

EFFECT OF POLITICAL GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIA POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF KARU LGA OF NASARAWA STATE

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Abstract

This paper discusses the role of political godfatherism in Nigeria politics. The paper focuses on the emergence of political godfatherism and its effects on dividend of democracy. Study has shown that godfatherism is part of Nigeria political history. In Hausa society it is a common place to hear people referring to political godfathers as 'maigidi' and 'baba isale'. The Igbo people call godfather as 'Nnam-Ukwu'. These are palpable testament to the fact that political godfatherism is part of the cultural fabric of Nigeria politics. This work is anchored on expectancy theory of Victor Vroom which is also called Valence-expectancy theory which is used to explain the action of political godfathers in the country. According to him, individuals are motivated to perform certain actions to achieve certain goals if they know or expect that such actions will help them attain the desired goals. Seen in this light, it means that a political godfather will be ready to place his material and political resources at the behest of a neophyte seeking public office in so far as he expects or believes that such 'benevolence' will yield economic dividends if the latter wins in an election. The researchers adopted quantitative method to carry out this study. One hundred and fifty structured copies of questionnaires were printed and distributed to the research participants. Out of which 100 were correctly filled and returned. The study has been able to establish that the people of Karu LGA of Nasarawa State are aware of the activities of political godfatherism. This is so as 54% of the research participants affirmed so. The study further demonstrated that the phenomenon of political godfatherism is a progeny of corruption, poverty, lack of voters' education and military influence. This is so as 30 % of the respondents affirmed so. The study recommends that the

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outrageous and intimidating amount of money that are charged on nomination of interest forms by political parties should be reduced to such a paltry amount that an average citizen can afford. In this case the temptation to build alliance with political godfathers who will finance them and dictate the affairs of an entire political system throughout their stay in office will not arise. The study further prescribes that political godfatherism should be criminalized and disbanded out rightly. This is because it is criminal and illegal in the way and manner in which it is practiced Nigeria.

Introduction

Abdullahi and Sakariyau (2013) observed that godfatherism has become a scary phenomenon in Nigerian politics. As rightly observed by Omotola (2007: 139), godfatherism in Nigeria, particularly in its current form and character, is distributive. Though it has longstanding and deeply rooted feature of the cultural values of Nigerian society, where it is purely socio-economic in nature and mutually productive for both parties. Its politicization would appear to have contributed to the criminalization of politics. For example, the Hausa have a well-institutionalized system where the godfather is known as "Maigida" (landlord or head of household). Godfathers reign across all spheres of the society: academics, legal, and religion environment.

The clamour for democracy in Nigeria is to improve both political and socio-economic situation of the country through massive involvement in the policy making, but reverse is the case as those that attained political power in both legislative and executive arms of government got to the seat of powers through the support of some political 'godfathers' in various states cum the center. The desire of political godfathers is to hold political and socio-economic powers both at the center and the component units as mechanisms to politically influence the activities of political office holders. Political godfatherism pervades almost every fabric of the public life in Nigeria. Appointments of people into elective positions like presidents, governors, houses of assemblies both at the states and national levels as well as appointments of people into various public offices, such as Ministers/Commissioners, Chairmen of the boards, Secretaries to the various Institutions, Director of Personnel Management and Treasurers of Local Governments as well as allocation of some developmental projects into various localities within the state or center are largely detected by political godfathers.

Political godfathers therefore are those who have the security connections, extended local links, enormous financial weight to plot and determine the success of a power seeker at any level of a supposedly competitive politics. Godfatherism has an institutionalized feature in Nigerian politics over the years, its contemporary manifestations suggest that it has assumed epidemic proportions, becoming one of the greatest threats to democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Omotola, 2007).

Literature Review: The Emergence of Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics

Gambo (2007) cited in Abdullahi and Sakariyau (2013) noted that the word 'godfather' appears in parenthesis in many western political studies. The situation is different in Nigeria. The patron/client relationships that popularised the term in Nigerian politics have cultural roots among many Nigerians peoples. It is not a totally new experience in the sociology of the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo for people to have one or other type of 'godfather'. For example, the word 'godfather' has a local equivalence in Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo languages and these words have been in usage since the pre-colonial era. A godfather is known among the Hausa as a 'maigida' (landlord or the head of a household). The word 'maigida' goes beyond its literal meaning. Cohen et al,(1965) used the term in their works to refer to those who provided brokerage services to Hausa traders in transit in different parts of West Africa. These Hausa traders brought cattle from their homeland to different parts of southern West Africa and took back kola nuts to the North. At the various transit centres where they have to stop to do businesses, they rely on a maigida to facilitate their economic activities. The maigida provides them with accommodation, storage and brokerage services. The maigida received compensations for their services and many of them became rich from the number of clients they had. Even in Hausaland, from where these itinerant traders came, this kind of patron/client relationship is popularly known.

Ayode (2008) asserted that a 'godfather' is referred to in Yorubaland as 'baba kekere' (the small father), 'baba isale' (the father of the underground world), or 'baba nigbejo' (a great help in times of trouble). The most historical of these terms is 'baba kekere'. It was used to depict community leaders whom people of less social status identified with to provide physical, social, political and economic security for them. For example, most of the Yoruba refugees who came to settle in Ibadan in the

early nineteenth century settled with the 'baba kekere' in the city. These were military chiefs and patrons appointed to be in charge of certain Ibadan colonies by the town's traditional council. The migrants who settled under these Ibadan chiefs paid the 'baba kekere' tribute, part of which the 'baba kekere' remitted to the Ibadan authorities. In return, the chiefs were obligated to protect those under them against any act of violence that characterized Ibadan at this time.

Dibia (2003) also observed that the idea of godfatherism is grounded in the sociology of traditional Igbo society. He made reference to the popular relationship between 'Nnam-Ukwu' (my master) and 'Odibo' (the servant) in the Igbo world view. A younger person is entrusted to a more mature and experienced person for training in social, economic and moral adulthood. The role played by the man in this kind of relationship is akin to that of a godfather. The latter is expected to set the boy up in his business after undergoing whatever training the master must have given him.

In the three cases mentioned above, a person of lesser social status attaches himself to another person, usually of higher status, for support, which could be social or economic. The godfather gets something in return from the adopted son for the transactional relationship. Probably, it is on this understanding that the modern notion of godfatherism in Nigeria is based. In other words, the phenomenon of godfatherism is not strange to the cultural world of the Nigerian people. The giving of kola by a client to his patron is also not strange. What is probably strange is that the transposition of this social or economic system into the political arena and also the ridiculous nature of what patrons now ask for from their clients as compensation for providing them with 'brokerage services'.

As pointed out by Ayode (2008), the founding fathers of party politics in Nigeria were godfathers of a sort. They were preceded by the first generation Nigerian elites to establish contact with the European in the late 1800s. The leading figures were the traditional rulers who later became the hub of the indirect rule policy of the British in the country. Between the early 1900s and the late 1940s, the educated, religious and business elite competed for influence with the traditional rulers. These people acted formally and informally as the middlemen between the British colonial officials, European trading houses and the local people. Those who could not read nor write depended on the 'professional' letter and petition writers for making their cases before the colonial officials. The business-minded among this first generation of Nigerian elite competed with European firms for the

sale of imported goods. For example, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and a few others invested in the transport business and gradually launched themselves into political activities. It was impossible to reach the Europeans without the facilitative roles of these godfathers. This provided many of them with the opportunity to become gatekeepers or godfathers; they determined who and who could not meet the Europeans. Those who wanted the favors of the white men had to go through these godfathers. Political godfatherism started with nationalist activities of the 1950s. The educated elite which constituted just six percent of the total Nigerian population championed this struggle for Nigerian independence. The educated elites, most of whom had only primary education, were respected for their knowledge and bravery in confronting the white man. They became idolised by their people and their personal opinions became the formal interests of the ethnic groups they claimed to represent. People who wanted to join in politics went to them and deferred to their 'good judgment' in almost all things.

These father figures were the leaders of regional political groups that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s: the Northern People's Congress for the Hausa-Fulani dominated northern Nigeria; the Action Group for the Yoruba-dominated south-west, and the NCNC for the Igbo-dominated eastern Nigeria. The role of the godfathers at this time was to show the way for the other Nigerians in a colonial system. As an Ibadan politician that belonged to this era noted, 'our job at this time was to teach our followers how to disrespect the white man who wanted to rule us forever'(Ayode, 2008). The political godfathers of this era included the then Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who led the NPC; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who led the AG, and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC leader. The other elder statesmen that fell into this category in Nigerian politics include Mallam Aminu Kano and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. These political leaders, up to the point of their death, dictated who could occupy political offices in the geo-political regions they led. They were 'clearing houses' for political opportunities. The godsons of Sir Ahmadu Bello later became a mythical political cabal, known as the 'Kaduna mafia' in Nigerian politics. The godsons of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in South-western Nigeria, collectively known as 'Afenifere' (those who wish others well) included the late Chief Bola Ige, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, and Chief Bisi Onabanjo, all of who were state governors during the second republic in Nigerian history (1979-1983). Dr Azikiwe's godsons in Eastern Nigeria included Chief Jim Nwobodo and Chief Sam Mbakwe, both of whom were also governors in Anambra and Imo states respectively from 1979 to

1983. Alhaji Abubabakar Rimi and Alhaji Balarabe Musa, who were governors of Kano and Kaduna states during the second republic, both recognized Alhaji Aminu Kano as their political godfather throughout his lifetime.

As pointed out by Dibia (2003), the only difference between these early godfathers in Nigerian history and their contemporary peers is that they supported and nurtured their godsons positively rather than negatively. The emphasis of those generation of godfathers was on developmental issues and not money. They also did not demand, figuratively, pounds of flesh from their adopted sons as the present day godfathers do. Those godfathers of blessed memory motivated their adopted sons to higher levels of political morality and made it necessary for them to be accountable to those who voted them into office.

Evidence of Politics of Godfatherism in Nigeria

Godfathers play important role in democratic sustenance in Nigerian politicking since 1953 during the era of self government up to the fourth republic where uninterrupted democracy is experienced from 1999 to 2011. As indicated earlier, the power and influence of the godfather is enhanced by political connections at the highest tier of government. Where this is absent the individual can only operate as a mentor, benefactor or financier. He must avoid a brush with the law because it will be visited with heavy penalty. Considering Kwara State from 1979, Dr. Olusola Saraki operated as a financier or benefactor to Alhaji Adamu Attah the Governor of Kwara State. The relationship turned sour and he withdrew the support. Dr Olusola Saraki then shifted his support to Chief Cornelius Adebayo who was in the Unity Party of Nigeria although he (Saraki) remained in the National Party of Nigeria. Chief Cornelius Adebayo went ahead to win the gubernatorial election in Kwara in 1983. Dr Olusola Saraki was clearly the deciding factor in the election as he had proved that whichever candidate he backed could win the election irrespective of party affiliation (Ayoade, 2008:124). In furtherance to this, Dr. Olusola Saraki, the strongman of Kwara politics also succeeded in taking over power from late Mohammed Lawal in 2003 to install his son Dr. Abubakar Bukola Saraki as Executive Governor of Kwara State from 2003 to 2011. However, at the tail of his son's administration, *Baba* Saraki wanted Gbemisola Saraki to take over the power from her brother under the platform of PDP but to no avail, the situation could not help *Baba* Saraki to achieve this objective in the Kwara State ruling party and this led to the rift between father and son to part ways in the control of PDP.

Therefore, Governor Saraki who has been in firm control of the PDP structure in Kwara while his father was forced to move to Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN), a less popular political party, where Gbemisola Saraki gained the party gubernatorial flag bearer through politics of consensus among party members to enable her replace the brother as governor in year 2011.

Consequently, the legislative elections conducted on the 9th April, 2011 indicated that the PDP party leader in Kwara State had succeeded in taking over the political power from his father because his party, PDP claimed all Senatorial seats and all house of Reps without sharing the position with other parties and this served as emergence of new political godfather in Kwara state. In addition to this assertion, Dr. Bukola Saraki backed Alhaji Fatai Ahmed as PDP gubernatorial candidate and urged other contestants from central and northern senatorial districts to step down for the contesters from southern senatorial district to pave way for his Godson at the primary level which eventually actualized his objective in installation of Alhaji Fatai Ahmed. In Ogun, son of former governor Olusegun Osoba, Olumide is also in fray. The younger Osoba is the standard bearer of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) for the House of Representatives slot in Odeda/Abeokuta North/Obafemi Owode federal constituency. Considering his father's pedigree in politics and the growing influence of the party in Ogun, the young Osoba was able to achieve his political ambition to Abuja as a result of his father's influence, the father therefore stood as political godfather to his son to serve as member of the Green Chamber with the 7th legislative council.

Impact on Democratic Governance

Godfatherism in Nigerian politics is a contest between elitism and democracy. Elitism, as Welsh (1979: 10) argued, is a system 'in which the exercise of political control by a small number of persons is institutionalized in the structure of government and political activity'. The typical godfather in Nigerian politics basically seeks to manipulate state officials and institutions for his own interests. Conflicts occur only when their clients refuse to be manipulated. This kind of situation does not augur well for the development and growth of any democratic process. Democracy has to do with the protection of the interests of all and should not only focus on the narrow interests of the privileged in the society. The matter becomes more serious when the intention of these powerful elites is to exploit the state. The other

point that must be made is that true democracy comes from the grass roots and not from the top; it evolves from effective participation of the citizenry in the political process. In a democracy, the governed do not only come out to exercise their voting rights, they also have the right to be voted for.

Political godfathers use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who participates in politics and under what condition. This kind of situation promotes mediocrity and financial corruption as 'the incumbent godson is at pains to satisfy the whims and caprices of the godfather among other competing demands on the scarce resources of the government, the interest of the larger number is savagely undermined. Any godson who fails to cooperate with the godfather is subjected to all forms of humiliations and political violence.

Theoretical Framework

Victor Vroom's expectancy theory, also called Valence-expectancy theory (Agbonifoh, et al 2005:214) can be used to explain the action of political godfathers in the country. According to him, individuals are motivated to perform certain actions to achieve certain goals if they know or expect that such actions will help them attain the desired goals. Seen in this light, it means that a political godfather will be ready to place his material and political resources at the behest of a neophyte seeking public office in so far as he expects or believe that such 'benevolence' will yield economic dividends if the latter wins the general election (Epelle, 2007:5-6). The theory can be summarised as: **FORCE=Valence x expectancy** (where force is the strength of a person's motivation; valence is the strength of an individual's preference for a particular outcome; and expectancy is the probability that a particular action will lead to a desired outcome) has been widely acknowledged for its recognition of the role of individual differences cum preferences in the process of human motivation. Though the theory has been roundly criticised for being too difficult to apply in practice due to its complexity and doubts as to whether individuals perform this multiple calculations before performing any action (Koontz et al, 1980:641; Baridam, 1993:62), yet it brings to the fore the fact that individuals come into politics with different needs which they want satisfied while some see it as an opportunity to offer selfless service to the community, others see it as an investment that must yield dividends. The latter is the context in which Nigeria godfathers see politics. Any attempt by the godson to renege on

earlier agreements is often met with an orgy of violence, thuggery, arson and assassination, thus replicating the Hobberian state of nature. Unfortunately, as with every confrontation among ruling elites, the ultimate losers are the Nigerian masses whose resources is being plundered and frittered away in the course of the egoistic war. The combatants, notably the godfathers, most times comes out unscathed as top party bigwigs will always wade in to either placate the feuding parties or more rightly massage the ego of the mafia. A few examples will be drawn to show that despite their negative influence in the country's politics, godfatherism is a concept that may have tacitly acquired official legitimacy in Nigeria's body politic.

3.2 Research Design

The researchers used quantitative method to elicit the required data for this study. Aliaga and Gunderson (2002) defined quantitative research as " explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics) The choice of quantitative method was informed by the fact that it helps to compare data in a systematic way. It also makes generalizations of study to a whole population possible. This is particularly so, when a researcher wants to compare or generalize information extensively within a specific population or between different populations (Aliaga, et al. 2002)

3.3 Population of the Study

The population of this study are eligible voters in Karu Local Government of Nasarawa State who had exercised their political franchise in one way or the other right from the dawn of democracy in Nigeria- 1999 to date. It is hoped that this category of people have much to say about the politics of godfatherism in the Local Government Area. The researcher used simple random sampling method to sample 100 respondents from the population.

3.4 Sampling Technique

The researchers used simple random technique to draw the 200 sample size for the purpose of this study. Simple random technique is a sampling procedure in which each element in the sampling frame has equal chance of being included in the sample size (Ujo, 2000). In the light of this, 10 sample was drawn from each of 9 districts in Karu LGA.

3.5 Instrument of Data Collection

The researchers employed questionnaires in order to collect the required data for this study. The choice of structured questionnaires was informed by the following reasons:

Firstly, the population of the study is fairly large. It will be more convenient and timesaving to administer questionnaires to them than to engage them in in-depth interview.

Secondly, structured questionnaires will facilitate data analysis and estimation of validity and reliability for the instrument (Ujo, 2000).

Finally, structured questionnaire is easier and demands less time to complete. On account of this, most respondents will not feel reluctant to complete and return the questionnaires.

3.6 Method of Data Analysis

The data for this study was analyzed through the use of frequency distribution table that contained the percentages of the respondents' responses.

Evaluation of the Activities of Political Godfatherism in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State

The researchers took a painstaking effort to investigate the extent of the activities of the activities of political godfatherism in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State and obtained the under listed results as presented and analysed in frequency and percentage distribution tables as follows:

Table 4.1. Distribution of the Respondents on Awareness of Political Godfatherism

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Are you aware that there are political godfathers in Karu LGA and Nasarawa at large?		
Yes	102	51.0
No	98.0	49.0
Total	200	100
If yes, how do you rate their activities?		
Very high	102	51.0
High	0	0.0

Very low	98.0	49.0
Low	0	0.0
Total	200	54

The table above indicates that 54% of the respondents affirmed that they are aware of the present of political godfatherism in the policies of Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State, while 46% of the respondents claimed that they are not aware of the presence of political godfatherism in the policies of Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State. Going by the affirmation of the 54% of the respondents, it is safe to maintain there is political godfatherism in Nasarawa State just as it exists in other state of the federation. It is also important to point out that the citizens are equally aware of the presence of political godfatherism in the body polity of the Local Government which manifest many a time as the imposition of party candidates on the people without prejudice to their abilities and performance. Many of them are so mounted and or forced on people because the political godfathers want them to.

TABLE 4.2. Views of the Respondents on the Causes of Political Godfatherism

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Causes of political godfatherism		
Poverty	30	15.00
Corruption	40	20.00
Lack of voters education	30	15.00
Military influence	30	15.00
Others, please specify	70	35.00
Total	200	100

From the survey, 15% of the respondents averred that poverty is the cause of political godfatherism, 21% of the respondents pointed out that corruption is the cause of political godfatherism, 15% revealed that insufficient political education is responsible for political godfatherism. Another 15% of the respondents said that military influence is responsible for political godfatherism, while 30.9% of the respondents averred that political godfatherism is a combination of several causes that bother on illiteracy, greed, corruption, military influence of big political big wigs in the state

among others. This shows that political godfatherism is pervasive. The fact that the factors enumerated above hold sway in political godfatherism phenomenon in Karu Local government Area of Nasarawa State cannot be underscored. This is because the political class in the area are corrupt, greedy people who want to cash into the poverty and insufficient voters education of the electorates to have the unarguable final say in all the political transaction.

TABLE 4.3. Distribution of the Respondents on Effects of Political Godfatherism

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Effects of political godfatherism		
Insecurity	10	10.9
Bad government	20	21.3
Policy reversal	14	7.10
Lack of essential services	20	21.3
Political conflict	30	31.10
Total	94	100

The researcher sought to know the effects of political godfatherism in the study and gathered that 10% of the respondents revealed that political godfatherism has led to insecurity in the area. 21% of the respondents admitted that political godfatherism is responsible for bad government in the area, 14.9% of the respondents said that political godfatherism is responsible for policy reversal in the area while 31.10% of the respondents are of the view that political godfatherism is responsible for a lots of political, social, economic and development woes in the study and area. This is because the resource that are meant to be used for all round development of the area are being channeled into the savings of the political godfathers who played the greatest roles in the making of the government of the day. The maxim which says: "he who pays the piper dictates the tune" has wide application in political affairs of the state. The political godfathers mount their successful godsons as their stooges and protégées who are there to rule at their dictates and instances like the case of the British policy of indirect rules. A lot of the previous financial resources of the state area are misappropriated in service of the political godfathers, who see their godsons/daughters as people they specifically and strategically mounted to

pay them back. The case of Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State is a single case at hand that mirrors what is obtainable in the country at large. For instance, in Anambra State, Ngige and Andy Ubah cannot be ignored as far as political godfatherism is concerned, in Nasarawa State, Abdullahi Adamu, Solomon Ewuga and Labaran Maku cannot be ignored. At the national level, the positions of the retired military leaders cannot be ignored. Little wonder therefore, trial President Muhammadu Buhari in the process of his electoral campaigns, was seen fraternizing with some of them, to ignore them is to risk victory. The rules of the political godfathers are not healthy for good democratic process. This is because they are out to seek their personal interests.

TABLE 4.4. View of the Respondents On Whether INEC is Bias Or Not

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Yes	89	94.7
No	5	5.3
Total	94	100

94.7% of the respondents averred that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is biased, while 5% of the respondents revealed that INEC is not bias. The respondents who admitted that INEC is biased said so because INEC has hands in the electoral malpractices and irregularities that leads to successful imposition of political godsons by political godfathers in Nigeria at large. Those who uphold that INEC is not bias are most probably the few individuals who are benefiting in one way or the other from the Machiavelli (political manipulation) activities of the political godfathers.

TABLE 4.5. Distribution of the Respondents Based on the Assessment Of The Judiciary in the Democratic Process

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Successful	5	5.3
Not Successful	89	94.7
Neutral	0	0.0
Total	94	100

The table indicates that 5% of the respondents said that is successful, while 94% overwhelmingly revealed that the role of the judiciary in the democratic

process in Nigeria is not successful. This is because they are not living up to their responsibilities as the umpire that they are constitutionally empowered to be. They are being constantly bombarded, covered, harassed and intimidated by the political big wigs who are godfathers in their respective places to say the least, it is not very possible for a Chief Judge of a state to say no to a serving state governor or the president who appointed him or her. It is illuminating and convincing to say that the judiciary is not successful in the discharge of its statutory constitutional responsibilities in the study area and by extension on the country at large.

TABLE 47.6. The Respondents View on how the Problems of Political Godfatherism can be Solved

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Increasing voters education	44	46.9
Strengthening of democracy	20	21.3
Adequate of INEC	20	21.3
Foreign support	10	10.7
Total	94	100

46.9% of the respondents said that the problems of political godfatherism can be solved through increase voters education. So that the voters can be sufficiently educated about their results, duties and responsibilities in order to forestall the ugly activities of the political godfatherism in Nigeria. Over 21% of the respondents are of the view that the democratic process should be further consolidated and strengthened in order to nip in the bud the ugly incidence of political godfatherism that is making the country dry, while 21% of the respondents opened that INEC should be robustly funded in order to bring the problems of political godfatherism to an end. And 10% of the respondents are of the considered opinion that foreign observers should be allowed to view and monitor the electoral processes in Nigeria so that the results of the election can be just, fair ad credible. In that case, the extent of the political godfathers will be hated appreciably.

TABLE 4.7. Views of the Respondents on Whether Political Godfatherism Has Religion Undertone

Variables	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Yes	84	89.4
No	10	10.6
Total	94	100

The table indicates that 89% of the respondents revealed that political godfatherism has religion undertone in Karu Local Government Area of Nasarawa State. This is so because of the move and clamour by many voters and electorates to vote and campaign as well as rig to favour people who belong to the same religion (faith) with them. This is not health for good democratic process as people with questionable character maybe voted in the name of religion. Just 10% of the respondents pointed out that godfatherism in Nasarawa State does not have religion undertone. This maybe few individuals who are profiting/benefiting from the activities of political godfathers.

Discussion of the Findings

The study has been able to establish that the people of Karu LGA of Nasarawa State are aware of the activities of political godfatherism. This is so as 54% (see Table 4.1) of the research participants affirmed so .This finding is congruent with the works of Debia (2003) and Ayode (2008) which pointed out that political godfatherism is as old as the origin of social relations in Nigeria. And that the founding fathers of Nigeria like chief Obafemi Awolowo, Mallam Aminu Kano and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe were political godfathers in their respects. Just that the only difference between these early godfathers in Nigerian history and their contemporary peers is that they supported and nurtured their godsons positively rather than negatively. The emphasis of these generation of godfathers was on developmental issues and not money. They also did not demand, figuratively, pounds of flesh from their adopted sons as the present day godfathers do. Those godfathers of blessed memory motivated their adopted sons to higher levels of political morality and made it necessary for them to be accountable to those who voted them into office (Ayode ,2008).

The study has further demonstrated that the phenomenon of political godfatherism is a progeny of corruption, poverty, lack of voters' education and military influence. This is so as 30 % (see Table 4.2) of the respondents

affirmed so. This finding is in tandem with the work of Albert (2005) which pointed out political godfatherism has multiplicity of causes which range from poverty to corruption. To him the costs of running vying for elective positions are both outrageous and prohibitive such that a poor person cannot afford them. For instance, Premium Time (17th November, 2014) pointed out that the expression of interest forms in PDP and APC were as 22 million naira (PDP) and 27.5 million naira (APC). Chairmanship and counsellorship positions were as high as 1.1000.000 and 250 respectfully. This has unarguably forced the choice of going to a political godfathers who are rich are enough to fund the political aspirations of their political sons whom they will dictate to later. This is to enable them get what they have spent in sponsoring their godsons back. Consequently, the welfare of the citizens will be compromised in order to do the biddings of their political godfathers. This explains why money that are meant for development projects are diverted to service the greed and the lusts of the political godfathers in many states in Nigeria

Similarly, the study has been able to demonstrate that unabated political conflicts and political wrangling that are not healthy for good governance are obvious debilitating effects of political godfatherism in Nigeria. This is evident as many of the respondents (31%) attested so see Table 3.3). The finding is in line with the work of Abdullahi and Sikariyau (2013) which pointed out that political godfatherism is to be blamed for the various political conflicts in Kwara, Borno, Anambara, Oyo and Ogun States where the disagreements and squabbles between godfathers and godsons nearly created conditions of anarchies in the affected states. Collier noted further that the activities of godfathers have made politics attractive to criminals. This is because of the use of violence which denies the emergent regimes any form of legitimacy because they emerge as regimes without any social contract with the people (Kew 2010). This is because godfatherism perceives winning elections as the ultimate end of democracy. Collier (2010) identifies guns, wars and coups as technologies of political violence in the third world countries. In Nigeria, godfatherism remains one of the ills in the political process since 1999. This is because it has configured public office like an eatery which only the godfather alone gives the ticket to whoever he likes and once any beneficiary disobeys him, he gets him or her out of the eatery (Adebanwi 2010).

Conclusion

This paper is concerned about the activities of political godfatherism in Nigeria, a phenomenon that is as old as Nigeria. Scholarly works and articles in reputable journals have shown the early founding fathers of Nigeria were in some respects political godfathers who were out to ensure that their political godsons succeed them in delivering the much desired dividend of good governance to the people as they have done. There were no like the modern day political godfathers who mount their political godsons in the positions of leadership and use them to drain public resources for their own selfish aim. The developmental goals of many states in Nigeria are compromised, not because there are no resources to achieve them, but because the resources are being diverted into the service of the whims and caprices of the political godfathers by their so-called political god-sons and god-daughters.

The various political turbulence that the country has witnessed over years since the dawn of democracy in 1999 can be attributed to the activities of political godfathers and godsons, especially where there is a clash of interest between them. For instance, Anambra , Kwara, Oyo were thrown into state of political turmoil when political fatherism conflict escalated the political fathers therein. We want conclude this paper by saying that political fatherism is an evil wind that does no one good because the negative effects on the society far out weights its seemingly benefits.

Recommendations

Based on the findings that were made the study, this paper wants to make the following recommendations:

1. The outrageous and intimidating amount of money that are charged on nomination of interest forms by political parties should be reduced to such that an average citizen can afford. In this case the temptation to build alliance with political godfathers who will finance them and dictate the affairs of an entire political system throughout their stay in office will not arise.
2. Political godfatherism should be criminalized and disbanded out rightly. This is because it is criminal and illegal in the way and manner which it is practiced Nigeria. The has milked many States in Nigeria dry and their development had at sundry times been compromised.
3. Government of the nation, should intensify efforts in voters' education. This is so because the activities of political godfatherism

has equally being blamed on insufficient voters, education. With sufficient voters' education, the masses will be better armed with knowledge of their rights to dare the consequences of political godfathers.

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