has Hon. Mustapha Shehuri as Minister of State for Power, Works and Housing, and Gombe had Mrs. Amina Mohammed of the Ministry of Environment (Pulse Nigeria, 2015).

Similarly, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai is from Borno state, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Sadiq Abubakar is from Bauchi state, the National Security Adviser (NSA), Rt. Major-General Babagana Monguno from Borno state, the Acting Chairman of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Ibrahim Magu is from Borno State. In addition, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Engr. Babachir David Lawal from Adamawa state, among notable others.

According to the Cable News, Governor Shettima of Borno corroborated this fact when he observed that, “the president has done extremely well as the sub-region has benefitted from his administration”. The Governor concluded that, “we all know the sorry state of the country, we are the net beneficiaries of president Muhammadu Buhari’s administration in terms of appointment, securing lives and properties (sic) and projects”.

C) Legal Reforms and Judicial Development:

Civil and criminal laws are by no means static neither are they cast on rocks. They are like other aspects of human socio-cultural elements, subject to change. This shows the dynamic nature of the positive law in its various jurisdictions. Prior to the revolting experience of violence from the Boko Haram and allied groups in Nigeria's north, there has been no legislative attempt to promulgate a national law to criminalize various acts of terrorism in Nigeria.

The wide spread fear that occasioned these acts of terrorism perpetuated through guerrilla warfare, armed assault, arson, kidnapping, suicide bombing, among others, has called the members of the the legislative arm of government to duty. One major expression of this duty is the enactment of the Terrorism Act 2011 and Terrorism Bill which has passed its second reading at the floor of the Green Chamber (upper House of Senate).

Interagency collaboration is receiving greater patronage and utilization. Among the various organizations such as intelligence, security, and paramilitary there is this synergy between them that dwarfs wastage, promotes communication and efficiency in counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria. There are a number of Protocols that allows for these collaborative changes and partnerships.

D) Calls for the Establishment of State Police:

The violent activities of the dreaded Islamists in the country's North has propelled many people especially from the North Central, South East and Western geopolitical zones to clamour and aggressively pursue an agitation that will see the (Federal) Nigeria Police Force (NPF) discentralized. The seeming ineffectiveness of the Nigerian Police Force to adequately address this unrest and secure the lives and property of citizens is frowned at by many.

Similarly, there have been cases of not only illegal arrest, but equally release of suspected Boko Haram members from the coffers of the Police. As a result, non-Muslims and especially

citizens from some southern states are at the fore front of demanding for a State Police to cater for their security needs without nepotism and travesty of justice. Greater impetus was given to this call due to the activities of Fulani herdsmen rampage across a wide range of farming communities in Nigeria.

4.2 Justice before War (*Jus ad bellum*) Evaluation of Terrorism in Nigeria:

The war carried on by Militant Islamists—chiefly by Boko Haram and Ansaru sects—in Northern Nigerian villages, towns and cities is clearly a political activity with well articulated religious goals. The strategy of the groups alongside their aims and motivation are an attestation to this reality. This is the case despite Islam’s well entrenched criteria before a decision is made to engage in war. The limits before war as approved ethically and legally in Islam will be studied under this sub-topic of our research with an aim to evaluate and see if what the violent extremists do conforms to the demands of Islam. This will be done through empirically founded examples or cases gotten from observation of secondary and some primary data, gathered through interview, which will suffice in this regard. To them we turn;

A) Just Cause:

This is the first criteria to be considered when the Islamic doctrine of *Jus Ad bellum* is discussed. The Qur’an and the Hadith are the foundation for teachings on all Islamic ethics and morals. While the Quran is believed to be the direct word of Allah given through the Holy Prophet, Mohammed (pbuh) for human guidance, the Hadith on the other hand shows how the Qur’an should be interpreted from the Prophet’s examples and commentary. The resort to force in Islam is governed by strict set of rules and regulations in the view of these sources. The Qur’an gives a good ground for this justification as Sura 6:151 admonished the faithful, “Do not kill the soul sanctified by God, except for just cause” is clearly spelt out for restraint on war and

fighting generally. This exception to kill or take human life only for just cause is understood as a war or fighting in protection of the practice of Islam (Joffe, 2010), in defense of freedom of religious belief for all and in opposition to aggression, injustice, and corruption (Syed, 2002).

This rationale carries a notion of defensiveness and not aggression in its intent. Aggression itself is prohibited and transgression is not approved in Islam. Self defense and the fight against injustice are permissive situations where Muslims are allowed to make use of sheer force and through military means effect change in society. Like M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) has it, Muslims are permitted to fight, “whosoever tries to intimidate you physically. You should fight them, confront them. Equally, when the unbelievers disallow you to practice Islam, you can fight with the last blood”. In that process he contends, “You become a martyr when you are killed in defense of your life, dignity and property. Anything outside this is *fauda* that is “terrorism in such a situation it is extremism”.

In a similar vein, S.O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) agrees that though “war is permitted in Islam with certain caveat. The caveat is that it must be a defensive war and Muslims should not start war. Anything you do you must go in-line with the Qur’an and Hadith”. For Oladiti, Muslims are permitted to fight when they have avoided the aggressor by every possible means and the injustice continues or if someone wants to take their life. “For the Qur’an admonished Muslims to fight those that fight them and not any innocent person around. War in Islam is only when you have been pushed to the wall. Everything is guided in Islam”.

R. Ibrahim (personal communication, March 30, 2017) enumerates on the broad categories, grounds or conditions for just war in Islam. The first condition he identified as defensive purpose and the other he called security purpose. In his explanation,

The first category involves a nation, its citizens and issues that borders on liberation of a people. Here, Jihad is a state policy. It must be under a government or community and regulated by an Islamic state by the *Amin Mumini*.

When there is injustice in the land or the people are been oppressed in an Islamic state, it is the responsibility of government to raise an army to defend the people. The latter involves the elimination of trouble and establishment of peace. It can be an individual declaration or decision. When you fight, you become a martyr. If you kill, you get a reward.

According to A. Yunusa (Personal Communication, November 21, 2016) Muslims are required to engage in war when they are forced or asked not to carry on their religious duties such as Salat, hajj, belief in the oneness of Allah (Sawn). In fact, the five pillars of Islam. But in all these, Yunusa insisted that Muslims cannot start a war even though they are born not to fear. Their only fear is to fear Allah. Similarly, A. Ozekome (Personal Communication, March 23, 2017) maintains that Prophet warned Muslims against riot but war is permitted in Islam under certain conditions. For him, it is at the point when force and violence is used against Muslim and Mosque is destroyed, women, children and scholars of Islam are killed. For Ozekome, Muslims are allowed to come all out in mass and defend their religion and if any able bodied man refuse to partake in this war he has sinned against Islam and Allah.

To further corroborate the ideas of Yunusa and Ozekome, in-line with teachings from the glorious Qur'an and the Hadith of the Prophet of Islam, A. Sani (Personal Communication, March 26, 2017) listed three conditions that can lead to the approval of war in the religion of Islam. First is if the life of an individual Muslim is threatened as a result of his religion. Secondly, if the unbeliever is using force to attack Muslims and thirdly, ones Muslims see the danger of persecution they should start at these points to prepare for war and defend themselves.

Sani used the life of Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) to narrate that, “all previous Prophets have been faced with opposition and persecution and the Prophet of Islam was no exemption”. He disclosed that,

The Prophet was given certain privileges, money, political power, slaves to enable him discontinue his preaching on the existence of one God and stop speaking against their idolatrous practices in Mecca. But he refused and insisted that they must accept one God.

The continuous aggression of the people of Mecca against the Holy Prophet of Islam and his few followers was the history behind war in Islam. The pagans even pursued him to a point he went to take refuge in Medina. And it was there that the Prophet was instructed by almighty Allah to fight and defend himself to preserve his life and the message Allah has for humanity during the battle of Badr (Sani, 2017).

Despite Sani’s above mentioned conditions, he expatiated on the issue of just cause by disclosing that “the cause of the persecution if it is tribal, political, or ethnic, Muslims are not allowed to partake in it. Rather, the leaders will call the people to prepare and defend if it is because of their religion they persecute them.” Against the backdrop of responses from various interviewees, the just cause criteria of the Militant Islamist, Boko Haram is a far cry from the Islamic stance. This is the case especially when the statement of Bartolotta (2011) is given an interpretative consideration that,

The political goal of Boko Haram is to create an Islamic nation in the 12 northern states of Nigeria, eventually spreading to the rest of the country. From its inception, Boko Haram viewed Nigeria as a state run by non-believers and made the government its main target—even when the country had a Muslim president.

While scholars agree that Muslims may fight in self-defense but they are forbidden to begin a fight. In clear terms, the jihadists and violent Islamist group members have fallen short of this criterion as they engaged in a war when no one has compelled them under the force of arm to stop exercising their religious duties of *Hajj*, *Salat*, *Sawn* among others. Equally, there was no time any group of “unbelievers” used force to attack them because of their religious identity neither was there any time it was discovered that such “unbelievers” were planning any form of aggression against them. For A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) Islam is not under threat, rather it is flourishing in Nigeria. Thus, like A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) enthused, “There is no justification for Boko Haram to kill people because they are not Muslims or good Muslims”.

One may only find some justification for their actions from the views of Batley (2003) when he asserts that, “Muslim societies often hold the view that the state should represent only the political expression of an Islamic society” Batley maintains that “once Muslims realize that public life has moved away from the moral values and norms of the Islamic religion, they are obliged to rise to reform their social and political attitudes and insitutions” (P. 12). There is no denying the fact that the Nigerian society is replete with a host of these challenges in private and public life. Little would one wonder why the Islamist group was emphatic on premising their actions on corruption, injustices among other ills in Nigerian State. From the perspective of Islamists both liberal and conservative, “it is ultimately the Shariah law which must guide the Ummah back to the path of God” (Batley, 2003). Thus, their action from this perspective holds some justification.

B) Last Resort:

The Qur'an, Hadith and other works by Islamic scholars and jurists are resolute on the need for Muslims to fight when all other options have been tried and they fail to bring the peace. Thus, Muslims are to fight in self-defense but they are practically forbidden and admonished not to begin a fight in their struggle to free worship of Allah and living in peace. In Sura 2:208 "The Heifer (Young Cow)" it was specifically stated in the Qur'an that, "O ye who believe! Enter into Islam whole-heartedly; and follow not the footsteps of the evil one; for he is to you an avowed enemy". The scripture pinpoints the intention and desire of the Qur'an for Muslims as it seeks to bring about peace and eschew war.

Like Jafri (2012) observes, Jihad is a last resort in Islam, because the Qur'an time and again invites to dialogue. A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) has it that Muslims can even engage in dialogue with their oppositions to see if they can change from their aggressive behaviour towards them. It is at the stage when such dialogue has failed that they can go to war especially when such aggressors doesn't want to refrain from applying physical force against the Muslims to suppress them. At this level, Allah has commanded them to fight the enemy unless they cease their aggression. Sura 8:61 was clear on this point, "And if they incline to peace then incline to peace and put your trust in Allah". The intent of the Qur'an is that when Muslims are mistreated and attacked then they must resist and defend themselves.

On the issue of last resort with respect to the Boko Haram, B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) has it that,

The presence of international law, United Nation's Charter and Articles of freedom are protecting the religious freedom of Muslims. Muslims in Nigeria are not prevented

from serving God through worship. As such, there is no basis for Boko Haram to declare or engage in war of any kind and we cannot talk about last resort.

In corroboration, the points and perception of A. Sani (personal communication, March 27, 2017) that, “Muslims can even migrate from an unsafe place to avoid persecution”. This goes a long way to show that no serious consideration was given to the criterion of last resort before the members of the Boko Haram sect resorted to large scale violence against the Nigerian state and her citizens.

For S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) the breaking point or last limit before a Muslim can engage in war is, “at the point that you have avoided the aggressor by every possible means and he refuses to cease the hostility or injustice”. He used an illustration with this scenario.

Two people can leave in the same house and they share one kitchen. Because of their misunderstanding one party asked the other not to cook in the kitchen and don’t want to see him there. Then you move the stove and other items to the entrance of your room. But the other party insists that you can’t cook in the house that the smoke cannot be allowed. You move it into your room he says he will not allow that. At this point you have left the kitchen, general passage and now the room. You relocate from the house to a different compound, nearby or elsewhere, he still comes to say, my friend, I tell you; you are not cooking, at that time you are free to fight. Because nobody that hears what happen (sic) will blame you. Whatever you do, Islam will permit you. You have exhausted all options. That is the point you reach and it is a defensive war.

It is with the above kind of scenario that A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) comments that, Muslims are not to insult other people's religion or Gods, because that will bring about insult on the Prophet or Allah. He concludes that,

The stage you can go to war as a Muslim is when force or violence is used against them. When there is destruction of Mosque, killing of women, children and scholars, Muslims will be called to defend the religion... If a man refuse (sic) to come out to fight for Islam, he has sinned against Islam and Allah.

As such, in Ozekome's view, when Muslims are aggrieved through forceful and violent aggression, it is at that state they can fight to defend themselves, the religion and God. From his statement, it becomes very clear to note that there was no clear-cut scenario when Muslims in Nigeria were faced with a near picture of Ozekome's explanation.

On the other hand, I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) gives a procedural explanation of the level of consideration one must explore as a Muslim before resorting to war. He observes that, "in Islam, if there is misunderstanding, you first go for reconciliation between the parties. You should not be the guilty party and the opponents should be the first to attack".

C) Legitimate Authority:

This criterion or principle is understood to be that it is only an Islamic (religio-political) leader that has the legitimate right to declare and prosecute war on behalf of the faithful. Wars are not to be fought on the ground that an individual Muslim is offended or provoked by a non-Muslim. That will be a personal matter. So, for A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016),

The authorities to declare war in Islam are the scholars, Sharia court functionaries such as Sheikhs, Imams and Sultans. And Muslims are meant to listen to these set of people

because of their position of authority that stems from their wealth of knowledge just like professors.

Similarly, A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) discloses that it is Muslim clerics such as the Imam or the *Amin Mumini* (Commander of the faithful) that declares war. But generally it depends on the type of leader in such an environment. Corroboratively, speaking on legitimate authority to declare war in Islam, S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) has it that, “it is the leader of the environment. It is relative, for the family setting it should be the husband or father, the children cannot start it”.

I. A. Yusuf (personal communication, March 25, 2017) seems to agree with the position that Imam (leader) is responsible for declaring war. But he enthuses that, “he doesn’t declare war, he gives the restrictions on the way to propagate the war”. He is concerned here with the defensive nature of the Islamic war. Thus, to downplay aggression, he prefers to see the Imam as only setting the limits of war for the belligerent faithful.

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) was unequivocal when he avows that,

It is the commander of the faithful in an Islamic state that declares war. The Caliphs are saddled with such responsibility. Although, it is not unilateral as it must begin with consultation with the jurists (Ulama of contemporary times). In our context, because of the historical role of the Sokoto Caliphate, the Sultan is the legitimate ruler of all Muslims in Nigeria.

Legitimate political authority as a clearly defined moral principle in Islamic warfare is crucial in the *Jus ad bellum* criteria. Jihad is a function of the Islamic state whenever it is expedient the state will undertake on it. It cannot be decided by individuals. It is for some

especially the Shiites only conducted in presence of the Imam or in the presence of a deputy of an Imam.

For M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) “the commander of the faithful, *Amin Mumini* is the Islamic leader that takes charge of the Muslim army. The location, purpose of the fight will be told by him. The reason must have an Islamic agenda or justification”. Abdul maintains that such a person must be, “accepted by the entire Muslim. And for Nigeria it is Saiad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto”. For him, though, “Yusuf Mohammed was initially a *Mallam* (a preacher) and was very good in Qur’anic memorization. He used religion as a tool... and killing cannot be Islam”.

Despite the provisions for a legitimate authority in the declaration of war in Islam, A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) has it that Mohammed Yusuf made the declaration of war against the Nigerian state. The first part of his declaration was against the Nigerian Police, where he charged them to kill the Force members anywhere they are found. Ozekome observes that as an individual Muslim he does not have the authority to declare war for Muslims in Nigeria. The Police equally did similar declaration on the sect members. Ozekome acknowledged that, “to his members, he is their superior but for all of Nigerian Muslims he is not.”

D) Just or Right Intent:

In Islam, one aim of War is to create a democracy where people are free to live their lives without molestation because of their religious beliefs and political oppression being imposed on them. There must be no hatred or vengeance in the fighting as wars of attrition and genocidal massacre often attempt to do. For Islamic warfare, as soon as peace is offered, fighting must stop immediately. Once peace has been restored the differences between people must be resolved and

harmonious relationship should ensue between them. It is for reasons as this the Hadith sharply admonishes, “Hate your enemy mildly; he may become your friend one day”.

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) gives the bottom line for any war that will gain the support and approval of Muslims as the glorious Qur’an and the Hadith of the Prophet has guaranteed. For Bello, “going to war is for the sake of Allah and to defend Muslims from attack. Anything you do should be because of Allah”. S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) has it that the intention is, “to fight for the right to practice your religion and not to force people to join your religion”. He adds that,

When they don’t want you to pray, you can even relocate to avoid conflict. For example, where you have a church and Mosque, you can go elsewhere. There is no way they will come and meet you where you are and still trouble you.

E) Probability of Success:

On the issue of reasonable prospect of success, B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) notes, “they started from the North and wanted to take it down the South”. He reveals that,

Boko Haram sect members are daring and violent. With an army of ignorant Muslim youths from the area who are indoctrinated, they really think they will succeed. They have assessed at that time, the strength of Nigeria’s police and military and they felt they will succeed by conquering that region and advance from there.

Bello is even convinced that members of the militant Islamist sect came better prepared with superior weapons.

Although, S.O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) asserts that, “I wouldn’t know the mindset, I don’t know their mindset and can’t speak for them”, he declares that,

It is not possible for them to win the war. Because God that created the world, give us the wisdom to know many things, and give us the will to choose one. If God want all of us to be Muslims, He wouldn't have given us the knowledge of any other one... Even in the life time of the Prophet there are Jews, there are Christians and he governed them together.

F) Public Declaration:

A consideration of the idea of A. Yunusa's (personal communication, November 21, 2016) interpretation is instructive on this issue. For him, "the war was not publicly declared because I do not know when and who declared the war. Anything that Allah or the Prophet of Islam does not permit you to do, when you do it you are bound to fail."

For B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017), "they publicly declared the war through their activities. From the video clips we saw too." Bello is of the opinion that it was after the murder of Mohammed Yusuf that other splinter groups joined in the violent activities of Boko Haram. For him during that period, terrorism was a trend in the world as a good number of terror associations were springing from one part of the world to another.

I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) did not agree that there was any public declaration by members of the sect. For him, "they did not publicly declare the war." While M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) agrees that members of the Boko Haram sect publicly declared the war, he insists that they did it, "through mob action and mobilization". By his statement, it is implied that their declaration and fighting had no time in-between for their "enemies" to have some time to prepare for defense against their onslaught and offensive. This explains why their action does not meet up with the *Jus ad Bellum* criteria of public declaration in the Islamic sense.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) maintains that it is political and nothing more. A set of people assisted and contributed in the political success of a person. He pledged that he will give them certain things which he did not do. It is a personal matter...they want to take their right by force. Their leader was killed and they now want to take vengeance. The Boko Haram matter is purely political and does not have a religious connotation. Why people give it religious connotation is based on what they say they are doing. Because they speak Arabic and quote Qur'an and now people say they are fighting for Islam. It is the government media that gave it a religious connotation...it is that religious connotation that made it go out of hand. They were speaking religion and people were willing to join the fight to save their religious practitioners who were killed. It is not religion, its politics. People take advantage of it.

If you want to put the country in fire they use religion. Because we are dogmatic and don't think beyond our nose. I want to tell you this, most of our Christians in the Northern part were already Muslim before they turn to Christianity, you see in the Northern part they say *Insa Allah*, not because they are Muslims, but because it is part and parcel of their language. You meet a Christian Northerner he will say *Insa Allah*, I will do it. It does not mean he is a Muslim. But because it has been part of their language, they mix the religion and the culture together that you cannot separate it. That is why in the North they don't consider name as a means of religious identity.

4.3 Justice during War (*Jus in bello*) Evaluation of Terrorism in Nigeria:

On a general note, moral restrictions on how one conducts oneself in war are usually quick to be met with various forms of disbelief. In Islam war is limited, as not every practice that is ethically approved is justified in the conduct of war. As Kalin (2004:4) quips, "the spiritual and ethical teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah underpin everything Islamic in principle, and

it applies *mutatis mutandis* to the question of peace and violence”. He further affirms that, “the legal injunctions (*ahkam*) of the Qur’an concerning peace and war are part of a larger set of spiritual and moral principle”. So, it is to these principles that we intend to evaluate in this aspect of our study.

A) Discrimination:

One key element in common responses to and fear about terrorism is the idea that it involves “innocent” victims (Coady, Nd). Central to the terrorist strategy is indiscriminate killing of innocent life. Noncombatant immunity is the central idea behind this criterion of *jus in bello*. Aly (2014) has rightly avowed that, “one of the most important areas of concern for humanitarians is the permissibility of targeting civilians” (P. 4). She continues that,

Jihadist groups offer a variety of justifications for attacks on civilians. Some argue that because non-Muslim armies are killing Muslim civilians, they are reciprocally justified in killing non-Muslim civilians. Others say civilians contribute to the war effort in “deed, word or mind”. Still others say it is sometimes impossible to distinguish civilians from combatants (P. 4).

A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) gives a list of some of the discriminations observed in Islamic law. For him they include; cutting down of trees, killing of animals, women, children, and aged people. A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) agrees that children and women are not part of a war but includes that women could involved, “if they come with first aid”. He continues that, “even an energetic person that is not part of a combatant, you ignore them. Except someone at the war front”.

Like Nwozor (2013) notes,

The arbitrary targets of Boko Haram's sustained terrorist attacks appear to create analytical problems with regard to who it categorizes as an infidel. There has not been any boundary in the targets of its attacks: it appears to attack everybody but with preponderance on Christian institutions (P. 8).

The statement of Nwozor is a clear depiction of the lack of restraint and neglect for the principle of discrimination in war prosecution in Islam. Since a major *jus in bellum* criteria in the Islamic injunction of war is the discrimination of the noncombatant from war such as women, children and the aged among others.

According to Zenn (2012) the Kaduna Easter day attacks by the sect members took the lives of a Muslim motorcyclist/rider, women and children outside the church. Whereas, I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) maintains that, "the lives of women, children should be spared and even that of captives of war". He gives a reason for this exemption because these people are not fighting you. Similarly, S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) opines that in Islamic war, "you don't destroy economic trees, kill adults, old people, girls and women or children. You only fight those fighting you".

According to A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2017) members of the Boko Haram sect did not live up to the expectations of Islam because they did not avoid bringing harm to certain exempted categories in the prosecution of their war. For Yunusa,

When Muslims agree or accept to go to war they (sic) must be some conditions. The leader declaring the war must be listened to. In war some categories are not expected to be in the war, battle. People of old age, people that are knowledgeable in Islam and women from both left and right i.e. from the side of Muslims and Christians. When the

war is going on, you must not touch by killing them. Children and animals are also not permitted to touch.

Some confusion seems to have arisen as a result of the deliberate destruction that has come to fellow-Muslims through the hands of the Jihadi group members.

Question as to whether they are Muslims or not, sprang up in a number of quarters. The Da'wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (2009) in their response to this mind-troubling question has it that, "even though BH members hold some views that are misconception and misinterpretations of Islam, they are still considered Muslims". The Islamic propagation group quote an Hadith of the Prophet (pbuh) to have said, "Whoever offers prayers as we do and turns his face to our Qiblah (direction faced in prayer) and eats the animal slaughtered by us, is indeed a Muslim for whom is covenant of Allah, and the covenant of the messenger of Allah...". This is against popular views of Muslim clerics and other public commentators that as long as the group members don't do as Islam has commanded completely, they are not true Muslims or Muslims at all.

On the 30th of July 2012, the members of the violent sect strayed far beyond the limits of war in Islam. They planned and successfully executed an attack in Sokoto, the heart and sit of the Caliphate. The violence in this location was not the basis for this comments, rather they perpetuated their violence during the end of that year's Ramadan. It is worthy of mention that Ramadan is not just the ninth month in the Islamic calendar, it is the holiest period for the Islamic faith when fast (one of the pillars of Islam) is held from sunrise to sunset. The assailant jihadists fired shot at the Arkila Police station in Sokoto and equally fired at the home of the then Vice President of the country, Architect Namadi Sambo in Zaria, Kaduna state while killing a person (Zenn, 2012).

The jihadists have seemingly lost all moral turpitude and ignored the Islamic injunctions on war. They have also destroyed against the ethical prescription of Islam, churches in a number of locations in the North. They tend to thrive in sharp contrast of the Qur'anic stance on war (jihad). In addition, they have transgressed against the Hadith of the Prophet (pbuh) and renowned Islamic jurists and theologians. For example, earlier on, on Easter day of this same year, members of the militant Islamist group detonated explosives near a church in Kaduna, killing about forty one (41) persons. A week later (June 17), they detonated another three (3) explosives near churches that took the lives of over ninety (19) worshippers during the Sunday service (Zenn, 2012).

According to the Institute of Economics and Peace (2014) the Boko Haram militant Islamists "...have issued an ultimatum to Christians living in the north-east to 'leave or die' (P, 53). Their attacks on churches prompted Ajayi (2012) to affirm that, "... the unprovoked attacks on churches by the terrorists, ostensibly to actualize the complete Islamisation of the North, makes Boko Haram terrorists activities unjustifiable and criminal given the secular status of Nigeria" (P. 105). Little would one wonder when Agang (2015) affirms that, "Boko Haram lacks morality in its war tactics. This is demonstrated by the aimless and indiscriminate slaughtering and bombing of innocent citizens". Similarly for Grotius (1825) cited in Teichman (2006) "the slaughter of a people is the worst possible evil" (P. 25) as war is evil.

It is instructive to align with Coady (n.d.) when he affirms that when we classify people as noncombat or innocents we do not mean that they have no evil in their hearts, or that they lack the enthusiasm or patriotism to defend their land. Rather, the classification is premised on the grounds that such individuals don't play any role in the organized attempt to repel the wrong doing of aggressors. Despite this reality, the members of the sect have progressively killed and

have continued to kill non-combatants especially the aged, women, children, and priests from the Christian and Muslim side.

While highlighting the criminal culpability of the violent Islamist militant sect, M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) concludes that Boko Haram, “kill children, women, old people, people with deformity, strangers and animals that they are not supposed to fight with or kill”. These indiscriminate killing can only make sense when we consider the comment of Aly (2014) when she affirm thus,

Islam’s prohibition against targeting civilians has exceptions—namely necessity. Mohammad Ibn al-Hassan al-Shaybani, the first Muslim jurist to codify Islamic rules of war, wrote in his seminal treatise, for example, that flooding enemy cities was acceptable even if women, children, slaves or Muslim prisoners were inside their gates. Some degree of collateral damage is seen to be acceptable if it helps achieve an imperative goal. In other words, the ends justify the means (P. 4).

The terrorist war of BH in Nigeria has terrorized the Northern regions of the country with greater impact on the north Eastern states. In their reign of terror in the country generally and on the zone specifically, they have shown no discrimination towards unarmed and innocent civilian population especially women, children and the aged despite their recourse to religious scriptures as their source of ideology and the interpretation of their social experience.

B) Human Shield:

I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) was not very assertive on the issue of human shield in the operations of the violent Islamists activities. He only concludes that, “they can use women and children to defend themselves. They have the tendency to do that”. The use

of young ladies to barricade their camps serves as a human shield for the violent Islamists who pursue the total Islamisation of the Nigerian polity in principle and practice or so they claim.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) was quick to declare his non-involvement in the group's activities but notes that, "it is a part of their strategies; they can do it to save themselves in order to continue their evil doing". A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) similarly has it that, "they usually use women and children for defense. They use it so that the army will not get them easily". For Ozekome, this is done with a mind-set that, "the presence of non-combatant should weaken the military in their planned offensive". In the view of A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) members of the violent group, "kidnapped Chibok girls to defend themselves. Anything can happen; they are out of Allah's chain...they are on their own".

In a rather detailed manner, B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) avows that members of the Islamist militant sect, "often use people as human shield." He decried the fact most "Nigerians were making noise about Chibok girls, whereas they (BH) have so much more female captives in their control. First as sex slaves and as human shield". He narrates that, "Boko Haram use girls as domestic slaves to satisfy their lust or pleasure and it was for this reason that they even accuse the government's assault on the region for the death of some girls and women". Bello concludes that Muslims should follow the guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith.

To deepen the un-Islamic nature of Boko Haram's use of human shield M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) concludes that, "Boko Haram use human shield but Islam does not allow it".

C) Night Attack:

A major strategy of the sect's attack was to lay wait in nearby bushes in the dark of the night and start killing innocent lives and destroying incalculable property through dawn. They have utilized this tactic severally whenever they want to destroy a village, town or city that has posed a difficult nut to crack. They mobilize more of their *jihadists* in such circumstance and besiege such places, open fire at them and make sure there is maximum casualty rate. Although, A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) was uncertain if they kill people at night, he could not attest to their moral uprightness in their pursuit of the war. For Sani, "we have been hearing that they are killing people at night. Their operation is limitless".

According to I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017), "they attack regularly at night. Most of the twenty one (21) villages they captured were at night". Similarly, B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) in corroboration to Raji's comments adds that, "they attack villages and communities at night. They come with bikes". He decried that, "at a time when people are relaxing from their days work, they use it to destroy a village. Some people are taken on surprise. People were even attacked during their early night prayer at 7pm and 8pm".

A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) on the issue of night attack by the sect's members observes that, "like the Kano and Maduguri attacks, I have not heard of it as such". A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) throws light on the utilization of night hours in launching attacks against civilian population. He has it that, they carry out operation during the night at the University of Borno where they attacked by 5am. Their activities are not Islamic.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) sees the attacking of people at night as their strategy to get people unaware. They don't fight the military but kill people in the Mosque and Church when they are praying. Which religion are they protecting? They attack soft

targets. You invite people to religion through words, not confusion. In Islam you invite people through beautiful words”. There are clear evidence that members of the group engage in night attacks, perhaps for military necessity against their helpless victims.

D) Mutilation:

Contrary to Islamic ethical and legal values of non-mutilation of targets in a war, the members of Boko Haram and allied militant Islamist groups have showed no concern for this crucial principle that upholds the sanctity and dignity of the human person being Allah’s creation. In fact, they seem to thrive in the neglect or suspension of all praiseworthy Islamic principle of war engagement.

According to I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017), “they usually mutilate. They use to burn people with fuel from generating sets. Imagine such a heinous crime”. For B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) the members of the extremist group “regularly mutilate, they went as far as committing cannibalism; they eat and drink the blood of people”. To further his argument, Bello quips that, “even if they don’t mutilate people, through bombing they did it indirectly. They pack, cut and butcher people in pieces”.

A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) agrees that, “members of the sect usually mutilate their victims”. But quickly adds that,

Islam does not permit it. Even in the real sense of war in Islam. It does not allow a Muslim to kill a non-Muslim to the extent they may not recognize them... The Prophet said they should not even touch their faces to the extent that they may not recognize their face again... This bombing of a something is part of it, by the time you bomb... when you kill people now, you will not recognize who is who.

For Yunusa, they are not even allowed to use knives to slashing somebody's face. The implication is that, Islam does not in any way approve the use of bombs in warfare but the militant Islamists in Nigeria have thrived in the possession and continuous usage of various improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or bombs with its mutilating effects.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) agrees that through burning people they mutilate. People scatter and burn. That is their strategy. You put bomb on innocent child to go and do something else and the parent doesn't know what you put there". A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) did not see any compliance of their actions with the Islamic rules and regulations for war prosecution. He notes that, "through bombing, people get burnt beyond recognition. Mass burial is the result". A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) summarizes that this is the case, "provided they do not work in-line with Allah's law and without His principles or guidance, they can do anything including genocide...since they lack human sympathy". Here, the group clearly falls short of this criterion of Islamic ethics and laws of war.

E) Weapons:

In Islam once a war has been legitimately declared there has to be some restraint on the use of weapons. Weapons here are understood holistically as all tools and instruments that aid in fighting against one's enemy. Although, I. A. Yusuf (personal communication, March 25, 2017) sees the contemporary form of weapon Muslims should use as that of knowledge. In his words, "the weapon you use today is knowledge to defend Islam". The war in northern Nigeria through terrorist strategy does not conform to Islamic standards neither in principle nor in practice.

According to I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017), "several United Nations War Charters and Conventions prohibits nuclear, biological, and missiles from been used. Boko

Haram use sophisticated weapons and hardware”. Talking about Islam, Raji insists that, “the religion prohibits chemical weapon because it affects plants and animals”. No wonder, A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) unequivocally avers that, “atomic bomb is not allowed in Islamic war”.

Speaking on Boko Haram’s use of un-Islamic approved weapons B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) asserts that, “bombs do not discriminate as it wipes out women, children and old people. Armoured-tankers are used by Boko Haram to erase buildings in order to displace and cause hardship for the people”. He includes that, “they even burn houses and Mosques. In their violence, they have raised down an entire community and village”.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) disagreed with the strategy of the militant Islamists sect when he avows that,

Bombing is not Islamic. Most of our modern weapons is (sic) not Islamic. It is mass killing and Islam does not allow mass killing. Because when you bomb such a place both innocent people and the enemies is (sic) killed. Islam does not approve such. Everybody die, unborn child, pregnant woman all of them die. You don’t kill a pregnant woman in Islamic war, you don’t destroy economic tree. That one has no discriminating something, is just everything you destroy.

While condemning the Islamist militants as un-Islamic due to the lack of compliance to discrimination with respect to choice of weapons, A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) based his stand by observing that, “this is the case because they use all kinds of weapons in their disposal such as heavy equipments, atomic bomb and chemical weapons”. In rejection of their tactics A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) in condemnation avows thus, “suicidal bombing is not an Islamic type of war”.

It is for unethical practices as these that, Flanders (1975) cited in Oluwaseun, Fagbamila, and Abdulganiyu (2014) asserts that, “religion is synonymous to militancy, weapons and ammunitions have become essential parts of religious apparels”. As a result of the methods employed by the dastardly group in the pursuit of their religio-political goals, they are currently one of the most deadly terrorist groups in Nigeria with an average of close to eight deaths per terrorist attack (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2014). Thus, the group did not meet the discrimination requirement with respect to weapons in Islam.

F) Property Destruction:

The presence of Islamic rhetoric in the seemingly faith-induced terrorism in Nigeria that has been prosecuted mainly through terroristic tactics and strategies has brought about quantum destruction of incalculable property in the country. These acts of destruction should not be seen as inevitable or sheer coincidence in the sense of collateral damages rather as willful and purposeful targets to destroy such property against the principle of restrain from destroying property as the Qur'an, Hadith and *ijtihad* have variously maintained.

I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) asserts that members of the militant sect often, “burn Mosque, Churches, even farm land are destroyed. This is in addition to the destruction of homes, settlements, places of worship, facilities, institutions and anything they can lay their hands upon”. Similarly, for A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) “you don’t burn people’s houses if it is an Islamic war... You must carry out the activities of God, with God consciousness and God mission”. Sani went ahead to observe that, “Boko Haram is a sect that come (sic) with certain mission and sponsored for certain mission. It is not Islamic as there is no threat to warrant their actions”. He furthers his statement by observing that,

The aim is to destabilize the oil field in the North-East so that Nigeria cannot benefit. They want to stop Nigeria from benefiting... France colonized Chad and Cameroon. They kill Christians and even Muslims. They are into massive reduction of human beings. In fact, it is human genocide. It doesn't comply with Islamic ethics.

A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) has it that Boko Haram's main target is the burning of houses and property. In his words, "they destroy houses, farm produce, places of worship, food items and whatever they can get". More condemnatory remarks were made on the issue of burning of houses and burning of people to death by the sect members when O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) quips that,

When they bomb a person where is the property again? Is it not happening in the North now? All the houses burnt, all the property destroyed, their farm land destroyed... when you kill the person, you leave the economic something whoever is left can continue... Their means of war is not approved by Islam.

In his own words, A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) has it that, "Islam does not approve the destruction of people's property. Bombs kill people and equally destroy property and Islam does not permit it". In fact,

They don't respect the lives and property of others. Bomb destroys anything that is closer to it. By the time you set bombs in a market, you set bombs into the square of where people are, you are not only killing but also destruction (sic). And Islam does not permit it.

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) situates the destructive activities of the violent sect in its broad economic sense when he quips that, "they destroy the economic assets of people and it is against Islam". Bello further maintains that, "maybe they really want to

impoverish the people and put them down in a perpetual state of psychological trauma. This may be in-line with their objectives. Their intention is really devilish”. More light was thrown on this devilish intention of the violent group and their depravity by A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) when he posits that, “they are vulnerable to all forms of evil that will cause genocide... any crime that Satan can lure people to, they can even do more than that. They don’t fight for missions”.

M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) contends that, “all property are not meant to be destroyed. But they are war booty. When a people have been killed, you can take their treasures and store them at a central place”. He insists that, “you don’t destroy property, you can go with them”. The violent group, Boko Haram did not meet the Islamic demands here.

I) Quarter and Safe Conduct:

On the issue of having a quarter or safe place where noncombatants to the violent sect members are kept and allowed to carry on with their daily business I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) responds that, “I don’t know if they are at peace with anybody. Nobody is their friend. Once you are not with them, they term you a *Haruna* and unbeliever”. In similar vein, Raji discloses that, “I am not aware if they have anybody they can protect. They even accuse each other of licking their secrets. In fact, they don’t trust anybody to the extent of safeguarding them in their midst”. There seem to be no such provision for ease in access to the stronghold of the Islamist fighters.

For A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) members of the sect sometimes cover some Christians and Muslims that don’t expose or confront them especially once you are ready to stay with them and depending on the agreement they have with them. On protection for certain people in the Boko Haram’s fighting, A. Ozekome (personal communication,

March 23, 2017) is emphatic when he quips that, “they don’t have that. They attack anybody in the locality except people who sponsor and provide them with basic daily needed items”.

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) describes members of the sect based on their disposition to quarter and safe conduct as a group that, “kill and don’t care. They kill everybody. They don’t protect Christians or Muslims who don’t want to fight with them nor expose them to the authorities”. Bello summarily concludes therefore, “they are devilish, criminal, unconventional, and un-Islamic”.

Boko Haram members in fact, are dealing heavy blows on Christians in the North and as such they are not at liberty to come any close to them, let alone stay among them. So far, they don’t seem to be giving anyone protection and are in fact, they are averse to providing any safe haven for non-Muslims. Come to think of it, they have shown no toleration for the slightest opposition from fellow Muslim faithful. Little would one wonder that they are not open to providing Quarter or encouraging safe conduct in their prosecution of the war.

The views of S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) on their respect for safe quarter will drive this point further home. “From their approach of the war, where is the respect? When they are killing innocent people, when they are destroying, bombing places, where is the respect? There is no respect for anything there. For life, for property, there is nothing like respect here. They don’t use guns, they don’t use cutlass, they use bomb. And they get people unaware, when people are sleeping. They jump to the village, raid them, spray all of them, bomb them, and kill them”. He concludes that they don’t protect lives of Muslims or Christian, they kill everybody.

A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) sees the reason behind their indiscriminate killing as due to their international support. He asserts this when he says, “If you

don't follow them in their operations, they can make you a target. They kill Muslims, Christians, pagans, and free-thinkers". Sani concludes that, "they have international supporters. It is a problem from outside-in. They are sponsored...the people don't work with the Qur'an and Hadith".

M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) was unequivocal when he maintains that, they kill everybody even those that are not opposed to them". Abdul decried that you cannot collect *Jizyah* (poll tax) without an Islamic state. That is normal in an Islamic state for non-Muslims who don't want to accept the religion to pay such tax for their protection.

The dismissal of the jihadist militant activities on the premise that it affects even Muslims and as such it is un-Islamic does not hold water in the light of the comment by some Islamic scholars. Okon (2013:77) has it that, "Islam does not accept change of religion. Muslims do not have any reason to abandon their religion. The punishment prescribed in the Islamic *shariah* for apostasy is death penalty". Abdul-Rahman al-Sheha (1998) cited in Okon (2013) throws more light on the implication of rejecting Islam. He has it that,

Rejecting Islam as a way of life, after its acceptance implies malicious propaganda against Islam and a disgrace to the immediate Muslim community where the apostate lives. Such rejection will not only discourage people from accepting Islam as a way of life, but will encourage all varieties of criminality and blasphemy (P. 129-130).

Thus, there is a justification in Islam for the waging of war against dissident and apostate Muslims after all, *Jihad*, both in the offensive and defensive dimensions, is aimed at eliminating contending religions, and any form of opposition against the consolidation of pan-Islamism (Okon, 2013). Boko Haram seem to lack any record of Quarter and Safe conduct from our research so far.

J) Prisoners of War (POW):

M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) has it that captives of war in Islam are not just killed because of their lack of faith in Allah. That they are to be asked and if they accept they should be spared. In his words, “you must ask a people to accept Islam. Ask them if they belief in Allah. If they accept it, you spare even if they do so to avoid your torment”. Abdul gives a ground for the killing of prisoners of war in Islam. For him, “...make them under your custody. Dominate them and only kill when they make an attempt on your life. It is the last thing to do”.

It is instructive to avow that the bulk of persons who were captured during this terroristic war were mostly ladies of school age (15-20 years). They constitute the kitchen crew and domestic maidens of the *jihadi* fighters. I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) in a confirmatory note is of the view that, ‘Chibok girls and others are still with them and they don’t threat them well. They use them as suicide bombers as the army has accused them of using under aged as soldiers’. Observing the level of harm that is melted to the prisoners of war in the Boko Haram camp, Raji concludes that, “they kill the captives and use some of them”.

Whereas the Quran and other Islamic sources approves of four possible outcomes with respect to the fate of prisoners of war in Islam, the contrary seem to be the lot of the Boko Haram prisoners of war.

A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) observes that, “they mostly treat their prisoners of war well. They feed and take good care of them. They use them in their custody to bargain for the release of their members. They even give the girls to themselves so that they can better take care of them. But for foreigners, he asserts that, “they maltreat foreigners so that ransom can be demanded from the government”. In all their activities, Ozekome concludes that, “Boko Haram’s violence is not justified. The greatest jihad is to spread the good news of Islam to

the world. When they kill everybody, who will they preach the message to? Knowledge is needed”.

M. A. Abdul (personal communication, March 30, 2017) has it that,

Over ninety percent (90%) of Boko Haram captives are women. They find them cheap and a soft target. The women under their captivity has (sic) to be given out in marriage by the Islamic leader. The commander of the faithful is the person to give consent.

But observing the Un-Islamic direction of the sect members, Abdul avows that, “Boko Haram members gave those women to themselves”. And on the strength of their action insists that, “they are non-Muslims... you cannot go to war and be fornicating, you cannot kill your parents”. Similarly, Abdul states that, young men who are captives in an Islamic war are encouraged to continue with their previous trade before they were captured and if you must go to Jihad, you must be very strong to run a state with all the necessary features”.

S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017) has it that,

We learnt that they capture some places and carried their farm products as a means of their own livelihood. When they are hungry, they go to their farms and harvest it and make it their own. I wasn't there, have not been there.

Oladiti strongly believes that it is the presence of financiers and politicians who give them money to protect themselves, they are their sources. Talking about Boko Haram, he says,

Everything about them is unjustified. It is personal vendetta they are fighting that turns to a national matter... Boko Haram was fuelled by the government itself, if not before the thing escalated and allowed it to be taken religious connotations, it couldn't have gone far. Just like this area boys, you cash them young and destroy them.

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) using the Gwoza case illustrates how the violent sect members threat their prisoners of war. Bello has it that,

In Gwoza as a town in the North East Borno, they impoverish the people. They give specific number of items they should contribute to them. Traders, farmers and all other workers were asked to bring parts of their proceeds. There are some of the things they use to maintain themselves. They forcefully collect people's property. They get them to path with their possession.

For Bello, the challenge with this practice from the Islamic perspective is that they make these demands without, "no rate, basis and they demand beyond the reach of people". The fact that they are very wicked to their prisoners of war seem to be a child's play because according to B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017), "they kill themselves on the command of a superior officer. They demand for ransom from foreign nationals to further their evil activity and as such their war is not justified from an Islamic or human perspective".

A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) discloses that, "Boko Haram is not following the real Islam on treatment of prisoners of war. Some of the young men are forced to be part of them to help them fight their enemy. If it is a girl, they force her to marry them since they are already their slave. Whatever they wish to do with her, they force her to do. To further clarify his explanation, Yunusa expatiates that,

In the war of Islam, anything you capture in the war ground, it has become a *genima* (spoil). So, if it is human being, they have automatically become part of you. If is a woman and is willing to accept Islam, you free them. But if they don't want to accept Islam, you still keep them under your custody until you give them a direction. Their property has become yours i.e. when it is properly channeled.

It is on the merits of the aforementioned statements of Yunusa that one situates a good number of the female captives as people that were violently abused sexually. As a result, a couple of them are pregnant in their custody with all the attendant health risk to both mother and child, let alone the quagmire of the psycho-social environment such children will be born into. A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) observes in this light that, “they maltreat the girls...their breast fall down like old women” In Sani’s concluding comment on this issue he asked, “what is their business with women?” Sani further argues that, “when you are not working for God, you are working for the Satan”. And asked the jihadists, “is anybody stopping them from practicing Islam? They use Islam as a cover because the name Islam gives it popularity like the ISIL, mere militant can’t sell”.

This aspect of our analysis seems to have some credit on the part of the Islamist militants. When viewed narrowly, they meet up with some aspects of this demand of Islam in part by putting their slaves to three possible uses. Firstly, as fighters through forceful conscription. Secondly, they marry the ladies-off and kill the recalcitrant or the “stubborn” ones among them. Thirdly, they free others who continually pay the poll tax (*Jizyah*) to them for guaranteed protection. Regrettably, they provide food for prisoners through stealing and they hardly show any mercy to non-combatant in most cases and these are clearly against the requirements of Islam for prisoners of war both Muslim and non-Muslims alike to be accorded good treatment. On the average, the activities of the group reveal lack of conformity to the standard of prisoners of war in Islam.

K) Principle of Necessity (*Al-Darura*) in Islamic Ethics of War:

B. S. Bello (personal communication, April 2, 2017) pegs the necessity of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities on a speculation that is recently making round in the North. For Bello, it is all about the deliberate attempt to take resources. In his words, “there is a believe that oil is in the

Chad-basin and some international sponsors from some powerful countries are behind the trouble. International politics cannot really be understood. Certain powers want to control the resources of Nigeria.” In a bid to throw in more light on his allusions, he quips that,

The Boko Haram can’t be divorced from these strategic plans of some world power. After all, they declared that Nigeria will no longer be in existence after 2015. Through the instrumentality of religious conflict, they want to weaken the national cohesion or unity of Nigeria.

Bello insists that to show their deception and lack of commitment to bring the human genocide to its end, the Boko Haram members “gave conditions that are not tenable like the release of all their members and the demand that Nigeria should become an Islamic state.”

Awodola and Ayuba (2015) give similar analysis to that of Bello, that “the group’s destabilization of the north-eastern part of Nigeria benefits these investors because it delays exploration on the Nigerian side of the Lake Chad”. They threw more light into the resource viability of the area when they quip thus,

The Lake Chad Basin is estimated to have a reserve of 2.32 billion barrels of oil, and 14.65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The oil and gas flows underground across the countries sharing the Lake Chad Basin: Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroun. Using 3D drilling, Chad is not only tapping oil within its territory but also from Nigeria to push up its production levels.

The infusion of oil and gas resources to this conflict equation is one that may hold a key to the amicable management of this unprovoked barbarism. There is this perception by neighbouring countries of Nigeria that the Nigerian state is already wealthy enough and should have no access to these seemingly shared resources and wealth. Thus, these opinions assume that the carnage is

an attempt to eliminate all viable opponents so that the resources will accrue to the victor, making it squarely a resource conflict.

For I. Raji (personal communication, March 30, 2017) membership of the militant Islamists comprise of people from other far and near countries. “Even a French man was caught among them. But for them to burn Mosques, kill people in the place of worship and destroy Qur’an, how can they be Muslims.” It is ironic, he concludes. On these aforementioned premises, he insists that the war of Boko Haram is not necessary.

A. Yunusa (personal communication, November 21, 2016) is very emphatic to not only assert that the Boko Haram’s war against the Nigerian state is not publicly declared but equally unnecessary for the time being. He concludes that, everything about Islam was started and ended by the Holy Prophet, Mohammed (pbuh) and he has cleared the grounds for Muslims to follow. You can’t declare war without following the steps of the Prophet (pbuh). For Yunusa (2017) the war is not necessary for now especially as it does not concern all Muslims. Even some Islamic scholars are killed in the process of prosecuting their war. For A. Ozekome (personal communication, March 23, 2017) the war of Boko Haram against the Nigerian state is not necessary when considered from the stand point of Islam.

A. Sani (personal communication, March 26, 2017) quips that, “Islam is not under threat, it is flourishing”. And from that point could not see the necessity of the Boko Haram’s violent agitation. Thus, he concludes that, “when weighed in the Islamic balance or scale, Boko Haram does not have weight”. Similarly, in the opinion of S. O. Oladiti (personal communication, April 2, 2017), “the war was absolutely unnecessary, because they cannot win. It was unconventional, un-Islamic and was not declared. It is merely a bastardization of the peace”.

The responds from these Muslim scholars seem to be channeled towards if war was necessary or not. Thus, they answered in the negative based on the aforementioned reasons. But, contrary to the aforementioned comments by various Muslims scholars, the principle connotes something different. There is a proper explication of this principle as given by Muslehuddin (1973) when he observes that, “necessity permits prohibited things is the general maxim incorporated in Article 21 of the Ottoman Civil Code (*Majallah*)”.

Also, Kelsay and Johnson (1991) maintain that the principle (*Al-Darurat Tubih al Mahzurat*) states that necessity makes permissible the prohibited. For an example, if an individual is faced with starvation then Islamic dietary restrictions are lifted. This provision allows such individual and group of Muslims to do the direct opposite or contravene well spelt out or known injunctions of war in Islam without the required moral condemnations or accountability.

Abdullahi (2015) confirms this principle of necessity in Islamic law when he asserts that it means choosing the lesser evil as captured in the Holy Qur'an, Sura 6:199, 145 where it permits the possibilities in case of necessity or severe harm. Also in Sura 16:115 where it provides for Allah's forgiveness on anyone who breaks his commandment under duress. As such

Muslim fighters or troops may flood, fire, or bombard a city, even though they know that women, children, old people and other non-combatant who should by right enjoy immunity during war.

This principle, even extends to the point of Muslim hostages been killed alongside other legitimate targets. This principle has a direct implication for collateral damages. For an example, the principle allows that when a dangerous enemy threatens to overwhelm Islamic lands and kill

Muslims and use Muslim captives as shields, it is permissible to kill the Muslim captives while attacking the enemy.

Similarly, the principle of necessity implies that any or all aspects of the justice during war (*jus in bello*) can be neglected and the Muslim fighters will suffer no moral burden as a result of their action provided they base such an action on this principle. Logically, it therefore becomes morally right or at least permissible to do any and everything necessary to win their war in the name of Allah and for safeguarding the people of Allah. Like Muslehuddin (1973) puts it, necessity knows no law. Thus, the various acts of violence perpetuated by the Boko Haram and allied groups against the people of the country are justified and morally right in-line with this principle. As he avows, the rule is always there to meet the need and necessity as and when they arise.

It is to be understood that this principle of necessity makes the unlawful lawful in Islamic law and rules of war (Aly, 2014). Thus, this corroborates the views of Agang (2015) that in Boko Haram's revivalist mission, the reformists see the Shari'a as the only path for restoration and renewal, because the Shari'a is the prescribed organizer of life. If that is the case, no limits were prescribed for laboring within its framework.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of the Findings:

The research came up with a number of findings. They are that:

Terrorism in Nigeria is an act of war and not merely a violent crime. This is because it finds expression through guerrilla warfare, suicide bombing, armed assault, arson, and the use of sophisticated small arms and light weapons against innocent and unassuming civilian (soft targets) and military personnel (hard targets) in the country .

The common denominator is that some Islamists in northern Nigerian feel deprived of a core necessity of their religious faith which is the practice of Islamic law in its holistic sense of civil and criminal law (Sharia). They construe social injustices and immorality as fallout from the western influences in the Nigerian society.

Yet, a number of factors were responsible for the scourge of terrorism in Nigeria. They range from Islamic revivalism and expansionism, supremacist ideology in Islamic political theology, psychology of transcendental reward, quest for social relevance and material gains, government's highhanded military strategy against BH, porous borders and difficult terrain, access to financial, military and logistical supports, over-dependence on Islamic and Arabic studies without scrutiny, and the influences from transnational jihadi and terror movements.

Successive governments of the country have sought for both military and non-military solution to the menace of BH terrorism. They have done this principally through declaration of a state of emergency, evolving a legal framework on terrorism, negotiation with BH, offer of amnesty, educational campaign, and establishment of a small arms proliferation taskforce.

Similarly, some friendly foreign governments (allies) like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Israel, among other non-Africa countries have given military support through finances, equipment sale and training of military personnel. On the other hand, some African countries like Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have donated equipments and sent personnels to help combat the terrorism in Nigeria. They have often done this under the auspices of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Also, religious leaders, traditional rulers and elders were not silent about the scourge of Boko Haram in Nigeria. At their level, there were public condemnation of the BH violence, various calls were made for an offer of amnesty to BH members, and peace advocacy.

Boko Haram terrorism had both negative and positive implications in the country. There were a number of excruciating dimensions to the negative implications. They range from security, psychological, economic, agricultural, tourism, political, health, humanitarian, educational, human rights, socio-religious, and international. These multidimensional misery and distortions have ravaged the country especially her North-Eastern geopolitical zone.

At the positive end, certain progresses were made both at individual and societal levels. They include, increased security consciousness at individual and group levels, economic and political developments, legal reforms and judicial developments and calls for the establishment of state police.

After an ethical evaluation of the activities of Boko Haram in-line with the Islamic ethics of war, on the grounds of ‘justice before war’ and ‘justice during war’ criteria, we found the following:

- a) Our ethical evaluation of *Boko Haram* terrorism at the level of justice before war (*jus ad bellum*) criteria, throw upon the fact that the group did not meet up with the requirements of legitimate authority and public declaration of war in Islam.
- b) Also, the Islamist activities fell short of a number of criteria on justice during war (*jus in bello*) criteria such as discrimination between combatants (innocents) and non-combatants especially women, children, the aged, religious personalities, and cultural sites which were deliberately targeted. The group's use of women, girls and children as human shields similarly fell below Islamic rules of war. In addition, night attacks, mutilation of victims, indiscriminate use of weapons and quarter and safe conduct featured as other ways they did not meet the expectations of war from an Islamic purview.
- c) The principle of necessity (*Al Darura*) which makes permissible the prohibited overturns the entire justice before war criteria. The doctrine absolves Muslim fighters of any moral burden from war on the grounds of necessity. In fact, it is understood that forgiveness is given to anyone who breaks the divine law (Sharia) under duress. This principle clearly allows Muslim fighters (*Boko Haram*) to break the entire *jus in bello* criteria like killing of women, children and elderly, using fire, mutilating their 'enemies' and still be in right standing with God. Thus, making their entire activity justified provided they meet the core *jus ad bello* criteria of just cause.
- 6) The place of religious ideology is central to the aim, doggedness and aspiration of the dissident group, *Boko Haram* and their allied extremists. Their clamour for Islamic law (Sharia) has called to question the secularist focus of the Nigerian constitution. Their call has placed at the front burner the issue of religious nationalism as core desire in the Nigerian society. Thus, they want to administer the polity on the basis of religious ideals and norms.

5.2 Contributions to Knowledge:

This research work has contributed immensely to knowledge in a number of ways:

The first stride of this intellectual exercise is the evaluation of the terrorism in Nigeria from a just war framework with focus on the Islamic perspective.

The research work in a relatively unique way discussed the scourge of terrorism in Nigeria in its multiple locations of effects to the Nigeria society.

The practical salience of the religious variable in security analysis is aptly x-rayed in this study. The place of religious violence as reinforced by theologies and historically founded practices is equally highlighted in this study.

The ethical and moral components of the study are very contributory to knowledge because previous studies on terrorism have never deemed it fit to account for the legitimate grounds to utilize brute force in the pursuit of politics through other means (war). Majority of works are preoccupied with the blame-game, economic considerations, political instability and foreign image dent caused by the terrorism in Nigeria.

The strain in religious relations among Christian and Muslims and the need to consider the demand of some Muslims for the governance of their society by Sharia is equally observed in this work.

The work unlike most researches previously conducted does not frown at the demands of some Muslims in Nigeria for the use of Sharia for the governance of their society. It acknowledges the demand as a legitimate right that is both culturally and politically founded. Muslims deserve and should be accorded the right to be governed by the divine law, Sharia. An Islamic state can be created to better serve their interest or at least restructuring of the federation to allow for peaceful coexistence.

The implication of the theory of just war in Islam for peace is above all pinpointed in this academic task pursued for its practical and urgent necessity. The dialectics of the Islamic purview of peace shows that the Ummah are in a perpetual state of war except when non-Muslims are converted or submit to their authority by paying a compulsory poll-tax (*Jizya*).

5.3 Recommendations:

The under-enumerated are put forward as recommendations with due consideration to the implications of the theory of just war in Islam to peace in the Nigerian context. To them we turn:

Anti-terrorism through counter narrative will go a long way to disabuse the minds of violent extremists. This should be accompanied by sincere and carefully crafted deradicalization programmes.

Improved border surveillance and security that is pursued from a multi-agency approach would be helpful. From Immigration, Customs, the Police, the Department of State Security, and Nigerian Armed Forces, all-hands should be on deck. Employment of relevant and functional hi-tech gadget like close circuit television (CCTV) and drones will go a long way to augment human efforts by curbing the free and easy flow of men, material and monies across all hot-spot border-lines in the country especially her north-East axis.

It is increasingly becoming difficult to curb terrorist activities because of the network of supporters in resident population. Similarly, protecting civilian population from random violence or attacks is an almost impossible task. Thus, for the sake of human dignity and right to life, the total implementation of Sharia in its civil and criminal sense for all Muslims in the country will be imperative in pursuit of peace.

Since religious law (Sharia) and religious identity are major bases for nationalism, cultural sensitivity and religious ideologies can be both mainstreamed and respected as legitimate

tools in the governance of Nigerian society. Thus, proper federalism or confederacy should be considered in Nigeria that will see each side of the north-south divide given the allowance to operation a jurisprudence that is built on their religious beliefs and practices as there is relative homogeneity in these regions.

Constituent parts of the federating units should exercise autonomy over their economic, natural and other resources. Fiscal federalism is long overdue in Nigeria. Afterall, economic pursuits should focus on comparative advantage in order to maintain healthy competition and good neighbourliness across the country.

A serious Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) for national coverage and Religious Affairs Commission (RAC) at various State or Provinces should be established through an Act of Parliament. Such a ministry should be saddle with the responsibility of ensuring religious peace, conflict management and transformation. The activities of the Nigerian Inter-religious Council (NIREC) can be incorporated into this ministry. With proper recruitment of experts (scholars and practitioners) in religion, conflict and peace and with a country-wide spread, this Ministry may help address the spate of insecurity in the country.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research:

The topic, *“Implications of Terrorism and Just War in Islamic Religion in Nigeria”* is a very broad one as it encompasses various themes and cuts across a number of related disciplines in the human and social sciences. To bring the various themes and issues closer home will require further in-depth study outside the efforts of this work. In this light, we recommend the under-listed topics for further research by others,

- 1). Contemporary issues in Women and Violence: Gender Implications of Religious Terrorism in Nigeria.

- 2). Challenges of Sharia Law and Religious Nationalism in Nigeria
- 3). Negotiating the future of a Deeply Divided Nation-state based on Religious Affiliation: Nigeria in Context.
- 4). Charities and Donor Agencies under-cover for Finance of Terrorism: A Moral and Economic Dilemma in Nigeria.
- 5). Socio-religious Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, 2009-2018.
- 6). Religious Relevance of Political Restructuring in Nigeria: Implication for Peace and Development.
- 7). Perception of Muslims in Nigeria on Sharia and its implication for Nation-building.
- 8). *Jus Post Bellum* Evaluation of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Conclusion:

The issue of terrorism has been recently pushed to the forefront of international political discourse with the 9/11 attacks which brought to the fore the well organized violence of non-state groups with a religious identity. Domestically, a non-state actor, the Boko Haram emerged with an objective to establish Islamic rule in Nigeria through imposition of Sharia (criminal) law throughout the country as fuelled by Nigeria's history, geopolitical structure, ethno-religious composition and socio-economic disparities.

In fact, Boko Haram has since the year 2009 posed a major challenge and in no small way cost the people and government of Nigeria so much. They have pursued this desire of theirs through violent and militaristic means and this has gone contrary or negated the motto, message and mantra of Islam which is 'universal peace'. It is noteworthy that the Islamic conception of peace is dialectic in that it is cyclic and moves in a continuum which stresses from peace to war and war to peace depending on the side one belongs to, either the *Dar Islam* (abode of peace) or

Dar al Harb (abode of war). To close this divide it should be observed that people are of two types. The brother in religion and the equal in creation. The latter implies that non-Muslims have equal rights with Muslims even in an Islamic state because of their humanness.

It is of human, security imperative and national interests to come to terms with Boko Haram terrorism as a challenge to political stability, economic growth, social progress and religious peace in Nigeria. The quest for a Nigerian-state governed through the principles of Islam with its full implementation of the Sharia (criminal) law which has found expression through this terrorist strategy of war, is an expensive nuisance and a renowned political embarrassment to the people and government of the country in contemporary times.

Regrettably, we hold no faith that terrorism as a politically motivated violence with religious undercurrent has a military solution as the near a decade (2009-2017) Boko Haram case has shown. This is not because of the irregular and guerrilla methods or strategies employed by BH, but due to the support and political sentiments favoured it by a host of Nigerian Muslims even from seemingly non-violent agents. These supports have continuously exposed the civilian population and non-combatants in the cross-fire of BH revolutionary change and Nigerian government's legitimate preservation of the status quo.

For if war, according to the Qur'an, is either just or unjust and never holy, and jihad is best defined as a 'just war theory', indeed a theory born out of necessity and developed in the midst of bloody and often chaotic wars, then it would all-most be impossible to argue that Boko Haram's war on the grounds of necessity is not justified.

With success and failures recorded in both camps of the bellicose divide, it is our sincere hope and prayer that the perseverance and unabated nature of the situation will not cause the Nigerian state to lose her nerves, experience a failure of her political will and well threatened

legitimacy, and resultantly offer a political settlement that will see the Nigerian state especially its Northern region a truly Caliphate or Sultanate.

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APPENDIX I

Department of Religion/Cultural Studies,
Faculty of the Social Sciences,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka,
Enugu State.

20th January 2017.

Dear Interviewee,

I am a Doctorate student of Religion and Cultural Studies from the above named department and institution conducting a research on “Implications of Boko Haram Terrorism and Just War in Islam in Nigeria.”

The aim of the interview is to enable the researcher to collect first hand information from the respondents in order to supplement the data collected from other library sources. No answer is right or wrong. So feel free to respond to the questions as they apply to you or from the point of view you see them.

Your kind assistance is required in order to make this research a success. You do not need to write your name on the form.

Thanks for your anticipated cooperation.

Yours faithfully,

Ikechukwu Maxwell Ukandu

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ON BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AND JUST WAR IN ISLAM IN NIGERIA

The Justice before War Criteria (*Jus ad bellum*):

1. Is war permitted in your religious tradition?
2. Under what condition does your religion approve you to engage in war (just cause)?
3. Is there any last or final point you reach before you are allowed or permitted to fight or go into war in your religion?
4. Who is the legitimate authority to declare war in your religion?
5. Under what right or just intent can one engage in or declare war in your religion?
6. Was there any probability of success in the quest of the militant extremists (*Boko Haram*) involvement in war in Nigeria?
7. Was the war carried out by the *Boko Haram* sect and other splinter groups publicly declared?
8. If the war by the violent group was publically declared, when was that and by who?
9. Was the war by the militant Islamist necessary?

The Justice during War Criteria (*Jus in bello*):

1. Is there an acceptable way of fighting or making of war as approved by your religion?
2. Is there discrimination against non-combatants like children, women and the aged in your religion?
3. Do the *Boko Haram* militant extremists use people to protect themselves from being attacked (human shields) by the state's security operatives and civilian Joint Task force (Civilian JTF)?
4. Do the violent extremists attack at night?

5. Do they mutilate or violently kill people to an extent that you cannot easily recognize their victims?
6. In your opinion and in-line with your religious views, do the members of the violent group use weapons that are not approved by your religion?
7. Do they destroy property of people they attack?
8. What type of property do they destroy?
9. Do the extremists respect the lives and property of people who don't intend to fight them and be at peace with them?
10. Do they protect the lives of some Christians and Muslim alike that do not confront or expose them to the authorities?
11. Do they collect money and other material things for such protection?
12. How do they treat prisoners of war in their custody?
13. The people they capture and kidnap especially young girls and foreign nationals, what do they do with them?
14. Do you see the violent activities of extremists as justified?

APPENDIX II

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

S/No	Name	Sex	Approximate Age	Medium of Communication	Occupation	Date
1	Ishaiku A.	Male	45	Personal	Public Servant	25/11/17
2	Ozekome A.	Male	47	Personal	Imam	23/03/17
3	Sani A.	Male	56	Personal	Teacher/Farmer	26/03/17
4	Danyaya A. S.	Male	39	Telephone	Trader	06/01/18
5	Yunusa A	Male	54	Personal	Teacher	21/11/16
6	Ibrahim B. C.	Male	59	Personal	Civil Servant	25/11/17
7	Imrana B. D.	Male	35	Personal	Law Student	25/11/17
8	Bello B. S.	Male	56	Personal	Civil Servant	02/04/17
9	Yakubu B. S.	Male	52	Personal	Public Servant	25/11/17
10	Raji I.	Male	54	Telephone	Lawyer	30/03/17
11	Yunusa J. I.	Male	59	Personal	Imam	30/03/17
12	Abdul M. A.	Male	61	Personal	Teacher/Imam	30/03/17
13	Jubril M. C.	Male	47	Personal	Farmer	06/01/18
14	Dauda M. T.	Male	45	Personal	Civil Servant	06/01/18
15	Ayuba P. A.	Male	43	Telephone	Teacher	25/11/17
16	Bako P.	Female	36	Personal	Student	06/01/18
17	Isa S. M.	Male	34	Personal	Teacher	25/11/17
18	Oladiti S. O.	Male	57	Personal	Public Servant	02/04/17
19	Yusuf I. A.	Male	64	Personal	Businessman	30-03-17

APPENDIX III

TIMELINE OF BOKO HARAM GORY ACTIVITIES, 2009-2017

Nwozor (2013) claims that although, "...both the origin and leadership composition of the Boko Haram sect are subject of (sic) speculation, their ideology and terrorist activities are not" (P. 7). There is a shortage of figures on the extent of damages caused by these militant Islamists. These groups have seemingly perfected the acts of bloodbath, brigandage and brutality in their advance stage.

S/No	Date of Attack	State/Location	Location of Attack and Number of Casualties
1	July 26, 2009	Bauchi	A Police station was attacked and for the next five days this attack spread to Maidugri.
2	July 27, 2009	Yobe	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe Divisional Headquarters, three Policemen and one Fire Service Officer died.
3	January 2010	Borno	4 killed in Dada Alemderi ward of Maiduguri.
4	March 13, 2010	Plateau	Operation by the sect in the northern parts of Jos Plateau which brought about the death of about 300 people.
5	September 7-8, 2010	Bauchi	Bauchi Central prison was set ablaze and 700 inmates including members of the sect escaped.
6	October 1, 2010	Abuja	Explosions near the Eagle Square, Abuja that claimed 12 lives and injured many more.
7	October 11, 2010	Borno	3 people died as a result of bomb/gun attack on a Police Station in Maiduguri.
8	December 24, 2010	Plateau	A bomb attack in Barkin Ladi, Jos, Plateau State that killed 8 persons
9	December 28, 2010	Plateau	38 people died as a result of Christmas Eve bombing in Jos
10	December 31, 2010	Abuja	Explosions at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja which claimed 10 lives

11	January 21, 2011	Borno	The Governorship candidate of ANPP for the 2011 elections, Alhaji Modu Gubio, a brother to former governor of the state, Mobu Sheriff, was killed by members of the sect alongside six others in Maiduguri.
12	March 2, 2011	Kaduna	Two Policemen attached to the residence of the Divisional Police Officer, Mustahpa Sandamu at Rigasa Area of Kaduna State were killed.
13	March 30, 2011	Yobe	Bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu the Yobe State Capital exploded and killed a Police Officer.
14	April 1, 2011	Bauchi	The attacked a Police station in Bauchi.
15	April 8, 2011	Niger	Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, which claimed lives of about 8National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members and that of 1 suicide bomber.
16	April 9, 2011	Borno	Bomb explosion occurred at a Polling Unit in Unguwar Doki of Maiduguri, Borno State that left the suicide bomber dead and several persons later sustained gunshot injuries.
17	April 20, 2011	Borno	The group killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri.
18	April 22, 2011	Adamawa	Boko Aharam frees 14 prisoners in a jailbreak in Yola.
19	April 24, 2011	Borno	3 persons dead due to the 4 bombs that were detonated in Maiduguri
20	April 26, 2011	Not verified	Three people killed and scores injured in a bomb attack.
21	April 29, 2011	Bauchi	Army barracks in Bauchi bombed.
22	May 29, 2011	Bauchi	Explosion at Mammy market of Shandawanka Barracks in Bauchi State which claimed lives and left many injured.
23	May 29, 2011	Bauchi and Borno	Bombings in various locations across the north of Nigeria with 15 left dead.
24	May 30, 2011	Borno	In the early hours of the morning, bombs exploded

			around Baga road of Maiduguri with 13 killed and 40 injured.
25	May 31, 2011	Borno	1 person, Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garba, brother of the Shehu of Borno was assassinated in Maiduguri
26	June 1, 2011	Borno	1 person, Abba El-Kanenu-Shehu of Borno's brother was assassinated in Maiduguri
27	June 7, 2011	Borno	Series of bomb blasts occurred in Maiduguri and claimed 5 lives and left several persons injured.
28	June 16, 2011	Abuja	Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja, was bombed by suicide bomber and left 3 killed and many vehicles damaged.
29	June 16, 2011	Borno	4 children were killed in a bomb explosion at Damboa town in Maiduguri.
30	June 20, 2011	Katsina	7 Policemen were killed when members of the Boko Haram sect stormed Kankara police station in Katsina State with 2 security guards killed.
31	June 26, 2011	Borno	Bomb attack on a beer parlour in Maiduguri, leaving 25 dead and 12 injured.
32	June 27, 2011	Borno	25 persons were killed when BH sect members on a motorcycle threw explosives into a drinking spot/beer parlour.
33	June 27, 2011	Borno	Bomb blast In Maiduguri that killed 3 girls and wounded 3 Custom Officers.
34	July 3, 2011	Borno	Another bombing at a beer garden in Maiduguri that resulted in the death of 20 persons.
35	July 9, 2011	Borno	A clash between Boko Haram and the military left about 31 people dead in Maiduguri, also in Suleja of Niger State which targeted a church and killed 4 and injured many others.
36	July 10, 2011	Niger	Bombing of Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja.

37	July 11, 2011	Kaduna	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Focados Street of Kaduna.
38	July 11, 2011	Borno	The University of Maiduguri was temporarily shut down on the grounds of insecurity.
39	July 12, 2011	Borno	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle that claimed 5 lives.
40	July 15, 2011	Borno	Explosion in Maiduguri injured 5 people.
41	July 17, 2011	Abuja	The Police Force headquarter was bombed by a suicidal team of the BH sect. it was a direct attempt on the life of the inspector General of the Police Force, Hafiz Ringim.
42	July 23, 2011	Borno	An explosion near the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem, the <i>numero uno</i> traditional ruler in Maiduguri which injured 3 soldiers.
43	July 25, 2011	Borno	Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler in Maiduguri which claimed 8 lives.
44	August 12, 2011		Prominent Muslim Cleric, Liman Bana was shot dead by members of Boko Haram.
45	August 16, 2011	Abuja	Over 34 persons dead as a result of the bombing of the United Nations building Complex in Abuja.
46	August 25, 2011		BH members killed 4 policemen, 1 soldier and 7 civilians and carted away with undisclosed sum of money after a bank robbery.
47	August 26, 2011	Abuja	A suicide bomber drove into the United nations building in Abuja with 25 killed and 60 injured.
48	September 12, 2011	Bauchi	7 people including 4 Policemen were killed during a bomb attack on a Police Station in Misau local government area of the State.
49	September 13, 2011	Borno	Members of BH sect shot and injured 4 Soldiers in an attack in Maiduguri after 15 of their members were arrested in Bauchi state in a military raid.

50	September 17, 2011	Borno	Babakura Fugu, the brother in-law of the demised leader, Mohammed Yusuf of Boko Haram was shot dead in front of his house in Maiduguri by two members of the sect just two days after he was visited by President Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria Armed Forces.
51	October 3, 2011	Borno	Boko Haram attacked Baga Market in Maiduguri and killed 3 persons.
52	November 4, 2011	Yobe	About 150 people were killed in Damaturu by BH members.
53	November 27, 2011	Yobe	7 people were killed in attacks in Geiden of the State by BH sect members.
54	December 18, 2011	Borno	3 members of the BH were killed when their bomb detonated in Shuwari in Maiduguri.
55	December 22, 2011	Borno	Explosive attacks by the BH sect members killed 4 and left several persons injured.
56	December 24, 2011	Plateau	About 80 persons killed in a bomb blast in Jos.
57	December 25, 2011	Niger	Over 50 people died and the Catholic Church badly destroyed on Christmas Day bombing in Madalla.
58	December 30, 2011	Borno	7 people were killed in Maiduguri by BH members.
59	January 5, 2012	Gombe	About 6 people died in a church attack due to BH's attack.
60	January 6, 2012	Adamawa	BH killed 17 people in a Christ Apostolic Church in Yola, while 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi area of the State.
61	January 20, 2012	Kano	Over 250 people killed in multiple attacks in Kano by BH sect members.
62	January 21, 2012	Kano	BH killed over 185 people through multiple bomb blasts

	2012		which rocked Kano city.
63	January 22, 2012	Bauchi	BH members destroyed two churches in Bauchi, 2 military personnel, a Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and 8 civilians were killed at the headquarter of Tafawa Balewa LGA in the State.
64	January 26, 2012	Kano	A number of explosions in Sabon Gari area of Kano with many injuries and a number luxury buses damaged as a result of the violence of BH.
65	January 28, 2012	Borno	BH killed 1 person in Gambiru Ngala.
66	January 29, 2012	Borno	BH killed another 2 persons killed in Gambiru Ngala.
67	January 30, 2012	Borno	BH killed 6 persons in Maiduguri environs including 2 Air Force Officers.
68	February 4, 2012	Borno	2 persons were killed in Damboa by members of the BH sect.
69	February 5, 2012	Yobe	An officer with the State Security Service (SSS/DSS) was killed by members of BH.
70	February 7, 2012	Kaduna	BH killed 5 persons in Kano Market and military Barracks.
71	February 7, 2012	Kano	Members of the violent sect, BH killed 10 persons.
72	February 8, 2012	Kaduna	Suicide bombing at the Army Headquarters in Kaduna by members of the BH sect.
73	February 10, 2012	Borno	4 BH sect members killed during a shot-out with the soldiers in Maiduguri.
74	February 10, 2012	Kano	BH members attacked a Police Station And Engaged the Police in a shut-out in Shagari Quarters.
75	February 12, 2012	Borno	Some members of the BH sect were killed in Maiduguri

76	February 15, 2012	Kogi	Jail break in Koton Karji Prisons with a Warder killed and 199 prisoners released as a result of BH attacks.
77	February 15, 2012	Niger	2 Policemen killed and other injured in Minna by BH members.
78	February 16, 2012	Central Nigeria	Members of the BH sect staged a prison break, freed 119 prisoners and killed 1 Prison Warden.
79	February 17, 2012	Yobe	2 persons killed in Geidem by BH members.
80	February 17, 2012	Borno	5 persons killed in Maiduguri Metropolis by BH members.
81	February 19, 2012	Niger	5 people were seriously injured after a bomb explosion near Christ Embassy Church in Suleija.
82	February 26, 2012	Plateau	2 people killed and 38 others injured after BH sect's members bombed Church of Christ in Nigeria, Jos.
83	March 8, 2012	N.A.	Killing of Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus 2 hostages who were abducted in the year 2011 by a splinter group of the sect (probably Ansaru).
84	March 11, 2012	Plateau	11 people killed and many injured after the bombing of St. Finbarr's Catholic Church Rayfield, Jos.
85	March 31, 2012	N.A.	5 sect members and a German held hostage killed during a joint Military Task Force raid on a Boko Haram den.
86	April 26, 2012	Abuja	5 people killed and 13 injured and 3 and many others injured respectively at This Day, the Sun and the Moments media Houses in Abuja and Kano.
87	April 29, 2012	Kano	16 people killed and many more injured during an attack on Bayero University, Kano.
88	April 30, 2012	Taraba	11 people killed and several injured during a bomb explosion in Jalingo.
89	June 3, 2012	Bauchi	15 worshippers in a church were killed and several

			others sustained various degrees of injuries after a bomb attack that Abu Qaqa claimed responsibility for.
90	June 17, 2012	Kaduna	Suicide bombers from the sect attacked three churches in Kaduna and left over 50 people dead.
91	June 17, 2012	Plateau	130 dead bodies were found in Plateau State and it was alleged that they died in the hands of BH members.
92	October 3, 2012	Adamawa	About 25-46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in a night raid by members of the BH sect.
93	March 18, 2013	Kano	A deadly bomb blast in a bus station in the heart of Kano that took the lives of 22 and injured 65 carried out by a suicide bomber.
94	April 25, 2013	Borno	87 Muslim children and adults who gathered for morning prayers were killed by the Militant Islamists
95	May 7, 2013	Borno	Members of BH killed 55 persons and freed 105 inmates in a coordinated attack on Army Barracks, a Prison and Police Post in Bama town.
96	June 6, 2013	Yobe	42 persons, mostly students were shot at and killed in a school attack by members of the BH sect.
97	July 6, 2013	Yobe	41 children and teachers were killed by members of the Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram in Mamudo Government Secondary school of the state.
98	September 20, 2013	Borno	142 corpses were evacuated from bushes when members of the BH sect had earlier made highway ambush.
99	September 29, 2013	Yobe	BH sect members attacked the College of Agriculture in Gujba and over 40 students were killed on campus and over 150 sustained various degrees of injuries.
100	January 26, 2014	Borno	BH opened fire in a market at Kawuri and killed 45 persons
101	February 11, 2014	Borno	23 people were killed when members of BH militant group burnt houses in the village of Kundoga

102	February 12, 2014	Borno	Boko Haram attacked Konduga killed 39 people and injured several others.
103	February 16, 2014	Borno	Boko Haram attacked a village in Borno killing 90 and injuring several others.
104	February 19, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Bama killing 60 people and injuring several others
105	February 25, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Buni Yadi killing 59 people and injuring others
106	March 1, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Maiduguri killing 51 people and injuring several others
107	March 1, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Mainokri killing 39 people and injuring others
108	April 10, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Bala Balge killing 60 people and injuring several others
109	April 10, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Dikwa killing 8 people and injuring several others
110	April 14, 2014	Abuja	BH attacked Abuja killing 88 people and injuring several others
111	May 1, 2014	Abuja	BH attacked Abuja killing 19 an injuring several others
112	May 5, 2014	Abuja	BH attacked Gamboru Ngala killing several people and injuring several others
113	May 13, 2014	Borno	100's of BH fighters stormed three villages in the state and some villagers resisted their assault and killing 200 of the militants
114	May 18, 2014	Kano	BH attacked Kano killing 4 people and injuring several others
115	May 20, 2014	Jos	Gunmen suspected to be BH members attacked Jos killing 108 persons and injuring 56 others
116	May 21, 2014	Jos	BH attacked Chikongudo and killed 25 people while injuring several others

117	May 25, 2014	Yobe	BH attacked Yobe killed 54 people and injured several others
118	May 27, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Borno killed 48 people and injured several others
119	May 31, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Kala Balge killed 40 people and injured a number of other persons
120	June 1, 2014	Borno	BH attacked Mudi killed over 40 people and injured many others
121	June 3-4, 2014	Borno	Hundreds of people were killed in raids by BH Islamists militants in the state and some sources putting the death toll at 400 to 500
122	June 7-8, 2014	Borno	Suspected BH militants kidnap at least 20 young women over a weekend in Northeastern Nigeria village of Garkin Fulani
123	June 14, 2014	Borno	The insurgents descended on Borno killing over 26 people and injuring many others
124	June 18-22, 2014	Borno	BH militant hold the village of Kummabza in Borno state, hostage for four days. They abduct more than 60 females, including children and killed 30 men in the raid
125	June 23, 2014	Kano	BH attacked the city of Kano killing over 12 people and injuring many others
126	July 7, 2014	Borno	63 women and girls kidnapped by BH from the Kummabza village in northern Borno state
127	July 14, 2014	Borno	The insurgents descended on Borno killing over 26 people and injuring many others
128	July 17-20, 2014	Damboa	BH raids Damboa killing 66 residents and more than 15,000 have fled
129	July 23, 2014	Kano	BH attacked the city of Kano killing over 12 people and injuring many others
130	July 23, 2014	Kaduna	BH insurgents attacked Kaduna killing about 39 people

			and injuring many others
131	January 3, 2015	Borno	Hundreds of BH gunmen seized the town of Baga and neighbouring villages
132	January 10-11, 2015	Borno	20 killed and 18 injured in a market by BH militants
133	January 10-11, 2015	Yobe	BH brought about the death of 3 persons and 43 injured in mobile phone market in Potiskum
134	March 2, 2015	On-line	Boko Haram releases video showing the apparent beheadings of two men they suspected of being spies
135	March 7, 2015	On-line	In an audio message purportedly from leader Abubakar Shekau. BH pledges allegiance to ISIS the Islamic militant group which controls areas of Iraq and Syria and is known for its gruesome execution
136	March 12, 2015	On-line	In an audio message purportedly from an ISIS spokesman, the group announces that the Caliphate has expanded to Western Africa and that ISIS leader Abu Baka al-Baghdadi has accepted BH's pledge of allegiance
137	April 28-30, 2015	Borno	Nigerian troops rescue about 450 women and girls in the Sambisa Forest during a military operation centered around destroying BH camps and rescuing civilians
138	July 1, 2015	Borno	BH militants raid 3 villagers in the northeastern Nigerian state of Borno, killing at least 145 people
139	July 20, 2015	Borno	Suspected BH gunmen raided Buratai, the native village of the Chief of Army Staff, Major Tukur Yusuf Buratai
140	July 21, 2015	Gombe	42 lost their lives in a series of blasts at two bus stations in Gombe and BH was responsible for this attacks
141	July 22, 2015	Cameroon and Nigeria	Twin suicide bombings in Cameroun and series of blasts at two bus stations in Nigeria that left at least 50 dead
142	July 22, 2015	Borno	Gunmen killed 8 people in a raid in a village,

			Pompomari, near Maiduguri
143	July 24, 2015	Borno	At least 25 people were killed in a suspected BH attack in Maikadiri in Southern Borno
144	July 26, 2015	Yobe	A girl aged about 10, carried out a suicide bombing near a crowded market in Damaturu killing at least 16 people
145	July 29, 2015	Borno	Suspected BH members slit the throats of 10 fishermen in villages near Baga on the shores of the Lake Chad
146	July 30, 2015	Not Available	At least 10 people were killed BH gunmen raided the village of Kukuwa-Gari including 2 women
147	August 1, 2015	Borno	BH fighters killed 13 people in an attack on Malari village near Maiduguri
148	August 2, 2015	Not Available	The military said it has rescued 178 people from the group BH. 101 of those freed were children and a further 67 were women
149	August 4, 2015	Borno	BH shot dead 9 fishermen on their way to Baga from Monguno, near Maiduguri. They were ambushed at Maduwari village
150	August 5, 2015	Yobe	BH shot dead at least 9 people and set homes on fire in a raid on two villages, Tadagara and Dunbulwa villages, Yobe State capital
151	August 9, 2015	Borno	BH shot dead 4 people and abducted 5 others in an ambush on a highway near Nwajurko village in Borno
152	August 11, 2015	Borno	A huge blast was recorded at a market in Sabon-Gari near Maduguri
153	August 16, 2015	Yobe	BH raided Awonori a village near the border with Niger killing 7 people
154	August 17, 2015	Yobe	160 people were massacred by BH in Awonori. Resident of Kukuwa-Gari in Yobe state described how more than 150 of their relatives and neighbours drowned in a river as they were trying to flee from the militants.

			Also, BH militants opened fire on the village on Thursday and another 8 persons were shot dead
155	August 24, 2015	Yobe	A child bomber killed 6 people and wounded dozens outside a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe state capital
156	August 30, 2015	Borno and Yobe	Suspected BH gunmen on horseback shot dead nearly 80 people in attacks on three villages on the outskirts of Maiduguri and Damaturu
157	September 2, 2015	Borno	BH gunmen on horseback killed dozens of people in Fatawa village near Gwoza, were around 100 BH militant rounding up residents, tying their hands behind their backs and slitting their throats
158	September 11, 2015	Not Available	At least 7 people were killed and 20 others injured in a blast at a camp
159	September 20, 2015	Borno	At least 54 people were killed in 3 explosions in Maiduguri, 90 people injured. One bomb exploded at a Mosque, while the other 2 detonated at an area where people gathered to watch football
160	September 23, 2015	Not Available	241 women and children are rescued and 43 BH militants are arrested
161	September 24, 2015	Borno	BH attacked Monguno and Baga, Borno State killing many
162	September 27, 2015	Borno	At least 9 people were killed and several others injured during an attack on Mailari village of Konduga LGA in Borno State
163	November 17, 2015	Borno	Nigerian Army may have lost about 150 men to an attack by BH in Gudunbali, Borno as a result the 157 Battalion of the Nigeria could not account for at least 105 soldiers including their commanding officer. BH also captured a T-72 tank as well as several artillery weapons from the unit
164	November 27,	Kano	Suicide bombing on a procession of 100 Shiite Muslims

	2015		in Kano. Shiite said at least 22 people died, including 21 who died at the scene on the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage. One of 30 wounded people died later
165	November 28, 2015	Not Available	BH attacked two villages at least 30 people were killed. 2 female suicide bombers kill 58 people at a Nigerian refugee camp as villagers were fleeing terrorism
166	November 30, 2015	Borno	BH destroyed a military based (157 Battalion), while 107 soldiers were believed to be missing in action
167	December 2, 2015	Borno	A multinational force freed 900 hostages held by BH, killed more than 100 fighters and arrested 100 others including a group leader from BH's stronghold in the Sambisa forest
168	December 5, 2015	Abuja	Security forces arrested nine alleged BH members plotting attacks on Abuja, over the festive season
169	December 5, 2015	Chad	A triple suicide bombing at a market on an island in Lake Chad killed at least 15 people and injured 130. The carnage was blamed on BH. Females carried out the three explosions on Koulfoua
170	December 5, 2015	Abuja	Security forces arrested 9 alleged BH members plotting attacks in Abuja over the festive season
171	December 7, 2015	Plateau	Suspected BH Explosive Devise Detonated Near An Evangelical Church During Sunday Service In Jos
172	December 10, 2015	Borno and Yobe	BH killed 7 civilains in Kamuya village along border between Borno and Yobe state. They burned Kamuya village to the ground
173	December 21, 2015	Adamawa	Bombing outside a Mosque killing 20 in Madagali in Adamawa
174	December 24, 2015	Borno	Suspected BH, five suspected operatives attempted to use coolers to smuggle five bombs into a Maulud celebration. They were inspected at a checkpoint where the devices were discovered and they were arrested in

			Maiduguri in a Abdulfathi Mosque
175	December 25, 2015	Borno	Suspected BH Bicycling Gunmen Raided A Village On Christmas day and burned down all the houses in Kimba, Borno
176	January 8, 2016	Cameroon	Suspected BH explosive device detonated in a Mosque Kolofata, far North Cameroon
177	January 13, 2016	Cameroon	Suspected BH suicide bomber detonated an explosive at a Mosque Kouyape far Cameroon killing about 12 persons
178	January 18, 2016	Cameroon	Suspected BH suicide bomber detonated device running into a Mosque Nguetchewe, far North, Cameroon killing 4 persons
179	January 30, 2016	Borno	85 people were killed in an attack by BH insurgents in a village near the restive Northeast Nigerian city of Maiduguri
180	February 1, 2016	Borno	BH militants attacked Dalori, Nigeria with suicide bombs and allegedly burnt children alive with 86 killed and others wounded
181	February 2, 2016	Borno	200 people were killed when suicide bombers sneaked into a crowd in Dalori and detonated explosives. The suicide bombings were preceded by gunmen on motorcycles and 2 cars who stormed the community, opening fire indiscriminately and burning houses
182	February 3, 2016	Borno	During BH's multiple attacks, worshippers were forced into a Mosque and shot 30 of them in Borno including casualties from non-Mosque attack, and 5 people from non-Mosque attacks were killed
183	February 8, 2016	Borno	BH terrorist also raided communities in the Damboa LGA killing at least 7 people
184	February 8-9, 2016	Borno	Female suicide bombers murdered and injured dozens in a Borno IDP camp

185	February 9, 2016		2 female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dika, Nigeria with 58 killed and over 80 injured
186	February 10, 2016	Adamawa	BH killed 7 people and burnt 10 houses in the town of Madagali in the North of Adamawa
187	February 2016	Borno	Over 50 person were killed by scores of BH terrorists armed with AK-47, 70 received gunshots, machete injuries in Dalori village about four kilometers away from Maiduguri and Walori village
188	February 2016	Borno	Militant from BH attacked 2 villages in Northeast Nigeria, killing at least 30 people. In another attack 2 female suicide bombers killed 58 people at a Nigerian Refugee camp for villagers fleeing terrorism
189	April 14, 2016	Cable Television	CNN posted a video of some of the teenage girls abducted from Chibok that was sent to negotiators by their captors as a 'proof of life'
190	April 18, 2016	Borno	BH attacked troops of 113 Battalion near the border with Niger Republic in the Jihadist Northeast who were on their way to the border town of Damasak
193	August 21, 2016	Not Available	BH Militants attacked Kuburuwa village killing civilians and raping women, 11 killed and unknown number of persons wounded
194	September 26, 2016	Borno	BH killed at least 8 soldiers in two attacks, while more than two dozen fighters also died near Bama 70 kilometer Southeast of Maiduguri and an army position at Logomani 110 kilometer Northeast of Maduguri
195	November 7, 2016	Borno	13 of the insurgent were killed, 3 soldiers were injured and 1 soldier confirmed dead at Kangarwa village in Northern Borno state after the attack of 119 Taskforce Battalion, 8 Division of the Nigerian Army
196	January 7,	Yobe	At least 5 soldiers were killed during an attack by BH

	2017		fighters in an Army base in Buni-Yadi, Yobe state
197	January 8, 2017	Borno	2 people were killed in a residential area in the Kaleri area of Gwange after an attack by 2 female suicide bombers. Hours prior to this, 3 suicide bombers all male attacked a military checkpoint in the area, killing themselves and a civilian self-defense fighter after one of the vests detonated
198	January 13, 2017	Borno	When BH militants attacked the 119 Battalion and 133 Special Forces Battalion of Brigade deployed to Kangarwa, Kukawa LGA, Borno state, 3 soldiers were killed in the encounter that also resulted in 10 BH casualties.
199	January 13, 2017	Adamawa	4 suicide bombers staged an attack in Madagali that killed at least 5 civilians
200	January 16, 2017	Borno	A twin suicide bombing by 2 teenagers on UNIMAID school campus, resulted in the death of 3 people, including Professor Aliyu Mani, the Director of the University's Veterinary Teaching Hospital
201	January 23, 2017	Borno	After invading the Dzaku village of Askira-Uba, LGA of Borno state, BH fighters killed 8 people and kidnapped an undetermined number of women and children
202	January 25, 2017	Borno	A civilian member of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the Kalari district of Maiduguri, Borno lost his life after 2 suicide bombers detonated their vests upon confrontation while trying to enter a Mosque
203	January 28, 2017	Borno	A recently secured Maiduguri-BTU highway was attacked by BH terrorists, leading to the death of 7 people. There were reports that claimed that the number of casualties were actually more than 20 civilians in a

			convoy that was travelling under military escort. The Theatre Commander of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General Lucky Irabor, refuted the figure, claiming that only one person had died.
204	January 31, 2017	Borno	1 person died after a suicide bomber attacked a Mosque in Dalori quarters, close to UNMAID during morning prayers
205	January 31, 2017	Cameroon	Another attack on a Cameroonian border town of Kontcha killed 5 United Nations contractors, a Kenyan, a Cameroonian and 3 Nigerians
206	February 5, 2017	Yobe	BH terrorists launched an attack on a military base and went ahead to burn down Sasawa, a town near Damaturu, Yobe state. No official death toll was released
207	February 10, 2017	Borno	7 soldiers lost their lives after troops of Operation Lafiya Dole fell into a BH ambush in Ajiri village of Dikwa LGA, Borno State
208	February 11, 2017	Borno	Terrorists invaded Mussa village of Askira-Uba LGA, Borno state burning dozens of residential houses with a man suspected to have been trapped in the attack
209	February 13, 2017	Borno	About 30 armed BH terrorists gained access to Mifa community in Chibok LGA, killing an Islamic scholar and breaking a boys hand
210	February 16, 2017	Borno	An attack by 3 suicide bombers near Muna Garage, a bus station in Maiduguri, left 2 civilians dead
211	March 14, 2017	Online	BH released a video that showed the execution of 3 people accused of being spies for the Nigeria Army
212	March 15, 2017	Borno	BH terrorists attacked Magumeri in Borno state killing 7 people
213	March 16, 2017	Borno	4 soldiers died in another attack on Magumeri after an estimated 300 BH fighters targeted the military and a

			local Police station
214	March 25, 2017	Borno	Militants kidnapped 18 girls and 4 women from Pulka village in Gwoza
215	March 30, 2017	Borno	In 2 separate attacks, BH fully abducted 22 girls and women from the village of Dumba. The abducted victims in Dumba were 4 women from the family of a herdsman who had refused to pay protection money to the terrorist group
216	March 31, 2017	Borno	At least 3 people were killed by BH in an attacked on Kaye near Gumisiri village in Damboa LGA of Borno, where terrorists burnt down the village and kidnapped dozens of people, including 3 women
217	April 5, 2017	Borno	BH fighters killed 7 men in a farming community outside Maiduguri, and stole an estimated 360 heads of livestock
218	April 12, 2017	Borno	A soldier was killed during a suicide and gun attack on a military checkpoint on the outskirts of Maiduguri
219	May 4, 2017	Borno	An attack by 2 female suicide bombers on Mandarari ward in Konduga LGA in Borno resulted in the death of 5 people
220	May 13, 2017	Borno	In another attack on UNIMAID, 2 suicide bombers detonated their vests when they were confronted, killing themselves and a security guard
221	May 13, 2017	Borno	9 BH terrorists also killed 11 farmers in Amarwa, a village in Konduga LGA, 16 kilometers away from Maiduguri
222	May 15, 2017	Borno	3 female suicide bombers attacked Shuwari Buri village, close to Maiduguri that resulted in the death of 2 persons
223	May 18, 2017	Borno	In two separate attacks 3 suicide bombers were killed when they attacked UNIMAID again, reportedly killing

			1 soldier
224	May 20, 2017	Borno	7 people died when BH fighters stormed remote villages in Mussa and shot at villagers in Askira-Uba LGA, Borno state. An unspecified number of people were also reportedly kidnapped
225	June 7, 2017	Borno	BH members carried out multiple attacks that rocked the Eastern axis of Maiduguri, at least 10 people were killed
226	June 8, 2017	Borno	After the arrest of a BH commander in a failed attack in the village of Hambagba, near Gwoza, on the Cameroon border, almost a dozen terrorists invaded the community, killing 4 people and kidnapping 6
227	June 9, 2017	Adamawa	2 teenage boys were killed in Fadama Rake village in Hong Council, Adamawa state, after unknown people handed them explosives contained in a polythene bag
228	June 11, 2017	Borno	After simultaneous raids by BH terrorists on Komdi and Tuyan villages in Borno, at least 5 people were reportedly killed
229	June 18, 2017	Borno	12 people were killed by 3 suicide bombers who detonated explosives in separate attacks on Kofa, a village that is only 8 kilometers from Maiduguri
230	June 20, 2017	Borno	After An Ambush Attack By Militants On A Police Convoy On The Maiduguri-Biu highway, 3 people were killed while 16 women were reportedly kidnapped. BH later released a video claiming some of the kidnapped women were Police officers
231	June 25, 2017	Borno	A UNIMAID security guard was killed by a suicide bomber, while 8 others died in another attack by 4 suicide bombers in Zannari community in Maiduguri
232	July 11-12, 2017	Borno	JTF members and 7 civilians were killed in a separate attacks on Moloi, Judumeri and Polo-Sabongari areas of Maiduguri

233	July 15, 2017	Borno	A 12-Year-Old Boy Was Killed At Muna Delti area of Jere LG council, Borno state after he was trapped with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) by suspected BH terrorists
234	July 17, 2017	Borno	8 people were killed when a female suicide bomber detonated explosives at a Mosque in Maiduguri
235	July 23, 2017	Borno	7 people died when suicide bombers attacked 2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in Maduguri
236	July 25, 2017	Borno	In what was BH's bloodiest attack in 2017, at least 69 people including soldiers and civilians died after an ambush of an oil exploration team in the Magumeri area of Borno
237	July 28, 2017	Borno	At least 8 people were killed and 14 others injured in a suicide bomb attack on an IDP camp in Dikwa LGA, Borno
238	August 1, 2017	Adamawa	After an attack on Mildu village in Madagali LGA of Adamawa state, BH terrorists killed 7 people and injured 10 others

The sources of information are as follows: Adagba, Ugwu, and Eme (2012), AFP (2016), Ajayi (2012), CNN Library (2016), Ekanem, Dada, and Ejue (2012), Haruna (2016), Ndahi (2016), News Agencies (2016), Omonobi, Nwabughioogu and Marama (2016), Oropo (2015), Sahara Reporters (2016), Sun News Online (2016), Tayo (2015), The Nation (2014), Toromade (2017), USCIRF (2016), Vanguard (2016), and Wikipedia (2016).