TITLE PAGE

HANS-GEORG GADAMER ON PREJUDICE AND THE TRANSMODERN PROJECT

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D) DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

BY

IDACHABA, PHILIP ADAH
PG/Ph.D/09/51469

SUPERVISOR: PROF. J.C.A AGABAKOBA

MARCH, 2015

DEDICATION

To Sir (Engr.) and Lady Charles S. Idachaba (KSM), who gave me life at first light.
To Mr. and Mrs. Emmanuel O. Idachaba, who gave more light when darkness raged.
To Gimba Rhainum, whose light went out when it was due to shine brighter.
To Faith, the new sight on the horizon.

CERTIFICATION

I, Idachaba, Philip Adah, a Doctor of Philosophy student in the department of Philosophy, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with Registration Number: PG/Ph.D/09/51469, has satisfactorily completed the requirements (research work embodied in a thesis), for the award of Doctor of Philosophy Degree (Ph.D) in Philosophy.

This thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree of this or any other university.

_____

PROF. J.C.A. AGBAKOBA
Supervisor

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis has been approved for the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) Degree in Philosophy.

By

_____	_____
PROF. J.C.A AGBAKOBA	**INTERNAL EXAMINER**
Supervisor	
_____	_____
PROF. EGBEKE AJA	**EXTERNAL EXAMINER**
Head of Department	

_____

DEAN OF THE FACULTY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am sincerely grateful to God and all who, in one way or another, have contributed to the completion of this work. May God reward them abundantly. I am particularly grateful to Prof. J.C.A Agbakoba, my supervisor, for his patience and acceptance to supervise this work and for his helpful suggestions. I am grateful to Prof. Egbeke Aja, the Head of Philosophy Department at the time of this work for his positive efforts towards the timely and successful completion of this programme. Rev. Fr. Dr. M. C. Chukwuelobe, the Postgraduate Coordinator of the department was also wonderful in the course of this work and I say thank you. I remain grateful to my internal and external examiners. I say a big thank you to Dr. F. O. C. Njoku, Dr. A.C. Areji, Dr. M. C. Anyaehie and all other lecturers of the department for their useful suggestions and contributions towards ensuring the success of this programme.

My gratitude also goes to my parents, Sir (Engr.) and Lady C. S. Idachaba (KSM) for all their parental affection. Worthy of gratitude too is the family of Mr. and Mrs. E.O. Idachaba for all the love and care. I am equally grateful to Prof. W. S. Onogu and Dr. Cletus U. Idoko for all the encouragement during this programme. To my brothers Dan, Aro, Willy, Attah and sister Charity, I say I am very grateful for the company and love.

I am also deeply indebted to Rev. Fr. Boniface Oplauwa, Rev. Fr. Emmanuel Alih, Rev. Fr. Louis Odidi, Rev. Fr. Patrick Isaiah and Rev. Fr. John Abutu. Your contributions have been immeasurable. Also to my friends with whom I have made this journey all the way, I cannot thank you enough. I appreciate Dr. Amos Ichaba, Dr. Paul Haaga, Dr. Anthony Ajah, Francis Egu, Barrister Sylvester Ogba, Idoko Okpanachi, Godwin Sani, Dr. Isaiah Negedu, Austin Atabor, and Godwin Monueke for being there as worthy companions on this journey. Also to Gimba Rhainum with whom we started this journey who now rests in the bosom of the Lord, I say Rest in Peace and we shall keep up the struggle. For all those I cannot mention here, all your contributions are indeed appreciated. God bless you all. *Me wola ukolo* (well done).

Idachaba, Philip Adah

ABSTRACT

There is no doubt that there is an urgent need to imagine another world in the face of the fall outs of the current world order. The urgency of this need for 'another world' or 'a world in which all worlds fit' is the primary motivation for this research. In line with this motivation, this work is aimed at examining the concept of prejudice within Gadamer's philosophy as well as the transmodern project with a view to constructing an understanding of cross-cultural contact that can foreground the possibility of 'another world' or 'a world in which all worlds fit'. The basis for this is that Gadamer's direct appropriation of prejudice and its impact on the transmodern idea of the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge challenges the idea of universality as it operates in the current Euro-American cosmovision. This challenge is not in favour of subjectivism or relativism, but in favour of 'intersubjective dialogue' and 'pluriversality as a universal project'. Adopting the philosophical tools of exposition, critique and textual analysis the work seeks to demonstrate that a proper appropriation of Gadamer's conceptualization of prejudice and of the influence it has had on the transmodern project can serves as the basis for a new principle of cross-cultural interaction/evaluation; the ethical-hermeneutic principle of intercultural contact/evaluation which can guarantee 'a world in which all worlds fit'. In the addition to this, the work also establishes that: i) the transmodern anti-Cartesianism and resistance of provincial universality are strong influences from Gadamer in their philosophy. Hence, their claim of delinking is not totally true; ii) the transmodern project in taking on board the coloniality question within the context of the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge is a clear extension and application of Gadamer's prejudicial philosophy; iii) despite the strength of Gadamer and the transmodern case, Gadamer's postulation is haunted down by the hegemony of the verbal understanding/factual modes of expression, while the transmodern project is wrong in blaming coloniality solely on foreign agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Given the fall outs from the current world order, a certain strand of contemporary philosophy makes the case for another world. In their estimation, ôanother world is possible.ö[1] For some others within this school of thought, the alternative to the current world order should aim at creating ôa world in which all worlds fitö[2] Yet for another group, they seek ôworlds and knowledges otherwiseö[3] For these schools of thought, the current world order is Euro-American and it possesses an exclusivist cosmovision. On this count, the current world order rather than seeking to arrive at a world in which all worlds fit just elevates the ideals of a particular world as a standard for other worlds to follow. In more specific terms, it is the Euro-American vision that has been universalised for all to follow. But the economic crises that greeted the West between 2007 and now places a lot of doubt on the continued efficacy of this cosmovision. The grand narrative which this vision held that ñé once situated humanity in some continuing stream of meaning has faltered amidst existential doubt or economic and political ruinsé ò[4] This places before us therefore, the urgent need for an alternative cosmovision. The urgency of this need is one motivation for this research.

Bearing in mind the fact that the world in which we live today is a global village, it becomes obvious that any effort at a new cosmovision cannot afford to ignore the demands for ôa world in which all worlds fitö Arriving at this world is primarily a practical task. But before this task can be executed in practice, it must redefine itself at a theoretical level or better still as a theoretical endeavour. It is within this context of theoretical redefinition that Gadamer and the transmodern engagement with prejudice is appropriated in this research. More precisely, Gadamerôs direct appropriation of prejudice and its impact on the transmodern idea of the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge challenges the idea of universality as is the case in the Euro-

American cosmovision. This challenge is not in favour of subjectivism or relativism, but in favour of ‘intersubjective dialogue’ and ‘pluriversality as a universal project’. Establishing these as genuine theoretical, as well as philosophical alternative upon which to achieve the practical task of building ‘a world in which all worlds fit’ is yet another motivation for this research.

In establishing the epistemic potency of these positions for a new world order, something further engages the attention of this study. As has already been stated above, Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy and its prejudicial base[5], alongside its impact on the transmodern concern for ‘pluriversality as a universal project’[6] are the favoured theoretical apparatus for achieving this new cosmovision. But then, a study of the transmodern project and its emphasis on delinking from the dominant macro-narratives projected by the West *needs* a closer scrutiny to establish how true the transmodern project is to this claim of delinking. The compelling force of this need is yet another motivating point for this research.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The idea of the possibility of another world is an idea which was developed, partly, as a reaction to the effects of the ‘clash of civilizations/cultures’. In the aftermath of the ‘clash of cultures’ came the rhetoric of ‘cultural interaction/contacts’ as alternative to the clash of cultures. But an observation of the world order, as it stands, still shows that the idea of ‘cultural interaction’ has not really proven to be a true alternative to ‘the clash of cultures’; rather it has only succeeded in moderating and covering over the naked force that ‘the clash of cultures’ portend. This is the case because, under the guise of cultural interaction, ‘super-cultures’ have continued to valourise aspects of their cultures and to hold them up as ideals/universals for other (smaller) cultures to follow. The broad problematique of this research is therefore, that of finding a basis for sustaining the identity and uniqueness of smaller-cultures in the face of the imposing presence of ‘super-cultures’. Based on this, the main question for this research is: is it possible to

find a basis on which all cultures can interact and be appreciated in their uniqueness without losing sight of the common good for humanity and the planet? Or better still, can there be any basis for creating a world in which all worlds fit? To answer this question properly, the research is guided by the following questions:

a) Are there any identifiable connections between Gadamerôs postulations on prejudice and the philosophy of the transmodern project?
b) Has the transmodern project been able to extend Gadamerôs philosophical legacy in any way?
c) Are the positions of Gadamer and the transmodern project with regard to prejudice tenable in any way?
d) Are there any specific practical imports of Gadamer and the transmodern concerns that can aid in dismantling the current Euro-American cosmovision (colonial matrix of power) and fostering a collaborative approach to building a new world system and cross-cultural contact?

1.3 Thesis

The thesis of this research is: A proper appropriation of Gadamerôs conceptualization of prejudice and of the influence it has had on the transmodern project can serve as the basis for a new principle of cross-cultural contact/evaluation; the ethical-hermeneutic principle of intercultural contact/evaluation which can guarantee óa world in which all worlds fitô.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This research is significant at two levels: the levels of theory and practice. At the level of theory, the significance of this research includes: (i) it demonstrates the continued fruitfulness of the works of Gadamer and the transmodern project and assesses continuing points of similarity and difference between them in order to refine and extend their legacies. It is hoped that the fertility and acuity of the present contribution will stimulate more thought and dialogue on the

rich and enduring value of Gadamerôs and the transmodernôs scholarships; (ii) it challenges the conventional one-dimensional truth base for universality and objectivity. By so doing, it rethinks the concept of universality and objectivity and upholds the idea that the focus should be on ópluriversality as universal projectô and óintersubjective dialogueô. These are considered as appropriate theoretical apparatus that can foreground the possibility of óa world in which all worlds fitô.

At the level of practice, the significance of this study revolves around the fact that the hermeneutic philosophy of Gadamer and its root in the transmodern project produces the ethical-hermeneutic principle of cross-cultural contact/evaluation which can dismantle the current world order and is a collaborative approach to building a new world order/cosmovision**.**

1.5 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this work is to examine the concept of prejudice in Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and how it forms the basis for the philosophy of the transmodern project with a view to constructing an understanding of universality that can foreground the possibility of óa world in which all worlds fitô.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of this research is tied primarily to Hans Geroge Gadamerôs postulations on prejudice. This research focuses on Gadamerôs main works: *Philosophical Hermeneutics* and *Truth and Method*. These works will also be supplemented with ideas from his other works *Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics*; and *Reason in The Age of Science*. Importantly too, this research is also moderated by the postulations of the transmodernists, especially as evidenced mainly in the works of Enrique Dussel, and supported by the works of Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, Ramon Grosfoguel and Nelson Maldonado-Torres.

1.7 Research Methodology

This is basically a qualitative research. Materials were sourced from journals, libraries and online sources. The expository method was used to lay bare the basics of the positions interacted with in this research. The critical method is used to ascertain how tenable the basic positions that the research is interacting with are. It is also used to make all the necessary connections between the various currents of thought we shall be engaging here. The historical method is used to trace the origin of the ideas engaged with in this research. Textual analysis is also employed in this research.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Prejudice: The word ópreju diceô etymologically breaks down into *pre-judice* or pre-judgment. All judgements are conditioned by pre-judgements. This is an older, pre-modern sense of prejudice which this research adopts. Whereas the familiar understanding of prejudice is unreflective judgment or over-hasty reasoning, resulting in the bigotry of purely subjective opinion or the unreflective parroting of purely received wisdom. The point being made here is that judgements are made possible not by an abstract and neutral reason but a set of pre-reflective involvements with the world that stand behind judgements and in fact make them possible.[7]

Cosmovision: This is an amalgam of the words ócosmosô and óvisionô. It refers to a vision of the world; a conceptualization of the world. The idea to be highlighted here is that the current vision of the world is Eurocentric which, is just one and an incomprehensive vision of the world.

Interculturality: This, as used here, suggests the intercultural; it is the nominal form of the adjective - intercultural. It refers precisely to the dialogue between cultures in this age of increasing global awareness.

Transversality: This refers to a kind of dialogue that violates the discourse rules of the established order. It is a type of dialogue that sets out from a place other than a mere dialogue

between the learned experts of the academic or institutionally dominated worlds.[8] It is a dialogue that has its nexus of discourse at the fringe of civilization.

Pluriversality: This concept stands in opposition to the concept of universality. Universality emphasizes the common features of things hence, suggesting uniformity. Pluriversality, on the other hand, comes to the fore when various local histories connect through their common experiences as the basis for a new logic of knowing.[9]

Hermeneutics: This term describes basically the art of interpreting texts. The notion of hermeneutics as developed in contemporary philosophy embraces not only the problems concerning the interpretation of texts ï literary, philosophical or religious ï but also the careful consideration of both the cultural and historical conditions that form the horizon of the text; that constitutes the interpreterôs horizon of ópre-understandingô.[10]

Endnotes

1. See, Susan George, *Another World is Possible if…* London: Verso, 2004; See also, Ubuntu Forum Secretariat (Ed.), *Reforming International Institutions: Another World is Possible*. London: Earthscan Publishing, 2009. This is also a central platform of the World Social Forum. This is clearly articulated by Boaventura de Sousa Santo in ñThe World Social Forum: Toward a Counter-Hegemonic Globalization.ò At http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/bss/documentos/wsf.pdf (2003).
2. Nelson Maldonado-Torress, ñEnrique Dusselôs Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1(1), 2011, 18
3. See, Escobar, Arturo. ñWorlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program.ò Paper presented to the International Conference of European Latin Americanists, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 3-6, 2002.
4. Terence Ranger, ócConcluding Remarksô, in *Zimbabwe International Book Fair Trust*, Indaba 2002: *The Impact of African Writing on World Literature* (Harare: ZIBF Trust, 2002), 78.
5. Gadamerôs interest in prejudice is based on ñdoing justice to the historicity of understandingò (See, Hans George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum Press, 1973), 268). This fact of the historicity of understanding suggests that prejudices are basic conditions and are part of our faculty for understanding. Defining óprejudiceô as a ñjudgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examinedò (See, Hans George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 273), Gadamer thinks that the negative conception of prejudice (*vorteuil* in German, *préjugé* in French, *praejudicium* in Latin) is only derivative from its definition. This research seeks to explore more the rudiments of this understanding of prejudice and its implication for the conception of universality in metaphysics and objectivity in epistemology. This understanding is unique in that it revises the derogatory commonsense understanding of prejudice as error in thinking and makes it the basic condition for thinking.
6. This concept of transmodernity was developed by: Rosa Magda, Ziauddin Sardar and Enrique Dussell. Magda writing from the European point of view begins her work *Transmodernidad* (1998) with the dialectical philosophy of Hegel. By this, the dialectics begins from modernity to postmodernity and ends in transmodernity; a kind of collaborative phase. There is also the Islamic perspective developed by Ziauddin Sardar in his *Postmodernism and the Other* (1997). His aim here is to transfer modernity and postmodernity from the edge of chaos to a new order of societyé Transmodernity is about finding a synthesis between ñlife enhancing traditionò-tradition that is amenable to change and transition- a new form of modernity that respects the values and life style of traditional cultures. (See also his ñBeyond Difference: Cultural Relations in A New Centuryò). This too is a collaborative perspective. For Dussell, he develops the concept from the Latin-American perspective in his work *The Underside of Modernity* (1996), following which, Walter Mignolo describes what he calls ópluri-versality as a universal projectô in his ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-colonialityò(2007). This Latin-American perspective is also collaborative. This quality of collaboration which all the perspectives on transmodernity share is the quality that this research intends to explore. Also, given the philosophical bias of this research and the colonial heritage of the researcher, the postulations of Dussel and his Latin-American colleagues will be favoured more (and even most).

   From the Latin-American prespective, the basic frameworks operative in the transmodern project are three: 1) modernity is not an exceptionally western or European phenomenon, as the men of letters and knowledge producers of the west will have us believe; 2) colonialism has ended, but coloniality and its logic of domination still prevails. Hence, the decolonization process is not yet complete; and 3) what can be termed shift in the geography of reason. This third point is the most important framework for this research. The claim is that other factors than the rational purity of an agent, contribute to giving credibility to an agentôs epistemological endavour.
7. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 115.
8. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 19. Accessed 10th November, 2011. http://enrique dussel.com/txt/Transmoder nity%20and%20Interculturality.pdf.
9. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007, 498.
10. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 72.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Preamble

Gadamerôs discourse on prejudice, its influence on the transmodern project and how these (Gadamer and the transmodern understadings) can build apn-*other* model for cross-cultural contact/evaluation is the focus of this work. For this reason, the review focuses primarily on how the concept of prejudice has been treated in the history of philosophy with a view to creating a background to Gadamerôs discourse. The review establishes that philosophy, particularly Epistemology, through its history has worked towards undoing prejudices, considering them as obstacles to true knowledge. Philosophy has worked generally towards repudiating prejudices. Prejudice, as conceived here, is not understood in the conventional English sense of a fundamental and unreasonable dislike for something. Rather, following Gadamer, it is seen as a prejudegment which is the function of a subjectôs particularity, historicity, finitude and situatedness. It refers to those presuppositions with which subjects apprehend reality and which structures out the picture of reality that a subject eventually builds.

In establishing the case of how prejudice has been treated in the history of philosophy, this review also tells the story of the modernity project especially from the point of view of its metaphysics, its methodology and its morality with a view to also creating a background for the transmodern discourse as will be treated in the fourth and into the fifth chapters of the work. In doing this, Heidegger is treated as the highpoint from which the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and its discourse on prejudice takes off.

2.2 Review of Related Literature

A clear instance of the drive to achieve an objective (prejudice free) description of the world and which carries a mechanistic understanding of the world is expressed in the philosophy of the atomists; particularly in the works of Leucippus of Miletus and Democritus. But as Copleston notes, ñit has been maintained that Leucippus never existed; but Aristotle and

Theophrastus make him to be the founder of the Atomist philosophy, and we can hardly suppose they were mistaken.ò[1] It is for this reason that the basic resources for this theory are drawn from the works of Democritus. Democritusô fundamental thesis is that matter is not infinitely divisible. Atoms, Democritus believed, are too small to be detected by the senses; they are infinite in number and come in infinitely many varieties, and they have existed for ever. Against the Eleatics, he maintained that there was no contradiction in admitting a vacuum: there was a void, and in this infinite empty space atoms were constantly in motion, just like motes in a sunbeam. For Democritus, atoms and the void are the only two realities: what we see as water or fire or plants or humans are only conglomerations of atoms in the void. Democritus explained in detail how perceived qualities arose from different kinds and configurations of atoms. Sharp favours, for instance, originated from atoms that were small, fine, angular, and jagged, while sweet tastes were produced by larger, rounder, smoother atoms. The knowledge given us by the senses is mere darkness compared with the illumination that is given by the atomic theory.[2] This Atomic philosophy will be the foundation upon which the Aristotelian conception of the world will be challenged in the 17th century.

A continuation of this drive for prejudice free understanding of the world is also found in Platoôs *The Republic*. This work expresses the general posture of dissatisfaction with prejudices in his preference for universal essences rather than particular existents. He also expresses the ontology of polarized units in that he creates polar units in reality at its most rudimentary level. In dealing with knowledge, Plato draws polar units between knowledge and opinion, and also distinguishes between reason and the senses as paths to each of these respectively. In his opinion, it is reason that leads to knowledge, but the senses only guarantee opinion. He notes that ñopinion and reason have to do with different kinds of matteré ò[3] and the matter for knowledge within this context is being. This ñbeing is the sphere or subject matter of knowledge and

knowledge is to know the nature of being.ò[4] But then, opinion for its part, though not synonymous with ignorance, is inferior to knowledge. Writing on this, Plato submits that ñopinion appearsé to be darker than knowledge, but brighter than ignorance.ò[5] From this it is clear in Plato that opinion is inferior to knowledge. It is not just inferior, but intermediate between knowledge and not-knowledge as well.

Besides knowledge being brighter that opinion, it also tends towards absolutes. Here reason, which is its path, tends towards grasping ñthat which is absolute, unchanging, and universal, the ideas (or forms, as they are sometimes called).ò[6] On the other hand,

> é those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see the absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who sees the many just, and not the absolute justice, and the like, - such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge.[7]

The point here is that to have the perception of the various instances of knowledge but not to know the absolute is merely to have opinion. For this reason, ñthose who see the absolute and the eternal and immutable may be said to know,é ò[8] Those who have this perception of the absolute are called the lovers of wisdom. These lovers of wisdom are philosophers, hence philosophy moves towards absolutes as its object.

These absolutes are ideas or forms as Plato calls them. They are the essences of things. On this Plato submits that,

> é there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term ómanyôis applied. There is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.[9]

These essences are located in the world of forms and it is this world that reason tends towards. It is the world which those pulled out of the cave should experience. It contains the highest level of knowledge on the knowledge chain. On the lowest ebb of the chain are images and imagination, the next is physical phenomena/beliefs, then there is mathematics/intelligence. The final and highest stage is that of ideas/reason. This level of reason is highest and it attains its power through dialectics. The world of appearances is the world of opinion, but the world of reason is

the world of reality. In this world only absolute, immutable, unchanging essences and universals are perceived. Here also there are polar units between the world of forms/ideas and the world of things.

The idea of reason being the clearest mode of acquiring knowledge is also extended to psychology and to politics in the philosophy of Plato. In the first place, Plato divides the soul into three parts. The soul has the appetitive, the spirited and the rational parts. The appetitive part of the soul is the lowest and most base part of the soul, followed by the spirited part. But the rational is the highest and most appreciated part of the soul for Plato. This division also flows into the state. Just like we have the appetitive part of the soul, so there are artisans who operate mostly by desires and opinion, incapable of true knowledge within the state. The spirited part of the soul represents soldiers who are guards in the state. Lastly, are the philosophers who represent the rational part of the soul and the state as well and only these must rule in the state. From all these, Platoôs denigration of all forms of particularity points to a repudiation of prejudice in his philosophy. The movement of the mind must always be towards knowledge (universals) and opinion (the particular) is considered as a distraction to be avoided. This knowledge is based on the abstract, immutable, unchanging, universal ideas, which are located in the world of forms; hence, Platoôs intellectualism[10]/idealism.

Aristotle, for his part, takes off from Platoôs polarization of sense and reason in knowledge production. But he does not derogate the senses as Plato does. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle considers the epistemic status of the senses in the course of defending the principle of non-contradiction against the Protagorean arguments.[11] The point here, for Aristotle, is resolving the issue of when two sense experiences contradict one another. For Aristotle, such a situation has generated weird and very varied opinions. For,

> those who really feel the difficulties have been led to this opinion by observation of the sensible world. They think that contradictions or contraries are true at the same time, because they see contraries coming into existence out of the same thing. If, then, that which is not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before as both contraries alike, as Anaxagoras says all is mixed in all, and Democritus too; for *he* says the void and the full exist alike in every part, and yet one of these is being, and the other non-being.[12]

The difficulty in handling this kind of experience has resulted in a situation where the two positions are held to be simultaneously true. This cannot be the case for Aristotle following the principle of non-contradiction. A thing must either be or not be; it cannot both be and not be at the same time. But then, Aristotle is quick to make it clear that this case of contradiction in experience does not mean the senses are inferior in knowledge production. The senses are in actual fact the window to knowledge acquisition. This is the realist flavour of Aristotleôs epistemology.

In resolving the issue of contradictory impression from sense experience, Aristotle notes that the information from every sense is not at once all correct. When we get impressions from the senses we have every reason to believe that one is more correct than the other. Certainly, the fact that more people believe that one is correct does not necessarily mean that such is correct. This is his answer to Protagorasô position that when a higher number agree that such is the case, then it is the case.[13] Aristotle gives a number of ways by means of which to determine the degree of truth of the various sense experiences we get. But the strongest criterion for doing this is that a sense has priority when it is judging its proper object. What then is this proper object? In *De Amina* Aristotle understands this proper object as being that which cannot be perceived by another sense, and that about which it is impossible to be deceived: colour is the proper object of sight, sound of hearing, and flavour of taste.[14] Commenting on this Kenny submits that ñAristotleôs first point is clear enough: we cannot taste a colour, hear a flavour, or see a sound.ò[15] this means that the sense organs have their proper sensible. In stating what it means to be impossible to be deceived by when a sense relates to its proper object, Aristotle continues that,

ñthat if I see something white, I can be mistaken about whether it is a man or something else, but not about whether it is white or not.ò[16] But the case does not end here for proximity is also very fundamental in determining that which is the most correct vision; for a closer vision has more truth than one that is far. By this, Aristotle brings to the fore the role the senses play in the acquisition of knowledge. This is Aristotleôs realism which insists that our knowledge is of this world not of another world.

Despite the above, Frost opines that ñAristotle carried this line of reasoning further by holding thaté genuine knowledge consists of knowing the reasons or causes of things. To reach these basic causes man must follow certain laws of logic or true processes of thought.ò[17] This brings to the fore the place of logic in the works of Aristotle and for some it is the most fundamental contribution of Aristotle to philosophy and knowledge in general. It is also within this logical system that Aristotle makes the case for the superiority of the universal over the particular and by implication reason over the senses. All of these are made clear in the *Posterior Analytics*.

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle makes the case for the fact that universals are products of the intellect, while particulars issue in sense perception. Aristotle begins the 24th Chapter by making the claim that there are certain instances where it seems like particulars are superior to universals. The situation here is that the superior demonstration is the demonstration which gives greater knowledge, and we have greater knowledge of a particular individual when we know it in itself than when we know it through something else. The justification for this assertion is the impression that universal demonstrations prove something is something else and not the thing in itself, and it is the particular which demonstrates that something is what it is. Thus, ñif the particular rather than the commensurately universal form so demonstrates, particular demonstration is superior.ò[18] There is also the general impression that commensurate

universals touch on realities that are delusions and operate in a world of unrealities and since particulars touch on the real world and will not mislead, it is a superior form of demonstration.

On the other hand, Aristotle reacts to some of these designations above. In the first place, the sets of arguments above apply no more to commensurate universals than to particular demonstrations. This is the case because it is better to know qualities of things generally and the qualities of the specific form of such things. As such, ñif a subject is thus to possess qua triangle an attribute which it does not in fact possess qua triangle, that is not demonstration; but if it does possess it qua triangle, the rule applies that the greater is his who knows the subject as possessing its attribute qua that in virtue of which it actually does possess it.ò[19] Here then, to know the wider term e.g. triangle and to know its particular form e.g. isosceles and to be able to make the wider connection thereof is to have superior knowledge. It also should be noted that this demonstration on universals does not suggest that universals have any being as substances different from their particulars.

Furthermore, since demonstrations are meant to show causes, i.e. reasoned facts and it is the commensurate universal which is causative, it is thus superior to particulars. This is the case because that which possesses an attribute through its own essential nature is itself the cause of the inherence and the commensurate universal is primarily also essential. The superiority of the commensurate universal is also premised on the fact that it constitutes full knowledge in that it is that point where an attribute no longer inheres because of something else. In giving an example here Aristotle writes,

> When we learn that exterior angles are equal to four right angles because they are exterior angles of an isosceles, there still remains the question ówhy has isosceles this attribute?ô and its answer óBecause it is a triangle, and a triangle has it because a triangle is a rectilinear figureô. If rectilinear figures possess the property for no further reason, at this point we have full knowledge-but at this point our knowledge has become commensurately universal, and so we conclude that commensurately universal demonstration is superior.[20]

From the above, it becomes obvious that at the point where we can no longer reason for a particular effect, we have reached a reasoned cause beyond which there can be no more answers or causes. Here then, is full knowledge and this point too is where the commensurate universal inheres not because of something else, but because it is the essential point beyond which no more reason can inhere. This is a broader and more comprehensive point of view and this makes it superior to the particular; moreso, because the knowledge of the universal is the knowledge of the principles or essences.

Also, the manifold indeterminacy into which particular demonstrations sink over time makes them inferior, but the simplicity and determinacy found within universals tend to make them surer foundations of knowledge. Again to know two things is better than to know one. For this reason, he who possesses commensurately universal demonstrations knows particulars as well, but he with only particulars knows no more. This makes the universal better. In addition, proofs become universal when their middle term gets closer to the basic truth and since proof derived from basic truth is surer and more accurate and the universal demonstration is characterised by this closeness, it is surer and superior. At the last point of Aristotleôs argument for the superiority of universal demonstrations over particulars is the dialectical argument. Here Aristotle contends that,

> the clearest indication of the precedence of commensurately universal demonstration is as follows: if of two propositions, a priori and a posteriori, we have a grasp of the priori, we have a kind of knowledge-a potential grasp ï of the posteriori as well. For example, if one knows that the angles of all triangle are equal to two right angles, one knows in a sense ï potentially ï that the isoscelesô angles also are equal to two right angles, even if one does not know that the isosceles is a triangle, but to grasp this posteriori proposition is by no means to know the commensurate universal either potentially or actually.[21]

In this regard, priori knowledge is supreme for by knowing it one also knows the posteriori. But this is not the case with knowing only the posteriori. It is also within this context that Aristotle submits that ñé commensurately universal demonstration is through and through intelligible,

particular demonstrations issues in sense perception.ò[22] This sense perception alone cannot guarantee scientific knowledge.[23] Science which is knowledge at once of the fact and of the reasoned fact, not of the fact by itself without the reasoned fact is the more exact and proper science[24] and this kind of science cannot issue from sense perception.

Besides the polar units of universal and particulars, there are other polar units in the philosophy of Aristotle. These include: substance and accidents, act and potency, cause and effect etc. And one end of these poles is often considered superior to the other. In summary, universals are superior to particulars and sense perception does not guarantee universal and true science. Thus, true knowledge arises from the repudiation of the prejudices that come with particulars and not their appropriation within the knowing process; for knowledge always has to transcend these particulars.

While Galileo reacts, most of the time, to Aristotleôs philosophy one thing he maintains from the philosophy of the ancients was the disposition to polarize reality and in this case between the subject and the object and to hold one end of this pole as being superior to the other. Galileo has so much faith in the natural sciences to the point that he even introduces mathematics into physics. In the words of Njoku, ñGalileo Galilei had insisted on knowledge of nature that was not based on guess-work. His concern for accurate measurement and experimentation intensified the role of mathematics into physics.ò[25] The book of the universe, he wrote, cannot be read until we learn the letters and language in which it is written. ñIt is written in the language of mathematics, and its letters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it is impossible to understand a single word.ò[26] The philosophical underpinning of Galileoôs investigation was the presupposition the mathematics was the key to understanding the universe, hence his maxim, ñmeasure what can be measured, and make measurable what can be measured.ò[27] The significance of Galileo in this regard is the fact that his faith in mathematics

necessitated his emphasis on observing, weighing, measuring and calculating in order to test his mathematical hypothesis. This is the scientific method and was the inauguration of the methodology of the modernity project and the desire to arrive at objectivity in knowledge acquisition and production.

The definitive attack on prejudices comes in Francis Baconôs critique of the various idols in his *Novum Organum*. This work is a further development of his previous work, *The Advancement of Learning*. In this work (*The Advancement of Learning*), Bacon argues basically that Aristotelian logic was so deficient because it did not engender invention which was at the root of all progress and development. Writing on how the marinerôs needle helped the discovery of the West-Indies and on how these events justify his claims, Bacon submits thus:

> Like as the West-Indies had never been discovered if the use of the marinerôs needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.[28]

From the above, there was obviously the need to invent another kind of logic that will take care of the deficiencies of the Aristotelian logic. This logic is induction rather than deduction. How this inductive logic should work is the kernel of the discourse in the *Novum Organum*.

Before Bacon begins to structure out his new logic, he makes the case that syllogism or deduction is not a comprehensive logic. This is because anyone using it can only arrive at conclusions consistent with existing, given premises. These premises themselves ï the assertions on which the whole process of reasoning is based ï must be taken on trust as true and incontrovertible. The syllogism ñis not applied to the principles of the sciences, and is applied in vain to the middle axioms, since it is by no means equal to the subtlety of nature.ò[29] Consequently, the entirety of the current system of reasoning, in Baconôs view, fails. Instead Bacon gives notice that his own logic will be an induction or gradual ascent from sense data to generalisations, though not the ôordinary inductionô of the logic handbooks. Furthermore, since

utility is the chief goal of science for Bacon and the purpose of investigation is to extend the power of the human race over nature, Bacon thinks syllogisms will not produce new concepts or extend knowledge. What is needed is *induction* ï not hasty generalization from inadequate sampling of nature, but a carefully schematized procedure, mounting gradually from particular instances to axioms of gradually increasing generality. A significant portion of Book One of *The Novum Organum* is taken up with discussion of what Bacon names the ódolsô, or ólusionsô ï impediments of various kinds which interfere with the processes of clear human reasoning. These Idols are of four kinds: Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace and Idols of the Theatre.

The idols of the tribe are the temptations common to all humans: the tendency to judge things by surface appearances and to acquiesce in received opinions. These are idols which stem from the predominant opinion that the senses open up the universe; they are the measure of the universe. This assertion for Bacon is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe. The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it.

The idols of the den/cave are peculiarities of particular types of character: some people, for instance, are innately too conservative, others are too attracted by novelties. These are the illusions of the individual man. For (apart from the aberrations of human nature in general) each man has a kind of individual cave or cavern which fragments and distorts the light of nature. This may happen either because of the unique and particular nature of each man; or because of his upbringing and the company he keeps; or because of his reading of books and the authority of those whom he respects and admires; or because of the different impressions things make on different minds, preoccupied and prejudiced perhaps, or calm and detached, and so on. The

evident consequence is that the human spirit (in its different dispositions in different men) is a variable thing, quite irregular, almost haphazard.

The idols of the market-place are snares concealed in the language we use, which contain meaningless, ambiguous, and ill-defined words. These are illusions which seem to arise by agreement and from menôs association with each other. Bacon surmises that

> é we take the name from human exchange and community. Men associate through talk; and words are chosen to suit the understanding of the common people. And thus a poor and unskilful code of words incredibly obstructs the understanding. The definitions and explanations with which learned men have been accustomed to protect and in some way liberate themselves, do not restore the situation at all. Plainly words do violence to the understanding, and confuse everything; and betray men into countless empty disputes and fictions.[30]

These then are illusions that came from language and distort our ability to acquire true scientific knowledge.

The idols of the theatre are false systems of philosophy, whether ósophisticalô like Aristotleôs, or excessively óempiricalô like that of William Gilbert (in fact a perfectly reputable scientist, discoverer of the magnetic pole), or ósuperstitiousô like the Neo-Platonists who do not distinguish sufficiently between theology and philosophy. These illusions Bacon calls the idols of the theatre. He writes:

> é for all the philosophies that men have learned or devised are, in our opinion, so many plays produced and performed which have created false and fictitious worlds. We are not speaking only of the philosophies and sects now in vogue or even of the ancient ones; many other such plays could be composed and concocted, seeing that the causes of their very different errors have a great deal in common. And we do not mean this only of the universal philosophies, but also of many principles and axioms of the sciences which have grown strong from tradition, belief and inertia.[31]

All of these refer to the negative side of his philosophy where lays out problems of science as it was practiced in his time. It is in the second book of the *Novum Organum* that he outlines the positive side of his philosophy.

As against the deductive method of Aristotleôs logic and science, Bacon favours the inductive method as the genuine method for science. In describing this method, Bacon submits that, ñour logic instructs the understanding and trains it, not (as common logic does) to grope and

clutch at abstracts with feeble mental tendrils, but to dissect nature truly, and to discover the powers and actions of bodies and their laws limned in matter. Hence, this science takes its origin not only from the nature of the mind but from the nature of things.ò[32] The goal of Baconôs inductive method is to discover the óformsô or essential definitions, of what he terms ósimple naturesôï the fundamental building blocks out of which all compound bodies are, in his view, constructed. The procedure for finding the form of a simple nature is clearly set out at the beginning of Book Two of *The Novum Organum*. The investigator starts by collecting into a History all available occurrences of the nature selected (Bacon chooses the simple nature óheatô for his worked example). From among these he selects those which provide as clear as possible a picture of the natureôs production. These are organised, tabulated and collated and any gaps filled in with examples drawn from specially designed experiments. Together they form a ótable of presenceô. A second table is now drawn up, in which the instances of presence of the selected nature are matched as closely as possible by ones from which it is absent (if the rays of the sun are an instance of presence of heat, the rays of the moon are an instance of absence). These two tables are supplemented by one which lists instances where the increase or decrease of the nature is accompanied by increase or decrease of other properties present, indicating that these may be essential concomitants of the nature under investigation. Baconôs óinductionô is carried out by eliminating extraneous and redundant material between the three tables, to yield an essential physical description of the simple nature ï its óformô. This simple elimination is the unique legitimate use of formal inference in the entire interpretation of nature. All further steps in the process of refining the ósimple naturesô and their essential óformsô depend directly on the observed outcomes of carefully classified experiments. There will, Bacon makes clear, inevitably be such further stages, until at some yet-to-be-determined date in the distant future a single overarching explanatory theory is arrived at (by years of assiduous practice and experiment).

From all of the above, one thing is clear; the method as described here by Bacon is the method of the natural sciences as it is used today. It proceeds from the particular to the universal. By this very token the aim is to acquire power to be able to dominate nature and to keep it under the control of man. By so doing, these sciences seek objective knowledge which is deprived of all forms of prejudices or particular pretensions. What is sought after here is an objective account of reality that transcends all contexts. Thus, we see in Baconsô work the start of a true repudiation of prejudices within the history of western philosophy.

Rene Descartes also follows Bacon in showing so much admiration for the natural or exact sciences, as they call it. His aim in *The Discourse on Method* and *Meditations on First Philosophy* was to bring the precision of the exact sciences into philosophy. Writing on Descartesô orientation in philosophy Robert Scruton surmises that

> for Descartes the results of all previous speculation had to be set aside or suspended, until clear and indubitable principles could be established against which to measure them. Without the aid of such principles, no system, scientific or metaphysical, could warrant assent. Descartes could not find these basic principles in the works that he had read. He therefore embarked on a programme of radical intellectual reform, which resulted in a change of philosophical perspective so great that scholasticism fell into lasting disrepute.[33]

Being a contemporary of Bacon, Galileo and preceding Newton, Descartes had great admiration for the new science that was developing at the time.

The primary objective of *The Discourse on Method,* as Descartes himself writes, is ñé undertaking and searching for the true method of arriving at the knowledge of everything that the [my] mind was capable of grasping.ò[34] He begins the work by noting how porous all his previous studies were. That his excessive study of other peopleôs ideas had to be put to a stop for if he did not stop he will not be able to produce anything serious of his own. Descartes observes that he had much regard for oratory and poetry, but they were more of gifts of the mind than fruits of study. As such,

> those who reason most powerfully and are the most successful at ordering their thoughts so as to make them clear and intelligible will always be best able to

> persuade others of what they say, even if they speak in the thickest of dialects and have never learned any rhetoric. And those whose linguistic expression is the most pleasing and who frame their thoughts in the most eloquent and agreeable way would always end up being the best poets, even if they did not know a single rule of poetic composition.[35]

The point here is that these areas of study are more like talents than what people could study successfully and be able to practice correctly. Descartes was also attracted by mathematics because of its certainty and its incontrovertibility. But the astonishing thing for Descartes is that,

> é nothing more exalted had been built on such sure and solid foundations; whereas, on the other hand, I compared the moral works of ancient pagan writers to splendid and magnificent palaces built on nothing more than sand and mud. They exalt the virtues, and make them seem more worthy of esteem than anything else on earth; but they do not give sufficient indication of how to learn about them; and what they call by such a fine name is in many cases no more than lack of human feeling, pride, despair, or parricide.[36]

Here then we see Descartesô admiration for mathematics and its precision. Its method is that which teaches one to follow correct order and to enumerate all the factors of the object under examination. It contains everything that confers certainty on arithmetical rules. Also, it becomes clear the sure foundation on which Descartes wants to place the study of philosophy and other discipline in general. Descartesô major issue with philosophy was that it had diverse opinions of which all were plausible and for this reason he deemed anything no more than plausible as false.

As a result of all these numerous foundations and his desire to get at the truest foundation and to move through life with confidence, he took hold of every opportunity he had to learn from mixing with people and testing himself at every point. He still discovers all the various cultures he came in contact with were besieged by the same numerous foundations as those of philosophy and the other disciplines. From all of these Descartes learnt one thing and writing on this he submits that,

> é when I was confronted by things which, although they seem to us very extravagant and ridiculous, are nevertheless widely accepted and approved of by other great nations, I learned not to believe too firmly in anything that only example and custom had persuaded me of. So it was that I freed myself gradually from many of the errors that can obscure the natural light of our minds, and make them less able to see reason.[37]

It is clear for Descartes anything coming from examples and from tradition was not worth learning. Here too, tradition begins to acquire its negative connotation and will develop to its culminating point in the enlightenmentôs total denigration of tradition. In the midst of all these Descartes decides to look into himself to find the surest path to follow and to his greatest dismay, looking into himself, is where he made more success and found more honest truths.

In detailing out the method for arriving at sure knowledge, philosophy, geometry and algebra were very useful for Descartes. The usefulness of these is premised on the fact that their difficulties[38] were overcome and their advantages retained. With this objective in mind, Descartes sets out the method in this manner,

> The *first* was never to accept anything as true that I did not *incontrovertibly* know to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both *prejudice* and premature conclusions; and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my mind so *clearly* and *distinctly*, that I would have no occasion to doubt it. The *second* was to divide all the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as many as were required to solve them in the best way. The *third* was to conduct my thoughts in a given order, beginning with the *simplest* and most easily understood objects, and gradually ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of the most *complex*; and *positing* an order even on those which do not have a natural order of precedence. The *last* was to undertake such complete enumerations and such general surveys that I would be sure to have left nothing out.[39]

From the procedure as noted above, avoiding all forms of prejudice is paramount. This is because the idea in question has to be clearly and distinctly perceived in order to avoid prejudices and premature conclusions. These kinds of conclusions should be avoided for they are at the base of the unfounded approaches to knowledge that Descartes took his time to describe before proposing this procedure. Along with these procedures, Descartes also resolved to live by certain moral maxims and he limited them to four: The *first* was to obey the laws and customs of his country, and to adhere to the religion in which God by His grace had him instructed from his childhood, and to govern himself in everything else according to the most moderate and least extreme opinions, being those commonly received among the *wisest* of those with whom he should have to live. His *second* maxim was to be as firm and resolute in his actions as he could,

and to follow no less constantly the most doubtful opinions, once he had opted for them, than he would have if they had been the most certain ones. The *third* maxim was to endeavour always to master himself rather than fortune, to try to change his desires rather than to change the order of the world, and in general to settle for the belief that there is nothing entirely in our power except our thoughts, and after we have tried, in respect of things external to us, to do our best, everything in which we do not succeed is absolutely impossible as far as we are concerned. *Finally*, he decided to review the various occupations that men have in this life, in order to try to select the best one. Without wishing to pass judgment on the occupations of others, he came to the view that he could do no better than to continue in the one in which he found myself, that is to say, to devote his life to the cultivation of his reason and make such progress as he could in the knowledge of the truth following the method he had prescribed for himself.

With these procedures and maxims set and sure that he could proceed with his search, he states thus: ñI proceeded to eradicate from my mind all the mistakes that might earlier have crept into it. In doing this, I was not copying those skeptics who doubt for doubtingôs sake, and pretend to be always unable to reach a decision; for, on the contrary, the aim of my whole plan was to reach certainty and reject shifting ground in the search for rock and clay.ò[40] The basic orientation of his procedure was to doubt everything he knew and this doubting was aimed at finding sure grounds of either rock or clay. But in doing this, Descartes found out something really compelling; hence, he declares:

> é while I was trying to think of all things being false in this way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and observing this truth: *I am thinking therefore I exist*, was so secure and certain that it could not be shaken by any of the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics, I judged that I could accept it without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.[41]

Here then is the classic statement of this *cogito* in which the doubting self cannot doubt itself thinking. Thus, the sure foundation for all knowledge is the thinking self. From this proposition,

Descartes was able deduce the truth of his existence as substance and of the existence of God and other things.

In the *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes embarks on explaining the fact that this master-premise of the *cogito* is not some form of inference. In this work, Descartes having made some clear arguments, submits that ñI can finally decide that this proposition, ôI am, I existô, whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in the mind, is necessarily true.ò[42] Also, this work broadly deals with the following: the things that may be called to doubt (Meditation I); the nature of the mind and that it is most easily known than the body (Meditation II); God and that He exists (Meditation III); truth and falsity (Meditation IV); the essence of material things (Meditation V); and the existence of material things and the real distinction between mind and body (Meditation VI). From this outline one sees that this work focuses on his philosophical psychology and his metaphysics of substances.

In summary then, Descartesô repudiation of prejudice resonates in his rejection of tradition and customs and his celebration of the mathematical method because of its clarity. Also, the polarization of the mind and body and the superiority of the mind over the body and material things shows his appreciation of reason and the fact that the senses may not lead to any valuable truth at all. His philosophy therefore is a continuation of the celebration of mathematics as was started in the philosophy of Bacon following the renaissance and this shows its complicity in the repudiation of prejudice and a furtherance of the ontology of polarized units.

Against the rationalism as imbedded in the works of Descartes, there is the tradition of empiricism which upholds the senses and sense data over any form of rationalism. Here, experience is the hallmark of all knowledge. Thus, any move outside the confines of experience one risks falling into skepticism or losing his or herself into nonsense. This tradition has been old in philosophy, that is, it did not just come as a reaction to rationalism. As far back as the Middle

Ages William of Ockham had made some empiricist propositions; so too had Bacon. But it was Hobbes in his philosophy of language, as set out in the *Leviathan* that sets empiricism on a base capable of challenging rationalism. In Hobbesôestimation, ñif a man should talk to me of a *round quadrangle*é or *immaterial substances* é or of a *free subject*é I should not say he were in error, but that his words were without meaning.ò[43] One sees here that Metaphysics and Metaphysicians with their use of language express meanings that are beyond immediate experience; hence what they say should not be taken seriously.

In the *Leviathan* also, Hobbes develops the idea of matter in motion still within the context of the ontology of polarized units and in furtherance of the scientific method as developed by Galileo and Bacon. For Hobbes, causation is a matter of motion and philosophy is knowledge of effects acquired from knowledge of generative causes. Convinced that everything is matter in motion, Hobbes asserts that human beings are sensory creature,[44] they are also part of this motion,[45] and being in constant random motion, they collide with one another and this results in chaos in the state of nature. To resolve this, men enter into a contract and they create the Leviathan. By conceiving humans as matter in motion; Hobbes offers a grim picture of human nature and of life in the natural condition. The modern project in Hobbes was to reduce everything to matter and quantifiable effects.[46]

For Locke, in the *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, the mind is a *tabula rasa* (blank tablet) at birth, and that its initial and basic content is inscribed by the hand of experience. He also opines that óideasô are produced in the mind by experienceð specifically, through the sensesð and these ideas óbear witnessô to truth. Within his philosophy, therefore, we have one classical picture of how perceptual knowledge arises and this is a version of representationalism.[47] This work also expresses Lockeôs óoptimism that we have enough for our useô.[48] In Lockeôs estimation, what is needed for knowledge is the adoption of the correct

method and in this, he follows Bacon and Hobbes. This must also be done paying attention to what the human faculty is capable of.[49] In Lockeôs estimation, ñwhen we know our strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success. And when we have well surveyed the powers of the mind, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not to set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything, nor on the other side question everything, and disdain all knowledge because some things are not to be understood.ò[50]

Following this is Lockeôs theory of the state of nature which is a state of perfect freedom. In this state there are natural rights. Alongside the natural right to freedom, there is also the right to private property. On this Locke writes that, ñthough the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet man has a property in his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he removed out of the state that nature has provided, and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with, and makes it his property.ò[51] The bottom line from the above is that labour fixes the boundary of property rights or relations. Njoku continues in this regard that, ñalthough Locke never explicitly used his theory of natural rights to argue for free markets; we have several 20th century authors who have employed his theory for that purpose.ò[52] Some of these are Hayek, Rothbard, Dietze, Mack etc. Lockeôs optimism and his following of Baconôs and Hobbesô method and its quest for objectivity are all routes to the consolidation of the modernity project in Lockeôs philosophy. Also, the influence of his theory of property on the free market enterprise is fundamental to the making of the modernity project. Furthermore, his epistemology lays the ground for the radical empiricism of Hume. These shall be considered in some detail in the following.

David Hume develops the empiricistsô worldview and drags them to their logical conclusion. For Scruton, ñThere are two ways of reading Hume. The first is as a sceptic who

defends, from empiricist premises, the view that the standard claims to knowledge are untenable. The second is as the proponent of a ónatural philosophyô of man, who begins from empirical observations about the human mind and concludes that the mind has been wrongly construed by the metaphysicians.ò[53] He further contends that despite the two methods, the two readings are not incompatible, although the second has been emphasised in recent commentaries, partly because it parallels recent developments in philosophy.

The *Treatise of Human Nature* begins by dividing the contents (óperceptionsô) of the mind into two classes: impressions and ideas, instead of following Locke in calling them all óideasô. Impressions are more forceful, more vivid than ideas. Impressions include sensations and emotions, ideas are what are involved in thinking and reasoning. Ideas, Hume says, are copies of impressions. This looks at first like a definition, but Hume appeals to experience in support of it. From time to time he invites the reader to look within himself to verify the principle, and we are told that it is supported by the fact that a man born blind has no idea of colours. Whether it is a definition or hypothesis, the thesis is intended to apply only to simple ideas. I can construct a complex idea of the New Jerusalem, without ever having seen any such city. But in the case of simple ideas, Hume says, the rule holds almost without exception that there is a one-to-one correspondence between ideas and impressions. The meaning of ósimpleô turns out to be as slippery as that of óvividô. But whenever he wishes to attack metaphysics, Hume puts the principle óno idea without antecedent impressionô to vigorous use.

In the first *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals* Hume asserts that óall the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact.* Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain .... Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not

ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.ô Hume means that all our reasoning concerns the relations between things. He further contends that philosophical relations are divided into invariable and variable relations. Invariable relations cannot be changed without a change in the objects related or in the ideas of them. Conversely, if the latter remain unchanged, the relation between them remains unchanged. Mathematical relations are of this type. Given certain ideas or meaningful symbols, the relations between them are invariable. In order to make an arithmetical or an algebraic proposition untrue, we should have to change the meanings of the symbols; if we do not do this, the propositions are necessarily true; that is, the relations between the ideas are invariable. Variable relations, however, can change without any change in the related objects or in their ideas being necessarily involved. For example, the spatial relation of distance between two bodies can vary, though the bodies and our ideas of them remain the same. It follows that we cannot come to have certain knowledge of variable relations by pure reasoning; that is, simply by analysis of ideas and *a priori* demonstration: we become acquainted with them by experience and observation, or, rather, we depend upon experience and observation, even in those cases where inference is involved. Here then variable elation belongs to the sphere of the matter of fact and invariable relation with the relation of ideas. This observation made by Hume here is key, because it occasions the *a priori* and synthetic divide within empiricism.

Hume approaches his examination of the causal relation by asking from what impression or impressions the idea of causation is derived. In the first place no quality of those things which we call ócausesô can be the origin of the idea of causation; for we cannot discover any quality which is common to them all. őThe idea then of causation must be derived from some *relation* among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover.ô These relations are those of contingency, temporal priority and necessary connection. Writing on the importance of

necessary connection Hume submits thus: ñShall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a *necessary connection* to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance than any of the other two above mentioned.ò[54] This idea of necessary connection is still not a product of intuition nor is it demonstrable; on this ground then Hume concludes that our idea of causality is just as a result of our habit or association. Causality is not a relation with an essence that is perceptible to the senses.

Hume also makes some comments on the nature of skepticism; here, Hume draws a difference between ôantecedentô and ôconsequentô skepticism. By antecedent skepticism Hume understands a skepticism which is ôantecedent to all study and philosophyô.[55] As an example, he cites Cartesian doubt, taking this to involve doubt not only of all our particular previously held beliefs and opinions but also of the power of our faculties to attain truth. Consequent skepticism is skepticism which is ôconsequent to science and enquiryô. In other words, it is the result of the discovery, or supposed discovery, by philosophers either of the untrustworthy character of our mental faculties or, at least, of their unfitness for reaching any reliable conclusion ôin all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employedô. Within this idea of consequent skepticism, Hume goes ahead to be skeptical about everything we believe, from personal identity to freewill to moral oughts and ultimately to the science of Metaphysics; and the simple objection is that its subject matter cannot be intuitively apprehended neither than can it be demonstrated or observed. Here then, the priority of observability and demonstrability will ground the enlightenmentôs case against authority, tradition and prejudices. These modes of knowledge acquisition will become the distinguishing mark of the natural sciences as against the human sciences.

From the two currents of thought above, that is rationalism and empiricism, one notices that they both have their roots in the Cartesian *cogito*, but they both diverge most significantly from the philosophies of Leibniz and Hume. This divide was the situation at the inauguration of the eighteenth century and the enlightenment. But it was the philosophy of Kant that came to reconcile these two traditions and to show that ñé the choice between empiricism and rationalism is unreal, that each philosophy is equally mistaken, and that the only conceivable metaphysics that could commend itself to a reasonable being must be both empiricist and rationalist at once.ò[56] Despite the plethora of Kantôs works, this review will focus on the reconstruction of metaphysics as it was the case in Kantôs *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant was concerned with the status of Metaphysics and of Philosophy in general due to the challenge of the rise, and the precision as well as prospects of the natural sciences. On these grounds then, ñall philosophy, then, for Kant, must begin from the question ôHow is metaphysics possible?ò[57] In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant tries to answer this question. In doing this, Kant attempted a systematic critique of human thought and reason. He tried to explore not just scientific beliefs, but all beliefs, in order to establish exactly what is presupposed in the act of belief as such. He wished to describe the nature and limits of knowledge, not just in respect of scientific discovery, but absolutely: his metaphysics was designed, not as a postscript to physics, but as the very foundation of discursive thought. He hoped to show three things: 1) That there is a legitimate employment of the understanding, the rules of which can be laid bare, and that limits can be set to this legitimate employment; 2) That Humean skepticism is impossible, since the rules of the understanding are already sufficient to establish the existence of an objective world obedient to a law of causal connection; 3) That certain fundamental principles of scienceð such as the principle of the conservation of

substance, the principle that every event has a cause, the principle that objects exist in space and time, can be established *a priori*.

Kantôs proof of these contentions begins from the theory of ósynthetic *a priori*ô knowledge. According to Kant, scientific knowledge is *a posteriori*: it arises from, and is based in, actual experience. Science, therefore, deals not with necessary truths but with matters of contingent fact. However, it rests upon certain universal axioms and principles, which, because their truth is presupposed at the start of any empirical enquiry, cannot themselves be empirically proved. These axioms are, therefore, *a priori,* and while some of them are ónalyticô (true by virtue of the meanings of the words used to formulate them), others are ósyntheticô, saying something substantial about the empirical world. Moreover, these synthetic *a priori* truths, since they cannot be established empirically, are justifiable, if at all, through reflection, and reflection will confer on them the only kind of truth that is within its gift: necessary truth. They must be true in any conceivable world. These truths, then, form the proper subject matter of metaphysics; the original question of metaphysics has become: ôHow is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?ô The answer to this question Kant links to the Copernican revolution in astronomy. This revolution, for Kant, seeks to make Metaphysics and indeed philosophy in general scientific.

To become scientific, Kant believed, philosophy needed a revolution similar to that by which Copernicus placed the sun, rather than the earth, at the centre of the system of the heavens. Copernicus showed that when we think we are observing the motion of the sun round the earth, what we see is in fact the consequence of the rotation of our own earth. Kantôs Copernican revolution will do for the mind what Copernicus did for the sense of vision. Instead of asking how our knowledge can conform to its objects, we must start from the supposition that objects must conform to our knowledge. Only thus can we justify the claim of metaphysics to *a priori*

knowledge, which unlike *a posteriori* knowledge comes before experience. All our knowledge begins with experience, but Kant insists that it does not follow that all of it arises from experience. Following this, Kant also makes a distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge. Here the marks of *a priori* knowledge are necessity and universality. Unlike Hume, Kant maintains that the proposition ôevery event has a causeô expresses a judgment which is strictly necessary and strictly universal. ôAll bodies are heavyô, on the other hand, is simply a generalization to which no exceptions have been observed; it is an *a posteriori* judgment.

Alongside the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgment, Kant employs a distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. In any judgment of the form ôA is Bô, he says, either the predicate B is contained in the concept A, or it lies outside it; if the former, then the judgment is analytic; if the latter, then it is synthetic. Kantôs examples are ôall bodies are extendedô and ôall bodies are heavyô. Kant has one thing in mind with this distinction and that is the fact that a judgment cannot be both analytic and *a posteriori*. But the possibility is left open that a proposition may be both synthetic and *a priori*. In Kantôs system, indeed, the realm of the synthetic *a priori* is extensive and important. It includes the whole of mathematics; arithmetic and geometry since they go far beyond pure logic, and yet they are *a priori*, because they are known in advance of experience.[58] How such synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible is the principal problem for philosophy, and only if it can be solved is a science of metaphysics possible. If it cannot, then metaphysics is nothing more than a natural disposition to ask certain types of questions, questions, for instance, about the universe as a whole. Nothing guarantees that these questions are not completely idle; achieving this task proceeds via a critique of reason. Thus, reasonôs first task is to understand the nature and limits of its own power. Reason must be used critically, not dogmatically, and scientific metaphysics must begin with a ôCritique of Pure Reasonô. The critique of pure reason, that is, of reason divorced from experience, prepares us for

the general study of *a priori* knowledge, which Kant calls ótranscendental metaphysicsô. ôTranscendentalô is one of Kantôs favourite words: he used it with several meanings, but common to all of them is the notion of something which goes beyond and behind the deliverances of actual experience. His favoured brand of transcendentalism is transcendental idealism, and Kant suggests transcendental idealism[59] to check the excesses of transcendental realism.

In the Transcendental Dialectics, Kant now sets the parameters for what he calls transcendental illusions. His concern here is ñto expose the illusion in transcendent judgments.ò[60] The Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic is therefore interesting for Kantôs presentation of reason as a presumably distinct capacity for cognizing in a way that, as Kant puts it, incites us to tear down the boundaries already enforced in the Analytic.[61] Reason is considered here as the capacity to think by means of ideas beyond all standards of sense. It is this general theory of reason, as a capacity to think (by means of ñideasò) beyond all standards of sense, and as carrying with it a unique and unavoidable demand for the unconditioned, that frames the Kantian rejection of metaphysics. At the heart of that rejection is the view that although reason is unavoidably motivated to seek the unconditioned, its theoretical efforts to achieve it are inevitably sterile. The ideas which might secure such unconditioned knowledge lack objective reality (refer to no object), and our misguided efforts to acquire ultimate metaphysical knowledge are led astray by the illusion which, according to Kant, ñunceasingly mocks and torments us.ò[62] From all of the above, Kant thinks reason cannot function without the aid of the senses. Reason working within the frame of the categories as set out by Kant leads to the knowledge of the noumena. Obviously, Kant shifts the center of metaphysics from ontology to epistemology. Within Kantian philosophy and based on the notion of the Copernican revolution, it could be inferred that objects now depend on the mind. This brings in the issue of the mind

giving essence to objects and not objects having essences of their own independent of the mind. Reality here depends on the mind and does not have any essence of its own. Secondly, the emphasis of the non-dogmatic application of reason is aimed at doing away with all forms of authority and tradition in the making of rationality and hence the repudiation of prejudice as an obstacle to the formation of reasonable positions and the working of reason.

G. W. F. Hegel continues the Kantian tradition but in a different direction. This is the case because it is the Dialectics which Kant scorns so much that Hegel adopts as his unique methodology and logic for arriving at metaphysical truths.[63] In fact, ñwhile Kant had used the word ódialecticô to refer to the propensity to fall into contradictions, Hegel used it to mean the propensity to transcend them. This process of transcendence is the true course of logic, and ódialecticô is the name for the intellectual pursuit whose endpoint is not limited or partial, but on the contrary, absolute truth itself.ò[64] Hegelôs metaphysical ideas are, for most of its part, contained in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Hegelôs purpose in this novel Introduction to Philosophy is not like Kantôs in the first of the Critiques, namely, to investigate the possibility and limitations of knowledge. He accepts knowledge and the knowing experience very much as it is accepted by common-sense, and then proceeds to develop its implications. Passing dialectically from sensuous consciousness through self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion, he finally arrives at what seems to him to be the true attitude of consciousness, the truth of the knowing experience. This final result of the *Phenomenology*, which Hegel calls óAbsolute Knowledgeô (*das absolute Wissen*), is thus his definition of the real nature of knowledge; it is his final statement of the significance of the subject-object relation within concrete experience. Hegel stands against what he calls Kantôs and Fichteôs subjective idealism or quasi-objectivity. For him, thought which is truly objective is not particular and individual, but in a sense transcends the individual and that truly objective thought

does actually express the essence of things. Following these, Gustavus Watts Cunningham sums up that ñé the purpose of the *Phenomenology* is to show, in opposition to the Kantian philosophy, why the *Ding-an-sich* (thing-in-itself) must be known and how it can be known. It must be known, because this is the presupposition of experience from its earliest and simplest stages; it can be known, because thought is no merely subjective and private process going on in our heads, but in its very essence is a significant relation to objects.ò[65] It is interesting to note that there are *two* temporal interpretations of the ómomentsô of consciousness. The *Phenomenology* contains a parable of the subject, launched with its infantile ói wantô into a world that it gradually reduces into possession, so giving both itself and the world objective form. It also contains a covert history of the human race. Such was the astonishing intellectual effrontery of Hegel, that he made no efforts to deny that mankind *as a whole* must evolve in accordance with the pattern of the *Phenomenology.* In this regard, Hegelôs story of the world proceeds through the episodes corresponding to the pre-historical state of nature, to the undifferentiated óspeciesô being of the animal, to the episode of primitive combat among tribes, to the Roman *imperium,* with its need for slavery and autocratic rule. Not surprisingly we find that the later stages of the evolution of consciousness fall one by one into the successive periods of history, and by a miracle of predestination, self-consciousness reaches its apogee in that free, protestant, Germanic *Wissenschaft* (science) of which Hegel was both prophet and exegete. This state was the absolute in the political sense. Here then, there was the universalization of one prejudice; the prejudice of the German *Wissenschaft* (science).

In the realm of Metaphysics the attainment of this absolute was a real propensity for Hegel. Thus, besides Hegelôs appreciation of dialectics which Kant was uncomfortable with, phenomenologically Hegel also thought the thing-in-itself was knowable. Thus, despite the fact that, for Kant, the thing-in-itself was an óinfinite resistance principleôõ it stood proxy for the idea

that our knowledge has a limit; for Hegel, the thing-in-itself is actual and knowable, being nothing but the absolute idea and its successive revelations. There cannot be more than one such transcendent thing: but nor can there be less than one. It has, in Hegelôs view, only one nature, and that nature is revealed to us in consciousness. In our advance towards it, we ópositô the world of nature and the world of óspiritô. These are modes of realisation, which the absolute undergoes in us, but in which it does not exhaust itself. How, then, do we know the absolute? Hegelôs nearest approach to an answer to this lies in his theory of the concrete universal, according to which the world as *given* is both known (because it is universal) and also sensuously known (because it is concrete). Hence, in moments of pure observation we see it as it eternally is, while seeing it transfixed in time, beleaguered by all its determinations, clothed in attributes, specified to a comprehensible point of being. Philosophy shows the world thus, but philosophy is a lingering occupation: art shows it more immediately, since art is the sensuous *shining* of the idea. From the obscure but tantalizing theory of óthe concrete universalô grew the idealist philosophies of art, of history and of the state.[66] Given the final phase of the dialectic which culminates in the Prussian state as the absolute and ideal, it becomes clear that Hegel seeks a totalizing whole which abhors differences. Thus, despite the role of the dialectic in the Philosophy of Hegel, it is not meant to manage difference but it seeks to unite all into one whole with an ideal in the Prussian state. Thus, there is a universalization of one prejudice in this case and others are considered inferior or other prejudices are repudiated except that of Hegel.

Aside the Kantian and Hegelian interlude, Hume had a great influence on Bentham. Even Bentham affirms this. Corroborating this fact Kenny surmises that, ñwhen he read the *Treatise of Human Nature,* he tells us, scales fell from his eyes and he came to believe that utility was the test and measure of all virtue and the sole origin of justice.ò[67] Benthamôs theory of utility is contained in his *An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation*. In understanding

this principle of utility Bentham writes that, ñby the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or oppose that happiness.ò[68] The happiness of an individual will be augmented if there is an addition to the sum total of his pleasures, which is greater than any addition to the sum total of his pains. The interest of the community is composed in like manner. This principle of utility as developed by Bentham following Hume forms the strong basis for the morality of the modern project as Njoku puts it, ñthe morality of the modern has two arms, namely the Machiavellian principle and the principle of utility.ò[69]

Following Bentham was J. S. Mill. In his *System of Logic*, he makes a return back to the empiricist basis of logic against the disorientation of empiricist with logic. Writing on this Anthony Kenny submits that, ñMill was the first British empiricist to take formal logic seriously, and from the start he is anxious to dissociate himself from the nominalism that had been associated with empiricism since the time of Hobbes. By ónominalismô he means the two-name theory of the proposition: the theory that a proposition is true if and only if subject and predicate are names of the same thing. The Hobbesian account, Mill says, fits only those propositions where both predicate and subject are proper names,é ò[70] Mill begins the work with an analysis of language, and in particular with a theory of naming. Mill uses the word ónameô very broadly. Not only proper names like óSocratesô but pronouns like óthisô, definite descriptions like óthe king who succeeded William the Conquerorô, general terms like ómanô and ówiseô, and abstract expressions like óold ageô are all counted as names in his system. Indeed, only words like óof ô and órô and óif ô seem *not* to be names, in his system. According to Mill, all names denote things: proper names denote the things they are names of, and general terms denote the things they are true of. Thus not only óSocratesô, but also ómanô and ówiseô denote Socrates. For Mill,

every proposition is a conjunction of names. This does not commit him to the extreme nominalist view that every sentence is to be interpreted on the model of one joining two proper names, as in ôTully is Ciceroô. A sentence joining two connotative names, like ôall men are mortalô, tells us that certain attributes (those, say, of rationality and animality) are always accompanied by the attribute of mortality.

More important than what he has to say about names and propositions is Millôs theory of inference. This theory of inferences leads to his celebration of induction. Although, Frege would show how weak his position was and even his godson Bertrand Russell will abandons his philosophy of arithmetic. Importantly also is his utilitarian philosophy, which will further consolidate the basis for the morality of the modernity project. But then his idea of induction as a continuation of the natural science attitude will be one of the starting point from which Gadamer will begin his critique of the natural sciences and its method in favour of the human sciences and against method.

Aside the outright denigration of prejudice as is the case in philosophy generally one also discovers that with the development of the natural sciences at the early stage of the enlightenment, a new project was also inaugurated in the history of philosophy. This is the modern project. This project begins to take shape with the introduction of mathematics into physics (particularly that of Aristotle) by Galileo. By this there was also the elevation of the scientific methods as the right approach to knowledge acquisition. A consolidation of this mentality runs through the works of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. Kant and Hegel represent the heart of the enlightenment and its denigration of the tradition (prejudices) in favour of universality in knowledge production. Bentham and Mill in their development of utilitarianism follow from Hume and this forms the morality of the modern project. Replete in all these philosophies is the contunation of the disposition to divide reality into binary poles and to

hold one end of the pole as superiror to the other. This still represents the the ontology of polarized units. The repudiation of prejudice, the elevation of the natural scientific method as the only sole method of acquiring knowledge, and the disposition to polarize reality are the motivation factors that ground Gadamerôs critique of the Enlightenment. These also form the basis for the transmodern negation of the modern project. But before Gadamerôs reappropriation of prejudice was Heideggerôs ontology of facticity.

Heideggerôs philosophy stands as the prelude to philosophical hermeneutics and its prejudicial rationality. It will not be out of place to note the centrality of Husserl to Heideggerôs ontology of facticity and his hermeneutic phenomenology.[71] Heidegger on a very general note

> combines Husserlôs method of phenomenological research with aspects of Diltheyôs theory of understanding life ï among many other important influencesé Phenomenological research means carefully to describe our experience without making judgements about what the experience implies. Heidegger maintains that one must first understand the meaning of being and particularly the meaning of the being of human beings before one can discuss our knowledge of entities. Therefore philosophy must commence with a careful description of how human beings are in actual life. The description is phenomenological, and the examination is hermeneutic since it is the interpretive self-understanding we have of ourselves in life.[72]

The focus here will be on his works *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity* as well as *Being and Time*.

Heidegger inaugurates his hermeneutic theory in his 1923 lecture series on *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. In this work, he undertakes the task of beginning to rethink the foundation for ontology that engenders polarity and abhors facticity in knowledge acquisition. Here, Ontology is considered as the study of being; but it must be understood, here, Heidegger tells us, as an óindefinite and vague directiveô in the sense that ñbeing should in some thematic way come to be investigated and come to language.ò[73] There are two problems with the modern philosophical concept of ontology. First, it presupposes that the meaning of being is to be determined only by examining objective objects and does not consider other possible ways beings might be. Secondly, because of this first problem, modern ontology does not even

consider the being of human beings, which is decisive for philosophy and ontology. Because ócontologyô could be misleading, Heidegger continues, the title of this course should be ñThe Hermeneutics of Facticity.ò[74] Facticity as used here refers to *Dasein's* mode of being.

What then is the *Dasein*? ôDaseinô is composed of *da* meaning óthereô and *sein* meaning óto beô; thus ôDaseinô literally means óthere beingô (or being-there). In German, ôDaseinô can mean human being, although it is not the usual word for human being (*Mensch*). Heidegger prefers ôDaseinô instead of *Mensch* to avoid improper metaphysical connotations associated with óhuman beingô and because, as we shall discover, the mode of being of human beings is to be in the there, that is, in the world. Dasein is ñóurô ównô Dasein.ò[75] On the other hand, there is also ófacticiyô. Writing on this, Heidegger surmises that ñmore precisely, this expression means: *in each case* óthisô Dasein in its being-there *for a while at the particular time* (é) insofar as it is, in the character of its being, *'there' in the manner of be-ing*.ò[76] ôFor a while at the particular timeô simply means I live, as Dasein, for a certain amount of time within a particular historical period. Heidegger notes that being there for a while also implies that I cannot run away and I am at home in the there in some sense. ôBeing there in the manner of be-ingô, Heidegger states, means specifically not to be there in the mode of being of an object (the mistake of traditional ontology). This phrase means *how* one is living or being there. That is, the way Dasein is, is an active living of life. Factical means the articulation of our mode of being Dasein and as such belongs to facticity. ñIf we take ólifeô to be a mode of óbeingô, then ófactical lifeô means: our own Dasein which is óthereô for us in one expression or another of the character of its being, and this expression too, is in the manner of beingò.[77] Thus, while Dasein is being there, facicity is the mode of this being there and our understanding of this mode of being there is fundamental to our active living within a historical period.

What then is the role of hermeneutics in this regard? Taking off from the etymology of the word ôhermeneuticsô, which comes from the name of the Greek messenger god Hermes, and following the Platoôs definition of the poet in his *Ion* as interpreters of the gods, Heidegger prefers to translate the Greek word, which is usually translated as óinterpreterô, as óheraldô, the ñone who communicates, announces, and makes known.ò[78] In Platoôs *Theatetus,* hermeneutics is associated with *logos*, meaning discourse, and so hermeneutics communicates not just the theoretical but also other aspects of human being. Therefore, ñhermeneutics is the announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to é (me).ò[79] According to Heidegger, Aristotle connects hermeneutics with conversation, óthe factical mode of actualizing *logos*ô and language is ómaking something known through wordsô. Aristotleôs work is correctly entitled *On Interpretation* (*peri hermeneias*), since it concerns discourse, which makes ñsomething accessible as being there out in the open.ò[80] Furthermore, hermeneutics concerns the truth of what is said: ñ*aletheuein* [being-true] (making what was previously concealed, covered up, available as unconcealed, as out there in the open).ò[81] But then, Heidegger does not detail out what this hermeneutic truth entails here. Against Schleiermacher and Diltheyôs understanding of hermeneutics, Heidegger underscores that the meaning of hermeneutics in the hermeneutics of facticity does not indicate the modern sense of a ódoctrine about interpretationô, but means a óself-interpretation of facticityô, where ñfacticity is being encountered, seen, grasped, and expressed in concepts.ò[82] Hermeneutics is used, Heidegger continues, to bring out several aspects of facticity. From the perspective of the so-called object, it indicates that this óobjectô is capable of and in need of interpretation, and also that it exists óin some state of having-been-interpretedô. The task of hermeneutics is to interpret Dasein to itself. óIn hermeneutics what is developed for Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an *understanding* of itselfô. This is hermeneutics in the Greek sense: the way of being of a being

(Dasein) is announced and made known (to that Dasein); it is an actualization of *logos* in language; and it uncovers something that has been covered up (the ontological tradition covered up Daseinôs actual mode of being). In a hermeneutics of facticity Dasein has the possibility of understanding itself. Understanding is no longer a relation to the life of another (Dilthey), nor intentionality as constitution (Husserl), but ña *how of Dasein* itself.ò[83] Here, there seems to be a sense of priority attached to the sense of understanding.

Since interpretation is a mode of its being, it is one of Daseinôs possibilities. Its aim is the radical ó*wakefulness* of Dasein for itselfô, that is, it aims to uncover a clear self-understanding. Hermeneutics in this sense is óprior ontologically and factico-temporally to all accomplishments in the sciencesô. It is ontologically prior since one must first understand the possible ways Dasein can be before one can discover how Dasein understands objects in the world, that is, science. It is ófactico-temporallyô prior since in living one has already interpreted oneself in one way or another, and this self-interpretation is the basis from which one can start to interpret the facts of the world. ó*Existence*ô names the special way Dasein is, óthe own most possibility of be-ing itselfô. Hence, the interpretive concepts ówhich grow out of this interpretation are to be designated as *existentials*ô. These existentials are neither schemata nor later additions, but are possibilities of being, different ways of how Dasein exists. They are discovered in the analysis of Daseinôs factical being. That Dasein is a being-possible means that Dasein has choices to make, different possible ways it could be. In its factical life Dasein modifies itself ñfrom out of the situation with respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to which hermeneutical questioning is operating in the particular case.ò[84]

The method by which to gain access to Dasein without presupposition is phenomenology. However, as with hermeneutics, the concept of phenomenology has also been corrupted in the philosophical tradition. Heidegger returns to the Greek concept. óPhenomenonô in Greek comes

from a word that means to show itself. For this reason, phenomenon means ‘being-present as an object from out of itself’. Phenomenology must be understood as the specific how of research. The aim is to approach the objects of investigation ‘as they show themselves in themselves’. However, we encounter an object in the way we are familiar with it and this is usually a result of tradition. Since a tradition can preserve an inaccurate understanding, a ‘fundamental historical critique’ is required, and ‘this means: a regress to Greek philosophy, to Aristotle, in order to see how a certain original dimension came to be fallen away from and covered up and to see that we are situated in this *falling away*’.

In *Being and Time,* Heidegger further solidifies these ideas as developed in these lectures. Writing on this work Schmidt contends that, ñPublished in April 1927, *Being and Time* systematically presents Heideggerôs new way of approaching philosophy and is the final analysis of the hermeneutics of facticity.ò[85] Heidegger starts *Being and Time* by justifying why the ontological question about the meaning of being needs to be raised anew. Three prejudices have hidden the need to ask about the meaning of being. First, some believe that ñ‘being’ is the most ‘universal’ concept.ò[86] Since everything that is, is, the term is the most universal one and thus understood. Secondly, others claim that ñthe concept ‘being’ is indefinable.ò[87] Since being is the most universal term it cannot be defined using some other, higher category by means of a differentiation, as human beings are defined as rational animals. Nor can it be defined using attributes of being, since this would only define a subset of beings. Thirdly, it is argued that ‘‘Being’ is the self-evident concept’. We use the verb ‘to be’ all the time and if it were not self-evident, then we would not know what we were saying. To these prejudices Heidegger responds that being the most universal concept indicates rather its obscurity, being indefinable indicates that ‘being’ is not something like a being and so we need to ask about its meaning and, finally, being self-evident indicates that we have already understood being in a particular manner that

might be incorrect, and so we need to ask what being actually means. Phenomenological hermeneutics helps us get at this meaning. This is because it reveals the truer nature (more undisguisedly) of the things in the world when they are encountered in a pragmatic situation. More importantly, the meaning that things have comes originally from the pragmatic situation. In fact, the most original encounter with useful things occurs when one is using them and not thinking about them. Following this, Heideggerôs theory of meaning is that things have meaning or significance to the extent that they have this relevance to Dasein through their references. So, the hammer, for example, means its usefulness in hammering nails, as a tool made by someone, as part of a workshop that can build things for someone and so on. Therefore meaning is not, as other theories contend, added on to an already known object; nor is it constituted by consciousness. Rather, meaning is already given in the hermeneutic situation.

In this work the Dasein is conceived, following the pragmatic situation surrounding it, as a being-with. In this regard Heidegger writes, ñthe world of Da-sein is a *with-world*. Being-in is *being-with* others. The innerworldly being-in-itself of others is *Mitda-sein* [with-Dasein].ò[88] As circumspection viewed useful things, considerateness and tolerance are the modes of Daseinôs sight or view of others. Other people, as we noted, also participate in the ôreferential totality of significanceô, which ôis anchored in the being of Da-sein toward its own most beingô through its for-the-sake-of which.[89] Someone may supply the boards, someone else the nails and someone else may help me build the fence. I understand and relate to these people from the perspective of my project of building a fence. Of course, in actual life there are many projects and we can be concerned about others in their projects. For this reason, this Dasein is a being-in-the-world and this being-in-the-world has the basic structures of ôbeing together with the world (taking care of things), being-with (concern), and being oneôs self (who)ô.

Examining closely this idea of being-in or that it is, Heidegger observes that understanding and attunement are equiprimordial as far as Daseinôs being-in is concerned. Equiprimordiality here means that the constitutive factors of being-in, which will be uncovered, are effective together and at the same time. One is not prior to the other although we must discuss them in sequence. For attunement, Heidegger identifies three characteristics of attunement. First, ñAttunement discloses Da-sein in its thrownness, initially and for the most part in the mode of an evasive turning away.ò[90] Most often in our everyday lives we try to avoid, cover up or flee from this attunement or awareness that we are and have to be. Secondly, attunement discloses our being-in-the-world as a whole, that is, it discloses the world, our being-there-with and our existence, and ñfirst makes possible directing oneself toward something.ò[91] For example, I am aware of being hungry and desiring the ice-cream cone my friend is licking over there. Thirdly, óin attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be encounteredô. That is, in whatever mood I am in, that mood discloses the world in which some things matter to me and other things do not, and I initially submit to this disclosed world in the sense of accepting the way things appear as mattering to me.

On the question of understanding, Heidegger notes that ñthe mode of being of Da-sein as potentiality of being lies existentially in understanding.ò[92] This understanding has the structure of a project. ó[It [understanding] projects the being of Da-sein upon its for-the-sake-of-which just as primordially as upon significance as the worldliness of its actual worldô. That is, in understanding, I choose a possible way to be or act, that is, I project a possible way to be with reference to my for-the-sake-of-which ï my project. Understanding may be authentic, understanding itself with reference to its for-the-sake-of-which, or inauthentic, understanding ó[itself initially and for the most part in terms of the worldô. In each case it may be either genuine (uncovering and truthful) or not genuine (covering over and falsifying). Understanding as

projecting a possibility is called the sight of Dasein. This would include the ócircumspection of taking care of things, the considerateness of concernô, and a sight or view concerning Daseinôs own existence. This understanding is a thrown project. From a particular situation of being-in-the-world Dasein projects a certain possibility for itself. ñThe development of possibilities projected in understandingò[93] is interpretation. Since all understanding is projection, all understanding involves interpretation.

Heidegger identifies three different fore-structures that characterize the initial situation of understanding, and in the case of things in the world these things have already been understood in terms of the totality of relevance. One is the fore-having (*Vorhabe*), which literally means what one has before. óInterpretation operates in being toward a totality of relevance which has already been understoodô. I already know the difference between hammers and screwdrivers and have some experience with the hammers, but it cannot be much, since if I did, there would be no need for explicit understanding. Heidegger uses the common meaning of *Vorhabe* as well, which is oneôs intention. I am building a fence. Another structure is the fore-sight (*Vorsicht*). Literally it means a previous looking towards. It is connected with Daseinôs sight, which we noted in discussing circumspection and considerateness. The movement of understanding from what is still unclear to explicitness óis always done under the guidance of a perspective which fixes that with regard to which what has been understood is to be interpretedô. I am interested in finding the hammer that I can use to secure the nail and not one to plant a fencepost. Fore-sight óóapproachesô what has been taken in fore-having with a definite interpretation in viewô. Heidegger implicitly uses the common meaning of *Vorsicht*, which is to be careful or be warned, to indicate that the perspective chosen by Dasein for developing the interpretation implies a need to be careful. The third structure is the fore-conception (*Vorgriff*). It means literally the previously grasped in the sense of concepts. óInterpretation has always already decided, finally or

provisionally, upon a definite conceptualityô. The concepts may be appropriate to the beings that are being interpreted or one may try to force the beings into inappropriate concepts. Concerning the hammers, I might consider them in terms of how hard it is to swing them or the shape of their heads, which would be appropriate, whereas to consider them in terms of their colour would be inappropriate: ñThe interpretation of something as something is essentially grounded in fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.ò[94] Given these three structures, there can be no presuppositionless interpretation whatsoever.

In understanding, Dasein discloses to itself the pragmatic situation. It reveals useful things, others and itself in terms of the totality of relevance. In this manner things can be said to have a meaning. ôBut strictly speaking, what is understood is not the meaning, but beings, or beingô. How then can this understanding proceed without falling into a vicious circle? But for Heidegger what is important is not to avoid the circle but to get into it correctly. The correct entering of this circle occurs

> é when the interpreter has understood that its first, constant, and last task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight, and fore- conception be given to it by chance ideas and popular conceptions, but to guarantee the scientific theme by developing these in terms of the things themselves.[95]

ôScientificô as used here has nothing to do with the idea of science as it operates in the natural sciences, but with a philosophically justifiable result. Following from all these, Heidegger argues on the question of hermeneutic truth that the traditional concept of truth as correspondence is grounded in the fact and only made possible because discovering is one of Daseinôs modes of being. Dasein is both in truth, since it has always and already disclosed the world in understanding as thrown projection, and in untruth, since Dasein has mostly fallen prey to the they and so misunderstands. Truth is the unconcealing (*a-letheia*) of what was concealed from Dasein.[96] There was a turn (*Kehre*) in the works of Heidegger.

Heidegger begins to express this turn in ñLetter on Humanismò. Here, Heidegger turned to a new way of thinking by going back to a more original situation where beings come to presence in the *Ereignis* (event). In this more original situation language, as medium, is the house of Being where human beings respond to the calling of Being. Being throws Dasein in its fateful sending into the clearing of the truth of Being, and Dasein in responding is the shepherd of Being. The furthering of this turn culminate in the disappearance of hermeneutics altogether in his later works. Thus, after Heideggerôs turning to the *Ereignis* (events), he no longer uses the term óhermeneuticsô. Hermeneutics as the analysis of the existentiality of existence, central to *Being and Time*, clearly suffers the same problems as that work. Even speaking of the hermeneutic relation in language between human beings and Being or the hermeneutic circle in language itself Heidegger claims to be superficial. Language then takes the centre stage and he understands language properly as containing a totality of traits that are unified in the saying. The essence of language is the saying. Human beings are granted entrance into language, into the house of Being, in order to bring the silent saying of language into resounding speech. This task is the essence of human being. In the event (*Ereignis*) human beings respond to the saying of language and thereby permit the presencing of beings in accordance with the sending of Being. Concluding on this Schmidt writes that ñhad Heideggerôs student, Hans-Georg Gadamer, not placed hermeneutics at the centre of his philosophy, óhermeneuticsô may well have disappeared from the philosophical conversation.ò[97] This then becomes the point from which Gadamer sets out. Over and above Heidegger, Gadamer reintroduces language into hermeneutics and even makes it the basis for the universality of hermeneutics. Besides this, Gadamer builds a wonderful hermeneutics of prejudices which subsumes that of Heidegger and his other forerunners. Gadamer will be the focus in the next chapter.

Endnotes

1. Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome*, Vol. I, (New York: Image Books, 1993), 72.
2. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy*, Vol. I (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2004), 26-28.
3. Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1896), Bk. 5, No. 476b-477d.
4. Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. 5, No. 476b-477d.
5. Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. V, No. 477e.
6. Louis P. Pojman, *The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings*, 2nd ed. (Belmort: Wardsworth Publishing Company, 1999), 6.
7. Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. V, No. 479b.
8. Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. V, No. 479b.
9. Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. VII, No. 517c.
10. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy*, 163.
11. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy*, 161.
12. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Benjamin Jowett (Princeton: Princeton University, 1991), Bk 5Γ 1009a22-1009a38, 52-3.
13. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk 5Γ 1009a1ï 5.
14. Aristotle, *On The Soul* (de Anima), trans. J. A. Smith in *Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Vol. I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), Bk. II, §6, no. $418^{a}12$.
15. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy*, 162.
16. Aristotle, *On The Soul* (de Anima), Bk. 3, §6, no. $430^{b}29$.
17. S. E. Frost Jnr., *Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers* (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 250.
18. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, trans. G.R.G Mura, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard Mckeon (New York: Random House, Inc. 1947), Bk I, Chapt. 24, No. 85a25-30.
19. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, Chapt. 24, No. 85b5-10.
20. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, chapt. 24, No. 86a35.
21. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, Chapt. 24, 86a20-30.
22. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, Chapt. 24, 86a20-30.
23. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, chapt. 31, 87a 35.
24. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Bk I, chapt. 27, No. 87a30.
25. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2004), 22-23.
26. Galileo Galilei, *The Assayer*, translated by Stillman Drake, in *The Controversy of the Comets of 1618*, (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press 1960), 123.
27. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy*, 23.
28. Anthony Kenny, *An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 203.
29. Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge University Press, 2003), Bk. I, Aphorism XIII.
30. Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, Bk I, Aphorism XLIII.
31. Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, Bk I, Aphorism XLIV.
32. Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, Book II, Aphorism 52.
33. Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein* (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 1995), 27.
34. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Part II, no. 17.
35. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part I, no. 7.
36. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part I, nos7-8.
37. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part I, no 11.

38. The difficulties here subsist in philosophy, algebra and geometry. With philosophy, particularly logic and its syllogism, the problem is the fact that its method is mostly fitted to explain things to other people that one knows already and it also contains some superfluous and harmful precepts. As for algebra and geometry, they deal only in highly abstract matters that seem to have no practical application, the former is so closely tied to the consideration of figures that it is unable to exercise the intellect without greatly tiring the imagination, while in the latter case one is so much a slave to certain rules and symbols that it has been turned into a confused and obscure art that bewilders the mind instead of being a form of knowledge that cultivates it.
39. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part II, no. 18-19.
40. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part III, nos. 28-29.
41. Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, Part IV, no. 32.
42. Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from Objections and Replies*, trans. Michael Moritarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Meditation II, no. 25.
43. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Prepared for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought, by Rod Hay (Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1651), part I, Bk V.
44. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy,* 31.
45. See, Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. The first five books of the work seek to establish this claim.
46. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy,* 31.
47. Robert Audi, ñA Narrative Survey of Classical and Contemporary Positions in Epistemologyò in *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings*, ed. Michael Huemer (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), Pg. 4.
48. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy,* 32.
49. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Edited by Peter Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), Bk. I, Chapter I, no. 7, 46-47.
50. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. I, Chapter I, no. 7, 46.
51. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Edited and with an Introduction by Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Bk. II, Chapter 5, no. 27, 110-111.
52. F. O. C. Njoku, ñThe Low Morality of the Capitalist Economic Development and the Debt-Talkò in *Debt Burden and Development in Africa.* A Publication of the Whelan Research Academy for Religion, Culture and Society (Owerri: Assumpta Press, 2005), 68.
53. Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*, 115-6.
54. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited with an Introduction by Peter Millican (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) Section VII, Part I, No. 60ff.
55. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section XII, Part I, No. 150-1.
56. Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*, 133.
57. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, (James Ellington: Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), § 1.
58. A.D. Lindsay, *Kant: The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1934) 68ff.
59. This transcendental idealism leads to the demarcation between phenoumena in space and time and noumena beyond space and time. See T. K. Seung, *Kant: Guide For The Perplexed,* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), 22.
60. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. L. W. Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), A297/B354.
61. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, cf. A296/B352.
62. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, cf.A339/B397.
63. It needs to be noted here that contemporary Hegelian scholarship has presented two opinions of the Hegelian metaphysical posture. The first affirms Hegelôs pre-Kantian ambition. For this school, Hegel's philosophy is treated as exemplifying the type of pre-critical or ñdogmaticò Metaphysics against which

Kant had reacted in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and as a return to a more religiously driven conception of philosophy to which Kant had been opposed. In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the influential work of Charles Taylor (1975), for example. The German Hegel scholar, Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1990, 2006), skeptical of attempts to de-metaphysicalize Hegel, also insists on the idea of an infinite self-reflecting subject as at the core of Hegel's philosophy. On the other hand, there is the school of thought that sees Hegelôs philosophy as a continuation of the Kantian projection. These are referred to as the non-metaphysical or the post-Kantian view of Hegel. For this school of thought, Hegel is in way committed to the bizarre, teleological ñspirit monismò that has been traditionally attributed to him. Prominent among such interpretations is the so-called ñnon-metaphysicalñ or ñpost-Kantianñ interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin (1989, 1997, 2008) and Terry Pinkard (1994, 2000). From a more technically analytic perspective, a broadly similar view has been put forward by Robert Brandom (2002, 2009). Thus while the traditional view sees Hegel as exemplifying the very type of metaphysical speculation that Kant successfully criticised, the post-Kantian view regards him as both accepting and *extending* Kant's critique, ultimately turning it against the residual ñdogmatically metaphysicalò aspects of Kant's own philosophy. But this research favours that pre-Kantian orientation Hegel and stresses that Hegel has strong metaphysical elements.

64. Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*, 163-4.
65. Gustavus Watts Cunningham, *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System*, (Ontario: Batoche Books Limited, 2001), 16.
66. Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*, 170-5.
67. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy in the Modern World*, Vol. 4 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007), 1.
68. Jeremy Bentham, Ch. 1 22
69. F. O. C. Njoku, *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy,* 34.
70. Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy in the Modern World*, 97.
71. Despite the influence, it will be right to note that as early as a 1919 lecture course we find Heidegger arguing that Husserl's view (developed in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl 1900/1973), that philosophy should renounce theory and concentrate on the things given directly in consciousness, is flawed because such givenness is itself a theoretical construct. For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality (the consciousness of objects), but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality.
72. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 7.
73. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1.
74. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 3.
75. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 5.
76. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 5.
77. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 5.
78. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 6.
79. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 7.
80. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 8.
81. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 8.
82. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 11.
83. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 12.
84. Martin Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, 13.
85. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 58.
86. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996). 3.
87. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 4.
88. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 118.
89. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 123.
90. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 136.
91. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 137.
92. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143.
93. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 148.
94. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 150.
95. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 152.

96. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 212-222.
97. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 94.

CHAPTER THREE
PREJUDICE AND GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

3.1 Preamble

This chapter focuses on exposing the prejudicial base of philosophical hermeneutics. The chapter begins by doing a biographical sketch of Gadamer. The chapter also looks at Gadamerôs point of departure from Hegel on the idea of dialectics. A point of departure is also drawn from the context of the critique of the epistemic superiority of the natural sciences. Finally, there is a consideration of Gadamerôs point of departure from Heidegger. Next the chapter explores the specific tenets of philosophical hermeneutics distinguishing it from classical hermeneutics and exposing the idea that philosophical hermeneutics is both *theoria* and *praxis*. There is also a consideration of humanism at the start of philosophical hermeneutics, aimed at showing the limits of scientific rationality as far as the human sciences are concerned. The chapter also establishes philosophical hermeneuticsô case for the ontological nature of understanding and its merging of epistemology and metaphysics into one. The chapter also establishes the historicity of understanding within philosophical hermeneutics. This leads to the idea of the ubiquity of prejudices and the need to rehabilitate tradition as well as to legitimize prejudices. Next, is the theory of the history of effect and significance of history within philosophical hermeneutics. The chapter also considers the fusion of horizons as the universalist propensity within philosophical hermeneutics and the political and moral implications of this within philosophical hermeneutics. The chapter closes with a summary on why truth is most fundamental and not method for philosophical hermeneutics.

3.2 Han- Georg Gadamer: A Biographical Sketch

Hans-Georg Gadamer was born on the 11th of February, 1900 in the small university town of Marburg, in the Germany of the second empire. His family was from Silesia (now Poland) and they soon moved back to its principal city, Breslau (now Wroclaw), then one of the largest cities in Germany, where Gadamer grew up. His father, Johannes, was a prominent

chemistry professor. Due to this background, his father did his best to interest the young Hans-Georg in natural science but to no avail. Already, in his secondary school years, Hans-Georg was clearly interested in the humanities ï especially in ñShakespeare, ancient Greek and classical German writers.ò[1] In 1918, Gadamer enrolled at the University of Breslau where he studied literature, the history of art, psychology, and philosophy. In 1919, Hans-Georgôs father accepted a call back to Marburg, and Hans-Georg followed him. There the young Gadamer settled on philosophy and classical philology, and in 1922 wrote a dissertation with the preeminent neo-Kantian Paul Natorp on Plato. Despite the politically charged tempo of this time, he exhibited a politically conservative disposition. He associated with the politically conservative Stephan George circle; with Ernst Curtius, the literary historian; and he became friends (as a student might with a professor) with the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann. Later in Marburg he became acquainted with the visiting Max Scheler and worked closely with the theologian Rudolf Bultmann. At Hartmannôs suggestion he chose for his dissertation advisor Paul Natorp, the leading neo-Kantian philosopher in Germany. He finished the work for the doctorate relatively early in 1922.[2] Shortly thereafter, in April 1923, he married ï ótoo young,ô he says.[3]

The encounter with Heidegger was a fateful one: a relationship that was difficult, complicated, and decisive from the very beginning. Gadamer spent the spring semester of 1923 in Freiburg, where he attended Husserlôs lectures and all the courses Heidegger was teaching. Among these were two different classes on Aristotle, a seminar on Husserlôs *Logical Investigations*, and a lecture series titled ñOntology,ò which soon found a more exact title: ñThe Hermeneutics of Facticity.ò Heidegger invited Gadamer and his wife up to his hut in Todtnauberg for several weeks during the summer break where they read Aristotle and Melanchthon together. This helped lay the groundwork for Gadamerôs appreciation of the importance of religious and theological thought for the philosophical tradition and provided the

basis for his later studies with the theologian Rudolf Bultmann. Gadamer hoped to write under Heideggerôs guidance his habilitation ï a second work after the doctorate required in the German university system in order to qualify for an academic position. Yet after a year Heidegger expressed disappointment in Gadamerôs work. His confidence shaken, Gadamer decided to concentrate on the study of classical Greek (classical philology) with Paul Friedlander. To borrow a phrase from Gadamerôs biographer, Jean Grondin, Gadamer took órefuge in the Greeks.ô Having grounded himself in the classics and passed the state examinations in this regard, Heidegger invited him to habilitate with him. Gadamer was up to the task and submitted, in the summer of 1928, his habilitation: a reading of Platoôs *Philebus*. The work was clearly hurried. It had only a few footnotes, a very small bibliography, and only two chapters: (1) a treatment of Platoôs dialectic and the way we come to an understanding (*Verstaïndigung*) and (2) a reading of the *Philebus*. With some correction, the work was published in 1931 under the title: *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*.[4] His career started at Marburg, but he eventually relocated to Leipzig during the war. ñWhen the war ended, Gadamer was called upon to lead the reconstruction of the University of Leipzig as its rector.ò[5]

In 1949 he accepted a call to Heidelberg to continue his career as a professional philosopher. ñIn the mid-1950s he began to plan the project that was to become *Truth and Method*, but it was very difficult for him.ò[6] In 1957, Gadamer accepted an invitation to give a series of lectures, the Cardinal Mercier lectures, at the University of Louvain in Belgium. The lectures, entitled ñThe Problem of Historical Consciousness,ò were published as a small book in French. These lectures articulated the central theses of *Truth and Method*. He requested and received the first sabbatical of his career in the winter semester of 1958ï 9. In this fall and winter he finally completed the manuscript. As mentioned in the introduction of this volume, Gadamer

initially proposed ôPhilosophical Hermeneuticsô as a title for the work, but the publisher rejected it. ôFundamental Characteristics of a Philosophical Hermeneuticsô became the subtitle for *Truth and Method*, which appeared in 1960. In 1968 he retired and this afforded him the opportunity to become an international scholar; globetrotting and giving lectures. It was at this point that he had his various confrontations with all the philosophers who engaged *Truth and Method*. He eventually died in 2002 with a rich career spanning for over a century.

As Gadamer himself notes, he has written only three books in his lifetime, even though a recent published bibliography of his work is over 300 pages.[7] With the exception of *Plato's Dialectical Ethics* (his habilitation), *Truth and Method*, and *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, each of his many published books is either a collection of essays, the reworking of a lecture series, or an extended essay published as a small monograph. On the literary side, he writes primarily about poetry, especially: Goethe, Holderlin, Immerman, George, Rilke, Celan, and Domin. In a small number of essays, he has given attention to painting. On the philosophical side, he writes about classical Greek thinkers like: Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Aristotle, and Plotinus as well as modern philosophers such as Herder, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey. Most importantly, however, he writes about Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. These three thinkers provide for Gadamer more than a number of interesting and important philosophical issues; they are the grindstone on which Gadamer sharpens his own interpretive theory.[8] All of these structure out the full core of Gadamerôs philosophical dispositions. The concept of prejudice as articulated in these works of Gadamer will be the focus of this chapter. The next section will focus on Gadamerôs point of departure.

3.3 Philosophical Hermeneutics and Its Points of Departure

The dimensions to Gadamerôs point of departure in this research are articulated from three points of view: the first is within the context of his engagement and further extension of

Hegelôs ideal of dialectics; second is within the context of the discourse on the epistemic credibility of the human science; thirdly is within the context of his engagement with Heideggerôs ontological conception of understanding.

3.3.1 Appropriating Dialectics: The Hegelian Point of Departure

Dialectic, developed as one of the key areas in Hegelôs philosophy exerts one of the most important influences on Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and its discourse on prejudice. This movement of dialectics from one stage to a higher universality is key to Gadamerôs conceptualization of the historicity of knowledge seeking subjects, as well as the fusion of horizon. The truth of this comes clearer when we understand that ñit was Hegel who saw that knowledge is a dialectical process in which both the apprehending consciousness and its objects are altered. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel sought to show that every new achievement of knowledge is a mediation or refocusing of the past within a new and expanded context. This dynamic and self-transcending character of knowledge is at the center of Gadamerôs concept of understanding as a concrete fusing of horizons.ò[9] The event of understanding is ñthe elevation to a higher universality which overcomes not only oneôs own particularity but also that of the other person.ò[10]

Despite the above, Lainge was still quick to note that, for Gadamer this óhigher universalityô remains finite and surpassable and is not to be equated with Hegelôs absolute knowledge in concepts or even in history. Foucault corroborates further that this absolute history is ña history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development. The historianôs history finds its support outside time and pretends to base its judgment on an apocalyptic objectivity.ò[11] This absoluteness and objectivity are not the case for Gadamer. Rather Gadamer draws mainly on the

empirical or phenomenological side of Hegelôs thought.[12] By this, it is not absolute knowledge, but the moving, dialectical life of reason that finds expression in Gadamerôs description of what takes place in the ófusion of horizons.ô Here we see a definite influence from Hegel on Gadamerôs prejudicial philosophy and at the same the lines are drawn between them. This line will get clearer in the course of this chapter.

3.3.2 A Critique of the Epistemic Superiority of the Natural Sciences

Gadamerôs involvement with the discourse on the epistemic credibility of the human sciences or the sciences of the human spirit could also be understood as a critique of the acclaimed superiority of the natural sciences. From this point of view, the primary motivation for Gadamerôs work is to provide a philosophical justification for the ñexperience of truth that transcends the domain of the scientific method wherever that experience is found, and to inquire into its legitimacy. Hence, the human sciences are connected to modes of experiences that lie outside science: with experiences in which truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science.ò[13] For this task to be accomplished, an investigation into the nature of understanding is fundamental. The conception of understanding here is not quite conventional and so Weinsheimer and Marshall note in their preface to the translated edition of *Truth and Method* that ñmuch of Gadamerôs argument is directed to showing that understanding and the kind of truth that belongs to it has the character of an event, that is, something that belongs to the specific temporal nature of human life.ò[14] Temporality is of the essence in Gadamerôs conceptualization of understanding and its operations within the human sciences.

On this ground, Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics is a constellation, a critique and a continuation of the ideas of Schleiermacher and Dilthey within the context of hermeneutics and it searches for a method for the human sciences. Palmer was therefore, right when he notes that,

ñin taking up the topic of understanding, Gadamer was dealing with a central issue of hermeneutics since Friedrich Schleiermacher, who redefined hermeneutics as a ógeneral theory of understandingô when it had previously been focused on the task of overcoming difficulties in understanding texts in various disciplinesé .ò[15] This approach was taken over by Dilthey who proposed to transform hermeneutics as a general method of understanding texts into the fundamental methodology of the humanities. Gadamer took issues with both Schleiermacher[16] and Dilthey[17] but not so much with Heidegger. This is because Heidegger broadened the conception of hermeneutics itself even further by making hermeneutics not just the process of understanding texts, but a process of self-understanding in the course of living oneôs life temporally and historically. He formulated what may be called an ontological hermeneutics, and this is the interpretation of the being of a temporally existing human being.[18]

3.3.3 On Understanding As An Ontological Category: Gadamer's Appropriation of Heidegger

At another level, Heidegger was yet another strong influence on Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and it prejudicial base. In fact, Schmidt maintains that ñGadamer commences his analysis of understanding by quoting Heideggerôs claim that the productive possibility of the hermeneutic circle occurs when we realize our constant task is not to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.ò[19] Continuing on the influence of Heidegger on Gadamer, Lainge holds that ñHeideggerôs discovery of the *ontological* significance of understanding is a major turning point in hermeneutical theory, and Gadamerôs work can be conceived as an attempt to work out the implications of the new starting point Heidegger providesò[20] This working out subsists primarily in the meaning of Heideggerôs description of Dasein as óthrown projectionô. This is significant for Gadamer in that as projective, understanding is intrinsically related to the future into which

Dasein continually projects itself. Beside the idea of temporality, as one of the features of this fore-structure of understanding, there are also ideas of circularity and fore-meanings which are some of the elements within the fore-structures of understanding in Heidegger. These ideas aid Gadamer in his resuscitation of prejudice, tradition and authority.[21]

Despite the deep connections between *Being and Time* and Gadamerôs Philosophical hermeneutics, ñit is nonetheless true that the decisive impact of Heideggerôs thought on Gadamer comes with the *Kehre* — the ôturnô that distinguishes the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* from the more explicit, even if often more enigmatic, reflection on being that is the dominant theme of Heideggerôs later philosophy.ò[22] This constitutes one of the points of departure between Gadamer and Heidegger. For although Heidegger identifies the place of language in the self-constitution of being, he does not elucidate on its usefulness within the hermeneutic context. But then, this idea of the centrality of language in the constitution of being becomes the basis for Gadamerôs universalisation of the hermeneutic experience. It is within this context that one can better understand Laingeôs claim that, ñin his essays, as in *Truth and Method,* Gadamer argues that despite the inadequacies of Heideggerôs language, there is a consistent development throughout Heideggerôs thinking, and that the ôturnô after *Being and Time* serves to draw out and clarify the basic insight into the relation of being and human-being that was present from the beginning of Heideggerôs work.ò[23] This means that Gadamer sees more of a unity in the whole of Heideggerôs corpus than a turn in the real sense. This comprehensive apprehension of Heideggerôs philosophy within the context of language and using this as the basis for the universalization of the hermeneutic experience is one point of departure of Gadamer from Heidegger. In also identifying another point of departure, Shalin opines that, ñHans-Georg Gadamer declined to follow Heideggerôs existential paradigm that seeks to redescribe objective reality in experiential terms and recover the radical singularity of individual existence, but he

remained faithful to *Being and Time*ôs central premise according to which humans are saturated with history-bound attitudes, stated and unstated, whose temporal imperatives they cannot evade.ò[24] According to Gadamer, prejudices informing our perspective need not be viewed as blinding and stultifying. Far from that ð and this is where Gadamer parts company with his teacher who tended to equate everydayness with inauthenticity ð tradition lends historical inquiry proper dignity, allows the researcher to shed new light on the past as well as reflect critically on the present. The next section begins with a consideration of Gadamerôs own understanding of hermeneutics and this will eventually lead to a deeper discourse of his concept of prejudice.

3.4 Gadamer within the History of Hermeneutics

Gadamer in a popular Encyclopedia article entitled ñClassical and Philosophical Hermeneuticsò summarizes the core of his philosophical hermeneutics as detailed out in his *Truth and Method*. In this article, he defines hermeneutics generally ñé as an art, a practical art, a *techne* involved in such things as preaching, interpreting other languages, explaining and explicating texts, and, as the basis of all of these, the art of understanding, an art particularly required any time the meaning of something is not clear and unambiguousò.[25] Based on this he exposes his understanding of philosophical hermeneutics.

3.4.1 On Philosophical Hermeneutics

Philosophical as distinct from the traditions of hermeneutics described by Gadamer has a subject matter in its own right. It cannot be classified as logic, because it is as general as logic and yet surpasses logic in its universality. For philosophical hermeneutics, temporality makes understanding possible. This does not mean philosophical hermeneutics legitimizes private and arbitrary subjective biases and prejudices. This is because the sole measure which it allows is the ómatterô [*sache*] being considered at the time, or the text one is seeking to understand.[26] This necessarily limits the focus of the interpretive act in this context. Language is very fundamental

within philosophical hermeneutics. This importance is hinged on the fact that hermeneutics at the philosophical level is aimed primarily at searching for common grounds and because of its intimacy with language and rhetoric, hermeneutics at the philosophical level possesses an inescapable universality. Despite the challenge from critique of ideology and psychoanalysis, Gadamer makes it clear that the approach of philosophical hermeneutics unlike those of critique of ideology and psychoanalysis does not posit any special scientific knowledge in advance. ñReflection in philosophical hermeneutics does not claim to know in advance that concrete social conditions allow only a distorted form of communication to take place.ò[27] This disposition enables philosophical hermeneutics to better achieve its task of seeking out common grounds and this further fosters its unique universal posture. This unique posture of universality is what makes philosophical hermeneutics a practice and not just a theory. The idea of hermeneutics as both theory and praxis is at the heart of Gadamerôs conceptualization of philosophical hermeneutics.

3.4.2 Philosophical Hermeneutics as Both *Theoria* and *Praxis*

This philosophical hermeneutics is both a practical and theoretical task, it is both theory and practice. In expressing this fact about philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer first establishes the fault with the conventional distinction between theory and practice based on the original Greek understanding of theory and practice. The point is that in the Greek understanding of philosophy as science and Aristotleôs demarcation between practical philosophy (ethics and politics) and theoretical philosophy (mathematics, physics and theology), we discover that the distinction between theory and practice was a distinction within knowledge. As such it is odd to oppose science and its application. Rather theory and practice are seen together; ñtheory is itself a practiceò.[28] Gadamer further puts this claim into perspective when he defines the nature of both theory and practice within his work.

In stating what practice is, Gadamer contends that ñé practice has to do with others and codetermines that communal concerns by its doing. Practice, then, certainly does not rely solely upon an abstract consciousness of norms.ò[29] Commonality and concreteness are fundamental in this definition of practice. On another level, Gadamer categorizes the practicality of philosophical hermeneutics on the basis of its being a description of every basic interpretative experience or attempt at understanding. On this he submits thus:

> The hermeneutics that I characterize as philosophic is not introduced as a new procedure of interpretation or explication. Basically, it only describes what happens whenever an interpretation is convincing and successful. It is not at all a matter of doctrine about a technical skill that would state how understanding ought to be. We have to acknowledge what is, and so we cannot change the fact that unacknowledged presuppositions are always at work in our understanding. Possibly we should not want to change this at all, even if we could. It always harvests a broadened and deepened self-understanding. But that means hermeneutics is philosophy and as philosophy it is a radical philosophy.[30]

Sequel to the above, one sees that in focusing on describing, philosophical hermeneutics is a practice.

But from the theoretical side, philosophical hermeneutics subsists as *theoria* in that it ñé has to do with a theoretical attitude towards the practice of interpretation, the interpretation of texts, but also in relation to the experiences interpreted in them and in our communicatively unfolded orientation in the world. This theoretic stance only makes us aware reflectively of what is performatively at play in the practical experience of understanding.ò[31] His understanding is couched within the Greek context. For him and the Greeks, theory meant ñto have been given away to something that in virtue of its overwhelming presence is accessible to all in common and that is distinguished in such a way that in contrast to all other goods it is not diminished by being shared and so it is not an object of dispute like all other goods, but actually gains through participation.ò[32] The fullness of the theoretic attitude Gadamer talks about consists in the fact of benefiting radically from being shared in. A theory is not a fixed set of ideas; and given philosophical hermeneutics attitude of openness; one understands how it becomes a theoretical

task. In sum then, as an attitude philosophical hermeneutics is theoretical. As a description of a process, it is practical and both tendencies are rooted in commonality and the need to be participated in and this makes philosophical hermeneutics unique.

3.5 Humanism At the Start of Philosophical Hermeneutics

Gadamer opens his discussion in *Truth and Method* with the significance of the humanist tradition for the human sciences. By this, he locates the humanist tradition at the start of his philosophical hermeneutics. This tradition, for Gadamer, defines some of the unique qualities of the human sciences against the natural sciences, especially with regard to the conceptualization of the method of the human sciences along the same line as that of the natural sciences of the time. Millôs inductive method was Gadamerôs example, for in the supplement to Millôs work *A System of Logic*, he seeks to ñoutline the possibilities of applying inductive logic to the moral sciences. The translator calls this *Geisteswissenschaften*.ò[33] Gadamer goes on to acknowledge that Millôs *A System of Logic* does not even raise the issue of the human sciences having its own logic, but on the contrary, the work shows that the inductive method is the only method valid even in the human sciences. Following the neglect of the metaphysical in the use of the inductive method and its quest for regularities in nature, Gadamer thinks that the nature of the human sciences has not been adequately grasped if one measures them by the yardstick of a progressive knowledge of regularity. This is the case because ótthe experience of the socio-historical world cannot be raised to a science by the inductive procedure of the natural sciences.ô For the óindividual caseô unlike in the natural sciences ódoes not serve only to confirm a law from which practical predications can be made. Its ideal is rather to understand itself in its unique and historical concreteness.ô From all of the above, it is clear that there is a methodological incompatibility between the human sciences and the natural sciences which is hinged on the fact

that the human sciences do not just seek to predict based on regularities in nature, but to understand based on the historical concreteness of the phenomenon.

Given the understanding above, the self-conception of science is even brought to question. And to keep the credibility of science in its natural form, its human form is often referred to as ónexact sciencesô. Despite Herman Helmotlzôs attempt to show the superiority of the human sciences ñé he still gave them a negative logical description based on the methodological ideal of the natural sciencesò.[34] This is as a result of his distinction between logical and artistic-instinctive induction and this takes the issue back to induction.[35] Also Droysenôs work within the historical school lays some much emphasis on and raises the human sciences to the same level as a nature through a profound understanding of history. Dilthey perceived strongly the defining point of the human sciences by maintaining the romantic, idealistic heritage in the conception of spirit (Geist) over and above English empiricism and the scientific method. The only advantage in Dilthey, for Gadamer, was his historical training which ñaccounts for his superiority over contemporary neo-Kantianism, it must be said that in his logical endeavour Dilthey did not really progress beyond the simple statements made by Helmholtzò.[36] But Gadamerôs major issue with Dilthey is his articulation of method. On this Gadamer submits that,

> however strongly Dilthey defined the epistemological independence of the human sciences, what is called method in modern sciences remains the same everywhere and is only displayed in an especially exemplary form in the natural sciences. The human sciences have no method of their own.[37]

Yet this seems to place the human sciences at a disadvantaged position. But the human sciences are a long way from regarding themselves as simply inferior to the natural sciences. ó[I]nstead possessed of the intellectual heritage of German classicism, they carried forward the proud awareness that they were the true representatives of humanism.ô This period had not only brought about a renewal of literature and aesthetic criticism, it had also given the idea of

humanity, and the ideal of enlightened reason, a fundamentally new content. Herder and his idea of ócultivating the humanô is fundamental here. Following Herder, óthe concept of self-formation, education or cultivation (*bildung*) was perhaps the greatest idea of the eighteenth century, and this was the basis for the human sciences of the 19th century, even if they are unable to offer any epistemological justification for it.ô Along with *bildung* are *sensus communis,* taste and judgment which form the guiding concepts of humanism and which are at the starting point of philosophical hermeneutics.

Conceptualizing *bildung* has to do with natural forms, which refer to external appearances (e.g. the shape of the limbs, the well formed figure) and in general to shapes created by nature (e.g. mountain formation - *Gebirgsbildung*). But in its current understanding, it is detached from its old idea. Herderôs definition of the concept as órising up to humanity through cultureô is at the heart of the understanding of the concept now. In line with this, ó*bildung* is intimately associated with the idea of culture and designates primarily the properly human way of developing oneôs natural talents and capacities.ô Though Kant and Hegel fill up the definition of the concept, it was Humboldt who draws the distinction between *kultur* and *bildung* and by his distinction moves the concept to include formation in its meaning. By this, *bildung* has no goal outside of itself. This is ñbecause the result of *bildung* is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual *bildung*.ò[38] Therefore, that by and through which one is formed becomes completely oneôs own. Everything is preserved and because of the historical nature of this preservation, *bildung* is important for understanding in the human sciences.

The most outstanding quality of *bildung* is its propensity towards universality and this is the case because if someone óabandons himself to his particularityô such a person ñis *ungebildet*

(unformed).ò[39] It is also at this level of universality that Gadamer connects the idea of *bildung* to the philosophy of Hegel. In his estimation, Hegel demonstrates that a man who abandons himself to his particularity ós lacking in the powers of abstraction. Such a man cannot turn his gaze from himself towards something universal, from which his own particular being is determined in measure or proportion.ô Also, taking together the idea of practical and theoretical *bildung* in Hegel, Gadamer tries to establish the self-giving that ends up in self-getting. As such, ñwhat constitutes the essence of *bildung* is clearly not alienation as such, but the return to oneselfé .ò[40] Besides this propensity to universality, *bildung* is also the element within which the educated man moves and at this point it (*bildung*) relies much on tact and memory and a óreceptivity to the otherness of the work of art or of the past.ôHere, the universality takes a different dimension,

> This universality is no means a universality of the concept as understanding. This is not a case of a particular being determined by a universal; nothing proved conclusively. The universal viewpoint to which the cultivated man (*gebildet*) keeps himself open is not a fixed applicable yardstick but is kept present to him only as the viewpoint of possible others. Thus the cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of sense.[41]

The kind of sense in this context is a universal sense. A sense that is active in all directions. And in fact, Gadamer thinks that it is from the survival of the humanistic idea of *bildung* that the human sciences of the 19th century draw, without admitting it, their own life. In summary, we can say *bildung* is that cultivated propensity towards universality based on tact and liberating work which takes into account openness to otherness which includes the historicity of such otherness.

Sensus communis, on the other hand, appeals to the humanist ideal of eloquence. ôTalking well here means not merely a rhetorical ideal. It also means the right thing-i.e., the truth.ôIt also appeals to another ideal of the distinction between the scholar and the wise man on whom the scholar depends. This is the point of Vicoôs distinctive appeal to *sensus communis* in his case against modern sciences. That even with the new sciences and their mathematical methodology,

we still cannot do without the wisdom of the ancients and their cultivation of *prudentia* and *eloquentia*.[42] There is still more to education in this regard for

> é the most important thing in education is still something else - the training in the *sensus communis*, which is not nourished on the true but on the probable, the verisimilar. The main thing for our purpose is that here *sensus communis* obviously does not mean only that general faculty in all men but the sense that founds community. According to Vico, what gives the human will its direction is not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete universality represented by community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence developing this communal sense is of decisive importance for living.[43]

With the foregoing, we see a movement from a common to a communal sense, a kind of sense that founds community and is vital for living. On this basis too, Gadamer thinks Vico draws a distinction between *critica* and *topica* and lays more emphasis on *topica* in education. Gadamer also sees Vicoôs distinction as going back to Aristotleôs distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge (*Phronesis*) and Aristotleôs effort to ground *phronesis* as knowledge in its own right. Further, Gadamer submits that the *sensus communis* for Vico is the sense of what is right and of the common good that is found in all; moreover, it is a sense that is acquired through living in the community and is determined by its structure and aims. This is a distinctively Roman formulation as against Greeks. Following all of these, Gadamer concludes õVicoôs return to the Roman concept of *sensus communis*, and his defense of humanist rhetoric against modern science, is a special interest to us, for here we are introduced to an element in the human sciences that was no longer recognizable when they conceptualized themselves in the 19th century.ôThe aim was therefore to show that the possibilities of rational proof and instruction do not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge.

Shaftesbury and Henri Bergson also developed concepts along the lines of *sensus sommunis*, but ñit is very characteristic of the human sciencesô self reflection in the 19th century that they proceeded not under the influence of the tradition of moral to which both Vico and Shaftesbury belongé but under the influence of German philosophy of the age of Kant and

Goethe.ò[44] ôThe concept of *sensus communis* was taken over, but in being emptied of all its political content it lost its genuine critical significance. *Sensus communis* was understood as a purely theoretical faculty: theoretical judgment, parallel to moral consciousness (conscience) and taste.ô But the swabian pietist Oeteiger relied on Shaftesburyôs defense of *sensus communis* and his basic concern was to show that óclarity is not enough for living knowledge.ô Rather there must be ócertain anticipants and predilections presentô ñFathers are moved without proof to care for their children; love does not demonstrate, but often against reason rends the heart at the belovedôs approach.ò[45] The case of Oeteiger is all the more interesting because he gives it a hermeneutic appeal since his focus was scripture. Here the true basis for *sensus communis* is life and not the violent anatomization of nature through experiment and calculations. This concept too stands at the very beginning of the conceptualization of philosophical hermeneutics.

There is also judgment and because of the sentimental character the English moral philosophers attach to judgment, óGerman enlightenment philosophy considered it not among the higher but among the lower powers of the mind.ô Kant was also decisive in the understanding of judgment. This is because óhe developed his moral philosophy in explicit opposition to the doctrine of ómoral feelingô that had been worked out in English philosophy. Thus, he totally excluded the concept of *sensus communis* from moral judgment.ô But this is a narrow understanding of judgment for it has to do with ógood senseô, ócommon understandingô and it is that which marks the divide between the fool and the sensible man. Its logical basis ï subsuming a particular under a universal, recognizing something as an example of a rule ï cannot be demonstrated. So it cannot be taught in abstract but only practiced from case to case and is therefore more an ability like the sense. Judgment recognizes the sensible individual and what it judges in the individual thing is its perfection or imperfection. A person with a sound judgment is not one who assesses particular via universals, but one who knows what is important. He sees

things from the right and sound point of view. Judgment here is not a faculty, it is a demand on us all based on our sense of the common or common sense and a sensible judgment of perfection is called taste.

The idea of taste was originally more of a moral concept than an aesthetic idea. It describes an effort to take a critical stand against the dogmatism of the school. The value of taste stems from its sensory differentiation, ñwhich accepts or rejects in the most immediate way and strike a balance between sensory instinct and intellectual freedom.ò[46] This is therefore not just an instinct, it is able to gain the distance necessary for choosing and judging what is the most urgent necessity of life. Quoting Grecian, Gadamer notes that it is a óspiritualization of animalityô and points out that there is cultivation not merely of the mind but also of taste. It implies a mode of knowing whose mark is its ability to stand back from ourselves and our private preferences. As such, it is a social phenomenon of the first order. Its judgment is always very decisive for ógood taste is always sure of its judgment- i.e., it is essentially sure taste. An acceptance and rejection that involves no hesitation, no surreptitious glances at others, no searching for reasons.ô It therefore, operates without reason and its opposite is tastelessness. Its knowing is always tied to a particular concrete moment in which the object occurs and cannot be reduced to rule and concepts. It belongs in the realm of that which grasps, in the individual object, the universal under which it is to be subsumed. It evaluates the object in relation to a whole in order to see whether it fits in with everything else - that is, whether it is ófittingô.

This kind of sense is needed wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole. ôThus taste is not limited to what is beautiful in nature and arts,é but embraces the whole realm of morality and manners.ô This is because ñthe ordering of life by the rule of law and morality is incomplete and needs productive supplement. For morality is constantly developed through the fecundity of the individual case. Thus, the beautiful in nature and art is to be supplemented by

the whole ocean of the beautiful spread throughout the moral reality of mankind.ò[47] All of these are at the heart of the self-definition of the human sciences until they were redefined by Kant and limited only to the aesthetic. This leads to a faulty definition of the human sciences based on the principles of the natural sciences. The revival of these humanist traditions and ideas raises anew the concept of understanding within the human sciences and Gadamer focuses so much on this. Gadamerôs involvement with humanism at this juncture is to establish the hermeneutic limits of scientific rationality[48] and to show that the human sciences have an approach to truth which defies the methodological apparatus of the natural sciences. At the heart of this approach to truth in the human sciences is the idea of the historicity of understanding. How then is understanding historical?

3.6 Understanding as an Ontological Category: Beginning the Historicity of Understanding

In laying bare the specifics of his contention that understanding is historical, Gadamer following Heidegger moves the course of the debate on understanding from the realm of epistemology to the realm of ontology. Gadamer begins with Heideggerôs disclosure of the fore-structures of understanding, but he notes that his primary task is how to free hermeneutics from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity and by this, do justice to the historicity of understanding. Following Heideggerôs case that the hermeneutic circle is not a vicious one or one to be tolerated, Gadamer notes that Heidegger was not prescribing how understanding should progress, rather he was describing how interpretative understanding is achieved. In this hermeneutic circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing and that our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception should be worked out not based on fancies, but based on the things themselves.The point here is that, ontologically, understanding springs from the things in themselves. As such, óall correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought

and it must direct its gaze on the things themselves.ô The necessity of this gaze is not a single consciencious decision, but is a first test and constant task.

In keeping this gaze, Gadamer notes that anyone who seeks understanding is always projecting. As one begins to interact with the text, given the initial impressions that emerge, certain projections are made. But again, ótthe initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to meaning. Working with this fore-projection which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.ô For this reason, there is no dogmatism about understanding, given the various shades within which the what-is-there shows itself, it is expected that what is projected should be revised to incorporate every new detail. In all of these fore-projections, rival projections can occur side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is. Interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. In this constant process of new projections constitute the movement of understanding and interpretation. And given this attitude of projection and anticipation of confirmation, objectivity lies in the confirmation of any projection by what is there. Despite this, care must be taken to ensure that fore-meanings are not arbitrary. For this reason, it will not be out of place for the interpreter to examine explicitly the origin of validity of the fore-meanings dwelling within as he seeks to understand the phenomena at hand.

Gadamer also brings the idea of questioning into the hermeneutic quest in order to better ground understanding and interpretation. This arises within the context of a misunderstanding in an interpreterôs fore-projection and the interpreter is blind to the misplaced nature of his fore projection and still holds unto them. This is not entirely out of place because ómeaning represents a blind multiplicity of possibilities, but in this multiplicity not everything is possible, and if a person fails to hear what the other person is really saying, he will not be able to fit what he has

misunderstood into the range of his own various expectations of meaning.ô For this reason ñthe hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in part so defined.ò[49] This questioning is directed primarily at the interpreterôs own fore-meaning /projections and this demands an openness to the alterity and otherness of the text. This openness does not demand neutrality with respect to the content of the text or total extinction of the self, but a fore-grounding and appropriation of oneôs meaning and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of oneôs own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against oneôs own fore-meanings. By this Gadamer takes over Heideggerôs phenomenology and approves of it as the right approach to understanding.

It is in this appreciation of Heidegger that Gadamerôs ontological posture towards understanding is made clear. Writing on this Lauren S. Barthold contends that ñHeidegger claimed that the process of understanding can only be explicated in terms of being, for Being precedes knowledge.ò[50] By this assertion and keeping faith with his basic frames of circularity, temporality, and fore-meaning, Heidegger emphasizes that to grasp being illuminates objects and facts. This is the case because facts and objects are more fundamentally embedded in (and thus emerge out of) an environment, or a world. Consequently, the return to an openness to things as they are, despite the necessity of our fore-projections and meanings which Gadamer following Heidegger emphasizes brings to the fore an ontological appreciation of understanding in the process of Gadamerôs articulation of the historicity of understanding.

3.7 The Ubiquity of Prejudice

This reversal of the part of the problem that often affects the appropriate understanding of a text or anything is what Gadamer calls the ótyranny of hidden prejudicesô. It is within the context of doing away with misunderstanding as stated above that the question of prejudices enters into Gadamerôs discourse and eventually forms the core of the discussion. Tradition most

times is couched in the given and it is these hidden prejudices that prevent us from being attentive to what this tradition is saying. But on a closer look, one discovers the presence of prejudice in all forms of understanding and it is this ñrecognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice that gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust.ò[51] The real thrust here revolves around the fact that there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that defines its essence; the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment and is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power. The power denied tradition here is the power to speak and to demand hearing from us.

But as a matter of fact, prejudices are at the very base of our judgment and understanding. In Gadamerôs opinion, it is with the enlightenment that prejudice acquired a derogatory connotation. Writing on this Gadamer submits that,

> The history of ideas shows that not until the enlightenment does the concept of prejudice acquire the negative connotation familiar today. Actually óprejudiceô means a judgment rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined. In German legal terminology, a prejudice is a provisional legal verdict before the final verdict is reached. For someone involved in a legal dispute, this kind of judgment against him affects his chances adversely. Accordingly, the French prejudice, as well as the Latin praejudicum, means simply óadverse effectô, ódisadvantageô, óharmô. But this negative sense is only derivative. The negative consequence depends precisely on the positive validity, the value of the provisional decision as a prejudgment, like that of any precedent.[52]

Following the above, one gets the impression that, óprejudiceô certainly does not necessarily mean a false judgment, but part of the idea is that it is a prejudgment that can also have a negative effect. But the German, English and French connotations of the word seem to have been limited in the meaning by the Enlightenment critique of religion simply to the sense of an óunfounded judgmentô. This unfoundedness is independent of whether such a judgment is correct or not, but is based on its having a methodological justification. It is based on this methodological unfoundedness that Enlightenment philosophy brands other forms of certainty as superfluous. The absence of a methodological base in any knowledge form means such

knowledge is not founded on the thing itself, for this reason scientific knowledge avoids prejudices. In Gadamerôs estimation, this attitude is an offshoot of the Cartesian attitude and method and this is incompatible with the historical mode of knowledge of which Gadamer is a strong proponent. On the basis of this understanding, Gadamer undertakes to discredit the Enlightenment prejudice.

In establishing his case against the Enlightenment understanding of prejudice, Gadamer makes a distinction between prejudices which are products of over hastiness and those that are products of human authority. It was prejudice based on authority that attracted the Enlightenmentôs attention and this was because the Enlightenment needed to attack the religious tradition of Christianity and its dogmatism. In this regard, the bible and its authority had to be placed before the judgment seat of reason, as far as the enlightenment was concerned, to ascertain its validity. From this time on, ñit is not tradition, but reason that constitutes the ultimate source of all authority.ò[53] The orientation here was even to question the written word as a source of truth. This even motivated a kind historical research that bears similar traits with the natural sciences. This is because ót makes the tradition as much an object of criticism, just as the natural sciences do with the evidence of the senses.ô Despite this overriding influence of the enlightenment, German enlightenment still recognized the true prejudice of the Christian religion. This was against the extreme adherence to enlightenment values in England and France.

Given the assertion above that German enlightenment expressed the idea that true prejudices were present in Christianity, Gadamer undertook to consider the moderation and modification of the enlightenment ideals in German historicism. Before undertaking this task, he observes that these ótrue prejudices must still finally be justified by rational knowledge, even though the task may never be able to fully be completed.ô By implication, the final arbiter who decides which prejudices are either true or false is reason and this is fundamentally an

enlightenment orientation. Given this basic orientation, Gadamer goes on to submit that ácthe criteria of the modern enlightenment still determine the self-understanding of historicism. This does not happen directly, but in curious retraction caused by romanticism.ô This suggests that romanticism had a role to play in the self-understanding of historicism and its enlightenment tendencies. This can be seen with particular clarity in the fundamental schema of the philosophy of history that romanticism shares with the enlightenment and precisely the romantic reaction to the enlightenment made it into an unshakeable premise. The schema is that of the conquest of *mythos* by *logos*. It is the presupposition of the progressive retreat of magic in the world that gives this schema its validity. Bearing this point of arrival between romanticism and enlightenment in mind, Gadamer submits that romanticism ñé shares the presupposition of the enlightenment and only reserves the evaluation of it, seeking to establish the validity of what is old, simply because it is oldé ò[54] This reversal of the enlightenmentôs presupposition results in the paradoxical tendency to restoration, i.e the tendency to reconstruct the old because it is old , the conscious return to the unconscious, culminating in the recognition of the superior wisdom of the premeveal age of myth. These romantic revaluations give rise to the attitude of the historical sciences in the 19th century. By taking over all the romantic achievements, historical research has step-by-step transformed the intuitive revival into historical knowledge proper. For this reason, ácthe historical sciences of the 19th century is the proudest fruit of romanticism and sees itself precisely as the fulfillment of the enlightenment, as the last step in the liberation of the mind from the trammels of dogma, the step to objective knowledge of the historical world, which stands as an equal beside the knowledge of nature achieved by modern science.ô

At issue for Gadamer is the down grading of tradition by the desire to raise the historical studies to the same level as the natural sciences and the universal/radical attempt of the 19th

century historical sciences to do away with prejudice. Given all the basic articulations above, Gadamer surmises that,

> This is the point at which the attempt to critique historical hermeneutics has to start. The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the enlightenment will prove to itself a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate understanding of our finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness.[55]

Gadamer thinks that the prejudice against prejudice is actually an obstacle that militates against our true acquisition of historical knowledge, and so, it has to be removed. It is within the context of emphasizing the need to do away with this prejudice against prejudice that Gadamer classically puts to the fore his case for the ubiquity of prejudice. On this he states,

> Does being situated within tradtions really mean being subject to prejudices and limited in oneôs freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in various ways? If this is true, the idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms - i.e., it is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates.[56]

By this statement, contextuality becomes the basic frame for understanding and the exercise of reason in the philosophy of Gadamer. Our finitude as historical subjects marks our essence true and true. And by this finitude, we cannot operate beyond the parameters set for us by the situation in which we find ourselves. Reason evolves out of our situation and it functions thereof as well. Since this is manôs basic posture in existence, prejudices become the condition for manôs self-knowledge and self-expression. Upholding subjectivity as Descartes does may not offer much light in the right direction. ôFor subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuit of historical life. That is why the prejudice of the individual, far more than his judgment, constitutes the historical reality of his beingô and hence the ubiquity of prejudice.

3.8 Rehabilitating Tradition and the Legitimation of Prejudice

Having discredited the enlightenmentôs prejudice and established the ubiquity of prejudice, the next task is reconstructing the understanding of tradition against its understanding

within romanticism and historicism; and also to firmly establish the basis for the authority residing in tradition. All of these are geared towards giving a justification for legitimate as against illegitimate prejudices. Epistemologically, Gadamer frames the question thus,

> Where is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudice? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones which it is the undeniable task of the critical reason to overcome?[57]

In dealing with these questions, Gadamer returns to his initial position on the difference between prejudices based on over hastiness and those on authority. In his estimation, ôover hastiness is the actual source of error in the use of oneôs own reason. Authority, however, is responsible for oneôs not using oneôs own reason at all.ô Since Descartesô idea of method was meant to overcome prejudices of over hastiness, the prejudice against what is old (authority) is what needs attention. Lutherôs reformation was directed at this in that it weakened the prejudice of human prestige, the philosophical and Roman Pope. These efforts of Luther gave birth to a hermeneutics that focused on ôsafe guarding the reasonable meaning of text against all unreasonable demands made on it.ô But ôthe real consequence of the enlightenment is different: namely, the subjection of all authority to reasonô.

The enlightenment derogation of authority in fact contains some truths, but on a closer look one discovers its shortcomings. This is because, ôthe distanciation the enlightenment draws between faith in authority and the use of oneôs own reason is, in itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority takes the place of oneôs own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of prejudice. But this does not exclude the possibility that it can also be a source of truth, and this is what the enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority.ô A good example Gadamer gives for this claim is the fact that Descartesô moral philosophy does not contain anything new. Upon this fact, it becomes clear the deformation of the concept of authority within the enlightenment. Furthermore, ôé the denigration of authority is not the only prejudice of the enlightenment. For, within the enlightenment, the very concept of authority becomes deformed. On the basis of its

concept of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could be seen as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be, in fact blind obedienceô. This represents the extent to which the concept of authority suffered within the enlightenment.

But this is not the essence of authority. For

> it is true that it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on recognition and knowledge ï namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence, i.e. it has priority over oneôs own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed, but is acquired and must be acquired, if someone is to lay claim to it. It rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have better understanding. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed authority has nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge.[58]

In this, it is clear that the recognition of authority is always connected with the idea that what authority states is not irrational and arbitrary, but can be seen, in principle, to be true. This brings the idea of prejudice again into the discourse, for ćthe prejudices that authority implants are legitimized by the person who presents them**.** Their validity demands that one should be biased in favour of the person who presents them. But this makes them then, in a sense, objective prejudices, for they bring about the same biases in favour of something that can come about through other means, e.g. through solid ground offered by reason. In line with this, the essence of authority belongs in the context of a theory of prejudices free from the extremism of the enlightenment.ô

Given the problem of the Enlightenmentôs understanding of authority as stated above, the romantic perspective to authority is yet another issue. This is because romanticism sanctioned a form of authority which is tradition. Here, ćthat which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that it is always the authority of what has been transmitted- and not only what is clearly grounded ï that has power over our attitudes and behavior.ô All of education and even morals are based on

the efficacy of this authority. But the problem here is the fact that óromanticism conceived tradition as the antithesis to the freedom of reason and regards it as something historically given, like nature.ô On this, Gadamer notes that ñit seems to me, however, that there is no such unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason. However problematical the conscious restoration of tradition or the conscious creation of new traditions may be, the romantic faith in the ógrowth of traditionô, before which all reason must remain silent, is just as prejudiced as and is fundamentally like the enlightenment. The fact is that tradition is constantly an element of freedom and of history itself.ò[59] On this note it becomes clear that óboth the enlightenmentôs critique of tradition and its romantic rehabilitation are less than their true historical being.ô

Gadamer goes ahead to relate all of these to the general objective of the human sciences as different from the natural sciences. He raised a fundamental question: ódoes understanding in the human sciences understand itself correctly when it relegates the whole of its own historicity to the position of prejudices from which we must free ourselves? Or does áunprejudiced sciencesô have more in common than it realizes with that naïve openness and reflection in which tradition lives and the past is the present?ô In answer to this question, Gadamer claims that áthe human sciences share one fundamental condition with the continuity of traditions, namely, that it lets itself be addressed by traditionô. Consequently, tradition is the object of the human sciences and this becomes clear when the history of both the natural and human sciences are considered. Besides, the great achievement in the human sciences hardly ever gets old. Within this context too, modern historical research expresses itself more as the transmission of tradition. For despite the historical interests of the human sciences, its interest is motivated in a special way by the present and its interest. For these reasons, there can be no disinterested appreciation of the object in the human sciences, and in this, consists the difference between the human and natural sciences. õWhereas the object of the natural sciences can be described idealiter as what would be

known in the perfect knowledge of nature. It is senseless to speak of a perfect knowledge of history and for this reason it is not possible to speak of an object in itself towards which its research is directed.ô In sum, Gadamerôs claim is that the legitimacy of prejudices is based on the authority of tradition which rests on knowledge rather than the subjugation of reason. At the same time, this tradition connects with the human sciences in that history is fundamental for the making of the human sciences, and its object, for its objects are historically fixed and these objects cannot be considered outside of their history. This brings to the fore the principle of historical effect.

3.9 Historical Effect: The Prejudicial Significance of History

Gadamerôs discussion of the rehabilitation of authority and tradition is done within the context of establishing prejudice as a condition of understanding. Along with rehabilitating authority and tradition, he also discusses the classics as an instance of prejudice as a condition for understanding. This is on the grounds that classical studies órésist historical criticism because its historical domain, the binding power of the validity that is preserved and handed down, precedes all historical reflection and is continuous with it.ô Following from this, the classics stand as something trans-temporal, trans-historical and yet this timelessness is a mode of historical being. Within this context Gadamer also discusses the hermeneutic significance of temporal distance. On this Gadamer holds that ñthe hermeneutic productivity of temporal distance could be understood only when Heidegger gave understanding an ontological orientation by interpreting it as an óexistentialô and when he interpreted Daseinôs mode of being in terms of time.ò[60] This ótemporal distance is not a yawning abyss, but is filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything handed down presents itself to us.ô ñIt lets local and limited prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.ò[61] Hermeneutically, the relevance of this rests on the

fact that ótthe subject matter would have to demonstrate the reality and efficacy of history within understanding itself.ô Gadamer refers to this as óhistory of effectô and understanding is essentially a historically effected event.

This historical effect is always at work when we try to ñunderstand a historical event from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation which determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and will appear as an object of investigationé ò[62] Foucault also sheds more light on this in his essay ñNietzsche, Genealogy and History.ò In Foucaultôs estimation this effective history (*wirkliche Historie*) has its final trait in its óaffirmation of knowledge as perspectivesô. He continues further that, ñhistorians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work, which reveal their grounding in particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy- the unavoidable obstacles of their passion.ò[63] This expression classically connects the idea of effective history to the Gadamerôs idea of horizons. For these horizons are perspectives from which the objective of history is approached and this clears the ground for the eventual fusion of horizons.

Furthermore, ówhen a naïve faith in scientific methods denies the existence of effective history, there can be an actual deformation of knowledge.ô In Gadamerôs estimation, historical objectivism/statistical modes of research are very pretentious because they let the facts speak in such a way that the historical effect is left at the background or out of the discourse. But the interesting thing about the historical effect is that, óé it does not depend on being recognized. This, precisely, is the power of history over finite human consciousness, namely that it prevails even where faith in method leads one to deny oneôs own historicity.ô Awareness of this historical effect is already effectual in helping find the right question and secondly consciousness of being affected by history is primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation. This idea of situation suggests that ówe are not standing outside the situation and hence we are unable to have

any objective knowledge of it.ô This situation Gadamer defines as that standpoint which limits the possibility of vision. Intimately related to this concept of the situation is the horizon. Given the fact that this effect is tied to the situation and the situation is the horizon, that standpoint which limits vision, we discover that the historical effect is also at the heart of the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. Following from these, the situation in which we find ourselves is the point that constitutes the prejudice with which issues are addressed from the standpoint of one in such a situation.

3.10 Fusing Horizons: The Universalist Propensity of the Prejudice in Rationality

Does having a particular horizon therefore suggest of relativism? Or does it suggest a situation in which we are all tied up within our own set of truths and horizons and demanding no interaction with other horizons? This is not the case in Gadamer and his idea of fore-grounding and the transposing of self which leads to fusion are his attempt at building a universal within his philosophy. In transposing ourselves, ñwe are not disregarding ourselvesé transposing ourselves consists neither in empathy of one individual for another nor in subordinating another person for our own standards, rather it always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity, but also that of others.ò[64] The concept of ôhorizonô suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand ï not in order to look away from it, but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. This perception keeps faith with the correct criterion of understanding which is the harmony of the details with the whole. Also, it guarantees that understanding differently is also a mode of understanding.

Fore-grounding, on the other hand, revolves around our carefulness not to hastily assimilate the past to our own expectations of meaning and to ensure that we can listen to

tradition in a way that permits it to make its own meaning heard. Reciprocity is characteristic of fore-grounding, in that ówhatever is being foregrounded must be foregrounded from something else, which, in turn, must be foregrounded from it.ôBy this, whenever there is a foregrounding, it also makes visible that from which the foregrounding is done. But the fundamental point to note is that, though the foregrounding begins from the prejudices which our situations carry and they represent that beyond which our vision cannot see, it will be an error to think that our horizons are fixed. This is because ñé the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we continually have to test all our prejudices.ò[65] In so doing, there is an encounter with the past which incorporates this past into the present and hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without that of the past. Based on this Gadamer submits thus:

> There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves é in tradition, this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are always combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other.[66]

This fusion represents the conscious attempt to harmonize various perspectives into a one and consistent whole. But the uniqueness here is that the process is continually ongoing, for something whole today can be remodified tomorrow in the light of new experiences. In hermeneutic terms, this fusion is very significant. This is because in understanding two horizons are opened up: that of the text and that of the reader. Alienating any will not be Gadamerôs demand, rather he advocates an interaction between the two horizons for the production of living knowledge.

There are also certain points about this fusion from Gadamerôs broad discussions within his hermeneutics. This question of horizon brings to the fore the issue of otherness and how it should be conceptualized and approached. For given the fact that we are situated and we cannot speak from outside such situation, it means our situations/horizons will have to interact as we

begin to move beyond our specific horizon. Gadamerôs discussion on the óI-Thouô relationship details out an approach to óothernessô that further expresses his idea of fusing of horizons. Gadamer discusses the I-Thou relationship within the context of his analysis of the historically affective consciousness and the point where the concept of experience meets the essence of the hermeneutic experience. He discusses this encounter at three levels. The first level is that which Gadamer calls the knowledge of human nature, where the other is seen as something to be predicated and manipulated. The second is the level where the other is seen as human, but understanding the Thou is still seen as sought of self-relatedness. The third is the level of openness where the other is seen as genuine partner in dialogue; the Thou is seen as Thou. The openness here ñé does not exist only for the person who speaks, rather anyone who listens is fundamentally open. Without such openness to one another there is no genuine human bond. Belonging together always means being able to listen to one another.ò[67] This openness also suggests that ñé I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.ò[68] Gadamer further radicalizes the nature of openness in the I-Thou encounter.

This level of openness brings into the discussion again Gadamerôs idea about the fore-conception of completeness, which is a formal condition for all understanding. It states that ñonly what really constitutes unity of meaning is really intelligible.ò[69] For this reason, when we are in a dialogue as is the case in the I-Thou, the emphasis on openness also suggests that we always assume the completeness of the otherôs position and only when this assumption proves mistaken ï i.e., the other is not intelligible ï de we begin to suspect the other and try to discover how it can be remedied. The application of the rules in this context is dependent on the subject matter of the dialogue and unintelligibility does not depend on having a contrary opinion, for a contrary opinion that is true has to be brought into the picture. The concern is therefore, not on the

solution of individual meaning, but on the truth they bring to bear on the subject matter. Consequent upon this, for a true fusing of horizons, there has to be that openness which is premised on the fore-conception of completeness. Given the ubiquity of prejudices as established above, Gadamer thinks that hermeneutics must be a universal human phenomenon. How then does Gadamer conceive of the universality of hermeneutics?

3.11 Linguisticality and Prejudice: On the Universality of Hermeneutics

In establishing the universality of hermeneutics and its problem, Gadamer also shows the linguisticality of prejudice. Gadamer sets before himself the task of establishing why language has become central in the philosophical discourse since the seventeenth century. At an ontological level, Gadamer submits that, ñlanguage is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the world.ò[70] Premising the full thrust of the hermeneutic demand on questioning and establishing the fact that this ability to question is necessary to all aspects of knowledge production, Gadamer universalizes the hermeneutic problem. In his opinion, ñthe real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable. Now if what we have before our eyes is not only the artistic tradition of a people, or historical tradition, or the principle of modern science in its hermeneutical preconditions but rather the whole of our experience, then we have succeeded, I think, in joining the experience of science to our own universal and human experience of life.ò[71] With this opinion, Gadamer expresses the unity of all of the domains of production within human life and experience.

Sequel to the above, Gadamer takes the bold step of categorizing the entire attempt at knowledge production within the spheres under consideration as linguistic. In his opinion, ñé we have now reached the fundamental level that we can call (with Johannes Lohmann) the ólinguistic constitution of the worldô. It presents itself as the consciousness that is effected by

historyé and that provides an initial schematization for all our possibilities of knowing.ò[72] In the above, it becomes clear the fundamental role of language in the apprehension of the universe at any level. Gadamer goes ahead to use the example of how the small child learns to speak as the basic condition of all humans as regards language and its value. The child learns new words he/she gets more acquainted with the world. He makes his case further when he submits that, ñé we are familiar with the strange, uncomfortable, and tortuous feeling we have as long as we do not have the right word. When we have found the right expression (it need not always be one word), when we are certain that we have it, then it óstandsô, then something has come to a óstandôò[73] Commenting on this Schmidt contends that ñlanguage is not a sign system used to designate already known beings. Language itself brings beings into presence within historically effected consciousness.ò[74] This perspective on language and human experience in general shows how ñé the claim to universality that is appropriate to the hermeneutical dimension is to be understood. Understanding is language-bound and this assertion does not lead us into any kind of linguistic relativism.ò[75] This is the case because there is absolutely no captivity within language

Here also we see the place of prejudice in this apprehension. The necessity of prejudice is hinged on the role of a historically effected consciousness, on the situatedness of the subject and the role such situatedness plays in knowledge production and the apprehension of the world. The weight of this claim can be better felt in Gadamerôs assertion that ñit is not so much our judgment as it is our prejudices that constitute our being.ò[76] These prejudices are also linguistic in their nature. This is the case because ñwe are always already biased in our thinking and knowing by our linguistic interpretation of the world. To grow into this linguistic interpretation means to grow up in the world. To this extent, language is the real mark of our finitude.ò[77] Through language, aspects of the world are revealed to us; a language view is a world-view.

Schmidt writing on the connection between óaspectô and óviewô as they function in German submits that

> The same German word that is translated here as óaspectô was translated as óviewô in the discussion of language-view being a worldview. This connection is important since just as a particular language only presents a particular worldview, so each correct interpretation also only presents only an aspect or view of the thing itself. Just as there is no perfect language that presents the world in itself, there is no perfect interpretation that presents the thing in itself, which can also be translated as subject matter in its totality. Both cases indicate the fundamental finitude of human understanding.[78]

Thus, we see that manôs living and operating within language is fundamental to his finitude and also it is this linguistic make up of man that fuels the need for a fusing of horizons. Gadamer puts it so well when he concludes his essay ñMan and Languageò in these words ñé language is the real medium of human being, if we only see it in the realm that it alone fills out, the realm of human being-together, the realm of common understanding, of ever-replenished common agreement ð a realm as indispensible to human life as the air we breathe.ò[79] The realization of this being together is the starting point for the need for a fusing of horizons and consequently the attainment of universality for Gadamer.

Besides the uniqueness of the role of language in human makeup as the pointer to the universality of hermeneutics, there is also the idea of questioning as yet another base for the universality of hermeneutics in Gadamerôs philosophy. It is based on this idea of questioning that he expresses his suspicion for the statistical mode of data presentation. For him a fact is an answer to a question and the statistical mode of presentation stifles the asking of questions because of its propagandist tendency. But ñwhat is established by statistics seems to be a language of facts, but which questions these facts answer and which facts would begin to speak if other questions were asked are hermeneutical questions. Only a hermeneutical inquiry would legitimize the meaning of these facts and thus the consequences that follow from them.ò[80] The bringing forth of new perspectives is fundamental to the universality of hermeneutics. In another

place, Gadamer furnishes us that the ñhermeneutical reflection fulfills the function that is accomplished in all bringing of something to a conscious awareness. Given that it does, it can and must manifest itself in all our modern fields of knowledge, and especially science.ò[81] It is questioning that essentially guarantees this bringing forth of new perspectives. Little wonder then Gadamer dedicates a section of his work, *Truth and Method,* to the concept of questioning.[82] Here too the prejudiced natures of the truths so sought are evident. For since statements or facts are answers to questions, and questions are direct products of our being historically effected with the view to raising new perspectives, questions also showcase our finitude, situatedness and, ultimately, the necessity and positivity of prejudice.

3.12Prejudice, Relativism and the Moral/Political Implications of Gadamer's Hermeneutics

What then are the moral/political implications of philosophical hermeneutics? Here, the focus will be on establishing the anti-relativist tendency of Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics. This will be done by showing how prejudice indeed aids the attainment of universality with particular reference to the moral and political domains. This task will not be an easy one because Gadamerôs mature philosophy did not really have much to do directly with politics. Robert Sullivan puts it well when he suggests thus:

> Gadamer, however, did not become a political theorist but rather became the originator of a school of philosophy called philosophical hermeneutics. Whatever else philosophical hermeneutics is taken as, it is not political theory, and it has had limited impact on contemporary political theorists. Its main impact has been in philosophy itself, where it has given heart to the so-called continental school of philosophy against the analytical tradition, and in literary theory and the philosophy of science. It has had and continues to have growing influence in the art world. It has had some impact on the philosophy of law, but it has still to the best of my knowledge not significantly influenced contemporary political philosophy.[83]

Despite this, substantial parts of his works are focused on ethics and particular the Aristotelian and Platonic versions of ethics. Although our focus here will also be on the Gadamerôs ethics, the political orientation of his early works will be quite fundamental.

In dealing with the political aspects of his work, Robert Sullivan goes back to the early Gadamer, because it is here that one can truly locate the political tenets in the works of Gadamer. Importantly, Gadamerôs academic career began at the time of First World War and the defeat of Germany in the war was fundamental to the making of the political orientation in Gadamerôs very early work. The defeat of Germany in this war showed Gadamer the weakness of the writing tradition as against the speaking tradition. The point here was that the strict adherence to the question of method and the instrumental pursuit of the exact science was located firmly in the writing tradition. For this reason Gadamer chooses at the beginning of his academic career to favour the speaking tradition over the writing one. He even goes as far as interpreting the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle in this regard. This was the basis for Gadamerôs case against Werner Jaeger in his first journal paper and broadly ñagainst the tendency of German *Altertumswissenschaft* (positivism) to accumulate a body of facts and call that Greece.ò[84] Gadamer, in his 1927 article ñAristotleôs *Protrepticos* and the Developmental-Historical Mode of Looking at Aristotleôs Ethicsò, expresses his discomfort with the mere ascription of ideas to Platoôs philosophy. He thinks ideas are ascribed to men in their capacity to reason which is the spark of the divine in them. His final submission is that there are no inscribed laws for men. For every act of thinking has a purpose and when ideas are inscribed the total aim for thinking is defeated.

At a fundamental level, the writing culture lays emphasis on answers, but the speaking culture lays emphasis on questions. The Ten Commandments, the laws of Solon, America and its emphasis on written constitution are all instances of the writing culture. This is because these written/inscribed laws are answers to subdued or suppressed questions and these answers are now held as eternal and ahistorical solutions to the human predicament. But Gadamer thinks that Greece is a classic example of a speaking culture. This is the case for the reason that ót

privileges the questionô and this it does because ñit is aware, at however subconscious a level, of its situatedness, which is nothing more than a different way of saying that the *polis* has an awareness that it did not possess definitive answers to the most troubling problems of human relations.ò[85] By this token, room is now created for the masses, the reader and the student within the nexus of meaning creation. Consequently, it is no longer just the state, the writer or the teacher that determines meaning, the others with regard to each of these categories are now brought into the game of meaning-making. As a political consequence in Gadamer, we see a motion from, or a reaction, to the state-liberalism of the pre-First World War Germany and a move towards a kind of individualist-liberalism. In this political orientation we see an affirmation and an appreciation of the rejected and unrecognized, a giving of voice to the voiceless within a hegemonic polity.

Also given the dissatisfaction Gadamer expresses over the writing culture and the categorization of America with its written constitution as housed in the writing culture, we see a preference for the unwritten constitutional approach in Gadamer. His political schema abhors the arrogance of the rigidity contained in the practice of written constitutions. He rather prefers the flexibility and openness of the unwritten approach. This approach dovetails perfectly with Gadamerôs approach in that it builds the concept of change and openness into its constitutional process. This does not mean written constitutions do not have in-built mechanism for change and openness, but the finality in the tone of the written approaches stifles any prospect for the vitality that change can suggest in this approach. This is very clear from the fact that amending written constitutions is always a very cumbersome process.

Besides the issue of flexibility, Gadamerôs conceptualization of the essence of legal hermeneutics and its role in the making of philosophical hermeneutics also further brings in the dimension of situatedness within the constitutional order as it relates to the political undertone of

Gadamerôs work. This addresses the issue of application as a fundamental core of understanding and also showcases clearly the relation between past and present that is fundamental to philosophical hermeneutics. On this Gadamer submits: ñé to understand and interpret means to discover and recognize meaning. The judge seeks to be in accord with the ólegal ideaô in mediating it with the present. This is, of course, a legal mediation. It is the legal significance of the law - and not the historical significance of the lawôs promulgation or of particular cases of its application ï that he is trying to understand.ò[86] In embarking on this mediating task, the judge is interpreting the law and by so doing he is ñconcretizing the law in each specific case ï i.e., it is a work of *application*.ò[87] This work of application at once involves also understanding and interpretation. The point to be made here is that, since application as used in this context, besides the fact that it is interior to the essential make up of understanding, cannot proceed out of context shows the importance of situatedness. Consequently, even when constitutions are written, the application cannot be arbitrary and straight jacketed. The situation is fundamental in that it determines how application should proceed and this is key to the hermeneutic project.

To sum up the perspective on politics in Gadamer, this research contends, despite the submissions in the preceding paragraphs, that is, the desire of Gadamer to revive the speaking culture over the writing one; the place of dialogue within his philosophy; the version of Socrates that he accepts[88] and his acceptance of the authenticity of the claim of the *Seventh Letter* that Plato turned to philosophy for political reasons; the understanding of politics within his work is not the conventional one. Sullivan makes this clearer when he submits that,

> é politics is not a prescribed activity in which language is used as a method to get at the objective truth. Politics is rather a completely unconstrained activity, appropriate for an overman, and conducted in a spoken language that heroically professes ignorance of any prescribed truth. Also, the recurrent concept of dialogue, if it means anything at all, means that politics is not an activity keyed to individual heroism. It is an activity that demands a multiplicity of overmen, each willing to admit ignorance of a prescribed truth, each willing to discourse until agreement is reached.[89]

The influence of this dialogical approach to politics on contemporary political theory will be further explored in the succeeding chapters of this research. For now we shall focus our attention on Gadamerôs ethics and establish the propensity towards universality in his philosophy as against relativism.

In dealing with the ethical side to Gadamerôs philosophy, it will not be out of place to begin with his consideration in his Habilitation which was completed in 1928 and published as *Plato's Dialectical Ethics* in 1931. The basic position Gadamer establishes here is the fact that ñPlato is not a founded rationalist, proposing always the theory of ideas, but is rather a kind of discourse rationalist, falling back as it were on conversation and its agreements as the beginning and end of public rationality.ò[90] Basically, the aim is not to show that Platoôs ethics is dialectical, but to show that dialectics is an ethics in itself. On this he submits poetically that ñit will not be claimed here that Platonic ethics are dialectical but it will rather be asked in what sense the Platonic dialectic is ethics.ò[91] Establishing dialectics as ethics is at the base of Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and even his *Hermeneutics, Religion and Ethics* further establishes this case very clearly.

In this work Gadamer lays bare the ethical dimensions and orientations to his philosophical hermeneutics. This work is a collection of essays detailing out the dialectical nature of Aristotleôs ethics and how it connects with the general project of philosophical hermeneutics. In his paper, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethicsò he sets forth the basic problem with philosophical ethics. This dilemma rests on the fact that ñthe reflexive generality which is necessarily its philosophical metier entangles it in the questionableness of law-based ethics. How can it do justice to the concreteness with which conscience, sensitivity to equity and loving reconciliation are answerable to the situation?ò[92] Gadamer finds the answer in Kantôs ethical formalism and Aristotle. But he still notes that ñneither can do justice to the possibility of

philosophical ethics per se, but both can do so for their part of it.ò[93] Challenging the ethics of material value and showing some of the weaknesses of Kantôs moral formalism, he goes ahead to show how Aristotleôs philosophy completes the circle of philosophical ethics. The aim is here to establish that there can be no space for pure theorizing in ethics. Ethics has to be context or situation based; it cannot be a purely theoretical affair. And even when it is theoretical it cannot be separated from practice lest it is not true theory. This is because ñ*theoria* does not stand in absolute opposition to praxis, but is in itself the highest praxis, one of the highest modes of human being.ò[94] Gadamer questions the premising of virtue on knowledge as a wrong approach to ethics and a wrong interpretation of Aristotle. The point is that ethical applications must be based on the situation and context in which action is required. It is for this reason that ñthe sense for the multiply conditioned, which constitutes Aristotleôs speculative genius, becomes fruitful for moral philosophy; for here and here alone emerges an answer to the question that has been plaguing us, namely; how a philosophical ethics, a human doctrine of the human, is possible without requiring a superhuman self-transcendence.ò[95] Based on this Gadamer concludes finally that ñAristotleôs ethics is able to take cognizance of the conditionedness of all human beings without having to deny its own conditionedness. A philosophical ethics that is not only aware of its own questionableness in this way, but takes that very questionableness as one of its essential contents seems to me the only kind that is adequate to the unconditionality of the moral.ò[96] Thus, distanciation in the discourse of moral issues does not hit at the kernel of moral practice and of practical philosophy for Gadamer.

In delineating the sphere of practical philosophy as it should operate within ethics, Gadamer notes that *praxis* does not just become the object of *theoria*, but as the method of conceptual analysis within practical philosophy ñis grounded upon the commonalities that bind us allé ò,[97] and this commonality is best established in friendship ñfor among friends everything

is common.ò[98] This brings friendship into the heart of Gadamerôs ethics. This concept of friendship within ethics also forms one of the bases for his appreciation of the ethics of Aristotle over Kantôs formalism. Writing on this he affirms that ñtwo extensive books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* deal with the subject ï whereas in Kantôs moral philosophy friendship merits only a single page!ò[99] Gadamerôs attention to friendship at the beginning of his academic carrier as far back as 1928 with his inaugural lecture titled ñThe Role of Friendship in Philosophical Ethicsò was motivated by two factors. The first was Heideggerôs assertion that ówe still do not think of the Greeks in a way that is Greek enoughô. Along with this was the neo-Kantian critique of transcendental idealism that was rising after WWI committed to establishing that the then contemporary transcendental philosophy was not enough to comprehend what makes the discourse of God possible. The second was a more practical motivation. Given the demolition of the liberal periodôs optimism about progress following the catastrophe of the First World War, there was the need to construct a new understanding of human (and also civic) community. This is because the consciousness of a deep crisis pertained just as much to the human relations to God as to the óworldlyô relations of ócommunity and societyô.[100] These two basically motivates Gadamerôs involvement with friendship.

In structuring out how this good of friendship should operate within ethics, Gadamer had first to define its basic essence over and above the idea of self-consciousness as was prevalent in the transcendental and phenomenological philosophy of his time.[101] Here too we see an appreciation and appropriation of Heidegger in the works of Gadamer. The point is that by ignoring the concept of the present-at-hand in their construction of subjectivity, their scheme could not satisfy the ontological demands of the concept. The temporal character of existence is very fundamental to the making of subjectivity and this is a more robust understanding of subjectivity. For this reason Gadamer ñnecessarily directed his attention to the fact that a

phenomenon like friendship, its consistency and constancy, could not be properly understood by beginning with self-consciousness.ò[102] There now has to be a move to the other in order to properly categorize the self. Subjective absolutism now has to be challenged. The development of intersubjectivity as was the case in Husserl was not enough for his categorization was roped in the modern scientific conceptualization.[103] As a reaction to this, Gadamer moves in the direction of the Aristotlean concept of friendship. The point there is that beyond self-love and reciprocity, *partners must not remain concealed from each other*. This openness is the fundamental point in the making of friendship; friends must be openly bound to each other which signifies a life together.[104] This concept of friendship also leads to a fuller or better appreciation of the self or self-knowledge for the friend mirrors the self. But,

> because this other, this counterpart, is not oneôs own mirror image, but rather the friend, all powers come into play of increasing devotion to the ôbetter selfô that the other is for oneself, and this is something more than good resolution and inward stirrings of conscience. All of it flows into the full stream of self-forming commonalities in which one begins to feel and recognize oneself. What is thus communicated is not just sentiment or disposition; it signifies a real embedding in the texture of communal human life.[105]

It is in this mirroring that well-being is appropriately allotted to humans. Although the ontological level of God is above participating with others to achieve well-being. This shows that, Godôs well-being is independent of ours. But for us humans, the measure of the well-being we enjoy is premised on the measure of integration we have with the other through friendship.

The final phase of this structuring of friendship in Gadamer is the with-structure. This structure is constituted by other elements like: perceiving-with, knowing-with, thinking-with; that is, living with and being with. Self-sufficiency here rests necessarily with all the friends who belong within a network. Here what one does through a friend one does through himself as well. But Gadamer thinks this is not the whole story of humanity. This is the case because

> é friends are essential in human self-understanding. Through exchange with friends who share our view and intentions but who can also correct and strengthen them, we draw nearer to the divine, which possesses continually what is possible for us humans only intermittently: presence, wakefulness, self-

> presence in ógiestô. As natural beings, we are humans divided from ourselves by sleep, just as we are divided from ourselves as intellective beings by forgetting. Yet our friends can keep watch in our place and think for us.[106]

This process of exchange in intentions for either refinement or confirmation does not only express the propensity towards divinity for humans as Gadamer suggests. It is also the bane for the formation of universality in his philosophy. The courage to be open to the other and to be willing to be either corrected or accepted by this other is a fundamental aspect to the making of universality. That we can agree or even disagree to agree is key to universality. It will make some sense therefore, to submit that in Gadamerôs philosophy universality is more a function of agreement than of methodological rigour and achievements. And what is more, this system of agreement and collaboration abhors all forms of relativism. This is because for an opinion to be adjudged worthy it has to be collectively agreed upon, and as such any private system cannot hold sway in any way in this context. Secondly, this approach also dispels the notion that universalization in whatever form must be abstract and removed from praxis. Writing on this, Gadamer submits that ñuniversalization, then, does not involve distanciation into the theoretical, but belongs essentially to the rationality of moral experience itself. This is the decisive thing, however: all universalization presupposes the normative validity of a ruling ethos and one being raised in it; it is not something of which one becomes aware of in a theoretical manner, but rather by entering into the concrete logos of moral awareness and choice.ò[107] The presence of a ruling ethos and being raised in it as well as the fact that logos constitutes manôs nature bring the concept of choice, agreement and the present-to-hand into the theoretical categorization of univeralization like it has never been done before. Consequently, universals are not thrown from space but are products of our deliberate and rational choice based on the situation at hand. In Summary therefore, situatedness which is at the core of Gadamerôs philosophy raises the issue of prejudices in both politics and ethics, but the attention Gadamer gives to friendship over consciousness and self-consciousness, and the emphasis on the speaking culture and its

deliberative attitude raises a perspective to universality that appreciates deliberative and context sensitive agreement. As such any charge of relativism against Gamaderôs philosophical hermeneutics is tantamount to an unwholesome appreciation of Gadamerôs philosophy.

3.13 Fundamental Ontology, Truth and Method: Summarizing the Imperative of the Prejudicial Rationality

In summarizing this chapter, it is noted that Gadamer like his predecessor Heidegger was involved in fundamental ontology. By fundamental ontology is meant the rational appreciation of those fore-structures that inaugurate the encounter with ontology as a field of study. A study of how the preconditions of being affect the constitution and the projection of being within ontology as a field of study. This is clear from the fact that Gadamer totally appropriates Heideggerôs ontology of facticity and the fore-conceptions of understanding. But he improves it in that he introduces questioning and the fusing of horizons into his speculations. As such, rather than being held up within our situation and seeking nothing (which obviously is relativism), we see a motion to a new attitude towards universality that emphasizes collaboration rather than methodological elimination.

Thus, Gadamerôs academic carrier centers on establishing the importance of truth over and above method. Method is considered as the scientific method and its instrumental and totalizing/eliminating approach to knowledge production. Gadamerôs motivation here rests on the desire to provide a philosophical justification for the extra-scientific experience of truth. Although Gadamer states that ñgiven the intermediate position (between the traditionary textôs strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended, distanced object and belonging to tradition) in which hermeneutics operates, it follows that its work is not to develop a procedure for understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place.ò[108] Despite this, the centrality of questioning in Gadamerôs scheme shows his preference for dialectics as the method for knowledge production within a tradition bound setting. Richard

Palmer makes the case better in his submission on the relationship between method and the subject that,

> in method, the theme to be investigated guides, controls and manipulates; in dialectics it is the theme that raises the issues that will be answered. The answer can only be given if it belongs to the theme and is situated in it. The interpretative situation is not anymore the situation of a person who questions and the situation of an object, considering that the one who questions should óbuildô methods that make the object accessible, on the contrary, the one who questions finds that he is the one being questioned by the theme (*Sache*). In such situation óthe schema subject-objectô is misleading because the subject becomes the object.[109]

For this reason, Palmer thinks that Gadamer prefers dialectics and by this token he is not overcoming method per se, but he is trying to rescue truth from the clutches of the exclusive reserve of the natural sciences have claimed to it for the human condition and for the production of living knowledge as against the instrumental approach of science and its method.

Given the obvious dissatisfaction with the exact sciences and their method, it becomes clear the notion of truth within which philosophical hermeneutics operates will not be the scientific notion of truth as correctness or the corroboration of a state of affairs. Truth here is rather disclosure, it is an unconcelment, it is an unfolding, an opening of a new perspective, a strange world. And given the imperative of the fore-conception of completeness, openness is demanded as the correct attitude to this disclosed world so that a fruitful fusion of horizons can take place. By this token, understanding evokes the disclosure of a world that may be all together strange. Science and its methodological approach that premises truth as correctness will demand an elimination of this strange world with its potential for truth that could better the self-understanding. Philosophical hermeneutics (and its prejudicial base) demands the appreciation of otherness within the context of sincere openness where questions are very vital in accessing and assessing the truth.

Endnotes

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeship*, Translated by Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 3.
2. Alfons Greider, ñA Conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer,ò *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 26, 1995: 116.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, 35.
4. Robert J. Dostal, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18.
5. Robert J. Dostal, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer,* 22.
6. Robert J. Dostal, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, 24.
7. See,Etsuro Makita, *Gadamer-Bibliographie: 1922–1944* (New York: Peter Lang, 1994).
8. Robert J. Dostal, *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, 9.
9. David E. Linge, *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Bekerley: University of California Press, 1976. xi
10. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd and Revised Edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2004), 288.
11. Michel Foucault, ñNietzsche, Genealogy, History,ò in *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 86-87.
12. David E. Linge, *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, xi.
13. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, xxi.
14. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, xviii.
15. Richard E. Palmer (Ed.), *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 89.
16. Although Gadamer recognizes Schleiermacherôs óbrilliant comments on grammatical interpretationô, his basic criticism of Schleiermacher centres on his psychological interpretation, which ógradually came to dominate the development of this thoughtô. In order to recreate the authorôs intention as Schleiermacher thinks, the interpreter must discover the authorôs seminal decision. For Gadamer, this emphasis on psychological interpretation implies that the subject matter is ignored in understanding a text and is replaced by an aesthetic reconstruction of the individuality of the author (See, Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics,* 97). This is an obvious deficiency for Gadamer given the role of the subject matter (sache) in his hermeneutics.
17. Dilthey is especially important because he argues that understanding in the human sciences is essentially different from understanding in the natural sciences. Diltheyôs project is to justify philosophically knowledge claims in the human sciences. He recognizes that the historian, who is to understand history, is himself a historical being living in a particular tradition. Since the historian cannot attain an objective point of view, which is possible in the natural sciences, valid knowledge must be derived from lived experiences. Dilthey argues that validity is possible since in an experience óthe identity between consciousness and object é is still demonstrable realityô. In other words, valid meaning is created ófrom the historical reality of lifeô. According to Gadamer, the problem Dilthey faces concerns moving from valid knowledge at the individual level to valid knowledge of meaningful structures within history itself. To accomplish this he must introduce ológical subjectsô instead of óreal subjectsô (See, Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics,* 97-8). And the use of logical subjects inevitably returns the method back to that of the natural sciences which Gadamer seeks to oppose.
18. Richard E. Palmer (Ed.), *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings,* 89-90.
19. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics* (Durham: ACUMEN Publishing Limited, 2006), 100.
20. David E. Linge, *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, xlvii.
21. Lauren Barthold, *Prejudice and Understanding: Gadamer's Ontological Hermeneutics*, Thesis Submitted in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for Degree of Mater of Arts in Department of Philosophy, (Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, 1996). 35.
22. David E. Linge, *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, xlviii.

23. David E. Linge, *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, li.
24. Dmitri N. Shalin, Hermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger and Gadamer in Their Historical Settingò, *Russian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 3, Nos. 1/2 (W inter/Spring 2010), 11.
25. Richard E. Palmer (Ed.), *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings*, 44.
26. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñClassical and Philosophical Hermeneutics,ò in *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings*, ed. Ricahrd E. Palmer, 62.
27. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñClassical and Philosophical Hermeneutics,ò 68.
28. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 90.
29. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, 82.
30. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, 111.
31. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, 112.
32. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*,77.
33. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 3.
34. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 5.
35. This distinction is not logical but psychological. Hence the human scientist has to have a stockpile of other requirements to get at knowledge, that is, a well stocked memory and the acceptance of authority. Whereas the self-conscious inferences of the natural scientist depends entirely on the use of his own reason. But then, Gadamer still opines that ñeven if one acknowledges that this great natural scientist has resisted the temptation of making his own scientific practice a universally binding norm, he obviously had no other logical terms in which to characterize the procedure of the of the human sciences than the conception of induction familiar to him from Millôs *Logic*.ò (See, Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 5) Thus Helmholtz relies on Millôs *Logic* which has no place in the human sciences in his own estimation.
36. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 6.
37. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 7.
38. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 10.
39. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 11.
40. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 13.
41. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 15-6.
42. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 18.
43. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 18-9.
44. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 24.
45. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 24-5.
46. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 31.
47. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 34.
48. J.Grondin, ñHumanism and Hermeneutic Limits of Rationality,ò *Paru in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 16 (1993), 417-432.
49. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 271.
50. Lauren Barthold, *Prejudice and Understanding: Gadamer's Ontological Hermeneutics*, 8.
51. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 272.
52. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 273.
53. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 274.
54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 275.
55. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 277.
56. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 277.
57. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 278.
58. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 281.
59. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 282.
60. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 296.

61. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 298.
62. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 300.
63. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 304.
64. Michel Foucault, ñNietzsche, Genealogy, History,ò in *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 90.
65. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 305.
66. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 305.
67. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 355.
68. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 355.
69. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 294.
70. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. & ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 3.
71. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 13.
72. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 13.
73. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 15.
74. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics* (Durham: ACUMEN Publishing Limited, 2006), 126.
75. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 16.
76. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 9.
77. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñMan and Language,ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, 64.
78. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 124.
79. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñMan and Language,ò 68.
80. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,ò 11.
81. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, 38.
82. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 356-70.
83. Robert R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer* (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1980), 7.
84. Robert R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer*, 61.
85. Robert R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer*, 60.
86. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 324.
87. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 325.
88. That is a Platonic rather than a Xenophonian, or Aristophanic one.
89. Robert R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer*, 86.
90. Robert R. Sullivan, *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer*, 13.
91. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1931; Hamburg, 1968, 1984), xv.
92. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics,ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer (Yale University Press, 1999), 22.
93. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics,ò 22.
94. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics,ò 19.
95. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics,ò 35.
96. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics,ò 37.
97. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy,ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, 119.
98. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy,ò 119.
99. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy,ò 118.
100. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñFriendship and Self Knowledge,ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, 128-9.
101. See, Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñSubjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person,ò *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 33, Issue 3, July 2000. 275-287, for detail of this discourse.

102. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñFriendship and self Knowledge,ò 129.
103. See, Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñSubjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person,ò 283.
104. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñFriendship and self Knowledge,ò 135.
105. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñFriendship and self Knowledge,ò 140.
106. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñFriendship and self Knowledge,ò 141.
107. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñThe Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy,ò 115.
108. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 295.
109. Richard Palmer, ñ*Hermeneutica* [Hermeneutics]ò, 170. Quoted in Celso Luiz Ludwig, ñHermeneuticsð The Path of The Hermeneutic-Ontological Shift and The Decolonial Shift,ò *Nevada Law Journal* Vol. 10, October, 2010. 629-645, 634.

CHAPTER FOUR
A TRANSMODERN READING OF GADAMER

4.1 Preamble

The core of this chapter focuses on two things. The first is to establish the transmodern elements in the philosophy of Gadamer and that is why the chapter is entitled óa transmodern reading of Gadamerô. Secondly, and a consequence of the first focus, the chapter establishes the Gadamerian roots of the transmodern project. To do this appropriately, the chapter first exposes the frame for Gadamerôs critique of the Enlightenment. Next, the chapter considers the turn that the transmodern project inaugurates in contemporary philosophy. This will lead into the anti-Cartesian epistemic foundations of the transmodern project and eventually into their attempt to resist the universalization of provincial reason. After these, the chapter closes with a discussion of the direct point of interaction between Gadamer and the transmodern project. This final section achieves the dual aim of at once establishing the transmodern orientation of Gadamerôs philosophy and indicating the Gadamerian roots of the transmodern project.

4.2 Gadamer and the Critique of the Enlightenment

The basic transmodern orientation in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer is his critique of the Enlightenment. The various elements of this critique have been considered in the previous chapter. But the discourse here spells out the basic frame of this critique so as to serve as a background to the discourse of the transmodern critique of modernity and to aid the identification of the moment of intersection between Gadamer and the transmodern project. The roots of Enlightenment thought, to which Gadamer reacted, are to be found in the so-called New Science, that is, the natural sciences rapidly developing in various centres of activity in seventeenth-century Europe. ñGalileo in Italy and Newton and Bacon in England established scientific method with its reliance upon reason and observation. The French mathematician and philosopher, René Descartes, is a key figure in the formation of Enlightenment thought.ò[1] Descartes is given this prominent role because he was the philosopher who ñsought to give

philosophy the kind of foundation and certainty he witnessed in the natural sciences. In part, Descartes is responsible for a key notion in Enlightenment thought, namely, method.ò[2] Gadamerôs reaction to this concept of method is reflected even in the title of his work *Truth and Method*. McCusker continues on this that, ñfor Gadamer, the fixation in modernity on empirical validity as determined by Cartesian method has limited the possibilities of understanding by obscuring alternative ways of approaching truth.ò[3] For this reason Gadamer embarks on the task of redefining the relation between truth and method.

The Enlightenment as an intellectual and cultural movement was a reaction to the place and prominence of the Church and of clerics in the society as it was the case in the Middle Ages. Little wonder, ñmany of the thinkers of the French Enlightenment were fiercely anti-clerical,ò[4] and their crusades directed primarily against superstition and tradition, for which often the focus was the authority and power of the church. In contrast to Christian traditions, the Enlightenment orientation held that ñ*reason* was the means to gain access to the truth.ò[5] In promoting dependency upon reason instead of óauthorityô, the Enlightenment had generated a shift towards reasoning about the origins, authenticity and legitimacy of knowledge. Kantôs own question, roughly paraphrased from his great Critique, was: ówhat are the grounds for the legitimacy of our knowledge?ô[6] His basic claim here rests on the fact that authority and legitimacy were validated not by accepted tradition but by universal reason. This universal reason becomes the new litmus test for establishing the credentials of any system of belief or set of practices.

Aside the prominence of universal reason, as one of the defining qualities of the Enlightenment, the idea of ó*objectivity*ô was also reinstated in the Enlightenment. Also, the Enlightenmentôs association with science and logic and the related dissemination of rational systems of understanding led naturally to the tendency to consider the natural sciences and its method as superior to the human sciences. This is ñin contrast to pre-Enlightenment reliance

upon the power of tradition, the Enlightenment put forward the idea that adherence to a strict scientific method would establish reliable and well-founded truths.ò[7] As a reaction to this, Gadamer develops, in quite a great detail, the epistemic credibility of the human sciences as distinct from the natural sciences. Writing on Gadamerôs revival of the human sciences within the context of knowledge formation, Charles Taylor argues that,

> é in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer shows how understanding a text or event, which comes to us out of our history, has to be construed, not on the model of the ñscientificò grasp of an object, but rather on that of speech-partners who come to an understanding (*Verstaïndigung*). If we follow Gadamerôs argument here, we come to see that this is probably true of human science as such. That is, it is not simply knowledge of our own past that needs to be understood on the óconversationô model, but knowledge of the other as such, including disciplines such as anthropology, where student and studied often belong to quite different civilizations.[8]

Following the above, Taylor concludes that, ñthis view has come to be widely accepted today, and it is one of the great contributions that Gadamer has made to the philosophy of this and succeeding centuries.ò[9] Besides reviving the human sciences by reacting to the elevation of the scientific method as one of the points of critique of the Enlightenment in Gadamer, other points of his critique include: (i) the revival and rethinking of prejudice, (ii) the defense of tradition in knowledge production and acquisition, and (iii) the essential linguisticality of human existence. These have been discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. But they are mentioned here in order to set the background for the transmodern critique of modernity with a view to stating clearly Gadamerôs transmodern orientation. What then are the core elements of the transmodern project?

4.3 The Transmodern Project and the Decolonial Turn

The transmodern project is at once a metacritique of modernity and of global capitalism. The point to be established here is that just like the linguistic and pragmatic turns in contemporary philosophy, the decolonial turn also suggests a significant moment in the march of contemporary philosophy and this was inaugurated by the transmodern project. In establishing this claim, one needs to understand that postcoloniality, multiculturalism and transmodernism all

share basic features in terms of the time of their historical emergence in contemporary philosophy and also the issues surrounding such an emergence. But the uniqueness of transmodernism lies in its decolonial turn. In fleshing out this point, the differences between transmodernism, postcoloniality and multiculturalism will be laid out and also the nexus between them. The opinion favoured here is that transmodernity is broader in scope than postcoloniality and multiculturalism. More precisely, postcoloniality and multiculturalism are trends within transmodernism. This becomes clearer when one looks at the flow of history from the modern times up till now. Within the chronological motion of history in the context of philosophy, modernity is immediately succeeded by postmodernity. Thus, etymologically postmodernity is the after of modernity and this constitutes also its essence as a historical movement. But as an intellectual movement, it is a reaction to the hegemonic, totalizing and authoritarian tendencies in modernism. Little wonder, Francios Lyotard contends that, ñI define postmodernism as incredulity towards metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences, but that progress in turn presupposes it.ò[10] Within philosophic tradition, the chief advocates of the tendency which postmodernism resists are ñDescartes, whose method of radical skepticism led to the foundationalist claim that accurate beginning will finally be made; and Hegel, whose synthetic approach, first of all, organized the entire tradition into a purposive and dialectical whole and then assumed that it had reached its apogee with no further work to be done.ò[11] But the undoing of posmodernity rests in its claim that there are a plurality of valid systems. Hence, the relativism of the postmodernist project.[12] Thus, postmodernity fragments the epistemic space all in the bid to end the tyranny of the modernity and its epistemic arrogance.

Transmodernity reacts sharply to this relativism of postmodernity and the excesses of modernity as well.[13] This is its starting point as an intellectual movement. It is that stage of the flow of philosophical history which comes after postmodernity; just as postmodernity is the after

of modernity, so transmodernity is the post of postmodermity, the after of after modernity. Given its stage within the flow of philosophical history, its project and focus is broader than that of multiculturalism and postcolonial studies. It is in the mapping out of its intellectual focus that it now meets with the aspirations of postcolonial studies and multiculturalism. Despite this, it is the task of postcolonial studies that dovetails more with the transmodern project than that of multiculturalism. This is because the colonial sentiment is the site of the inauguration of its philosophical attitude. But way beyond just reacting to the postcolonial condition, it is a reaction to a discourse; to a whole phase of narrative within philosophy. This too is the point of motivation for postcolonial studies; it is a critique of the discourses of modernity while multiculturalism is just minority studies.[14] Here the ñpostcolonial and post-occidental theorizing areé post-subaltern forms of knowledges and rationality. As diverse sets of theoretical practices emerging from and responding to colonial legacies at the intersection of Euro-American modern history, they represent a new accounting of modern colonial histories with a view to superseding subalternity and recasting subaltern knowledges.ò[15] It is quite clear from the task of postcoloniality (and postoccidentalism) that they seek to achieve same goals as the transmodern; they both challenge the natural march of modernity as the only historical option.

Despite the intersection between the two (postcoloniality and transmodernity) as stated above, the first undoing of postcoloniality as far as the transmodern project is concerned is the fact that it achieved full self realization only in the United States of America. On this Mignolo submits that ñthe postcolonial begins when Third World intellectuals have arrived in First World academy.ò[16] Tlostanova and Mignolo continued further on this point that,

> in the US (around the 1970s) the concern was with the body-politics of knowledge. It was the moment of the creation of women studies, ethnic studies, Chicano/Latino/a studies, African-American Studies; Queer Studies, Asian-America Studies, etc. The post-colonial studies emerged mainly in the US in this particular context. The novelty was that it put the geoplitics of knowledge on the table of an already subversive scenario centered on the body-politics of

> knowledge. The postcolonial theories and/or postcolonial studies entered the US carrying in their hands the books of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan.[17]

Given this starting point for the postcolonials, their approach was only focused on dealing with the problem of subaltern knowledge from within the Euro-centric focus.

Still on placing the difference between the postcolonial and the transmodern, Mignolo submits that ñthe notion of trans-modernity may help us in moving beyond post-modernity and post-coloniality, both prefixes are still caught in the ómodernô ideology of a linear concept of time; of the unfolding of history.ò[18] The truth in this becomes clearer when one realizes the centrality of the colonization of not just space, but also of time within the network of the colonial matrix of power. With the articulation of the concept of modernity as against the Middle Ages, the moments of the colonization movement becomes double faced: initially that of time and later that of space. ñColonization of time was created by the simultaneous invention of the Middle Age in the process of conceptualizing the Renaissance; the colonization of space by the colonization and conquest of the new world.ò[19] For this reason, the entanglement with the prefix of ópostô in postmodernity and postcoloniality places them within the colonial matrix of power.

Given this entanglement within the colonial matrix of power, transmodernity opts rather for a decolonial rather than a postcolonial, postmodern or multicultural turn. What then is the decolonial turn? It seeks to reawaken and to valorize the silenced side of modernity right from its inception. It places the locus of its enunciation in the colonial wound or rather the colonial difference. It seeks to complete the unfinished project of decolonization and this it does by setting out what it calls óthe myth of modernityô.[20] It is a phase of disenchantment; ñthis disenchantment ï no longer that of ótraditionô or religion, as Weber had highlighted ï but rather of those forms of Eurocentric knowledge that represent a central part of what Dussel calls the ómyth of modernityô...ò[21] That the European and American models of development and well-being are inherently repressive and *an-other* world is indeed possible. In this *an-other* world,

rather than the celebration and elevation of the universalization of greed as global capitalism seeks to do, it ñaims to restore the logic of the gift through a decolonial politics of receptive generosity.ò[22] Here otherness is reconceptualized and the other who is voiceless and invisible is given a voice and brought to vision. Neither the people, the multitude, nor the preliterate are the focus. But as Torres puts it, ñthe damnes, different from the people, the proliterate, or the multitude, can be taken as the primordial object of Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.ò[23] The shift at this point is not only quantitative (increasing the size of the participants in the discourse), it is also qualitative (changing the rules of the game and the primary determinants of truth). Tlostanova makes this clearer within the context of the discourse of decolonial humanistic studies. Tlostanova claims that the decolonial option rejects ñthe very essence and structure of the existing system of knowledge in humanities, it refuses to accept its fundamental logic and methodological apparatus which is impossible to disentangle from the material, being analysed. This shift is a qualitative one, not just a quantitative one as is often the case in postcolonial studies.ò[24] The colonial wound is the fundamental starting point and from this point the transmodern project seeks to challenge the discourse of modernity. This makes the transmodern decolonial option a ófromô and a óbeyondô. Its space of contestation comes from the legacies of coloniality or the colonial wound and the proponents of the transmodern project, aim to move beyond it. Colonilaity appears as a neologism in the transmodern discourse. The difference between this concept and colonialism within the tranmodern project will be considered in the next chapter. This work subsequently considers the epistemic foundations of the transmodern project.

4.4 Anti-Cartesianism and the Epistemic Foundations of the Transmodern Project

The philosophy of Rene Descartes and particularly his formulation the *cogito ego sum* was at the heart of the epistemic foundation of modernity. For this reason transmodernism in building its epistemic framework begins by deconstructing Cartesian epistemology, showing its agenda and the role it plays in the making of the colonial matrix of power. In doing this, the proponents of the transmodern project sought to show the extent to which the Cartesian pretension to an unprejudiced approach to knowledge acquisition and production was in fact entangled in the very opposite of what it claims to establish. Some of the scholars here even question the truth as to whether Descartes was really the founder and opening philosopher of the modern era in philosophy.

Enrique Dussel begins his anti-Cartesian discourse by questioning whether Descartes was the first modern philosopher. Working through the Hegelian lecture on the philosophy of history, Dussel submits that Descartes shows up in Hegelôs *Philosophy of History* at a very Eurocentric /provincial stage in Hegelôs categorization of the history of philosophy and the world in general. After summarizing the various stages of the history of philosophy as detailed out by Hegel beginning from oriental philosophy through Greek philosophy and culminating in Modern philosophy, Dussel notes that this stage of philosophy within Hegelôs scheme is quite Eurocentric. This is because at this point Hegel outlines the unique achievements of the modern period. The invention of the gunpowder and the disappearance of individual enmity in warfares, the discovery of America, its treasure, and its peoples, the discovery of nature and manôs discovery of himself. On the context of Hegelôs work at this stage, Dussel submits thus:

> In the first place, evidently, Hegel introduces Jacob Boehme (born in Alt-Seidenberg in 1575) who is a German, the mystical and popular thinker of the ñGermanic interiorityò, representing an amusing and nationalist folkoric note; but nothing more. In the second place, although he attempts to speak of ñhistoric-external factors of the life circumstances of philosophers,ò he doesnôt go beyond indicating sociological aspects that make the modern philosopher not a monk but a common man of the street, one who ñis not isolated from the rest

> of society.ò In no way does he imagineð in his Northern-European ignoranceð the global geopolitical cataclysm that had occurred since the end of the 15th century in all cultures on Earth (in the Far East, Southeast Asia, India, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Indigenous North America, from the European invasion of the ñfourth continentò).
>
> It is within this provincial, Eurocentric view that Descartes appears in the historical discourse of Hegel as he who ñinitiates the authentic philosophy of the modern epochò.[25]

Thus, one sees that there is a Eurocentric vision in focus even within Hegelôs *Philosophy of History* for it celebrates, simply, the achievements of Europe. The point here is that Europe, particularly Western Europe, was the heart of Europe and the heart of the world at large. Hence, there was already a categorization of the regions of the world in the philosophy of Hegel.

Dussel continues his deconstruction of the idea of Descartes as the first of modern philosopher by exploring and exposing the Jesuit and Augustinian influences on Descartes. On the influence of the Jesuits on Descartes, Dussel tries to show that Descartes studied with the Jesuits when they were recalled back into France in 1603 by King Henry. The kind of education here was modern in every sense of the word. Dussel writes

> The education provided, according to the Council of Trentð which ómodernized,ô by rationalizing, all aspects of the Catholic Churchð was completely ómodernô in its *ratio studiorum*. Each Jesuit constituted a singular, independent, and modern *subjectivity*, performing daily an individual óexamination of conscience,ô without communal choral hymns or prayers as was the case with medieval Benedictine monks. Put differently, the young Descartes needed to withdraw into silence three times a day, *to reflect* on his own subjectivity and óexamineô with extreme *self-consciousness* and *clarity* the intention and content of every action, the actions carried out hour-by-hour, judging these actions according to the criterion that óman is raised to praise, revere, and serve Godô. These examinations were a remembrance of St. Augustine of Hippoôs *exercitatio animi*. It was a daily practice of the *ego cogito*: ôI have self-consciousness of having done this and thatô, all of which dominated the subjectivity in a disciplined manner.[26]

Thus, one sees the beginning of the idea of digging deep into subjectivity as the surest foundation for knowledge as would become Descartes specific contribution to knowledge. Beside this, the studies undertaken here were very methodic. Even his studies in logic were focused on and taken primarily from the works of the Mexican philosopher Antonio Rubio (1548-1615).[27] He also studied the works of Francisco Suarez *Disputationes Metaphysicae* as he (Descartes) would even note in his confessions. Based on these facts, Dussel asks, óshouldnôt the

16th century, then, have some philosophical interest? Is Descartes not the fruit of a *prior* generation that prepared the path? Were there not *modern* Iberian-American philosophers before Descartes, who opened up the problematic of modern philosophy?ô

On the other hand, Dussel still makes the case for the Augustinian influence of Descartes highly revered *ego cogito.* In Dusselôs opinion,

> the subject of the *ego cogito* has its Western and Mediterranean antecedents, although this does not undermine in any way its *novelty*. The references to Augustine of Hippo are undeniable, although Descartes occasionally tried to seem to not have been inspired by the great Roman rhetorician from Northern Africa. And nor did he admit the influence of Francisco Sánchez, or anyone else. In effect, during his time Augustine argued against the skepticism of the academics; Descartes against the skepticism of the libertines. To do so, he referred to the indubitability of the *ego cogito*.[28]

Following the above Dussel also thinks that the idea of the *ego cogito* is not exclusively Cartesian, but even has elements from the Augustinian *Civitate Dei.* Going further Dussel makes an analysis of the various strands of pre-Cartesian thinking in the works of Suarez and Gimes de Sepulveda which led to the *ego conquiro* from which Descartes stealthly develops the idea of the *ego cogito*. Within the context of the *ego conquiro*, the debates were around justifying war against the non believers in the New World and this also generated theological justification to plunder the indigenes of these worlds considering them as inferior due to their lack of any Christian faith or faith in the supreme God of Christianity. Dussel also takes time to spell out the critique of the nascent modernity as was the case in the works of Bartolomede las Casas, but which was caught still within the current racial category of the time, for he still had to categorize the world and made others superior and others inferior. But the first and truest critique of modernity from exteriority was produced in the works of Felipe Guaman Poman Ayala. As a conclusion to his discourse, Dussel maintains that, ôDescartesô future *ego cogito* would constitute a *cogitatum* whichð among other *beings* at its dispositionð would situate the corporality of colonial subjects as exploitable machines, like those of the Indians on the Latin American

encomienda, mita, or *hacienda,* or the African slaves on the õbig houseô of plantations in Brazil, the Caribbean, or New England. Behind Modernityôs back these colonial subjects would have their õhuman beingô taken away from them forever, until todayô. This is the real beginning of the *ego cogito* for it was preceded by the *ego conquiro* in the first place; this was the first phase of modernity. Hence, the Cartesian outburst into modernity constitutes the second phase of modernity. Thus, ñif Modernity does not commence philosophically with Descartes, and if he should be considered instead as the great thinker of the *second moment* of *early* Modernityò when the concealment, not of Heideggerian õbeingô but rather ó*colonial* being,ô had already occurredò then an entire process of *philosophical decolonization* needs to be undertaken.ò[29] This was the justification for Dusselôs development of the transmodern projects specifically the ethics of liberation because Levinas and even critical theory did not adequately deal with the fall outs of the colonial takeover of the colonial subjects.

Maldonado Torres further develops Dusselôs ideas on the anti-Cartesian meditations. On the issue of *ego conquiro* with regard to Dusselôs schemes Torres maintains that:

> Enrique Dussel states that Herman Cortes gave expression to an ideal of subjectivity that could be defined as the *ego conquiro,* which predates Rene Descartesôs articulation of the *ego cogito*. This means that the significance of the Cartesian *cogito* for modern European identity has to be understood against the backdrop of an unquestioned ideal of self expressed in the notion of the *ego conquiro*. The certainty of the self as conqueror, of its tasks and missions, preceded Descartesôs certainty about the self as a thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and provided a way to interpret it.[30]

This means that the practical conquering of self and the theoretical thinking substance are parallel in terms of their certainty. The *ego conquiro* is not questioned, but rather provides the grounds for the articulation of the *ego cogito*. Thus, what is most obvious here is the fact that the *ego conquiro* had already been articulated before the *ego cogito* and that the intellectual atmosphere of the articulation of the *ego conquiro* was that within which the *ego cogito* was articulated. Torres further suggests that just as the certainty of the Cartesian subject is

determined by the methodic doubt; a form of skepticism, so too is the certainty of the mission of the *ego conquiro* fixed on a form skepticism to. Hence, ‘before Cartesian methodic skepticismé became central for modern understanding of self and world, there was another kind of skepticism in modernity which became constitutive of it. Instead of the methodic attitude that leads to the *ego cogito*, this form of skepticism defines the attitude that sustains the *ego conquiro*’. More specifically, Torres submits once again that, ‘I characterize this attitude as racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism. It could also be rendered as the *imperial attitude*, which gives definition to modern Imperial Man.’[31] The modern imperial man will later become the man Torres suggests should be killed before coloniality can be brought under control.

This misanthropic skepticism unlike the methodic doubt is not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and mathematics. It is rather a form of questioning that very humanity of colonized peoples. Broadly, since the Cartesian idea is built on the division between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* (consciousness and matter) which eventually divides into the mind and body, that of the Manichean misanthropic skepticism can be said, to a large extent, to be built of the division between the *ego conquistador* and the *ego conquistado*. Thus, the very relationship between the colonizer and the colonized provided a new model to understand the relationship between the soul or mind and the body. With regard to the relationship between the *ego cogito* and *ego conquiro*, Torres observes that, ‘if the *ego conquiro* anticipates in some ways the subjective turn and the solipsism of the *ego cogito*, then the Manichean skepticism in some ways opens the door and shapes the reception of the Cartesian skepticism’. It is based on this that Torres then states the basic necessity for the deconstruction of the Cartesian epistemic foundations in any anti-modernity narrative or discourse. Given this necessity, ‘this point of view (the relationship between Manichean misanthropic skepticism and

Cartesian skepticism as stated above) also leads to the idea that it would be impossible to provide an adequate account of the crises of modern Europe without reference, not only to the limits of the Cartesian view of the world, but also the traumatic effects of the Manichean misanthropic skepticism and its imperial ethosô. This kind of skepticism is like a worm in the heart of modernity. This is because the achievements of the *ego cogito* and instrumental rationality operate within the logic that misanthropic skepticism helped to establish. This misanthropic skepticism provides the basis for the preferential option for the *ego conquiro*, which explains why security for some can conceivably be obtained at the expense of the lives of others. With this orientation therefore, the ñthe imperial attitude promotes a fundamentally genocidal attitude in respect to colonized and racialized people. Through it colonial and racial subjects are marked as dispensable.ò[32] The attitude to the racialized subjects becomes that of acute hostility and inhumanity. This behaviour coincides more with the kind of actions shown at war, than with ethics that regulated life with other European Christians. It is within this context of the inhuman treatment of the colonial subjects justified by the Manichean misanthropic skepticism that Torres categorically designates coloniality as ña radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war. This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and slaving certain subjects ï e.g., indigenous and black ï as part of the enterprise of colonization.ò[33] Here then, to identify the Manichean misanthropic skepticism is key to deconstructing the Cartesian epistemic foundations of modernity and its intractable colonial undertones.

Furthermore, Ramon Grosfoguel presents some other dimensions to the issue of deconstructing the Cartesian influence in modern philosophy and its colonial overtures. For him, the key issue here is the fact that we speak or rationalize from a given position; we are situated and the influence of our situatedness is a constitutive part of our attempts at knowledge production whether we know it or not. Thus he writes, ñas feminist scholar Donna Haraway

(1988) has stated, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called their perspective ‘afro-centric epistemology’ (Collins, 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while the Latin American philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel, called it ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (Dussel, 1977) and following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldua (1987) I use the term, ‘body-politics of knowledge’.[34] In spelling out the details of what he means by the ‘body-politics of knowledge’, he observes thus:

> this is not only a question about social values in knowledge production, or about our knowledge being always partial knowledge. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. In western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis. The ‘ego-politics of knowledge’ of western philosophy has always privileged the myth of a *non-situated* ego, ego meaning the conscious thinking subject. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth about a *Truthful Universal* knowledge that conceals who is speaking, as well as, obscuring the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.[35]

The above makes clear the role of our contexts and situations in knowledge production and the falsity of a delocalized universal. As such, the western erasure of the thinking ego and its pretension to a universal is not altogether correct. In further making his point, Grosfoguel distinguished between the epistemic location and the social location of the thinking subject. In his opinion, just because one is located on the oppressed side of the colonial divide (social location) does not mean one is thinking from the subaltern rationality (epistemic location). This therefore means, somebody can be socially oppressed and be epistemically thinking from the position of the oppressor and this is the greatest achievement of the modern/colonial world; its ability to make colonial subject think from the position of the oppressor rather than the oppressed. By this token, Grosfoguel claims he is not advocating ‘an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. One claims that all knowledge forms are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the

power relations and that this positioning is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a western mythô Thus, the ego-politics of knowledge claims situational and disembodied neutrality to the possession of knowledge, while the geo/body-politics of knowledge claims situatedness as a fundamental and constitutive element in knowledge production.

From Grosfoguelôs scheme, there was first the ótheo-politics of knowledgeôof the middle ages where God was at the centre of knowledge production and projection, then came the ógo-politics of knowledgeôwhere all the epistemic qualities vested in God in the preceding age were transferred to man. Rene Descartes was fundamental to the making of this turn in modern philosophy. On this Grosfoguel explains:

> The Cartesian *ego-cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) is the foundation of modern western science. By producing dualisms between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim nonsituated, universal, God-eyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the ópoint zeroô perspective of Eurocentric philosophies (Castro-Gomez 2005). The *point zero* is the point of view that conceals itself; that is, it is the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of origin. It is this *god-eye view* that always hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism. Western philosophy privileges the ego politics of knowledge over the geopolitics of knowledge and the body-politics of knowledge. Historically, this has allowed western man to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to dismiss non-western knowledge as particularistic and, so unable to achieve universality.[36]

Here therefore, the ego becomes the sole determiner of true and universal knowledge. Nothing more contributes to the making of knowledge; for anything more was considered as a prejudice that should be dispelled out in the making of universal knowledge and this is the myth of the ego-politics of knowledge, its arrogant pretension to universal truth, while it is cunningly projecting a provincial knowledge base as universal. This becomes *the point zero* ground for this kind of epistemology. Beyond the ego, nothing more contributes to the making of knowledge.

This approach was fundamental to the triumph of the West in taking over the rest and particularly the colonial world. As the West denies the location of the subject of enunciation,

European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world. Based on this, we went from the 16th century characterization of ópeople without writingô to the 18th and 19th century characterization of ópeople without history,ô to the 20th century characterization of ópeople without developmentô and more recently, to the early 21st century of ópeople without democracyô. We went from the 16th century órights of peopleô (the Sepulveda versus de las Casas debate, in the school of Salamanca in the mid-16th century), to the 18th century órights of manô (the Enlightenment philosophers), and to the late 20th century óhuman rightsô. This changing nomenclature is part of the global strategies articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans. In the end then, unraveling and appropriately dealing with this myth of the point zero epistemology becomes the epistemic thrust of the transmodern project.

For Walter Mignolo, the epistemological critique of the modern/colonial world is at the heart of his scholarship interest. In his opinion, ñEpistemology is not ahistorical. But not only that, it cannot be reduced to the linear history from Greek to contemporary North Atlantic knowledge production. It has to be geographical in its historicity by bringing the colonial difference into the game.ò[37] By this articulation, the relationship between place and thinking is brought to the heart of epistemology; that is the issue of the geopolitics of knowledge. Notice that Grosfoguel calls it the body-politics of knowledge and Mignolo calls it the geopolitics of knowledge as against the ego-politics of knowledge. In outlining the advantages of the geopolitics of knowledge, Mignolo writes that

> the geo-politic of knowledge is twice relevant, then. First, it is the affirmation of what has been denied by the agents that created, enacted and expanded the theo and ego-politics of knowledge. Secondly, once geo-politics of knowledge is affirmed as the re-emergence of the reason that has been denied as reason, it

> makes visible what the theo- and ego-politics of knowledge occluded and still occludes, namely their own geo-political location, which is cloaked in the rhetoric of universality.[38]

Here, too, the issue of the universality of knowledge becomes implicated given the fact that knowledge is geographically articulated. Given Mignoloôs analysis of the coloniality of power and how it relates to historical capitalism and the desire of the West to universalize capitalism through its various expansionist movements since the 15th century, Mignolo observes that ñuniversalism, as the ideological key stone of historical capitalism, is faith as well as an epistemology, a faith in the real phenomenon of truth and the epistemology that justifies local truth with universal values.ò[39] Then he goes ahead to quote extensively from Wallerstein explaining the extent to which provincial ideals and ideas were imposed on other cultures in the name of universality, meanwhile the real issue was the expansion of capitalism a provincial economic ideal and preference. In his opinion, ñnobody has access to an ultimate truth, and, consequently no one person (or collective, church, or government) from the right to the left, can offer a solution for the entire population of the planet. That is why abstract universals (Christianity, Liberalism, Marxism, and Islamism) run out of fashion and become the different content of the same fundamentalist and imperial logic.ò[40] The truth of the claim above becomes clearer when one realizes that modernity was in fact more of a planetary phenomenon than a provincial one.

Enrique Dussel locates his discourse on anti-Cartesian mediations on Hegelôs *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. For Mignolo, way beyond Hegel also locates the discourse too in Kantôs *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. This discussion of Kant within the making of the modern/colonial world in the works of Mignolo has two bases: first within the context of the black legend and secondly within the context of cosmopolitanism and the decolonial option. Within the context of the black legend, Mignolo et al look at how Bartolome de las casasô categorization of the various races of the world was a template for Kantôs categorization too. One

of the reasons for the categorization of some races was the fact that some of these races lacked literal locutions. That European superiority with regard to these races was because they had alphabetic writing and Latin as well which was the language closest to God. Here the Turks, Arabs, Hebrews and Russians were considered barbaric because though they are alphabetic languages, none of them derive directly from Latin.[41] So, too, were races in the New World and Africa considered barbaric in the writings of de las Casas. Also, others were considered so because they lack the right religion. This became the template Kant adopts in his categorization of the races of the world as well. On this, Greer et al surmises that,

> in this respect, Las Casasô barbarians in the age of Christian imperialism became one template for Immanuel Kantôs racial classification of the ethnocontinental tetragon, this time based essentially on skin color: yellow Asia, black Africa, red America, and white Europe. For Kant as for Las Casas, none of the people inhabiting the globe outside of Europeð beyond Germany, France, and Englandð were apt to understand a central literary tradition, which for Kant was understood to be the beautiful and the sublime; the level of all non-Europeansô rationality thus becomes questionable. Such is the Kantian version of Las Casasôs second type of barbariansð those lacking literal locution. In the later half of the eighteenth century Kant said, following Hume, ôHume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the worldô.[42]

This tag of inferiority did not subsist only outside Europe, but also within Europe. The Spaniards were considered an inferior nation within the heart of Europe due to their accommodation of the Moores and Semitic races (this Was the core of the Back Legend, that Spain was an inferior race and this will be used By the British in their campaign against the Spaniards in the New World). Thus, Spain had for long been the internal racialized other of Europe. The point in all this for our research is the fact that Kant here adopts a form of racial categorization of the world which was a function of an already existing colonial prejudice that saw Europe as most developed and had the responsibility to help the other races of the world develop while exploiting them.

On the second level, Mignolo in discussing cosmopolitanism and the decolonial option details out the basic elements of Kantôs racial categorization of the world. On the character of the nations, the character of the nations are limited to six European nations: France, England, and Germany in the first round; Italy, Spain, and Portugal in the second round.[43] Quoting Kant directly, Mignolo notes that Kant arrives at the frontier of ónations,ô encloses this section stressing its limits ñsince Russia has not yet developed definite characteristics from its natural potential; since Poland has no longer any characteristics; and since the nationals of European Turkey never had a character, nor will ever attain what is necessary for a definite national character, the description of these nationsô character may properly be passed over here.ò[44] This is a characterization of the people who are of the same race as Kant is. Given such designation of people of the same race, what becomes of people of other races? The colonial conquest of the world was already in full flight at the writing of this, thus it was a reflection and a justification for the European mishandling of the colonial subjects and their locations. Thus, the tag of universality as couched in the philosophy of Kant was only the universalization of a provincial reason in the guise of neutral, objective and disinterested production and projection of knowledge. In another place Mignolo articulates it better that ñWestern imperial knowledge was cast in Western imperial languages and was theo-politically and ego-politically founded. Such a foundation legitimizes the assumptions and claims that knowledge was beyond bodies and places and that Christian theology and secular philosophy and science were the limits of knowledge-making beyond and besides which all knowledge was lacking: folklore, myth, traditional knowledge, were invented to legitimize imperial epistemology.ò[45] Identifying and resisting this provincial universality in the spheres of culture, knowledge, being and so on, therefore, became the focus of the transmodern project. In this section, this chapter has tried to sketch out how the proponents of the transmodern project have tried to identify and unmask this provincial

universality. The following considers how the transmodern project advocates that this universality should be resisted or better still dealt with.

4.5 The Border of Thought and the Resistance of Provincial Universality

For Walter Mignolo, epistemic disobedience through border thinking is the key to resisting any form of provincial universality. For this reason, our discussion here focuses on Mignoloôs proposals in the realm of knowledge on how to deal with the overriding influence of the ego-logical politics of knowledge within the context of the geo/body politics of knowledge. The epistemic disobedience here advocated consists in the scorned exteriority or the periphery ñno longer claiming *recognition by* or *inclusion in*, the *humanitas*, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity (Wall Street dixit).ò[46] For him, the path to epistemic disobedience is taking two routes in our time: the de-westernization option and the decolonial option. Within a capitalist economy de-westernization means that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The de-colonial option, on the other hand, is the singular connector of a diversity of de-colonials. The de-colonial path has one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally. Given these preliminary statements, Mignolo goes ahead to spell out the point of arrival and divergence between the de-westernization and the decolonial options. In his words,

> decolonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments: the definitive rejection of ôbeing toldô from the epistemic privileges of the *zero point* what ówe ôare, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of *humanitas* and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However, de-colonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in -disputable point: while the latter do not question the ócivilization of deathô hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity), de-colonial options start from the principle that the *regeneration* of

> life shall prevail over primacy of the *production and reproduction* of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of *humanitas* and *anthropos* alike!).[47]

From the above, undoing the ócivilization of deathô is the first mission at the heart of the decolonial option. While the de-westernization option only wants to change the players of the game, the decolonial option seeks to change the rule of the game entirely, to place due emphasis on the generation and regeneration of life rather than the production of good at the expense of life as it already happening around our world.

The first concrete move in this delinking project was to rearticulate the locus of enunciation. To conveniently do this, Mignolo, taking off from Emile Benvenisteôs work in semiotics, makes a distinction between the enunciation and the enunciated. On this Mignolo submits:

> in semiotics, a basic distinction has been made (Emile Benveniste) between the enunciation and the enunciated. The distinction was necessary, for Benveniste, to ground the floating sign central to Ferdinand de Saussureôs semiology and its development in French structuralism. Benveniste turned to the enunciation and, by doing so, to the subject producing and manipulating signs, rather than the structure of the sign itself (the enunciated). With this distinction in mind, I would venture to say that the interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated while patriarchy and racism are grounded in the enunciation.[48]

This focus on the enunciation, which is the subject producing and manipulating the signs (knowledge) aids Mignolo in conveniently bringing in the concept of the geo and body politics of knowledge to the discourse on knowledge generation. In Cartesian terms, the dictum will no longer be I think, therefore I am; but I am therefore I think. Here then, the body becomes the condition for thinking and not thinking the condition for having a body. Also, given the fact that bodies must always exist in a place, which is their particular space at a particular time, the issue of the location or the geography of the knowing subject become paramount in the generation of knowledge.

From the position of the colonial matrix power and the colonial wound, the geo and body politics of knowledge vocalized the voiceless or the silenced epistemic potencies within the

hegemonic expansionism of the ethnocentrism of Eurocentrism. Given this fact of operating from the margins of the current modern/colonial division of the world, Mignolo also terms his delinking project ódborder thinkingôor ódborder gnosisô. He also makes it very clear that its kind of gnosis is entirely different from hermeneutics. On this issue Alcoff notes that

> because hermeneutics recognizes the interpretive step involved in all understanding, thus making it possible to pluralize meaning, many see hermeneutics as less prone to imperialism than epistemology proper. For epistemology in the Cartesian tradition, to note the role of the situation of the knower is to submit to relativism, and to acknowledge the ubiquity of interpretive frames would be to invite skepticism. Knowledge is either imperial or it does not exist. For hermeneutics, by contrast, the situated-ness of knowers, what Gadamer calls óprejudgementô and Heidegger calls óforeknowledgeô, that works to situate both knower and known in time and space, is a precondition of knowledge and not the sign of its demise.[49]

But this is not the case for Mignolo, for he saw hermeneutics as the corollary of epistemology because both do not represent the colonial wound and both are judged within the European frame of reference. It is within this context that he makes the case for a pluritopic hermeneutics which he later rejects on the grounds that it encourages the colonial wound within colonial semiosis. It is for this reason that he explains that,

> ódborder thinkingô is the notion that I am introducing now with the intention of transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and the corresponding distinction between the knower and the known. . . . To describe ón realityô both sides of the border [which, I take it, he understands a pluritopic hermeneutics to be attempting to do] is not the problem. The problem is to do it from its exteriority. . . . The goal is to erase the distinction between knower and known, between a ñhybridò object (the borderland as the known) and a ñpureò disciplinary or interdisciplinary subject (the knower), uncontaminated by the border matters he or she describes. To change the terms of the conversation it is necessary to overcome the distinction between subject and object, on the one hand, and between epistemology and hermeneutics on the other.[50]

This border thinking is ñnot aimed so much at the usual normative epistemic concerns about justification and belief formation, but rather at the way in which knowledge is normatively defined in reference to its other(s).ò[51] Thus, the point in border thinking is to specify the locality of subaltern knowledge as a border location rather than simply the beyond of Western knowledge or the site of pure difference. Hence, it only seeks to rearticulate the silenced epistemic advantages located in the border since those within this location have the double advantage of

thinking from and beyond the colonial difference. It is that moment in which the imaginary of the modern world system cracks.[52] Within this context then, decolonization should not be understood as a move into an entirely different space, but as a transformation of the rigidity of epistemic and territorial *frontiers* established and controlled by the coloniality of power.[53]

This is the point where Grosfoguel comments on Mignolo. He expresses the fact that critical border thinking is a privileged position given the fact that those operating from the border possess a double positionality and this aids them at a better harmonization of the epistemic options at their disposal. Grosfoguel continues on this that:

> Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefines the emancipator rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism; it is a decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity.[54]

He even goes ahead to give example of the Zapatista struggle as a good example of critical border thinking given the fact that they do not reject democracy and retreat into some indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatista accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as ócommanding while obeyingô or ówe are all equals because we are differentô. Thus, what seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern. The true critical border thinking subsists in taking the good from the modern and adding to it the good from tradition which was silenced by the hegemony of ethnocentric eurocentrism and forming a new whole that transcends the modernity and all of its antecedents.

It is also at this point that delinking connects with border thinking. Writing on this, Mignolo holds that, ódelinking in my argument presupposes border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and knowledge is on the one hand unavoidable and on the other highly limited and dangerousô. Given the focus of the attack on the unfounded nature of the imposition of Western specificity as universal, the loci of border thinking is grounded not in Greek thinkers but in the colonial wound. It provides no method for enacting the decolonial shift and it operates as a connector between different experiences of exploitation. Thus, ócritical border thinking is the method that connects pluri-versality (different colonial histories entangled with imperial modernity) into a uni-versal project of delinking from modern rationality and building other possible worldsô. Border thinking therefore, founds and grounds the pluri-versality as a universal project. The core of this project of pluri-versality as a universal is constituted by the ñassumption that the project cannot be designed and implemented óby one ethnic groupô, but has to be an inter-epistemic and dialogical, pluri-versal. Thus, border thinking becomes the necessary critical method for the political and ethical project of filling in the gaps and revealing the imperial complicity between the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality.ò[55] It is based on this imagining of pluri-versality as a universal project that Mignolo concludes that the aim will be óFree Lifeô rather than óFree Tradeô. Having considered the epistemic foundations of the transmodern, the focus will now be on identifying the Gadamerian roots in the transmodern project.

4.6 The Precise point of Intersection between Gadamer and the Transmodern Project

From the above, one clear point of intersection between both schools of thought is the idea of situatedness. This idea of situatedness is also what indicates the transmodern orientation in Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics. Within the context of this idea, the aim of the two enterprises is that they both seek to fix reason within its particular context. Gadamer, following

Heideggerôs ontology of facticity, holds very strongly that the context in which we find ourselves conditions our quest for knowledge. Here, man is a thrown projection and that context into which he is thrown becomes the point from which he begins his epistemic quest. In Gadamerôs opinion prejudices are everywhere and we cannot operate without them; hence they are ubiquitous. And it is in this ubiquity that hermeneutics derives its real thrust, for it is the ñrecognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice that give the hermeneutic problem its real thrust.ò[56]

As for the transmodern project, it is the opinion of this research that this is the greatest mark they bear from Gadamer in their philosophy. The development of the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge is definitely an off shoot of Heidegger and Gadamerôs hermeneutics of facticity. While Maldonado Torres takes some points from Heidegger and Mignolo makes a few comments on what he calls monotopic hermeneutics with reference to Gadamer, there is no mention of the idea of situatedness in Gadamer and Heidegger and its influence on the reconstruction of the geo/body-politics of knowledge. Grosfoguel outlines succinctly the crux of the idea of situatedness within the transmoden project. For him the key issue here is the fact that we speak or rationalize from a given position; we are situated and the influence of our situatedness is a constitutive part of our attempts at knowledge production whether we know it or not. Thus he writes, ñas feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) has stated, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called their perspective óafro-centric epistemologyô (Collins, 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while the Latin American philosopher of liberation, Enrique Dussel, called it ógeopolitics of knowledgeô (Dussel, 1977) and following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldua (1987) I use the term, óbody-politics of knowledgeô.ò[57] Here then, the influence of social values on oneôs thinking and the fact that our thinking is always partial, constitutes the situatedness of our knowledge. This is an appropriation

of Heidegger and Gadamerôs ideas and it is unfair not to have noted it. This then is one weakness in the transmodern project.

Sequel to the prioritization of situations within knowledge production, both schools of thought seek to dismantle the enlightenmentôs covering up of the subject in the quest for knowledge. The critique of the enlightenment from this point of view is yet another transmodern orientation in philosophical hermeneutics. Here both positions react to the idea of objectivity as it functions within the enlightenment and the modernity project in general. Gadamer is uncomfortable with the idea that the subject can get at knowledge of the object independent of their subjective propensities. For him something of me is always present in the quest for knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, the quest for knowledge is always collaborative. As such the impression that runs most especially from Descartes that there can be a transparent knowledge of the object by the subject is false. Prejudices all go into the knowing of something; besides, true knowledge is always intersubjective and not purely dependent on a thinking ego. This unrest about Cartesian epistemology is also at the heart of the transmodern reaction to modernity and its excesses. The philosophy of Rene Descartes and particularly his formulation *ego cogito* is at the heart of the epistemic foundation of modernity. For this reason transmodernism in building its epistemic framework begins by deconstructing Cartesian epistemology, showing its agenda and the role it plays in the making of the colonial matrix of power. In doing this, they (transmoderns) seek to show the extent to which the Cartesian pretension to an unprejudiced approach to knowledge acquisition and production was in fact entangled in the very opposite of what it claims to establish. Within this context, they consider the search for universality within modernity as the universalization of a provincial rationality.

It is the transmodern project that picks up the theoretical tool of situatedness in the form of the geo/body-politic of knowledge and primarily deploys this tool within the political and

economic spheres to deal appropriately with the issue of coloniality as it manifest itself within colonial spaces. These groups of scholars are not in any way interested in literature or philology; as such issues of authorial intention, historical consciousness/continuity are not the concerns of the transmodern project. Their concern is how to deal with the reality of human denigration within colonial spaces as a result of the coloniality of power and to negate the European designation of some peoples of the world as subhuman because they lack some of the basic categories common to Western subjectivity. Consequent upon this, their concern is also directed at alleviating the poverty that this orientation brings upon humanity, most especially the ódamnesô in colonial locations. Thus, the situtedness/prejudices in Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutic is employed here to show the equality of humanity in all spheres of life and that the difference thereof is that some may be more efficient than others in coordinating the various aspects of human affairs. This does not in any way suggest a lack of such abilities thereof. Following from this, the transmodern scholars make the case that humanity working together in equality and solidarity can deal better with poverty than single handedly through capitalist competition and greed as the West will have everyone believe via their economic ideal of market fundamentalism/neo-liberalism.

Following the transmodern application of Gadamerôs idea of situatedness within the socio-political and economic arena, this chapter wraps up by concluding that the transmodern project is the social and political extension, expansion and application of the Gadamerôs prejudicial philosophy. Thus, despite the lack of explicit social and political discussions in Gadamerôs prejudicial philosophy, the transmodern projectôs development of the idea of the geo/body-politic of knowledge and its implications within the social and political arena are obvious developments over and above Gadamerôs basic motivation and claims. In this connection, Gadamer following Heidegger develops the idea of facticity and situatedness. But

the shortcoming of Gadamer in this regard is that he takes time to flesh out the full contours of this idea within the context of literature and philology primarily focusing on the interpretation of texts. On this ground therefore, we see a lot of issue about authorial intention, the epistemic credibility of an art work, the continuity of history/historical consciousness as the basic issues discussed in Gadamerôs works. Issues of the economy and even governance are not raised that much. Further extensions of various aspects of Gadamerôs philosophy within the transmodern project will be the focus of the next chapter.

Endnotes

1. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 43.
2. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, 44.
3. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, 27-8.
4. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, 43.
5. Yvonne Sherratt, Continental Philosophy of Social Science: *Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 51.
6. Yvonne Sherratt, Continental Philosophy of Social Science: *Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century,* 51-2.
7. Chris Lawn and Niall Keane, *The Gadamer Dictionary*, 44.
8. Charles Taylor, ñGadamer on the Human Sciences,ò in *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. Edited by Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 126-7.
9. Charles Taylor, ñGadamer on the Human Sciences,ò 127.
10. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1979), XXIV.
11. Paul Sheehan, ñPostmodernism And Philosophy,ò *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism,* ed. Steve Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21.
12. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 81.
13. Mike Cole, ñTransmodernism, Marxism and Social Change: Some Implications for Teacher Education,ò *Policy Futures in Education* Vol. 3, 1. 90-105, 68.
14. Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, ñAt the Margins of Postcolonial Studies: Part 1,ò in *The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies*, eds. Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 6-7.
15. Walter D. Mignolo, ñ(Post) Occidentalism, (Post) Coloniality, and (Post) Subaltern Rationality,ò in *The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies*, 89.
16. Walter D. Mignolo, ñ(Post) Occidentalism, (Post) Coloniality, and (Post) Subaltern Rationality,ò 93.
17. Madina Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, ñGlobal Coloniality and the Decolonial Option,ò *Kult 6 - Special Issue* Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications. Fall 2009. 141.
18. Walter D. Mignolo, ñImperial/Colonial Metamorphosis: from the Ottoman and Spanish Empires to the US and European Union,ò 99. Accessed February 16th, 2013. http://www.alati.com.br/pdf/2005/Separata_do_Livro_de_Ankara_Istanbul/pdf117.pdf.
19. Walter D. Mignolo, ñColoniality: the Darker Side of Modernity,ò *Cultural Studies*, vol. 21, nos. 2ï 3, (2007), 41-42.
20. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñEnrique Dusselôs Liberation Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1(2): 2011, 3.
21. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñEnrique Dusselôs Liberation Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò 2.
22. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò *Cultural Studies*, 21:2, 2007, 261.
23. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOf Zizeck, Huntington, and Beyond: Eurocentrism and Americanism against the Barbarian Threats,ò 352.
24. Madina Tlostanov, ñTowards a Decolonization of Thinking and Knowledge: A few Reflections from the World of Imperial Difference,ò 4-5.
25. Enrique Dussel, ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity,ò 5. Accessed September 27th, 2011. http://enriquedussel.com/txt/Anti-Cartesianmeditations.pdf.
26. Enrique Dussel, ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity,ò 5.
27. Enrique Dussel, ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity,ò 6.
28. Enrique Dussel, ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity,ò 7.
29. Enrique Dussel, ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity,ò 38.

30. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò 244-245.
31. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò 245.
32. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò 246.
33. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò 247.
34. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Colonialityò, 13-14.
35. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Colonialityò, 15.
36. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò 15.
37. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò *The South Atlantic Qaurterly* 101:1, 2002, 67.
38. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007, 463.
39. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò 79.
40. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò 458.
41. Margaret R. Greer, Walter D. Mignolo, And Maureen Quilligan (Eds.), *Rereading The Black Legend: The Discourses Of Religious And Racial Difference In The Renaissance Empires* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7.
42. Margaret R. Greer et al, *Rereading The Black Legend: The Discourses Of Religious And Racial Difference In The Renaissance Empires*, 7-8.
43. Walter D. Mignolo, ñCosmopolitanism and the De-colonial Option,ò *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, (2010), 114; See also, Walter D. Mignolo, ñCosmopolitan Localism: A Decolonial Shifting of the Kantian's Legacies,ò1*Localities* Vol. 1, (2011), 17.
44. I. Kant, *Anthropology from A pragmatic Point of View*, 235 as quoted in Walter D. Mignolo, ñCosmopolitan Localism: A Decolonial Shifting of the Kantian's Legaciesò, 17.
45. Walter D. Mignolo, ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,ò *Theory, Culture & Society* Vol. 26(7ï 8): 2009, 18-19.
46. Walter D. Mignolo, ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,ò 3. The exteriroty is here referred to as anthropos which is distinguished from humanitas and it expected to reject inclusion in humanitas. This distinction between anthropos and humanitas is reminiscent of and a definitive answer to Spivakôs question in her 2003 work that ñwho crawls into the place of the óhumanô of humanism at the end of the day, even in the name of diversity?ò For Mignolo, it is the óEuropean subjectô (humanitas) that actually crawls into this place. In his opinion, this divide has its roots back at the point of the inauguration of the Renaissance. From this point ñWestern philosophy distinguished, in different guises and masks, *humanitas* from *anthropos*. This distinction was not made by those classified under the domain of *anthropos*; neither were they consulted. The distinction was a pure, sole, and unilateral decision made by those who considered themselves, and their friends, to be *humanitas*. The other-*anthropos* is, then, inevitably linked to the same-*humanitas*. The magic effect here consists in blurring the epistemic and ontological dimensions and in pretending that *humanitas and anthropos* is an ontological distinction that the enoncé only describes, but is not an effect of an epistemic and political classification that the enunciation controlsò (See, Madina V. Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, ñOn Pluritopic Hermeneutics, Trans-modern Thinking, and Decolonial Philosophy,ò *Encounters*, vol. 1 n°1 fall, 2009, 11). It is within this context that he considers óepistemic delinking and disobedienceô, among others, as possible paths of the anthropos to get at true liberation.
47. Walter D. Mignolo, ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,ò 3.
48. Walter D. Mignolo, ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,ò 5.
49. Linda Martin Alcoff, ñMignoloôs Epistemology of Coloniality,ò 88.
50. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18.
51. Linda Martin Alcoff, ñMignoloôs Epistemology of Coloniality,ò 93.

52. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, 23.
53. Linda Martin Alcoff, ñMignoloôs Epistemology of Coloniality,ò 94.
54. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò 26.
55. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò 499.
56. Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 272.
57. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò *Kult* 6: (2009) Special Issue Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications, 13-14.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE TRANSMODERN PROJECT AND THE EXTENSION OF GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHICAL LEGACY

5.1 Preamble

At the end of the preceding chapter, it was noted that the transmodern project is more of a socio-political application and extension of the philosophy of Gadamer. This means that the transmodern project can be described as an extension of Gadamerôs philosophical legacy. The focus of this chapter is to flesh out, more comprehensively, the full contours of the transmodern extension of Gadamerôs philosophical legacy. The chapter begins with the unique manner in which Gadamerôs idea of prejudice is brought into the colonial question in order to understand colonialism in a new light. Next, the chapter considers the rethinking of the concept and practice of history and this leads into the discourse of an alternate modernity within the transmodern project. The chapter then considers the transmodern perspective on ethics and given the primal role of the other in this ethics, the chapter concludes with an exposition of the intercultural imperative within the transmodern project. All of these are discussed as some of the precise points where the transmodern project extends Gadamerôs philosophical legacy.

5.2 Prejudice and the Colonial Question in the Transmodern Discourse

The rejection of all forms of provincial universality also suggests abandoning the ego/theo-politics of knowledge in favour of border thinking which thrives on the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge. This rethinking of universality is at the heart of the conception of coloniality. The core of this concept rests on the appropriation of the idea of prejudice into the colonial quest. Coloniality as used here is indeed different from colonialism and it is the core of the transmodern decolonial turn. As a concept, it was developed by the Peruvian sociologist, Annibal Quijano. This concept was coined to aptly describe the situation of the persistence of repressive and totalitarian forms of knowledge production at the very inception of modernity by Europe with the takeover of the New World and its persistence even after the end of colonialism

in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The constitution of the coloniality of power and its epistemology was motivated by a geographical fact as well as convergence of historical processes. The movement of the naval center of the world from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean was a strong geographical factor in this regard. The historical vicissitudes are succinctly described by Quijano. Quijano begins his paper on ñColonilaity of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin Americaò by noting that America is the identity of modernity and the site where the notion of the ócoloniality of powerô began to be articulated. This worked through two processes as he writes,

> é two historical processes associated in the production of that space/time converged and established the two fundamental axes of the new model of power. One was the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of órace,ô a supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others. The conquistadors assumed this idea as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination that the conquest imposed. On this basis, the population of America, and later the world, was classified within the new model of power. The other process was the constitution of a new structure of control of labour and its resources and products. This new structure was an articulation of all historically known previous structures of control of labour, slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis of capital and the world market.[1]

Thus, we see a conglomeration of both mental and economic factors in the making of the ócoloniality of powerô. Mental factors in that Quijano conceives race as a mental category of modernity and economic in that the new forms of labour control led to the consolidation of capitalism and even global capitalism. Thus, ówas the center of global capitalism, Europe not only had control of the world market, but it was also able to impose its colonial dominance over all the regions and populations of the planet, incorporating them into its world-system and its specific model of powerô.

History had to be rearticulated in this context; all other sections of the world had to be brought into a world in which Europe was at its centre. This incorporation of the various cultures and histories of the world within the network of the matrix of power within Eurocentrism took

the same form as that of the organization of labour and capital as noted above. Writing on this Quijano still continues that:

> The incorporation of such diverse and heterogeneous cultural histories into a single world dominated by Europe signified a cultural and intellectual intersubjective configuration equivalent to the articulation of all forms of labour control around capital, a configuration the established world capitalism. In effect, all the experiences, histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global cultural order revolving around European or Western hegemony. Europeôs hegemony over the new world of global power concentrated all forms of control of subjectivity, culture and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony.[2]

This incorporation led, eventually, to the hegemonic takeover of knowledge and its production, of culture and even of subjectivity.[3] With this colonization of the process of even knowledge production, modernity and rationality were conceived to be exclusively European products and experiences. Thus, at the heart of this Eurocentric vision were the myths that the history of human civilization was a trajectory that departed from a state of nature and culminated in Europe; a view of the differences between Europe and non-Europeans as natural (racial) differences and not consequences of a history of power. In the end, ôboth myths can be unequivocally recognized in the foundations of evolutionism and dualism, two of the nuclear elements of Eurocentrismô. Given the flow of history from a state of primitive culture in the state of nature to the high culture of Europe, evolutionism becomes central because from this myth originated the specifically Eurocentric perspective of linear and unidirectional movement and changes in human history.[4] Dualism is also central here because through it the categorization of the world in binary poles becomes a reality. Within the Eurocentric vision we now have the west and the rest, primitive and civilized, magic/mythic and scientific, irrational and rational, traditional and modern, Europe and non-Europe etc. The amalgamation of these two (evolutionism and dualism) produced a significant moment of the ethnocentricism of Eurocentrism. Quijano puts it well when he writes regarding this amalgamation that it becomes meaningful ñé only as an expression of the exacerbated ethnocentrism of the recently constituted

Europe; by its central and dominant place in global, colonial/modern capitalism; by the new validity of the mystified ideas of humanity and progress, clear products of the Enlightenment; and by the validity of the idea of race as the basic criterion for a universal social classification of the worldôs population.ò[5]

Given all that has been said above we can summarize the case of Quijano by noting that there are significant moments at the heart of the making of Eurocentrism that is intimately tied to the coloniality of power. By this he means there were phases of the flow of history that would have made its way through in a different form were it not for the coloniality of power. On this Quijano writes:

> The confrontation between the historical experiences and the Eurocentric perspective on knowledge makes it possible to underline some of the more importamt elements of Eurocentrism: (a) a peculiar articulation between dualism (capital-precapital, Europe- non-Europe, primitive-civilized, traditional-modern, etc.) and a linear, one-directional evolutionism from some state of nature to modern European society; (b) the naturalization of the cultural differences between human groups by means of their codification with the idea of race; and (c) the distorted-temporal relocation of all those differences by relocating non-Europeans in the past. All these intellectual operations are clearly interdependent, and they could have not been cultivated and developed without the colonaility of power.[6]

Coloniality of power, for Quijano, therefore resides specifically in Eurocentrism and its proclamation of its self as the heart of modernity and the world at large and most importantly, the desire Europe still nurses to keep the entire world in its hold as the bacon of progress, governance and economics. It (coloniality of power) ñrefers to a crucial structuring process in the modern/colonial world-system that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labour with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy and Third World migrantsô inscription in the racial/ethnic hierarchy of metropolitan global cities.ò[7]

Sequel to the preceding discussion on Quijano, it becomes clear that there is a difference between coloniality and colonialism. Commenting on Quijano in this regard, Ramon Grosfoguel notes that ñcoloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination

after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist system.ò[8] Aside the proclaimed end of colonialism, coloniality thinks of the devastating effects on some of the areas affected by colonialism which have not been adequately dealt with on the intellectual front. With regard to the issue of the coloniality of knowledge, Alcoff, writing on Mignolo, submits that ñfor Mignolo, the epistemic effects of colonialism are among its most damaging, far-reaching and least understood.ò[9] Torres raises another side to the issue when he writes that ñwith the concept of coloniality, Quijano provides a way of understanding sociologically the complex nature of colonial power and the specific challenges that confront the project of decolonization *qua* decoloniality.ò[10] Power as it is conceived within this matrix is socially constructed and the powers behind this construction are still bent on keeping the status quo as it is. Undoing this desire first in the makers of this power matrix and also in the recipients of this power categorization becomes the task of decolonization as decoloniality.

Nelson-Maldonado Torres develops further the discourse on coloniality. In his opinion, ñcolonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire.ò[11] But ócoloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but they define culture, labour, intersubjective relations and knowledge production well beyond the strict limit of colonial administration. Thus, coloniality survives colonialismô. It is not simply the aftermath or the residual from any given form of colonial relation. Coloniality emerges in a particular socio-historical setting, that of the discovery and conquest of the Americas.Within this context, ñmodernity considered to be the product of the European Renaissance or the European Enlightenment, has a darker side, which is constitutive of it.ò[12] Walter Mignolo claims that, ñmodernity is a European narrative that hides its darker side, ócolonialityô. Coloniality, in other

words, is constitutive of modernity ï there is no modernity without coloniality.ò[13] For him (Mignolo), ñpostmodernity and altermodernity do not get rid of coloniality. They only present a new mask that, intentionally or not, continues to hide it.ò[14] It is now also clear that aside the fact that coloniality extends way beyond colonialism, it is also the darker side of modernity; it is the underside of modernity. It is within the context of this underside of modernity that Dussel hinges his critique of modernity as contained in the *Discourse on Modernity* (Habermas) and *The Sources of the Self* (Taylor). Modernity was born at the point when Europe began to expand beyond its historical limits and it is when it gets to those other locations that its second moment; its underside is inaugurated. This second moment is no longer as an emancipatory rational nucleus but an irrational sacrificial myth.[15] Here, Europe plundered the rest of the world in the manner it liked and sought for all kinds of reason to justify such actions. Herein was the underside of modernity for it lost its favour for emancipation the moment it came in contact with the other with which it was not very familiar (before the discovery of the New World, Europe at least was family with the Asian world or was characterized as the Oriental World).

Given the flow of this encounter of coloniality since the rise of modernity in the fifteenth century, it has continued to unfold in different phases. For Tlostanova and Mignolo, ñthe colonial matrix of power went through successive and cumulative periods, in which the rhetoric changes according to the needs and the leading forces shaping the spheres of economy, authority, public realm (gender and sexuality) and education (knowledge and subjectivity).ò[16] They went ahead to detail out the various stages of the change of this rhetoric of modernity:

- ✓ Theology and the *mission of conversion* to Christianity managed the first period. That period dominated the scene during the 16th and 17th centuries and was in the hands of the Catholic Christian and Southern European monarchies, although Orthodox Christianity also had its limited success. By the end of the 17th century, a secular and

commercial language emerged in England based on the profitable economics of the plantation.

- ✓ The combination of the growing economic discourse and an increasing secularization of life was a step towards the second stage, the *civilizing mission* led by England and France.
- ✓ When the US took over the leadership from England and France, after World War II, the mission was to develop the ónderdevelopedô countries and to modernize the traditional ones. This third stage was the *development and modernizing mission*. It had a strong completion with another modernizing and another developmental mission called socialism.
- ✓ In the period from 1970-2000 neo-liberalism was consolidated in the wake of the of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Neo-liberal agenda translated the previous mission of development and modernization, into the Washington Consensus of granting the market economy priority over social regulation.[17]

What is clear from the above is how the rhetoric of modernity has continued to change its face and to remain despite all the attempts to undo it. Deeply implicated in this triumph of the coloniality of power is the success of capitalism. Thus, the continued triumph of capitalism in its form of competition will always mean the perpetuity of the colonial matrix of power and of coloniality at large. Socialism is left out because it obviously could not succeed in its attempts to undo capitalism, besides it still existed within the same paradigm as the capitalist one. They both emerged from Europe. Decoloniality sought to develop alternatives from the periphery, from the world that was looked down upon.

From all of these, we can see clearly the difference between colonialism and coloniality, and the case has also been successfully established that coloniality still exists with us today

despite the demise of colonialism. Also, from the discussion, one sees how the difference between colonialism and coloniality spines out of the fact that all knowledge form are bio/geo/body-politically motivated in the first place. Consequently, the prejudicial base of all knowledge form creates a room for annexing the coloniality question into the philosophical enterprise as a whole. This is indeed an extension of the Gadamerian legacy.

5.3 Prejudice and the Rethinking of History in the Transmodern Project

The transmodern critique of modernity is located within the general context of the redefinition of the theoretical foundations of the concept of history. It is for this reason that the transmodern reconstruction of history will be considered before going ahead to explore the transmodern understanding of modernity. Though both Gadamer and the transmodern project understand the pivotal role of history in the human enterprise, Gadamer only appropriates it within the context of a historically affected consciousness. His position is not radical enough to question the practice of history as it stands. It is the transmodern project that takes the critique of the practice of history to its radical conclusion. Walter Mignolo devotes a lot of time to the issue of history as it relates to the decolonial project of transmodernity. He broadly tags this issue ôthe colonization of memoryõ and in this discourse he explores the complicity between history and empire. For him, the tool for this colonization was alphabetic writing and the discursive frames were the Renaissance genres of history, literature, letter writing and the encyclopedic mode of knowledge organization.[18] The first chapter of his work *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* focuses on what he calls the colonization of language and it is here that he lays bare the complicity of the development of alphabetic writing in the consolidation and expansion of the empire. Hence the colonization of language was a necessary prelude to the colonization of memory. In line with all these Mignoloõs aims are, first, to expose how the colonization of language aided the colonization of memory and subsequently time and then space; second, to

develops another perspective on the materiality of semiotic interactions (as different from that of letters, pen and paper) and also another understanding of history as memory keeping (as different from the western of notion of writing history in books). All these are aimed at the deconstruction of the coloniality of power as it is manifested at non European locations.

In Mignoloôs opinion, ñthe concept of history in the Western world developed at the same time as the alphabet. Herodotus (c. 480-425 B. C) and Thucydides (c. 460-400 B. C) were considered the fathers of history and Greece the original place of Alphabetical writing.ò[19] But then, what gave writing its authoritative mark? Focusing on Elio Antoni de Nebrija, Mignolo makes the case for how writing acquires its authority within the western context. These all began in the fifteenth century when a philosophy of language based on the celebration of the letter and of vernacular language began to emerge in Europe. Nebrijasô contribution here rests on the fact that he wrote ñone of the first grammars of a vernacular language, Castilian, and the rule of its orthography. Both treatise, the *Grammar of Castilian* (1492) and the *Rule of Orthography* (1517), included substantial prefaces in which Nebrija laid out the historical significance of the invention of the alphabet and the import of language in the consolidation of the Spanish empire.ò[20] Here, the complicity between language and empire becomes very clear. Here too the ideological role of alphabetic writing begins to emerge as well. The dominant frameworks/ideologies couched in the writing of these grammars ówere bounded, at one end of the spectrum, by Latin as the language of learning and civility, and by Castilian as the language of the nation. And the other end is the belief in the power of the letters to tame the voice, to preserve the glory of the prince and the memories of a nation, and to upgrade the social and cultural processes of the Amerindians, who, even though they were not barbarians, had not been blessed with the most marvelous human invention, which, as Nebrija had argued, was the letterô.

From this, numerous elements are buried within the writing of the Latin and Castilian grammars by Nebrija.

From a philosophic point of view, Nebrijaôs connection between language, civility and empire has its roots in a combination of Plato and St. Augustineôs works. Mainly his influence was Augustinian. This is because Augustine as a Christian and neoplatonist in his reading of the Holy Book

> assumed an original unity from which the multiplicity of things came. The original and unified language, according to Saint Augustine, was not named because it was not necessary to distinguish it from other human languages. It could simply be called human language or human locution. However, human language was not enough to keep human beings happy and free from transgressing the law, as expressed in the project of building a tower to reach heaven. The multiplication of languages that caused the division of people and communities attained the number seventy-two, and each of them had a name. At this point it became necessary to find a name for the primordial language to distinguish it from the rest. Saint Augustine had good reasons to believe that the original language was Hebrew.[21]

By this token, it was taken within the scheme of Nebrija that the original language was simply the best. Here the grammar and genealogy of a language were framed not in evolutionary terms but as prestigious legacies. Thus, there was no linguistic or synchronic hierarchy at work at this point. Lorenzo Valla also had great influence on Nebrija, for while Nebrija was in Italy during the reign of Isabella and Ferdinand in Castile, he got acquainted with Vallaôs re-evaluation of letters as a means to save the Holy Roman Empire from total ruin. Thus, ôValla realized that rebuilding an empire could not be accomplished solely by means of arms. He intended, instead, to achieve his goals by the expedient of letters. By contrasting the Latin of his ancestors with the expansion of the Roman Empire, and by underlining the strength of the language as a unifying force over geographical and political conquests, Valla foresaw the Roman recovery of its lost power and, as a consequence, predicted a unified Italy playing a central role in the future of the new emerging nationsô. Given the value of language in making the empire, Nebrija thought it

right to assume that Latin was the language of civility and science, while the Castilian was the language of the empire or the conqueror.

The relationship between the language and the expansion of the empire rests on the fact that ‘the vanquished received the language of the vanquisher, the conquered received the language of the conquerorô. This thesis was severely defended not minding the fact that the linguistic relation between the Visigoths and the Roman Empire was that in which the ‘vanquisher took the language of the vanquishedô.[22] For Nebrija, this even becomes a need among the conquered, for the conquered ‘é shall stand in new need; the need for the laws the victor owes the vanquished, and the need for the language the victor shall bring. That his grammar shall serve to impart them the Castilian tongue, as it has been used to teach Latin to the youngô. From this statement it is clear there is a combination of the two original languages into one in the schemes of Nebrija. The first is that Latin is used to give humanistic teaching to the children of the royal house and secondly, it is used as language to colonize the people of the new world.

In making his case for the superiority of the original languages he makes the case for the values of alphabets within these languages. In fact, for him, alphabets were the greatest inventions of human imagination. They were invented to tame the voice. This is because they were invented out of the amount of different voices within a language, so that if arranged in a particular pattern man could ‘represent the world as he wished, as much for his memory as for speaking with those who were not present and those who were about to come. Thus the letter is nothing more than a trace or figure by means of which the voice is represented.ò[23] It is in this that Nebrija identifies the remedy for the inconsistencies of speech; the letter becomes the instrument for taming the voice. Thus, without letter, languages deteriorated in Nebrijaôs opinion. Alphabets (letters) were therefore meant to tame the voice and resolve the

inconsistencies in speech and these alphabets were also the companion of the empire. These were the basic ideological frames behind Nebrijaôs celebration of the alphabets.

This same mentality of the superiority of the alphabet also went into the elevation of the book as the greatest source of literacy. For by this the word was detached from its oral source which is the body and can no longer be heard but be read. Thus, the hand takes over the activity of the tongue and the eyes takeover the activities of the ear. But for Mignolo, this whole progression from the alphabet to the pen, the paper and eventually the book is only a side of the whole story of reading and writing (or semiotic interactions as he prefers to call it). As against the tradition just described, Mignolo prefers to talk about semiotic interactions rather than reading and writing. His reason is that sign encoding and decoding is a general characteristic of all species of *Homo sapiens*. On this, he writes: ña human interaction is a semiotic one if there is a community and a body of common knowledge according to which (a) a person can produce a graphic sign with the purpose of conveying a message (to somebody else or to him- or herself); (b) a person perceives the graphic sign and interprets it as a sign produced with the purpose of conveying a message; and (c) that person attributes a given meaning to the graphic sign. Notice that in this theoretical definition of writing the links between speech and writing are not necessary because writing is not conceived as the representation of speech.ò[24] Thus, writing in the sense above is common to all peoples, with alphabetic writing as just a form of graphic sign relative to a particular people.

To further buttress this point Mignolo goes into an analysis of what he calls the materiality of graphic semiotic interactions. Here, he presents the case that every inscribed and transmitted sign needs a medium. This medium is the material form that such a graphic sign assumes in concrete terms. For ideo-pictographic modes of semiotic expression, the pen, paper and letters are strange, just like the picture, the tablets of stones or back of trees will be strange to

someone who best represents ideas in books and in alphabetic forms. The end point of his discourse on the materiality of reading and writing is thus:

> Writing, which is of interest here for its ties to the book, seems to be a universal of culture; the book, however, is not. The book could be conceived as a general object among communities with different writing systems only if there is agreement to call ôbookô any kind of material or solid surface on which graphic signs are inscribed (i.e., the book as mere object); it is culture specific if what a culture understands by ôbookô (e.g., Holy Book) transcends the object and it becomes a text: the idea of the object on which graphic signs are inscribed as conceived by the culture producing and using it.[25]

The book as a material on which to write is culture relative and not a cultural universal. Writing is culturally universal in that it is a graphic sign for semiotic interactions. How then do all of these relate to history?

Within the context of history, the colonial connection between history and the book (alphabetic writing) is at the heart of the decolonial project. For Mignolo the issue at stake was ñnot just the conceptual reframing of history as narrative, literature, or fiction é rather, the ways in which understanding the past could impinge on speaking the present as political and epistemological interventions.ò[26] In his opinion, the first issue with the western understanding of history is that it links more to rhetoric after the tradition of Cicero and the Roman historians than philosophy. In contradistinction to this is the Arabic conception of history which links it to ñspeculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why of events. History, is therefore, firmly rooted in philosophy. It deserves to be accounted a branch of philosophy.ò[27] Thus, if the search for the truth should mark history, then it should be linked with philosophy and not rhetoric as the western tradition sees it.

The second issue is the fact that the concept of history operative during the colonial era particularly in the New World was different from other conceptions of history. Generally, Mignolo identifies two broad theories of history: the Greek sense of *ιστοπεω* (*istopeo*)

or ιστοπια (*istopia*) and the Latin sense of *historia*. From the Greek point of view, the noun ιστοπια (*istopia*) meant inquiry or learning by inquiry as well as the narrative by means of which what was learned by inquiry was also reported. The writer of *istopia* could have himself been the eyewitness or he could have used the report of direct informants who had witnessed the events themselves. For the Latin *historia*, it adopted the senses of temporality and chronology. As a concrete example, "Tacitus, in writing the history of Rome during the first century A.D., used the expression *anales* to refer to the events that took place before the time of his own birth and *historia* to refer to the events contemporary with his own biography. However, Roman historians such as Livy (59 B.C.-A.D. 17) and Tacitus were writing about a subject matter, Rome, that they were able to trace to its beginning and through its development until their own days". Here then, one understanding of history sees it as "the report on witnessed event" and "the other narrative of past events". With the adoption of Ciceroôs definition of history as "witness of time, model of life, life of memory, light of truth, and messenger of antiquity" in European renaissance, the understanding of history as narrative of past events came to dominance in the colonial world since the colonization of the New World was based on the ideals of the renaissance.

The third issue Mignolo has with the western conception of history is that it has been tied to the book and to alphabetic writing. To challenge this understanding of history and writing, Mignolo has to explore the works of Giambattista Vico and Berbardo Boturini. With the model developed by these scholars, he was able to first challenge Nebrija and his understanding of alphabetic writing and secondly raises alternatives to the Western understanding. Boturini had works on Mexicoôs history of writing and writing of history and following Vicoôs assertion that "every nation spoke by writing", it was easy for Boturini to conclude that Amerindians, prior to the arrival of the Europeans, had their own way of writing, by speaking and by hieroglyphics and

the language of arms. Following Vicoôs second assertion that every nation wrote its history corresponding to every age[28], Boturini concluded that the Mexicans had their own way of recording past events and thus, the realization that alphabetic writing was not necessarily a condition for writing history.[29] Despite this, Mignolo still maintains about Boturini that,

> by recognizing this he indirectly introduced a new philosophy of writing upon which to evaluate Amerindian manners of preserving memories. Boturini was able to solve much of the puzzle presented to sixteenth-century observers of the Amerindian history of writing and their writing of history: namely, that every human community had its own manner of recording the past and that the connivance between alphabetic writing and history was a regional invention of the West. He could not go far enough to recognize that the Mexicasô five ages were as desirable as Vico's three. His model was of one evolutionary world, not of alternates.[30]

The trouble with Boturini then was that he still built an evolutionary model of the ways of writing history. But what was actually needed was an alternative one. It is this alternative that Vico puts forth in his idea that óevery nation spoke by writingô. In substantiating this assertion, Vico contends that alphabets were just one form of writing. This is because Vico saw writing as any visible sign related to the world of ideas rather than to speech. This distinction is very important, because it becomes the foundation for the idea of ówriting history without lettersô. Thus, ñlanguage could be used as a distinctive feature in a model of universal history, but language is not necessarily a distinctive feature of universal history itself.ò[31] This then places the idea of record keeping without letters not as an inferior to recording keeping with letters, but as it worthy alternative that could be not appreciated by the renaissance men of letters due to their ideological drive to propagate western literacy and expansion and consolidation of the empire. The key issue for Mignolo was found in the works of Francesco Patrizi, who insisted strongly that history was not just narrative, it is essentially about memory; thus, showing the inability of the Ciceronian conception of history to identify that history was not about words and things. Patrizi even went ahead to make the case that the non-alphabetic form of writing was valid and that ñSculpted and painted record keeping are more properly history than written ones, because

they reveal the events to the eyes without need of mediation by words.ò[32] In the end, Mignolo concludes the issue that ñé a large and increasing number of studies in the ethnography of speaking and on folk taxonomy over the past forty years have convincingly demonstrated that the Western categories of genres, so powerfully codified during the Renaissance and transmitted to the colonial periphery as part of the package of spreading alphabetic literacy, are, like Western concepts of history, a regional conceptualization of discursive types and not a theoretical construction that accurately describes and analyzes non-Western discursive typologies.ò[33] This attitude to history which sees it more as memory than narrative is a classic example of the ólocal histories of border thinkingô.

This is a fundamental distinction Mignolo makes on the issue of history in his work *Local Histories/Global Designs*. In this work, he distinguishes between the local histories of global design and the local histories of border thinking. The basic framework in this work is the search for another framework for knowledge acquisition in line with the tranmodern desire of shifting the geography of reason. Therefore, this work seeks an-other model for knowledge appreciation outside of epistemology and hermeneutics. On this Mignolo writes, ñborder thinking is the notion that I am introducing with the intention of transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and the corresponding distinction between the knower and the known, in the epistemology of the second modernity.ò[34] Local histories of global designs are therefore those narratives and categorizations of the world as they have been carried on by men of letter at the various centers of the modern/colonial. This is the case because there is no consideration of the perspectives of those at the periphery. In fact these men of letters at the centre see it that the people at the periphery are incapable of writing these histories, as such it is their duty to do it for them. And in so doing there is a double movement in these works for they seem to categorize and put the stories of the world together with some form of prejudices. On the other hand, there is also what

Mignolo calls the local histories of border thinking. This in Mignoloôs estimation has planetary and local historical conditions as its locus of enunciation. These planetary and local historical conditions Mignolo refers to as the double movement having two phases: first, the expansionism of the modern world system since the end of the fifteenth century and second, the parallel construction of its imaginary both from inside and from outside of the system. In this regard, Mignolo contends that, local historical conditions refer also to both the local histories ówithinô the modern world system (e.g. the local histories of the ómetropolitan centersô, the local histories of Europe and the United States, the local histories of Spain and England) and the local histories of its margins (e.g. the Andes under colonial rule, the independence in Latin American countries from Spain and nation building under a new global order, the local history of India under British rule or of Algeria and Tunisia under French colonialism). So local histories here refer to the planetary evolution of various historical perspectives in our time and Mignolo also makes it clear that he is ñnot setting a stage in which local histories are those of the colonized countries, or the Third world, and the global designs are located in the colonizer countries of the First World. Global designs, in other words, are brewed, so to speak in the local histories of the metropolitan countries; they are implemented, exported and enacted differently in particular places.ò[35] In the light of the above, the local histories of border thinking are those perspectives on history that are coming from the borders of the modern colonial world. Those perspectives on history based on the exteriority of totality; the perspectives on history based on tradition. ôTradition here doesnôt mean something before modernity, but rather the persistence of memory. In that regard, there is no difference between African and European ótraditionô. Both Africa and Europe have themé ô. Here then, the fundamental understanding of history as memory keeping show how complicit the Western understanding of history as words and event was with expansion of the empire. It also shows the epistemic authority the idea of the writing history without letters as Mignolo has

demonstrated. The unmasking of these facts about history is an extension of Gadamerôs legacy for they are more radical and ambitious appropriations of the modes of prejudice within history.

5.4 Prejudice and An Alternate Modernity in Transmodern Project

Sequel to the transmodern reconstruction of history, the transmodern project further attempts a reconstruction the whole understanding of modernity. This is something Gadamer does not do at all. It is within the context of understanding local histories as a planetary phenomenon that Mignolo makes the case that ñôModernity,ô in other words, is not the natural unfolding of world history, but the regional narrative of the Eurocentric worldview.ò[36] It is within this planetary context too that Dussel also undertakes a redefinition of the Eurocentric conception of modernity giving it a planetary undertone. Dussel begins his case even from the name óEuropeô; for him, there is a semantic slippage in the adoption of the name Europe. In his opinion,

> the mythological Europa was the daughter of a Phoenician king and thus was Semitic. This Europe that comes from the Orient bears little resemblance to the ódefinitiveô Europe (the modern Europe); one should not mistake Greece with the future Europe. This future Europe was situated north of Macedonia and north of Magna Graecia in Italy. The future Europe was the home of everything that was considered barbaric (thus, in later times, Europe eventually usurped a name that did not belong to it). The classical Greeks were well aware that both Asia (the area that would later become a province in the Roman Empire and which corresponded to contemporary Turkey) and Africa (Egypt) were home to the most developed cultures. Asia and Africa were not considered barbaric, although neither were they considered wholly human. What became modern Europe lay beyond Greeceôs horizon and therefore could not in any way coincide with the originary Greece. Modern Europe, situated to the north and west of Greece, was simply considered the uncivilized, the nonpolitical, the nonhuman. By stating this I am trying to emphasize that the unilineal diachrony Greece-Rome-Europe is an ideological construct that can be traced back to late-eighteenth-century German romanticism. Therefore, the single line of development Greece-Rome-Europe is a conceptual by-product of the Eurocentric óAryan modelô.[37]

From the above one thing is clear: the ideological base for the linking of modern Europe to Greece and Rome. This in Dusselôs opinion is not a comprehensive narrative of the story of modern Europe. This is because between Rome and Modern Europe, there are some significant interventions from other cultures which contributed to the making of Modern Europe.

Dussel even goes as far as diagrammatically representing this incomprehensiveness and showing the points where significant cultural interventions are made from outside Modern Europe. Fig 5.1 shows this very well. Essentially, the figure attempts a comprehensive diagrammatic representation of the historical sequence from the Greeks to the modern European world.

Fig. 5.1



With this schema, Dussel shows that there is no direct Greek influence on western Latin Europe (it is mediated by both arrows a and b). That is, the mediation was done by the Arabic and Jewish world from the tenth century onwards. There is also no direct link between either sequence c of modern Europe and Greece or the Byzantine world (arrow d), but there is a direct link with the western Christian Latin-Roman world. What these show is that, in the making of modern Europe, the Arabs and Jews were fundamental non-European interventions that the sequence Greek-Rome-Modern Europe has not properly represented. In fact, in Dusselôs words, ñMuslim óuniversalityô reached from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Thus, Latin Europe was a secondary peripheral culture and up to this point had never been the ócenterô of history.ò[38] Within this context then, óthe crusades can be seen as the first attempt of Latin Europe to impose itself on the eastern Mediterraneanô.

Dussel also takes issue with the equation that Western=Hellenistic + Roman + Christian. This equation resulted from the fact that during the Italian Renaissance there was a coming together of independent cultures. Here, the Latin world joined the eastern Greek world and they subsequently confronted the Turkish world. In turn, the Turks forgot the Hellenistic-Byzantine origin of the Muslim world and thus allowed to emerge this equation. This equation Dussel considers the Eurocentric ideology of German romanticism. This perspective is erroneous for two reasons:

> First, there was not yet a world history in an empirical sense. There were only isolated, local histories of communities that extended over large geographical areas: the Romans, the Persians, the Hindu kingdoms, the Siamese, the Chinese, or the Mesoamerican and Inca worlds in America. Second, their geopolitical locations did not allow them to be a center (the Red Sea or Antioch, the final destination of commerce with the East, was not the center but the westernmost border of the Euro-Afro-Asian market).[39]

In summary Dussel concludes that Latin Europe of the fifteenth century was nothing more than a peripheral, secondary geographical location situated in the westernmost boundary of the then Euro-Afro-Asian world, besieged by the Muslim world.

Sequel to all of the above, Dussel makes the case that there are two concepts of modernity. The first is the Eurocentric concept of modernity within which Taylor and Habermas operate. In Dusselôs opinion, this concept of modernity understands modernity as a distinctively European phenomenon and every other culture had to adopt the European culture in order to be reckoned with as modern. This concept of modernity is not just Eurocentric but it is also provincial and regional. It is an ómancipation, a Kantian *Ausgang*, or óway out,ô from immaturity by means of reason, understood as a critical process that affords humanity the possibility of new developmentô. In identifying the specific historical moment of this modernity, Dussle observes that it took place in the eighteenth century and the temporal and spatial dimensions were described by Hegel and commented on by Jurgen Habermas as well. For Habermas the key moments of this concept of modernity are Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. He even goes as far as later suggesting that the English Parliament should be added as one of the key moments too. The sequence will therefore be from Italy to Germany to England and to France. For Dussel, this perspective is Eurocentric because

> it indicates intra-European phenomena as the starting point of modernity and explains its later development without making recourse to anything outside of Europe. In a nutshell, this is the provincial, regional view that ranges from Max Weber (I have in mind here his analysis on órationalizationô and the ódisenchantment of worldviewsô) to Habermas. For many, Galileo (condemned in 1616), Francis Bacon (*Novum Organum*,1620), or Descartes (*Discourse on Method*, 1636) could be considered the forebears of the process of modernity in the seventeenth century.[40]

This concept of modernity is that which Habermas thinks has not been completed and need to be completed for true emancipation to be arrived at. Thus, reason is here called ómancipating reasonô.

This emancipating reason also has its irrational, violent and annihilating part. The exercise of this irrationality of emancipating reason is what constitutes the óMyth of Modernityô. The point is that with Europeôs contact with other cultures of the world and the advantage it had

over them, it began to exercise its reason in some irrational forms. For Dussel ómodernity implicitly contains a strong rational core that can be read as a ówayoutô for humanity from a state of regional and provincial immaturity. On the other hand, this same modernity carries out an irrational process that remains concealed even to itself. That is to say, given its secondary and mythical negative content, modernity can be read as the justification of an irrational praxis of violenceô. The last sentence notes the two moments of the Eurocentric concept of modernity. That is, modernity has: a) a mythical negative content which b) justifies an irrational praxis of violence. Dussel itemizes some of the constituent elements of these moments of modernity as follows:

- ✓ The modern civilization casts itself as a superior, developed civilization (something tantamount to unconsciously upholding a Eurocentric position).
- ✓ The aforementioned superiority makes the improvement of the most barbaric, primitive, coarse people a moral obligation (from Ginés de Sepúlveda until Kant or Hegel).
- ✓ The model of this educational process is that implemented by Europe itself (in fact, it is a unilineal, European development that will eventuallyð and unconsciouslyð result in the ñdevelopmentalist fallacyò).
- ✓ Insofar as barbaric people oppose the civilizing mission, modern praxis must exercise violence only as a last resort, in order to destroy the obstacles impeding modernization (from the ócolonial just warôto the Gulf War).
- ✓ As the civilizing mission produces a wide array of victims, its corollary violence is understood as an inevitable action, one with a quasi-ritual character of sacrifice; the civilizing hero manages to make his victims part of a saving sacrifice (Dussel has in

mind here the colonized indigenous people, the African slaves, women, and the ecological destruction of nature).

- ✓ For modern consciousness, the barbarians are tainted by ôblameô stemming from their opposition to the civilizing process, which allows modernity to present itself not only as innocent but also as absolving the blame of its own victims.
- ✓ Finally, given the ócivilizingô character of modernity, the sufferings and sacrificesð the costsð inherent in the ómodernizationô of the ôbackward,ô immature people, of the races fitted to slavery, of the weaker female sex, are understood as inevitable.[41]

Given these elements, it becomes clear the level of complicity the Eurocentric concept of modernity has in the levels of exploitation the world is suffering today. For this reason, modern reason does not need fulfillment, but transcendence.

In transcending this Eurocentric modern reason, Dussel develops another concept of modernity. This concept takes into view a consideration of a world perspective on modernity. The point here is that modernity is at the center of world history and this centrality is achieved from various perspectives: state, military, economic, philosophical. This centrality was very important for Dussel in that it was Europeôs distinct contribution to the making of modernity. This is because ñall the great Neolithic cultures were ócentersô of civilizing subsystems with their own peripheries, but without any historically significant connection with other ecumenes. Only modern European culture, from 1492 onwards, was at the center of a world system, of a universal history that confronts (with diverse types of subsumption and exteriority) as all other cultures of the earth: cultures that will be militarily dominated as its periphery.ò[42] As indicated above, the specific historical point for the articulation of this concept of modernity is 1492. Thus, before 1492 there was no world history in the empirical sense of the word. Empires or cultural systems simply coexisted. What existed before this time was just a series of interregional

relations. For this reason, ‘the centrality of Latin Europe in world history stands as the fundamental determination of modernity’. This centralization of Latin Europe began to take place right from the fifteenth century when the Spaniards and Portuguese began their exploration of the Atlantic and to take over the various parts of the New World. Against Hegel and Habermas contention about the start of modernity, Dussel maintains that “the seventeenth century (as exemplified in the works of Descartes and Bacon) must then be seen as the result of one-and-a-half centuries of modernity. It is a consequence rather than a starting point.”[43] With the centralization of Latin Europe here, other cultures were denoted as being in the periphery while Europe is in the centre. This concept of modernity takes into cognizance the fact that modernity was more of a planetary phenomenon than a European one.

An obvious implication of this perception that modernity is planetary is that “a great part of the achievements of modernity were not exclusively European but grose from a continuous dialectic of impact and counter-impact, effect and counter-effect, between modern Europe and its periphery even in that which we could call the constitution of modern subjectivity.”[44] At a more specific level, Dussel notes that Latin America is the first ever periphery of Modern European and it gave “Europe the first *comparative advantage* that explains, in part (but it is a part of the explanation that is never considered in the interpretations of modernity), the triumph over the Muslim world, vanquished at Lepanto in 1571 (25 years after the discovery and the beginning of the exploitation of the Zacatecas silver mines in Mexico and the Potosi silver mines in Bolivia), and over China, which ‘closes’ upon itself until the 20th century.”[45] It is important to note this because Europe was at the periphery of the then Afro-Asiatic-Mediterranean interregional relations and this civilization that was before Latin Europe was very fundamental to making of modernity as a whole.

Dussel even goes into history to note that China was a nation of power at the time of the rise of Latin Europe and could have explored and taken over the New World. In his words,

> é the reason China could not be hegemonic in the ónew systemô that emerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the reason it did not discover America, was not because it was inferior to the Europe of the time (either from an economic, a cultural, a technical, or even a scientific point of view), but because the ócenterô of the óinterregional systemô was west of China, in Hindustan and the Islamic world. America was beyond its horizonô if the Chinese did arrive in Alaska or California, they did not find anything of commercial interest.[46]

He further corroborates the truth of the power of China at the time with the ideas from the works of Adam Smith and Max Weber. An extensive quote here will show Dusselôs impression about Smith on the power of China at the time. Dussel writes thus:

> In *The Wealth of Nations* (1976 [1776]), Adam Smith often comments on Chinaôs greatness, its economic importance, and its low salaries: óChina has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world. . . . ó*China is a much richer country than any part of Europe*, and the difference between the price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is any-where in Europeô. The life of the elite is much more developed in China than in Europe (this is the óluxuryô that Werner Sombart (1965 [1913]) requires for capitalism): ó[T]he retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europeô. Nevertheless, the enormous masses of Chinaôs workers are poorer: ó[B]ut the real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life which is given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is lower both in China and Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part of Europeô. For Adam Smith the discovery of Spanish America permitted Europe to buy from both markets (the two richest in the world-system and the most varied in the world prior to the Industrial Revolution): ó[T]he silver of the new continent seems in this manner to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce between the *two extremities [*sic*] of the old one* is carried on, and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one anotherô.[47]

From all of these, one sees the advantage that China had economically over Europe and the fact that it was only after Europe had access to Latin America that she now had the economic power to buy from the Chinese and Indostan markets. Were it not for the discovery of Spanish America, Europe was still a periphery. Besides the fact that the centre of the world, for China, was not in the New World, the internal crisis in China also gave Europe the opportunity to take over and become the economic centre of the world.[48]

In a similar vein Weber holds strongly that if Europe had not been the most prepared region to carry out the industrial revolution, it would have been China or India. Weber devotes a great deal of time in his works on ethics, religion and morality to showing ówhy China and India did not give rise to capitalist society. His voluminous research produced the same answer time and again: China and Hindustan could not be capitalist because of their corporate property regime, because they had a bureaucracy that impeded competition, and so onô. On the other hand, while óstudying the ethics of the prophets of Israel, Weber found that, as far back as this, the long road was being built that would lead to capitalist modernity; the last stage of this road would be the reform promoted by Calvinist ethics (the conditions for the realization of the capitalist system). Calvinist individualism, wealth considered as a divine blessing, competition, private property, and the discipline of an austere subjectivity made the birth of capitalism possible, conditions not found in Chinese corporatism or in the magical quasi-feudalism of Hindustani Brahmanic cultureô. Thus, Christianity and the Protestant ethic were fundamental to the making of Latin Europe and its capitalist identity. The point to be made is that, other superior cultures existed before Latin Europe, but did not force themselves on Latin Europe. Also, these cultures played vital roles in the making of Modernity and its history of which Latin Europe now claims to be the center. For this reason, it is not fair for Latin Europe to begin to claim exclusively that modernity is purely its product and to begin to force itself on others.

At another level, the anti-modern discourses which other non-European cultures have produced against modernity and its excesses have gone unnoticed just because they are not European. In Dusselôs opinion, the debate between Sepulveda and de las Casas is a classic example of a non-European anti-discourse on modernity that has not been properly taken note of. Specifically in evaluating Habermasô *The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity,* Dussel

observes that Habermasô concept of modernity is not just Eurocentric, but it also contains strong elements of the developmentalist fallacy. This is because

> in the first place, Habermas situates in time the beginning of this ócounterdiscourseô: there at the beginning stands Kant (we would therefore be only two hundred years old!). Yet, in historical reality, from a non-eurocentric point of view of modernity (that is to say, worldly), this *counter-discourse* is already five centuries old: it began on the Hispaniola Island when Anton de Montesinos attacked the injustices that were being carried out against the Indians, and from there it reached the classrooms of Salamanca (since it is there that the critique of 1514 is continued with the theoretical and practical labor of Bartolome de las Casas, and it is there also where this counter-discourse will be expressed in the university lectures of Francisco de Vitoria concerning *De indiis).* As is always the case with Central-European philosophers, and especially Germans, the 16th and 17th centuries do not count, and Latin America much less.[49]

Here then, there is a systematic denial of the contributions of the Spaniards and hence the Spanish Americans to the development of a counter-discourse on modernity, which in actual fact is not true. But this Eurocentric mentality has to be pushed along on the grounds that since modernity is purely Eurocentric horizon, ó the counter-discourse is also an exclusively European product. In this manner, the periphery itself, in order to criticize Europe, will have to europeanize itself, because it would have to use a European counter-discourse in order to show Europe its own contradictions, without being able, once again, to contribute anything new and having to negate itselfô. Thus, there is an attempt to even make similar the point of radical counter-discourse. But,

> if é this counter-discourse is already the dialectical product (affirmation of alterity as principle of negation of the negation: analectical movement) of a critical dialogue with alterity, it cannot be said that it is exclusively and intrinsically European, and least of all that Europe is the only one that can óretrieve from its *own* traditionsô the continuation of such counter-discourses. On the contrary, it is likely that it is only outside Europe where this counter-discourse may develop more critically, and not as continuation of a strange or *exclusively* European discourse, but as continuation of a critical labor that the periphery has already stamped in the counter-discourse produced in Europe and on its own peripheral discourse (in fact and almost integrally, when it is non-eurocentric it is already counter-discourse).[50]

This is the point here, a true critical discourse on modernity has already been started outside the Eurocentric counter-discourse and this should be allowed to thrive for Europe alone does not have the right to do philosophy. In fact, European philosophy is not the exclusive product of

Europe. Instead it is the product of the humanity located in Europe, and with the contribution of the peripheral cultures that were in an essential co-constitutive dialogue. Here, then, there are productive possibilities within both modernity and periphery and ñthe fulfillment of modernity has nothing to do with the shift from the potentialities of modernity to the actuality of European modernity. Indeed, the fulfillment of modernity would be a transcendental shift where modernity and its denied alterity, its victims, would mutually fulfill each other in a creative process.ò[51] The process of achieving this transcendence is what Dussel calls transmodernity.

5.5 The Ethics of Liberation: Transmodern Extension of Gadamer's Ethical Legacy

At the ethical level, Gadamer rethinks the frames of discourse in quite a unique manner. This is the case in that his reaction to self-consciousness as the basis for ethics in the transcendental and phenomenological philosophy of his time pushes him to adopt friendship as the basic frame for ethics. This approach in Gadamerôs estimation appropriates the ready-to-hand in the ethical network as distinct from other schools of thought. But the transmodern project pushes this appropriation of prejudice to yet another dimension; that of radical responsibility. In discussing liberation as the ethics of the transmodern project, Dussel distinguishes between moral conscience and ethical conscience. Moral conscience is designated as óthe application of the principles in force in a given system to a concrete decisionô. A handy example of a person with good moral conscience is that of an administrator who helps his organization to exploit people without stealing from his organization due to his personal moral ideals. Such an administrator has a conscience but it is only a moral one as different from an ethical one. This kind of conscience óaccompanies an act and can cheer, disturb, blame, or tranquilize. The greatest tyrant can have a tranquil moral conscience, as can the fanaticô. An ethical conscience on the other hand is designated as óthe capacity one has to listen to the otherôs voice, the transontological word that breaks in from beyond the present system. The just protest of the other

may question the moral principles of the system. Only the one who has an ethical conscience can accept this questioning from the standpoint of the absolute criterion: the other as other in justiceô. Dussel goes ahead to identify two basic conditions that are necessary for this adequate listening to the other in justice:

> in the first place, to be able to listen to the voice of the other it is necessary to be atheistic vis-à-vis the system or to discover its fetishism. In the second place, it is necessary to respect the other as other. Respect is the attitude of metaphysical passivity with which honor is rendered to the exteriority of the other; it lets others be in their distinctness. Respect is a metaphysical attitude as a point of departure for all activity carried out in justice. But it is not respect for the law (which is universal or abstract), or for the system or its *proyecto*. It is respect for someone, for the freedom of the other. The other is the only really sacred being worthy of respect without limit. Respect is silence, not the silence of someone who has nothing to say (Wittgenstein), but of those who want to listen to everything because they know nothing about the other as other.[52]

Here respect has a metaphysical attitude, it is silence and not just silence of one who has nothing to say, but of one who wants to listen so that he/she can know more about the other and be ready to take responsibility for the other. To be responsible here means to ótake chargeô(spondere) is to make oneself responsible; to take charge of the poor who are encountered in exteriority with regard to the system. Responsibility is related not to answer-to (a question) but to respond-for (a person). To be responsible-for-with-regard-to is the theme. It is within this context of responsibility that mere tolerance for a helpless exteriority is superseded. This form of responsisbility, ótaking charge,ô also suggests solidarity. This solidarity refers to a ñdrive of alterity, a *metaphysical* desire (Emmanuel Levinas) for the other that is located outside the system in which tolerance and intolerance reign. It is a *taking-charge* of the other (which means *re-sponse*: to take charge (*spondere*) of the other, reflexively (*re*-)) before the tribunal of a system that accuses him or her, and assuming the other to be the victim of an injustice insofar as, by virtue of being accused, the other has been marked as the unjust, the guilty, the criminal ï it is to come before that tribunal in the name of the other.ò[53] Thus, the basic orientation of this ethics is a call to take responsibility for the poor in solidarity with them rather than in toleration. Torres

is quite apt in these words, ñtransmodernity can be seen as the application of liberation ethics to history, and to the ethical recognition of the other as a subject of knowledge and culture.ò[54] Ethics in the transmodern project is hinged on the appreciation of the value of otherness and the need to take responsibility for it. This premium placed on otherness within the transmodern project necessitates the delineation of ways for intercultural interaction.

5.6 Transversality and the Intercultural Imperative

Given the value attached to the other as evidenced above, interculturality becomes an imperative from the Dusselian point of view. This interculturality is germane because it is the bane of pluri-versality which transmodernity aims at. Writing on this, Dussel opines that, ñó*Trans*-modernityô points toward all of those aspects that are situated óbeyondô (and also óprior toô) the structure valorized by modern European/North American culture, and which are present in the great non-European universal cultures and have begun to move towards a pluriversal utopia.ò[55] One notices that the utopia here is not a universal one, but a pluriversal one. The concern of this section is how this transversal interculturality is executed for the optimal achievement of pluriversality. In his work ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Liberationò, Dussel lays out the model by which true intercultural dialogue can take place. The claim in this regard is óa future *trans*-modern culture ï which assumes the positive moments of Modernity (as evaluated through criteria distinct from the perspective of the other ancient cultures) ï will have a rich pluriversality and would be the fruit of an authentic intercultural dialogueô. This ñintercultural dialogue must be *transversal*, that is to say, it needs to set out from a place other than a mere dialogue between the learned experts of the academic or institutionally-dominated worlds.ò[56]

For Dussel, the intercultural dialogue proposed here must proceed in steps. The rationality behind this dialogue is that it has to be transversal. The sense here is that óan

intercultural dialogue must be *transversal*, that is to say, it needs to set out from a *place other than* a mere dialogue between the learned experts of the academic or institutionally-dominant worlds. It must be a multicultural dialogue that does not presuppose the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between culturesô. Dussel then goes ahead to detail out the specifics of each step. The detailing out of these specifics is in line with Mohammed Abed Al-Yabriôs works. In line with Al-Yabri, the dialogue should proceed in the following steps:

Affirmation of scorned exteriority: Here, Dussel raises the question, ñhow can one negate the disparagement of oneself but through setting-out on the path of the self-discovery of one's own value?ò[57] In discovering oneôs own value, there is an affirmation of an evolving and flexible identity in the face of Modernity. Postcolonial cultures need effective decolonization, but for this they must begin with self-valorization. A reinvigoration of the scorned self is a fitting place to begin this affirmation. Also, in Dusselôs opinion, there are erroneous ways of valorizing this self. There are three broad erroneous categories here. The first is fundamentalism which is just ahistorical and traditionalist. The second is the liberal Europeanist which claims to be modern but only negates the past and is unable to appropriately reconstruct it. The third is the leftist stand which often moves in the Marxist direction. All of these seek one thing, how to reconstruct tradition today. The most reasonable first step out of the dilemma here is an affirmative study of the legacy in question. For him Al-Yabriôs study of the Arab world is a good example in that it is an indigene who understands the language and cultural ideals that undertakes the study and can come out with better understandings within that cultural milieu. Another example is Rigoberta Menchuôs *An Indian Woman in Guatemala* which is a cultural study carried out by an indigene. There is no way such a study will not come out with affirmative elements within such a culture.

Something that could be of help too in this direction is the study of memory. Memory is here defined as the persistence of tradition and it is ñpart of a complex discourse, which becomes the pathway to an existence (individual or communal) that has functioned as resistance to alienation of self in colonized societies. Memory is a tool wielded by all who occupy a colonial space regardless of their race, class, gender, age, education, intellectual ability or religious affiliation.ò[58] Within this context and definition, memory allows for the assertion of that which is displaced and is the most pervasive instrument and vehicle of consciousness. It assures that these values exist even when they are denied. Here, memory is considered powerful, meaningful and resourceful. They can hide and resurface to avoid obliteration. Memory is very powerful in this understanding. And ógiven their power to help sustain the self, memories are the battleground for maintaining or destroying the self. Memory is that which modernity seeks, engages, enhances, corrupts or destroys. It is not just important as a source of the self, but also as a crucial battleground from which colonization has been foughtô. For this reason, ñThe site of memory is not only a place of affirmation of existence, but also a prime source of the selfé ò[59] As a place of affirmation of existence and even value, it will not be out of place to evoke memory in the affirmation of scorned exteriority.

Critiquing One's Traditions with the Resources of One's Culture: The rational for this point is that ñthe only way to grow from within oneôs tradition is to engage in critique from within the assumptions of that same culture. Thus, it is necessary to find within oneôs culture the originary moments of a self-criticism.ò[60] This point is not far from that which Gadamer makes on the value idea of óquestioningô in the search for valid interpretation. By these questions, points of deficiency are found within a cultural whole without even taking any comparative step in the first instance. That this critique should be carried out within the resources of oneôs culture is very fundamental. This is the case because, ót is not Modernity that imposes the tools upon the

critical intellectual; it is the critical intellectual that controls and directs the selection of those modern instruments that will be useful for the critical reconstruction of her own tradition+. The point here is that the critical intellectual should not abandon the western apparatus for critique altogether but he should be located between ñ(in-betweeness) the two cultures (their own culture and Modern culture). This is really the issue of the ' border (the ' frontier) between two cultures as a *locus* for ' critical thought.ò[61] Following Al-Yabri, Dussel shows how a critical thinker within the Arab world has followed this method by being faithful to their tradition while subsuming the best elements of other cultures, which were in some aspects more highly developed.

Strategy for Resistance: Hermeneutic Time: This stage emphasizes maturation because it is necessary if resistance is to be formidable. Thus, ó*the affirmation of one+s own values require time, study, reflection, a return to the texts* or symbols and constitutive myths of one+s culture, before or at least at the same time that one consults the domain of the texts of the modern hegemonic culture+. The aim here is to recapture some of the pristine ideals of the ancients within such a tradition to see how such ideals (be they rationalist, Gnostic, democratic, socialist etc) can be brought to life again. This is not an easy task hence it is a project that requires ñtenacity, time, intelligence, research, and solidarity. It requires the long-term maturation of a new response in *cultural resistance*, not only to the elites of other cultures, particularly those that are dominant, but also against the Eurocentricism of elites in peripheral, colonial, and fundamentalist cultures.ò[62] The introduction of the symbolic into Christianity as demonstrated by Manchu in Guatemala is a good example in this direction.

Intercultural Dialogue between Critics of their own Culture: This is a dialogue between critical cultural innovators with modernity serving as the catalyst for such a critique. It is not merely a dialogue among cultural apologists, it is not a dialogue among those who merely

defend their culture from enemies. It is fundamentally a dialogue among ñthose who *recreate it, departing from the critical assumptions* found in their own cultural tradition and in that of globalizing Modernity.ò[63] Despite all of these, this dialogue still has another quality in that it ónot even the dialogue between the critics of the metropolitan ' core and the critics of the cultural ' periphery. It is more than anything *a dialogue between the —critics of the periphery,* it must be an intercultural South-South dialogue before it can become a South-North dialogueô. The South as used here is not ña simple geographical location but a ómetaphor for human suffering under global capitalismôò[64] This point is very vital for in most cases research works funded by the Western World can affect the traditional content of research from the periphery thus recycling modern ideas in a world where it does not fit and engendering more brain-drain. As Mignolo puts it ñbrains are not being stolen when a social scientist leaves a country in which there are limited research conditions and moves to a country and institution with better resources. Instead, this happens when the social scientist remains in a county under limited research conditions and reproduces and imitates the patterns, methods, and above all, the questions raised by the social sciences under different historical and social experiences.ò[65] The advantage in this intercultural dialogue is the fact that it

> brings about a transversal and mutual cross-fertilization among the critical thinkers of the periphery and those from ' border spaces, and the organization of networks to discuss their own specific problems transforms this process of self-affirmation into a weapon of liberation. We should inform ourselves and learn from the failures, the achievements, and the still-theoretical justification of the creative processes in the face of the globalization of European/North American culture, whose pretense of universality must be deconstructed from the optical multi-focality of each culture.[66]

Thus, this intercultural dialogue serves as a mode of negating and even critiquing the mono-focal cosmovision of Euro-Americanism and in its place emphasizes on the need for a pluri-focal cosmovision with planetary antecedents.

Dussel summarizes this strategy under the sub-heading ñStrategy for trans-modern growthò. Here, Dussel writes specifically that

> a strategy presupposes a project. We have defined the ó*trans*-modernô project as a liberation intention that synthesizes all that we have discussed. In the first place, it suggests the affirmation, the self-valorzation of oneôs own negated or merely devalued cultural moments which are found in the exteriority of Modernity, those still remaining *outside* of the destructive considerations of that ostensibly universal modern culture. Secondly, those traditional values ignored by modernity should be point of departure for an internal critique, from within the cultureôs own hermeneutical possibilities. Thirdly, the critics, in order to be critics, should be those who, living in the biculturality of the ñbordersò, can create critical thought. Fourthly, this means a long period of resistance, of maturation, and of the accumulation of forces. It is a period of creative and accelerated cultivation and development of oneôs own cultural tradition, which is now on the path toward a *trans*-modern utopia. This represents a strategy for the growth and creativity of a renovated culture, which is not merely decolonized, but is moreover entirely new.[67]

The above is so clear on what Dussel thinks the trans-modern approach should be and how it should progress. It also shows how the transversality within the recommended intercultural dialogue should progress. This kind of dialogue engenders contact between different worlds, both core and peripheral and the aim is at building a transmodern world with a pluri-versal truth base, rather a modern one with a universal truth base. What then should constitute this pluri-versal truth base?

5.7 Towards Pluri-versality: A Précis of the Transmodern Project

In summing up this chapter our focus will be on explicating the details of this pluri-versal truth base as the high point of the transmodern project and highlighting its mandate within the decolonial turn which moves from tradition to transmodernity. In discussing the ethics of liberation, there was a brief consideration of the kind of coherence liberation philosophy appreciates and it was noted that the kind of coherence here is not an internal coherence that projects itself as the ideal for others to emulate. Rather it is an internal coherence that co-implicates other internal coherence within the functioning of a structural whole. The rationale here is creating a world in which all worlds fit. It was also made clear that this form of coherence has two phases, the functional and aesthetic forms. Here the functional aspect considers how well

the various internal coherence work together in the system. The aesthetic refers to the tactile and the visible aspects of the functioning whole. This whole has to be visibly and tactilely appealing to the senses lest, such coherence is incomplete.

All of these defile the universal truth base operative in modernity and its inflated self-understanding. The truth base here is pluri-versal, it is tolerant and ready to work with others. It is Mignolo who articulates clearly the idea of ópluri/di-versality as a universal projectô. Commenting on the idea of universality, Mignolo contends thus, ñI no longer feel like enrolling (or requesting membership) in a new abstract universal project that claims a fundamental European legacy.ò[68] He makes this assertion within the context of his assessment of Çiǵekôs case against globalization. The articulation of the concept of pulri-verality is preceded by the complicity of the idea of universality in the making of the modern/colonial world divide. Mignolo in developing this claim first considers the complicity between universality and capitalism in Wallersteinôs *Historical Capitalism and Capitalist Civilization* and the relation between globalization and universality in Çiǵekôs ñA Leftist Plea for Eurocentrismò. In the first place, he makes the case that Wallerstein sees universalism as the ideological keystone of historical capitalism. Here, it is faith as well as an epistemology. It is faith in that it believes in the real phenomenon of truth and it is an epistemology in that it justifies local truth with universal values and it is for this reason that Mignolo notes that ñit cannot be said of Wallerstein that he, like Vattimo or Habermas, is blind to colonialism. Unlike continental thought, Wallerstein is not imprisoned in the Greco-Romanï modern European tradition. The politics of location is a question valid not just for minority epistemology. On the contrary, it is the key stone of universalism in European thought.ò[69] Thus, it is the politics of location that frames the discourse on universality within thought and the rise of historical capitalism is very fundamental in this regard.

On the other hand, Mignolo considers Žižekôs case that the true opposition today is between globalization and universalism. In his opinion, Europe possessed universalism while America possessed globalization. Thus, with the rise of America today, globalization is taking the center instead of universalism. It is on this ground that he pleas for Eurocentrism on the grounds of restoring the ótrue European legacyô. He even goes into history to make his claims for the true European legacy. But then Mignolo notes that óŽižek reproduces the macronarrative of Western civilization (from ancient Greece to the current North Atlantic) and casts out the macronarrative of the modern/colonial world in which the conflict between globalization and universality emerged. Since he does not see beyond the linear narrative of Western civilization, he also cannot see that ódiversalityô rather than universality is the future alternative to globalizationô. The point is that a macronarrative with planetary pretensions will understand that diversality rather than universality is a far more viable alternative. This diversality ñoffers the possibilities of a network of planetary confrontations with globalization in the name of justice, equity, human rights, and epistemic diversality.ò[70] Here then universality becomes one mode of self expression of which there are others, thus creating a network of diversality.

The proposal here is further dealt with within the context of what Mignolo calls ópluri-vesality as universal projectô. This context of pluri-versality comes to the fore when various local histories connect through their common experience and use this common experience as the basis for a new common logic of knowing which Mignolo calls border thinking. This critical border thinking is also ñthe method that connects pluriversality (different colonial histories entangled with imperial modernity) into a uni-versal project of delinking from modern rationality and building other possible worlds. Critical border thinking involves and implies both the imperial and colonial differences.ò[71] As a method, it must take on the colonial and imperial difference if not it is not critical enough. Those on the border must have a voice in what happens in this new

planetary world. Writing on the horizon of exception in this new future world, Mignolo submits categorically that ñé the horizon of expectations here will be precisely ópluri-versality as a uni-versal projectô. That is, the uni-versality of the project has to be based on the assumption that the project cannot be designed and implemented óby one ethnic groupô, but has to be inter-epistemic and dialogical, pluri-versal.ò[72] This is what border thinking as a critical methodology entails in this context. The universal here is very concrete as Grosfoguel puts it, ñas opposed to the abstract universals of Eurocentric epistemologies that subsume/dilute the particular into the same, a óradical universal decolonial anti-capitalist diversalityô is a concrete universal that builds a decolonial universal by respecting the multiplicity of local particularities in the struggles against patriarchy, capitalism, coloniality and eurocentric modernity from a diversity of decolonial epistemic/ethical historical projects.ò[73]

Truth, is here tolerant and is able to incorporate other perspectives. Marc Luyckx puts it well in these words:

> The ótransmodernô way of thinking, which we described as óre-enchantedô, is *actively* tolerant. It acknowledges that all civilizations need to be receptive to that which is alien, whatever form this may take. It is open to the transcendental, while resisting any authoritarian imposition of religious certainty. The Truth is at the center of things; each person converges toward it through his/her own culture, along his/her own path. But no one gets to say, ñThe search for Truth can now be called off, for I have found it.[74]

The centre as indicated here is an empty centre. Modernity which has been at this centre has been dethroned from there. This is because it is the cause of as much dirt as the goods it has brought. Besides all the philosophical evils of modernity as detailed out by the transmodern project, Luyckx goes ahead to note that Modernity has lost its appeal because it is a danger to religions, civilizations, and humanity: it has a lethal dimension. Modernity has demonized religion. Modernity has attributed, often unjustly, many conflicts and wars to religion. Modernity has a religious hostility to religions; it has also killed millions of people, and animals. One can see a link between modernity and the Holocaust. The Holocaust would not have been possible without

the dehumanization produced by modernity. Modernity has a frighteningly totalitarian dimension. Modernity has dehumanized religion. The obvious implication here is that the truth modernity portends cannot really be a whole and complete one as it would force other cultures to believe. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 represent the posture of the truth and how it is constituted within the transmodern world.

Fig 5.2



Fig 5.3

The figures above show the empty centre[75] to which all cultures are moving. Nobody here claimsto have it all. It is a collective work. In the same vein, the figure below shows how Dussel characterizes this kind of universality.

Fig 5.4

In this figure, the truth (transmodernity) is located up and all cultures are ascending towards it. These cultures are not just moving up but are moving having appropriated some of the vital elements within modernity and these points of appropriation are located in $A^{1,}$ $B^{1,}$ $C^{1,}$ $D^{1,}$ N^{1} and we can see to that modernity too is moving up. The movement upwards shows that modernity is being transcended towards transmodernity. From the other points of movement, traditional structures are going up after taking relevant elements from modernity. Thus, we see here a movement from tradition to transmodernity. That is, having appropriated relevant elements from

modernity, traditions are moving towards a transmodern stage where there is more light and peace for humanity. This is indeed yet another phase of the fusion of horizons. Pluriversality becomes a new form of universality and the next chapter will show that this can be the basis for ña world in which all worlds fitò.

Endnotes

1. Annibal Quijano, ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 1.3, (Duke University Press, 2000), 533-534.
2. Annibal Quijano, ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò 540.
3. These are some aspects (most especially knowledge and subjectivity) of the reign of coloniality that colonialsm and all the efforts directed at it did not adequately deal with.
4. Annibal Quijano, ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò 551.
5. Annibal Quijano, ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò 551.
6. Annibal Quijano, ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò 553.
7. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò *Kult* 6: (2009) Special Issue Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications, 15.
8. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò 14-15.
9. Linda Martin Alcoff, ñMignoloôs Epistemology of Coloniality,ò *The New Centennial Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007, 80.
10. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñEnrique Dusselôs Liberation Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1(2): 2011, 13.
11. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò *Cultural Studies*, 21:2, 2007, 243.
12. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò 244.
13. Walter D. Mignolo, ñColoniality: the Darker Side of Modernity,ò *Cultural Studies*, vol. 21, nos. 2ï 3, (2007), 39.
14. Walter D. Mignolo, ñColoniality: The Darker Side of Modernity,ò 43. Altermodernity is a movement that reacts to both modernity and postmodernity. Nicolas Bourriaud captures its essence thus, ñIf twentieth-century modernism was above all a western cultural phenomenon, altermodernity arises out of planetary negotiations, discussions between agents from different cultures. Stripped of a centre, it can only be polyglot. Altermodernity is characterised by translation, unlike the modernism of the twentieth century which spoke the abstract language of the colonial west, and postmodernism, which encloses artistic phenomena in origins and identitiesò. But then, this concept is still considered as caught in the web of coloniality.
15. Fred Dallmayr, ñThe Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel,ò *Constellations*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, 155.
16. Madina Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, ñGlobal Coloniality and the Decolonial Option,ò *Kult 6 - Special Issue* Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications. Fall 2009. 135.
17. Madina Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, ñGlobal Coloniality and the Decolonial Option,ò 135-136.
18. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 204.
19. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 135.
20. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 29.
21. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 44.
22. Aldreteôs work is the case in view for Mignolo in this regard. Mignolo notes that Aldreteôs inspirations came from the works of Jose de Acosta, who lived a large part of his life in Peru. Acosta got information from Mexico and published his work on the history of the Indies in 1590. From this work Aldrete garnered that there were two monarchies in the Indies: one of the óIngas, 0 Incas del Piru,ô and the other in New Spain, belonging to the kings of Mexico. Aldrete was particularly interested in learning from Acosta's report that Quechua was the official language (the general language) of the Inca empire and that Nahuati in Mexico had a similar function for the Aztec (or Mexica, as they prefer to call themselves) empire. Both were languages that the conquerors imposed upon the conquered. Aldrete found these examples extremely useful. The expansion and colonization of language by the Incas and Mexicas supported his thesis that the vanquisher always inflicted its language upon the vanquished, as did the expansion and colonization of language by the Spaniards. Since Aldrete was interested in supporting his thesis and indirectly justifying colonial expansion, he did not point out the differences between the colonization of language by ancient

Mexicas and Incas and the colonization of language by Spaniards, as he did when distinguishing the Roman from the Arabic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula. The blind spots of his argument show that Aldrete was interested in establishing the Greco· Roman tradition in language and the Holy Roman legacy in religion. Following from this, Alderete goes ahead to express his disappointment that the Castillian tongue was not spreading as fast as it should among the Indians. He even goes as far as arguing that because the Indians lacked no letters, they went about naked and behaved like beasts lacking science and civility (See, Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 32-35).

23. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 42.
24. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 71.
25. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 121.
26. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 126.
27. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 136.
28. The ages here are: the age of the gods, the age of heros and the age of men (human beings). This distinction, which has been traced back to ancient Egypt and was known through Varro, was expanded by Vico. To each age Vico attributed a particular kind of language. During the age of the gods, the language was hieroglyphic; during the age of the heroes, the language was composed of signs and of ómprcsas heraicasô [heroic enterprises]; and in the age of men, the language was epistolary, and they were able to communicate across space. Vico came to the conclusion that a civil history was possible because each nation was able to write its own history in the characters corresponding to each period (See, Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 146).
29. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 146.
30. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 147.
31. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 153.
32. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 167.
33. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*, 168-9.
34. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, 18. The idea here signals part of Mignoloôs grand design to move beyond hermeneutics and epistemology within his intellectual scheme. It is the opinion of the current that while Mignolo *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* was an exercise in pluritopic hermeneutics, it moves beyond hermeneutic, altogether, as a decolonial epistemic category in *Local Histories and Global Designs* in favour of óborder thinkingô. This is evidenced by Mignoloôs contention that the idea of hermeneutics (and also epistemology) is caught up in the epistemology of the second modernity and its attendant distinction between the knower and the known; hence his introduction of óborder thinkingô at this point. This is ñwith the intention of transcending hermeneutics and epistemology and to describe reality from its exterirotiy (in Levinasô sense)ò. (See, Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, 18)
35. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, 65.
36. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, 13.
37. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 1.3, (2000), 465.
38. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò 466.
39. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò 468.
40. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò 469-70.
41. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò 472-3.
42. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Translated and Edited by Eduardo Mendieta (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), 132.
43. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, 470.
44. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, 132-3.
45. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, 134.
46. Enrique Dussel, World-System and ñóTransô-Modernity,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 3.2 (2002), 224.
47. Enrique Dussel, World-System and ñóTransô-Modernity,ò 225.
48. Enrique Dussel, World-System and ñóTransô-Modernity,ò 226. For Dussel following Weber, It would seem that until the eighteenth century, China was the greatest producer of commodities, and that the China Sea

was an unequalled mercantile site within the world-system (because of the articulation of the Old World with the New World since 1492). The Chinese crises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulted, partly, in Chinaôs inability to realize the modernity as Europe did. In this opinion, the Ming dynasty (1368ï 1644), which founded the highly developed Chinese empire (which included capitalist regions), went into a relative crisis with the arrival of the Manchurian dynasty (1644ï 1796). In Europe, this was a time when the rococo ñChinese styleò (*chinoiserie*) became fashionable (porcelain utensils, lacquered paintings on wood, baldachins in the gardens to have tea, decorated Chinese pavilions, silk for wide-sleeved garments, etc.).

49. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, 135.
50. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, 136-7.
51. Enrique Dussel, ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò 474.
52. Enrique Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, 59.
53. Enrique Dussel, ñDeconstruction of the Concept of ñToleranceò: From Intolerance to Solidarity,ò *Constellations* Volume 11, No 3, 2004, 330.
54. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñEnrique Dusselôs Liberation Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò 3-4.
55. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 19. Accessed 10th November, 2011. http://enrique dussel.com/txt/Transmoder nity%20and%20Interculturality.pdf.
56. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 19.
57. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 20.
58. Gertrude James Gonzalez de Allen, ñEnrique Dussel and Manuel Zapata Olivella: An Exploration of De-colonial, Diasporic, and Trans-modern Selves and the Politics of Recognition,ò *Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise,* Fall 2006, 2.
59. Gertrude James Gonzalez de Allen, ñEnrique Dussel and Manuel Zapata Olivella: An Exploration of De-colonial, Diasporic, and Trans-modern Selves and the Politics of Recognition,ò 10.
60. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 21.
61. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 23.
62. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 24.
63. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 24.
64. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò *The South Atlantic Qaurterly* 101:1, 2002, 67. 66.
65. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Differenceò, 74.
66. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 25.
67. Enrique Dussel, ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 25.
68. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò 74.
69. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò 89.
70. Walter D. Mignolo, ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò 90.
71. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007, 498.
72. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò 499.
73. Ramon Grosfoguel, ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò 33.
74. Marc Luyckx, ñThe Transmodern Hypothesis: Towards a Dialogue of Culture,ò *Futures* 31 (1999), 974.
75. Marc Luyckx Ghisi, ñTowards a Transmodern Transformation of our Global Society: European Challenges and Opportunities,ò *Journal of Futures Studies*, 15(1), 2010, 41.

CHAPTER SIX
GENERAL EVALUATION

6.1 Preamble

This chapter focuses on evaluating the two currents of thought that this research engages. The chapter begins with a general exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of philosophical hermeneutics and the transmodern project. In doing this, the chapter looks closely at the exclusivist nature of Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and also considers the question of native agency within the making of the coloniality of power as weaknesses within Gadamerôs philosophy and the transmodern project respectively. Having done this, there is a consideration of an alternative ontology that will structure out the possibility of ónother worldô; an ontology of complementarity as against that of polarized units. Following this, the chapter considers an-*other* principle for cross-cultural contact/evaluation that carries on board the basic elements of this new ontology. This consideration proceeds by looking at how previous principles of cross-cultural contact /evaluation have fallen short in carrying the elements of this ontology on board. Finally, there is a summary and conclusion which articulates the core of the thesis of the research by stating how ópluriversalityô meets directly the requirement of the óethical-hermeneutic principleô of cross-cultural contact/evaluation.

6.2 Assessing Gadamer's Position on Prejudice

The assessment of Gadamer here begins with the various confrontations he had with some of his contemporaries notably, Hirsch, Habermas and Ricoeur. Hirsch ñrepresents the traditional position of literary interpretation and philology, which developed from Schleiermacherôs hermeneutics. The traditional position argues that the meaning of a text is determined by the authorôs intention.ò[1] For Hirsch therefore, Gadamer is incorrect in his understanding of interpretation as residing not in the authorôs intention. This is because the authorôs meaning is the only normative concept for interpretation that is ñuniversally compelling and generally sharable.ò[2] In criticizing Gadamerôs repudiation of method and in contrast

upholding the philological method, Hirsch claims that Gadamerôs theory ñcontains inner conflicts and inconsistencies.ò[3] Hirsch analyzes three failed attempts by Gadamer to save the idea of correct interpretation from the relativism implied by historicity: ñtradition, quasi-repetition, and horizon-fusion.ò[4] Within the context of the above, it is pertinent to note that Hirsch and Gadamer differ over the constitution of meaning. Hirsch, following Husserl, argues that verbal meaning can only be intended by the author, whereas Gadamer, following Heidegger, argues that meaning is always already given and must be interpreted. Hirsch contends that meaning and significance must be strictly distinguished but Gadamer conflates them. Since consciousness can isolate part of itself, the interpreter can reconstruct the authorôs intended meaning without incorporating her own beliefs. Gadamer disagrees and argues that there is always a moment of application in just understanding a meaning. Gadamer proposes a hermeneutic event of truth, while Hirsch argues that an interpretive hypothesis must be validated using probabilistic arguments. Hirsch argues that the historicity of understanding that Gadamer accepts leads to relativism and that Gadamerôs concept of prejudice inaccurately limits the proper idea of pre-apprehension as an interpretive hypothesis.[5]

Despite Hirschôs position in this regard, this research upholds that the true nobility and grandeur of Gadamerôs position is the fact that the truth is Gadamerôs concern. This becomes clear when we consider the nature of a text for Gadamer. Gadamer considers a text first to be an instance of *authority*, by this it has superior knowledge about a subject and consequently has something to teach the reader. Secondly, it contains *information*. This means that the content of the text is meaningful in some way. This superior knowledge is meaningful and informative for the readerôs life. Thirdly, a text contains the *truth* and this is the most important feature for Gadamer following even the title of his great work (*Truth and Method*). ñHere, however, we can take note of the distinct direction Gadamer is taking. The earlier Romantics were not interested

in the authority, information or truth of the text. They were concerned with the authorôs expression contained in the words, his originality, individuality, his thoughts and feelings.ò[6] This same romantic tradition Hirsch extols and so favours meaning over truth in his critique of Gadamer. But Gadamer favours truth over meaning and since this is the case, Gadamer is ready to sacrifice the demands of historical and interpretive exactitude in order to arrive at the truth. Lorraine Code is, therefore, right to suggest that ñhermeneutic understanding is in this sense less definitive than orthodox empirical knowledge aims to be, but in some sense ótruer toô the texts and experiences it engages.ò[7] The truth in this context is intimately connected with óhistorical effectô, that is, the usefulness of the merging of horizons to us. Interpretation in this regard is meant to teach us something that is useful to us and not just a disinterested quest for knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Thus, while the key issue, for Hirsch, is the exactitude of meaning, Gadamerôs concern is that the meaning be true and it is for the reason that he aligns correct interpretation more with the subject matter rather than to the authorsô intention. Also the place of praxis and the concern for the preservation of the life-world is yet another fundamental justification for this move in Gadamer. On the account of praxis/application mere theory is not sufficient for enhancing the life-world, there has to be a move to the truth which is the appropriate guide for praxis. On the grounds of Gadamerôs concern for the truth, the weaknesses identified by Hirsch can be said not to have much justifiable grounds.

There are also the concerns of the Habermas - Gadamer debate. In the words of Robert Piercey, ñthe debate between Gadamer and Habermas involves a number of different themes and takes place on a number of different levels. At bottom, though, the debate concerns the philosophical status of tradition.ò[8] Habermas argues that Gadamerôs defense of tradition is both philosophically dubious and ethically retrograde. He claims that human inquiry must not be identified with the respectful interpretation of tradition, and that, on the contrary, it often requires

us to be suspicious of tradition. The linchpin of Habermasôs critique is his so-called *theory of interests*. According to Habermas, all inquiry is directed by a variety of interests, which he defines as the ñbasic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the species.ò[9] In this regard therefore, inquiry is ideological and there are three sides to the ideological interest here. The first is the *technical* interest which governs the empirical sciences. These sciences are driven by the desire to exert ñtechnical control over natural forcesò[10] ï to subordinate nature to human ends. Next is the *practical* interest which governs the humanities. These disciplines pursue *understanding* ï they study the meanings of symbolic structures in the cultural world, particularly as these meanings are transmitted by tradition. Finally, the disciplines that Habermas calls the critical social sciences are governed by an *emancipatory* interest. Rather than seeking to control nature or understand a cultural heritage, these sciences unearth the interests at work in the other branches of inquiry. They seek to expose ñviolently distorted communicationò[11] ï that is, to bring to light the ideologies that govern supposedly disinterested theoretical standpoints. They criticize the ideological bases of other branches of inquiry with the aim of liberating humanity from them. This last phase Habermas likens to the area of psychoanalysis and this is his project in philosophy. It is also the deficiency of Gadamerôs claims in his view.

As a result of his theory of interests, Habermas denies that hermeneutics is universal in scope. He denies that all intellectual undertakings simply take up and modify the fore-meanings handed down by tradition. In Habermasôs view, this orientation to tradition belongs only in the second sphere. Only the humanities pursue an interpretative understanding of the contents of tradition. The other spheres do not. In fact, critical social science is in some ways hostile to this attitude towards tradition. Critical social science does not simply take up what the past has handed down to it. Its aim is to expose the ideological element at work in tradition, to criticize

and remedy the violently distorted communication that the past has transmitted. In short, the task of this sphere is to carry out a *critique of ideology*. And the critique of ideology, Habermas argues, is incompatible with Gadamerôs insistence on the universality of hermeneutics. Thus, he writes: ñGadamerôs prejudice in favor of the legitimacy of prejudices (or prejudgements) validated by tradition is in conflict with the power of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the claim of traditions. Substantiality disintegrates in reflection, because the latter not only confirms but also breaks dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge.ò[12] Consequently, Habermas contends that Gadamerôs insistence on the universality of hermeneutics is both theoretically dubious and ethically problematic. This is because far from making our link to tradition a universal condition of understanding, ñreflection requires that the hermeneutic approach limits itself.ò[13]

At another level, Habermas also raises the issue of method as it arises within Gadamerôs schemes. In his ñA Review of Gadamerôs *Truth and Method*ò, Habermas argues that Gadamerôs correct criticism of objective science cannot ñlead to a suspension of the methodological distanciation of the object, which distinguishes a self-reflective understanding from everyday communicative experience.ò[14] Gadamerôs strict opposition of truth to method and his critique of all methodology goes too far. That the object of understanding is itself part of the human tradition and not a physical object does imply that the natural scientific method cannot be applied.

Gadamer responds to Habermasôs criticisms in ñOn the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflectionò by asserting the universality of hermeneutics. In general Gadamer argues that Habermasôs use of the power of reflection to support a sociological methodology fails, since ñthe hermeneutic experience is prior to all methodical alienation because it is the matrix out of which arise the questions that it then directs to science.ò[15] Gadamerôs point is that

your matrix of inherited prejudices first establishes what is questionable. Within ordinary operations, a normal workerôs inherited prejudices usually prevent him from sensing that prejudice as questionable within the context of his normal operations. On the other hand, a trained member of the Communist Party would question that prejudice on the grounds of his training to seek out exploitation within workplaces. Therefore, it is tradition, as oneôs inherited prejudices, that determines what is questionable before reflective consciousness is even aware of an inherited prejudice. Gadamer states that he did not mean that truth and method are ómutually exclusiveô but that the use of any method must pay the price of ótoning down and abstractionô, which narrows the objects under investigation. This may not be a problem in the natural sciences, but in the human sciences this leads to a narrowing of human social relations, where finally social science aims at the óscientific ordering and control of societyô. Habermas, Gadamer admits, does not go this far, but in arguing for the emancipatory interest of reflection on the model of psychoanalysis, he presupposes the knowledge and authority of the doctor in relation to the patient. On this value that Habermas places on psychoanalysis in his critique of Gadamer, Gadamer counters that when this relationship is used as a model for understanding and questioning inherited prejudices, one cannot determine which social group will be given the authority of the doctor. In the hermeneutic conversation the doctor and patient are on the same level. They are partners in the same linguistic game and one cannot presume to have superior knowledge. óA game partner who is always óseeing throughô his game partner, who does not take seriously what they are standing for, is a spoilsport whom one shunsô. Gadamer concludes that the use of psychoanalysis as a model for understanding in society fails since it must dogmatically assume who will be the doctor with superior knowledge.[16]

Gadamer asserts that Habermas is being dogmatic in thinking that authority is always wrong. Reason and authority are not óabstract antithesesô. In accepting this antithesis from the

Enlightenment, Habermas grants reflection a false power. Gadamer admits that there are cases where an authority exercises dogmatic power, as in education, the military and through political forces. However, mere obedience to authority does not indicate whether it is legitimate or not. Most of the time ót seems evident this *acceptance* or *acknowledgement* is the decisive thing for relationships to authorityô. When the powerless follow the powerful this is not acceptance, ónot true obedience and it is not based on authority but on forceô. The loss of authority demonstrates that authority is not based on dogmatic power but on dogmatic acceptance. Dogmatic acceptance means óone concedes superiority in knowledge and insight to the authorityô. According to Gadamer, the real dispute is whether reflection, as Habermas argues, ólways dissolves what one has previously acceptedôor whether reflection, as Gadamer argues, just presents an alternative to what is accepted without judging which is correct. ó The idea that tradition, as such, should be and should remain the only ground for acceptance of presuppositions (a view that Habermas ascribes to Gadamer) flies in the face of Gadamerôs basic thesis that authority is rooted in insight as a hermeneutical processô. Gadamer challenges Habermas by pointing out that óa universalized emancipatory reflectionô would aim to reject all authority and invariably the óultimate guiding image of emancipatory reflection in the social sciences must be an anarchistic utopiaô, which, of course, is not Habermasôs goal. To all of these Habermas responds in his essay ñThe Hermeneutic Claim to Universalityò[17] and Gadamer further responds to Habermas in his ñReply to My Critics.ò[18]

With regard to all of these, it will not be out of place to surmise along with Schmidt that the central disagreement between Habermas and Gadamer concerns the power of reason and the methodological justification of interpretations. Habermas charges Gadamer with an uncritical acceptance of traditional meaning because he neglects the power of reason to reveal the genesis of prejudices and thereby to discover those prejudices whose authority is based on force instead

of reason. Gadamer counters that he never claimed that the textôs or the traditional meaning is always superior to the interpreterôs. He argues that Habermasôs model for critique ï psychoanalysis ï fails since it must unjustifiably presuppose that one interlocutor has superior knowledge, like the analyst in relation to the patient. While Habermas denies the universality of hermeneutics because there are pre-linguistic experiences of the world, Gadamer affirms the claimed universality because to understand and communicate about these experiences requires language and thus hermeneutic analysis. Habermas claims that some critical methodology must be incorporated into hermeneutic understanding if it is not to succumb to a dangerous relativism. Gadamer argues that in the event of truth, the legitimate prejudice shines forth and convinces the dialogue partners and this event does not rely on methodology, that is, one comes too late to ask for a methodological justification.[19]

Paul Ricoeur seeks to balance the tensions in the above positions and in fact the tensions here constitute the core of his research concerns. On this Robert Piercey contends that, ñdespite his debts to Gadamer, Ricoeur does not simply side with Gadamerian hermeneutics and against the Habermasian critique of ideology. Instead, he argues that Habermasôs concerns can be addressed within a hermeneutical framework, and that philosophical hermeneutics can incorporate within itself a Habermasian impulse towards critique.ò[20] His mission is not to fuse the two positions; he states explicitly that he cannot do that. Rather, he wishes to steer a óthird pathô between hermeneutics in its Gadamerian form and the critique of ideology as Habermas describes it. But then, this third path seems closer to the former than to the latter. In short, Ricoeur tries to show that there can be, and indeed must be, ñ*critique within hermeneutics*.ò[21]

In a series of pieces on the debate, Ricoeur argues that Habermasôs hostility towards tradition is both incoherent and, at the end of the day, unwarranted. It is incoherent because the critique of ideology cannot óbe detached from hermeneutic presuppositions.ô Habermasôs ideal of

ón exhaustive critique of prejudice ï and hence of ideology ï is impossible, because there is no zero-point from which it could proceed.ô Specifically, Ricoeur argues that there are four respects in which the Habermasian critique of ideology has hermeneutic presuppositions which render it inconsistent. First, he claims that óthe theory of interests that underlies the critique of ideologiesô rests on hermeneutical presuppositions. Second, Ricoeur argues that the goal of the critique of ideology ï communication free of violence ï is intelligible only on the basis of embeddedness in tradition. Critique tries to expose distortions in communication and to liberate humanity from them. It conceives of communication that is free of distortion as a regulative ideal to be pursued, though this ideal is never encountered in experience. But how, Ricoeur asks, is it possible to conceive of this ideal at all, even if it is only regulative? Third, Ricoeur argues that Habermasôs specific criticisms of ideology betray a dependence on tradition that is incompatible with his critique. Habermas is particularly critical of the distortions of one contemporary ideology ï namely, the óideology of science and technologyò prevalent in ñmodern industrial society.ô Finally, the argument is that ó*[c]ritique is also a tradition*ô. Criticizing authority to emancipate humanity is not something one can do from nowhere. It is an activity with a long and highly specific history, and we can make no sense of it unless we are connected to this history.

Despite all of these critiques against Habermas, Ricoeur still takes issue with Gadamer. Ricoeur thinks that the critical resources of hermeneutics are often overlooked because of the dominance of Gadamerôs work. There is a tendency, Ricoeur argues, to identify philosophical hermeneutics with *Truth and Method*, and to assume that there is nothing in the former that is not in the latter. This is unfortunate, because Gadamer often expresses himself in ways that downplay the critical resources of hermeneutics. In particular, Ricoeur claims, the very title of Gadamerôs *magnum opus* is misleading, since it suggests that hermeneutics is founded on an antithesis ï truth *or* method, the humanities *or* the sciences, belonging to tradition *or* breaking

with it. Dichotomies such as these are unhelpful and false. Gadamerôs reliance on them prevents him from ñrecognizing the critical instance and hence rendering justice to the critique of ideology.ò[22] According to Ricoeur, we must rethink the assumption that being embedded in a tradition is opposed to distancing oneself from it and criticizing it. Belonging and distanciation must rather be seen as dialectically related. In short, we need to reinterpret embeddedness in tradition as an *essentially critical* stance. And we can do this, Ricoeur thinks, if we shift the emphasis of philosophical hermeneutics away from the opposition between ótruthô and ómethod,ô and back towards its origin: the interpretation of literary texts. Viewing tradition as a text to be interpreted will, Ricoeur argues, allow us to see the criticism of traditions as a necessary and productive phenomenon.

Ricoeur goes ahead to outline four respects in which viewing tradition as a text will help rehabilitate the critique of ideology. Ricoeur hinges this on the idea of distanciation. Concluding on this Robert Piercey contends that,

> the point of all this is that according to Ricoeur, hermeneutics and the critique of ideology are not simply opposed. We need not choose between a hermeneutical and a critical stance towards tradition ï between an affirmation of our dependence on tradition, and a critical gesture that breaks with the past. The hermeneutical and critical enterprises cannot be neatly separated. The critique of ideology is possible only on the basis of hermeneutic presuppositions ï that is, on the basis of its embeddedness in a highly specific historical tradition. But at the same time, the hermeneutics of tradition must contain a critical moment. It must view its heritage as a text to be reinterpreted, and it must recognize that its ability to distance itself from this heritage is what makes reinterpretation possible.[23]

Within this context it becomes clear that there is a ó é tension between the critique of ideology as Habermas describes it and philosophical hermeneutics as Gadamer describes it. Ricoeur insists that hermeneutics must be *re*-formulated in a less Gadamerian way if its critical resources are to be made manifest.ô The lesson from the Gadamer - Habermas debate for Ricoeur is that it maintains that hermeneutics has to be critical. It has to adopt elements from critique of tradition within its scope. It will therefore not be out of place to contend here that philosophical

hermeneutics is not critical. To meet this need, Ricoeur develops the distinction between traditionality, traditions and tradition[24] in his hermeneutic theory. This is the third way as Robert Piercey describes it. This distinction in his opinion is dubious because it has far more implications than building a hermeneutic theory alone.[25]

The above position of Ricoeur in my opinion misses the point to a large extent. To say philosophical hermeneutic is not critical is not to really understand the place of questioning within Gadamerôs philosophy. Questioning constitutes a fundamental critical element within Gadamerôs scheme. The reason for this is the fact that there are no problems but questions in philosophy. Or better still, problems show themselves as questions in philosophy. In Gadamerôs opinion, ñthe dialectical sense of the ópromblemô has its proper place in rhetoric, not in philosophy.ò[26] What philosophy has in essence is ó« ôhonestly motivated refutationsô in which the truth of the subject matter is advancedé ô. Thus, ócritiquing the concept of problem by appealing to the logic of question and answer must destroy the illusion that problems exist like stars in the sky. Reflections on the hermeneutical experience transform problems back to questions that arise and derive their sense from their motivation.ô Hence, intimately tied to the hermeneutical quest is the idea of questioning which aids to generate new questions by way of fresh interpretations. Gadamer also details out the value of questioning in knowledge acquisition. In his estimation, questioning shows forth the finitude of experience, it necessarily evokes openness and determines the sense of the answer.[27] Gadamer therefore, premises the logic of question and answer over formal propositional analysis. This he does on the grounds that the starting point of the logic of question and answer is ñthe conviction that every thought, every philosophical theory, every text is an answer to a question: not an eternal or perennial question, but one posed out of and informed by specific historical circumstances.ò[28] Given this value of questioning within Gadamerôs scheme, this research submits that the designation of

philosophical hermeneutics as uncritical hermeneutics is not a true representation of what philosophical hermeneutics stands for.

As another implication of the Habermas-Gadamer debate, is the issue of relativism within the philosophy of Gadamer. This is the case on the grounds of his conceptualization of truth and his idea of prejudice (his attack) as against objectivity. But there is a need to understand that while Gadamer is uncomfortable to cede the truth to only one position as objective; he is also very quick to note that positions or interpretations can be false. Thus, while he will not be ready to easily give in to the authorôs intention as overriding in a text, he also does not accept that everything/anything goes as the interpretation of the text. As Hekman puts it, ñalthough he defines the ótruthô that is his goal as a ókind of truthô rather than ótheô truth he firmly opposes his truth to falsehood. He speaks of ótrue meaning of a textô and the need to distinguish ótrue prejudices by which we understand from the false ones by which we misunderstandô, implying that incorrect interpretations are possible.ò[29] On the question of illegitimate prejudices that do not guarantee understanding, Gadamer following Schleiermacher contends that any projected fore-meaning which does not guarantee the unity of meaning between the parts of a text or text-analogue and its whole is illegitimate. But this fact of a guaranteed unity between parts and whole only establishes the illegitimacy of some prejudices or projected fore-meanings. It does not establish how ñthe unity of part and whole is a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of prejudices or interpretation.ò[30]

Legitimacy of prejudices in this context rests on the fact that ñunderstanding always develops out of particular starting points, recurring to particular assumptions, and reflecting certain interpretative decisions.ò[31] The guiding maxim here is that, to say that our traditions pre-orient us does mean they necessarily mis-oreint us. Thus, for Gadamer the task of hermeneutic understanding is distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate prejudices and this cannot be

by tagging all prejudices as illegitimate, but by establishing that all understandings of meaning are prejudiced. Georgia Warnke continues on this that ñthe idea is that insofar as we are conscious of the influence of history on us and insofar as we acknowledge the roots of all our views and all our assumptions in history and traditions, we are also prepared to check them against what following Heidegger he calls ótthe things themselvesôò[32] True understanding does not therefore, subsist in rejecting prejudices altogether. Rather, true prejudices are those that allow either the text or text-analogue to be understood in their own otherness or truth. Legitimate prejudices are those that therefore, predispose us to learn from others and for other to learn from us. The ultimate advantage of this orientation in Gadamer is that it places before us the fact that what the truth should be within the social arena is product of our collective making and not an imposition by a self-acclaimed saviour. His position too has given the method (though Gadamer will not accept this) to achieve this; dialogue.

In spite of the accusations that there are various shortcomings in philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamerôs works were a watershed in the development of the tradition; so much so that twentieth-century hermeneutics, aside from Habermasian critique, has not really moved beyond the influence of many of the central points outlined in *Truth and Method.* Most of the subsequent developments reflect this work in various ways. These responses come in different forms. First, there are those who, as we have seen, generated a critical response, for example, Hirsch, Habermas and even Ricoeur. There are also those who appropriate many of Gadamerôs philosophical points, either directly or in a mediated fashion. They then apply these to the actual practice of interpretation itself, for instance, the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz is highly indebted to continental hermeneutics.[33] Here too we have some African appropriation of Gadamerôs ideas particularly by Okere and Serequeberhan. Then there are those who have been influenced by Gadamer but refuse to accept it. Even when they do, it is only in quite derogatory

or minimal terms. The transmodern project is considered as belonging to such category in this research. Having looked at the issues Hirsch, Habermas and Ricoeur have made above, the research will consider the insights of Greetz, Okere and Serequeberhan from Gadamer as positive moments of Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics.

Geertzôs approach to anthropology is particularly useful as an instance of hermeneutics as he is interested in meaning within culture. He does not consider cultural activity to be merely an instantiation of a particular law, nor indeed, does he believe that all cultural activity can be explained by economic or pragmatic concerns. Geertz considers that cultural activity is meaningful and this meaning cannot be accessed through the deployment of symbols. This is because meaning occurs in symbolic systems.[34] In his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Greetz describes his task generally in these words:

> The concept of culture I espouse, and whose utility the essays below attempt to demonstrate, is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with MaxWeber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.[35]

Geertzôs approach is to gain access to this meaning through interpretation. He writes further that, ñsocieties like lives, contain their own interpretations. One has only to learn how to gain access to them.ò[36] How he achieves this is, in his own language, through what he refers to as *Thick Description*. This can be contrasted with *Thin Description*. Thin description is the process of mere empirical observation, where we record data. Thick description, in contrast with thin description, occurs when the anthropologist attempts to uncover the *meaning* of empirical data. This involves first, the process of óthin descriptionô that is the detailed observation as outlined earlier. However, it then goes on to uncover the meaning of what is observed. Thick description is not hard science, not the collection of facts, but a process of increasingly refined debate.[37]

Geertzôs task then becomes one of how to uncover meaning and these meanings are expressed in symbols and there are two ways in which a symbol can represent a meaning for Greetz. First, it can occur through conscious representation. For example, a flag represents a country. A second way in which meaning can be represented is through óhidden symbolsô. This is when individuals, groups or indeed whole societies are unaware of what exactly a particular symbol represents. Cultural meanings are often, according to Geertz, in this second category. That is, they are often hidden or unconscious. For this reason, we need a ómethodô of interpretation in order to understand them. Geertz goes on to depict his own particular approach. Social action occurs through the cultural forms of symbols, and these, according to Geertz, are like a text. For Geertz, once we construe social action as a text we can deploy the features of a text in order to gain access to meaning. Consequent upon this, Geertz makes the following propositions about a text. First, it has a unity of meaning. Second, all the symbols unite to form a consistent narrative of substantive content. Third, a text is not viewed as a static object, a mere óthingô like a book. A text is considered by Geertz, following Ricoeur, to be dynamic. The dynamism here consists in interacting with or engaging the text. Yvonne puts it better that

> in point of fact a text is only truly a text, that is to say it only has meaning when one engages with it and performs the act of reading it. A book lying unopened on a shelf has no meaning ï it must be actively engaged with. To express this in another way, we could say that meaning lies not in the static object or óthingô, but in the act of engagement between the reader and the text. We can go on to say that all meaning resides in engagement with symbolic forms and not simply in the symbolic forms themselves.[38]

This sounds very much like Gadamer, for truth and living knowledge in his contention come from the confrontation with the text and not getting at the intention of the author. On this note then, we see the influence of Gadamer in anthropology and this is a positive side to his philosophy.

There are also the works of Theophilus Okere which represent the appropriation of Gadamer particularly within the African setting. In *African Philosophy: A Historico-*

Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility, Theophilus Okere appropriates hermeneutics by arguing that all philosophies must spring from and deal with non-philosophy. Hermeneutic philosophy is both the interpretive tool and the result of mediating and rationalizing lived experience. The work is predominantly an overview of the Western tradition of hermeneutics; it is only in the final chapter and conclusion that Okere explicates what he thinks is the hermeneutic nature of philosophy in general, and African philosophy in particular. Here, the engagement between hermeneutics and African Philosophy consists in the fact that philosophy must always deal with the non-philosophical features of lived experience and its expression, whether that be religion, culture, or even the irrationality of certain presuppositions.[39] Okere is somewhat unclear about the nature of non-philosophy; sometimes, it is the irrational, sometimes the prerational, sometimes the transcendent. And it is in his understanding of non-philosophy that the appropriation of Gadamer is clearest in his work. His definition is his interpretation of Gadamerôs *Vorurteile*, or prejudgments: ñnon-philosophy must stand for the non-reflected, that unreflected baggage of cultural background. . ..ò[40] For Okere, at any rate, the philosophical and hermeneutic moment is the appropriation or repetition of these non-philosophical roots without negating them. But why should Okere appeal to hermeneutics at all? The most likely explanation is that he wants to ensure that African philosophy has a unique starting point, since it is rooted in a particular tradition of non-philosophy. This means that African philosophy can be unique, not reducible to other philosophical systems, and at the same time make use of all the rational tools that any other philosophical tradition assumes as essential. In other words, hermeneutics allows the ontological moment of self-understanding to emerge through repetition for African philosophy. Also, the emphasis on beginning philosophy from non-philosophy toes the line of Gadamerôs case for the value of tradition in philosophizing.

In a similar vein, Tsenay Serequeberhan appropriates insights from Gadamer and even Heidegger for African philosophy. His main work, *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy* divides neatly into four chapters of similar lengths. But it is in the first chapter that Gadamerôs influence is most manifest in the work. From the title of the chapter the idea of Gadamer is already manifest. The chapter is entitled óPhilosophy and Postcolonial Africa: Historicity and Thoughtô. This chapter proceeds with sketches drawn from Gadamer and Heidegger and the point here is that philosophical discourse always originates in and is related to the concrete conditions and ways of acting and being. Based on this therefore, he contends that the common horizon of all Africans is the post-colonial condition, hence it is against and in response to this historical backdrop that the discourse of African Philosophy should be articulated. Thus, ñé to interpretively engage the present situation in terms of what Africa óhas beenô ï both in its ambiguous pre-colonial ógreatnessô as well as in its colonial and neo-colonial demise ï is the proper hermeneutical task of African philosophical thought.ò[41] In the next chapter he chronicles the discourse of African philosophers and categorises them as insufficient given the demands of hermeneutics on philosophy and goes on in the third chapter to state his version of Fanonôs case for violence against European violence against Africa via colonialism. Writing on this he contends that

> in this context a non-violent resistance is a contradiction in terms precisely because any self-assertive act of the colonized is bound to violate ï hence do violence to-the rule and standard or norm of subjugation and domination on which the colonial relation is grounded.[42]

Following this, the concluding chapter also ends with issues of historicity. Here then, the idea of historicity as developed by Gadamer aids Serequeberhan to properly locate the context within which African philosophy should proceed and his claim in this regard is quite valid.[43] This is also an advantage of Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics.

6.2.1 On the Exclusivist Tendency of Gadamer's Hermeneutics

This section sets out to establish that Gadamerôs prejudicial philosophy is characterized by a hegemony of verbal understanding/factual modes of expression, hence there is an exclusion of non-verbal modes of understanding/communication from the realm of interpretation. This does not just betray Gadamerôs commitment to openness within his philosophical hermeneutics, but also signals an exclusivist tendency within his philosophy. The hegemony of verbal understanding in this regard has to do with Gadamerôs contention that ólanguage is the only being that can be understoodô. It is also within this context that Gadamer develops his idea of the universality of the hermeneutics. Thus, hermeneutics is universal but only in its philological or linguistic form. Writing on this, Shalin observes that ñit is not the emphasis on prejudices that raises red flags, but the emphasis on language and textual analysis as the focal point of hermeneutical inquiry, the emphasis that limits the scope of hermeneutics and dulls its critical thrust.ò[43] Here then, the fixed word is the genuine context for the Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and for interpretation. The obvious implication of this universalization of the hermeneutic experience, especially in its linguistic, is that it excludes non-verbal forms of communication from the network of interpretation. In the words of Pappas and Cowling, ñthe conversations of marginal voices are inaudible in Gadamerôs work, nor does he address the issue of embodiment as it is apparent in the ways male and female participants are differently situated in their claims to occupy speaking positions.ò[44] This is indeed an exclusivist tendency in Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics.

Furthermore, Shalin notes that ñsometimes actions, or inactions speak louder than words.ò[45] Kieran Owensô words are even stronger in this regard. He maintains that ñé understanding extends beyond the verbal into gestures, embodiment, and perception and therefore that Gadamerôs emphasis on the verbal factualness prevents him from fully grasping

the nuances of understanding and its genesis.ò[46] Hence, he thinks that the hegemony of verbal understanding in Gadamerôs schemes is at once theoretically and ethically dubious. In fact, the limitating of understanding to the verbal word though important

> é are bound to mislead if taken outside the far larger universe of what has been secreted, emoted, expressed, embodied, produced, manufactured, and created in any given era. Textualized forms cannot fully capture the vibrancy of lived experiences reduced to a thin-gruel abstraction of linguistic lifeworlds. Written traditions tend to distort voices incompatible with dominant discourses, edit out incongruent sentiments from the annals of history, tidy up and prettify the rough edges of affective experiences.[47]

In line with these objections, it becomes pertinent to spell out a better path other than that spelt by Gadamer in this regard.

This lack which is apparent in Gadamer has been taken up and dealt with quite appropriately in the works of some philosophers writing at about the same time with Gadamer. Notable among them are Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Writing on the congruity between hermeneutics and ethics, Gerald L. Bruns contends that ñLevinasian ethics is not easily translatable into Gadamerôs language, but it is not outside his philosophical horizon.ò[48] Levinas in his ethics of the face recongnizes the value of the unspoken word in the communication and understanding process. In his estimation, the face of the other is the starting point of all forms of interaction with alterity. For him, ñthe face speaksò[49], the face is not just a phenomenon - not something given to perception like a mask; rather the face is a language without words, a primordial language that signifies of itself. It is in the presence of the face that language opens up a world. For

> language as the presence of the face does not invite complicity with the preferred being, the self-sufficient ôI-Thouô forgetful of the universe; in its frankness it refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter and cooing. The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other ï language is justice. It is not that there first would be the face, and then the being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; the epiphany of the face *qua* face opens humanity.[50]

Here then, the presence of the face is a language that calls us to responsibility, and ñnot an office or a function. The face of the other faces me with an exigency that cannot be worked off like a

debt.ò[51] Responsibility in this case is prior to dialogue, to the exchange of question and answer, the thematization of what is said and this is the point where Levinas addresses a lack which Gadamer does not deal with in his philosophical hermeneutics. Here, the imperative of responsibility to the other is the unspoken language which conditions the question and answer that constitute Gadamerôs dialogue and the articulation even of the spoken word.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty further develops this idea of the unspoken as genuine paths to communication and understanding in his ontology of embodiment. For him ñexistence realises itself in the body.ò[52] The body is not to be seen as a barrier between the perceiver and the world. Rather, as in the case of prejudiced thrownness for Gadamer, our openness to the world is only possible *on account of the thickness of the body*.[53] For Owens, ñan ontology of bodily understanding allows us to make better sense of the ready-to-hand.ò[54] But most importantly, contrary to Gadamer, Merleau-Pontyôs ontology suggests that what we most fundamentally need, if the world is to speak to us, is embodied perception. With echoes of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty writes, ñthis voracious vision, reaching beyond the óvisual givens,ô opens upon a texture of Being of which the discrete sensorial messages are only the punctuations or the caesurae. The eye lives in this texture as a man lives in his house.ò[55] The point here is not even to create hierarchies among modes of expression. For no single form of expression has priority in terms of its access to truth - ñspeech is as dumb as music, music as eloquent as speech.ò[56] We here arrive at a notion of language in a broader sense, loosened of Gadamerôs verbal shackles. Within this context then, meaning is not just mere verbal articulation and since this is the case, we must remain open to expressions of moral injury of all kinds, even when such expressions challenge our capacity to translate the relevant claims into a verbal form. We must remain open to the possibility of *being moved*, that is, of having our understanding altered, by such communications of moral experience. In the end Owens writes that ñGadamerôs theory poses the risk of a systematic

disregard for such expressions lead me to suggest that we are dealing with a kind of *differend*. Coined by Lyotard, a differend arises when a moral injury cannot be claimed since the claimant is unable to participate in the dominant discourse in which such claims are made.ò[57] The key point here therefore, is that Gadamerôs separation of the articulated from the unarticulated word is unnecessary and could even complicate issues.

In line with all the above and with the specific aim of dealing with the deficiency in Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics, Dimitri Shalin develops his idea of a pragmatist hermeneutics as against what he calls structural hermeneutics in the works of Gadamer. His work, in this regard, is rooted in the works of social scientists who have been criticizing the disembodied view of society and human agency. Mary Douglas contends that ñwe now realize that we have unduly privileged the verbal channel and tended to suppose that it could be effective in disembodied form.ò[58] In a similar spirit, Richard Shusterman challenged ñphilosophyôs image as an essentially linguistic disciplineò and called to refocus philosophical investigation on ñthe nondiscursive somatic dimension of life.ò[59] Kindred sentiments reverberate throughout the social sciences where scholars express their dissatisfaction with ñthe text metaphor [that] has virtually. . . gobbled up the body itself,ò[60] highlights ñthe crucial role of emotion in the being of the body in society,ò[61] and advocates ñthe turn to the body as a primary site of social and cultural theorizing.ò[62] Following from this Shalin writes that his ñarticle takes a clue from the incipient movement in the social sciences aiming to complement the traditional concern for discursive dimensions of cultural life with the embodied forms of social phenomena. In particular, it seeks to extend the óparadigm of embodimentô and the pragmatist notion of óbody-mindô to interpretation theory, suggesting the way in which we can turn body and emotion into a hermeneutical resource.ò[63] Here,

> pragmatist hermeneutics starts with the premise that embodied human agency signs itself in the verbal-discursive forms, as well as its somatic-affective markers and behavioural - performative traces. The pragmatist perspective implies that historical temporality is transmitted through the somatic-affective media as readily as in the discursive symbolic forms. Every tradition has its somatic-affective a priori inscribed in its agentôs brain circuitry, hormonal pathways, and emotional structures that came to the fore in practical deeds and wide-ranging behavioural forays ï the embodied forms of agency bearing the imprint of an era passed on from one generation to another through extra ï textual channels. It is the task of pragmatist hermeneutics to expand the scope of hermeneutical analysis so that it can accommodate all the semiotic resources of the body.[64]

Given this perspective, that is the pragmatist ethos, hermeneutics in this context should explore the word-body-action nexus. This neglect of the body in the making of meaning and its appreciation by pragmatist hermeneutics is one of the crucial points of relevance that pragmatist hermeneutics brings into the heremeneutic discourse which portends more comprehensiveness than structural hermeneutics.

6.3 Appraising the Prospects of the Transmodern Project

This assessment commences by exploring and defending some of the attacks against the transmodern project before focusing on the strengths of the transmodern project. Critical reflections on the transmodern project begin with some of the critical receptions of Dusselôs works particularly by Cerutti, Schutte and Otto-Apel. Cerutti and Schutte focus on the problem of rationality in Dusselôs works. Dussel is first accused by both scholars as developing a kind of self-righteous philosophical attitude. This attitude results in a form of rational dogmatism which is philosophically unhealthy. For Cerutti, philosophy ought to avoid dogmatism and has to give an account of its own praxis. Taking part in philosophy demands that one not be partisan, but open oneself to the maximal possible criticism.[65] Schutte too envisions philosophy as critical task, intent on testing the validity of its claims. Thus, to argue that claims possess clarity, truth or correctness simply because they originate from an epiphany of the otherôs face is to commit the genetic fallacy that the origin of a claim proves its validity.[66] Understanding Dusselôs Levinasian

roots can help to clear this. The power of the face of the other at this point has a strong force and this force can suffice as a reason for dogmatism on the side of the oppressed.

They (Cerutti and Schutte) also claim that the personality trait of Dussel flows from an erroneous underlying philosophical approach, namely: that Dussel claims to produce first philosophy, a fundament that the sciences and other forms of knowledge cannot shake. For Michael Barber, ñhere again, a more careful understanding of Dusselôs Levinasian roots can meet the criticism.ò[67] Levinas conceives ethics as first philosophy and must be ñbecause every cognitional domain pursued, every theme discussed, and every truth sought is situated in relationship with the other as interlocutor, who arise behind even the theme in which he or she is presented and who continually issues an inescapable ethical demand.ò[68] This ethical demand necessitates the move within Dusselôs philosophy to create first philosophy that needs no justification. And it is Schutteôs lack of familiarity with Levinas and Dusselôs consistent attempt to distance himself from his Levinasian source that makes Schutte make such claims about Dussel.

For Karl Otto-Apel, Dusselôs appropriation of Marx is anachronistic and mistaken. Barber defends Dussel in this regard. In Barberôs estimation, Apel continues that Marx basing himself on the dialectical laws of history and strengthened by his scientific transformation in later life, considered the market economy unreformable and was willing to substitute a social utopia for that economy and its accompanying system of liberal rights. Dusselôs rejection of similar reformist possibilities in *Philosophy of Liberation* appears anachronistic in the face of European experience, in which the social democracies of Western Europe, with their welfare provision and democratic procedures, have developed a better alternative to ócreal existing socialismô itself. One key factor for this claim by Apel is his critical attitude to the idea of surplus value and his claim that Marx and Dussel do not recognize the value of demand and

supply as is the case with modern economics. But for Barber, ñby reverting from the empirically observed phenomena to the underlying essence, here the surplus value created in the sphere of production through exploited labour, Dussel and Marx furnish an ethical framework for economic science in much the same way as Dusselôs ethical hermeneutics in the field of history involved adopting a heuristic or interpretative preference for the forgotten other.ò[69] Following from this, the non-empirical interpretation of Marx by Dussel carries much weight for modern economics that has become quite too empirical.

On the side of the strength of the transmodern project, it takes up the colonialism/coloniality debate at very rational, philosophical and critical levels. Here then, the issue of how the West underdeveloped the rest has come up anew. The issues in this regard are not based on economic indices alone, but are hinged at epistemological and metaphysical levels. This is very obvious from the works of Walter Mignolo when he distances his intellectual heritage from Samir Amin. Pheng Cheah, writing on Mignoloôs work ñDelinking,ò avers that

> the single word title of the text, ôDelinking,ô is identical to a book written by the Marxist political economist, Samir Amin (*Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World*). Yet, Mignolo repeatedly distances his project from that of Amin (and all dependency theory) for at least two reasons. First, Amin only conceived of political and economic delinking, i.e. delinking in the sphere of political economy. He did not understand the urgent need for delinking at the epistemic level, the more fundamental level of thought. Hence, Aminôs project fails to break with the modern concept of totality. Second, and as a consequence of this failure to engage in epistemic delinking, Amin remains caught up in the modern disembodied universalistic project of Marxism. It is thus not really a radical delinking but only óradical emancipation within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of colonialityôò[70]

In a similar vein, Nelson Maldonado-Torres in his essay ñThe Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Colonialityò makes the claim that,

> this essay has to do with what I would call the *forgetfulness of coloniality* in both Western philosophy and contemporary social theory é My aim is to show that while both Heideggerian ontology and Levinasôs ethics gave a strong ground to the linguistic turn and provided ingenious ways to overcome the limits of the Western idea of Man, their philosophies remained complicit with imperial spatial formations. Their philosophies are marked by the forgetfulness of coloniality.[71]

So too he takes on Hardt and Negri observing that the second section the essay offers ña theoretical account of coloniality in relation to the concept of modernity. I distinguish this critical perspective from critical theories that conceive the global as a post-imperialistic network of relations, most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negriôs *Empire*.ò[72] From these, one discovers there is a desire to take an honest philosophical look at the colonial experience and how it manifests itself today.

At another level, the transmodern project and its ñhypothesis can improve conflict analysis. It allows us to dissect, forecast, and perhaps resolve some óreligiousô conflicts in a more sophisticated way. It helps analyze the sources of intolerance and the prospects for more tolerant behavior. It should help discover, rather than repress or deny, conflicts of interpretation, conflicts about the definition of truth.ò[73] This aspiration works better through the idea of ópeace as the union of universality and particularityô. Within this context,

> ahistorical universalism and óhistoricistô particularism, do not exhaust the possibilities in thinking about the relationship between universality and particularity. Differently understood, universality and particularity need not be incongruous. They can be shown to be in a sense intimately related, even mutually dependent. In the light of this understanding of universality and particularity, humanism and multiculturalism are seen to be not only compatible but to be different aspects of one and the same effort to realize lifeôs higher potential. Diversity need not be a threat to unity; it can, as unified by humanistic discipline, enrich and enhance the common.[74]

Here unity thrives through diversity, rather than *despite* diversity; both are different sides of the same coin. This unity is distinguished from the ódubious unityô that characterises what Claes Ryn calls Jacobin universalism of the imperialism of the United State of America that ñenvisions moral, cultural, and political homogeneityò[75] the world over. In this óform of universalism the will to power supersedes and controls thought. Ideology replaces philosophy.ô The reaction to this form of imperialism is what has led to the crises situation in many parts of the world today. Thus, the transmodern hypothesis of ópluriversality as a universal projectô innovatively

delineates the spheres of the universal and the particular for proper analysis and reconciliations in order to attain peace within diverse networks of cultures and life forms.

Also the transmodern hypothesis helps us to understand that much of the resentful and aggressive rhetoric heard in non-Western cultures is really directed not against ôthe Westô, but against what people see as the political, economic, psychological, and cultural fallouts from modernity. This is also a powerful political message; but we are able to understand it only when we take a critical look at the collection of ideas and technologies called ômodernô.[76] By implication, therefore, the attack is not against modernity itself but the ôunderside of modernityô, against coloniality as the manifestation of modernity at non-European locations. Consequently, the filth/trash which is modernityôs hallmark at non-European locations is detrimental to the whole of humanity. The point here is,

> If Humanity continues industrial, capitalist, patriarchal growth and development strategies, it is in danger of collective suicide. It was already true when only the West was polluting and externalizing its trash elsewhere. Now that almost three billion more citizens have joined this group, including China, India, Brazil, and others... a collective ecological collapse becomes evident. Citizens all over the world are conscious of this. Few people speak about it but it remains in our collective subconscious.[77]

Beyond this technological underside of modernity, the dissatisfaction of transmodernity is also directed against the ontological, epistemic and ethical undersides of modernity which is not always very obvious. Thus, the focus of transmodernity on these other forms of undersides is crucial and most crucial of all is the fact that it is not aimed at the West per se, but fallouts from the western mode of operation. The dialectics between tradition and modernity in the making of transmodernity is very vital in this regard. Figure 5.4, in the fifth chapter of this work, illustrates this very well; the march is from the modern to the transmodern with appropriate elements taken from tradition. Thus, the problem is not with modernity in itself, but its underside that the west has failed to address since it is not its burden.

On the side of the weaknesses of the transmoden project, it is important to first note that the critique leveled against the likes of Habermas and Taylor, most especially by Dussel, is too severe and carries element of insufficient philosophic sincerity. This is the case because these works were genuine critiques of the enlightenment in their own rights and they had something to offer in this regard. In a review of Dusselôs *The Invention of Americas,* Mario Sáenz contends in this direction that ñHabermasô defense of modernity is more nuanced than Dussel allows in these lectures. Habermas is after all critical of a subject-centered modernity that universalizes a conception of reason closed to critical-theoretic and critical-practical thematization of its validity claims.ò[78] With this assertion he goes ahead to suggest that,

> é Dussel should have distinguished between Habermasô alleged blindness to the structures of dependence and subjectivity (and intersubjectivity?) created by the conquest, on the one hand, and Habermasô defense of an intersubjective conception of modernity. These are two distinct issues, and Habermasô shortcomings in the former should not obscure his contributions in the latter. Furthermore, if Dussel had made that distinction, then one could also more clearly and critically examine the effects of Habermasô abstracting out of the material conditions of intersubjectivity (in this case, the conditions created by the conquest) from the ideal speech situation of communication. That is, one could then elaborate a critical theory of the possible ideological interests implicit in the ideal speech situation (and also of Apelôs ideal conditions for discourse, which Dussel has been criticizing in an ongoing debate with Apel of several yearsô duration).[79]

Dusselôs ability to do this is flattened out by the zeal with which he and other members of the transmodern project in general were eager to emphasize the extent to which contemporary European men of letters are complicit in the making of the coloniality of power.

The research also observes the ethical insensitivity of the transmodern position in that it seeks even to give a voice to certain positions that are not supposed to be voiced all in the name of bringing all into the network of discourse within the transmodern context. There are even points when abortion is given open consent just for the sake of guaranteeing feminity. Dusselôs work is a good example and one of such is his notorious public ñacceptance of the womanôs right to abortion in front of catholic prelates, a difficult thing to do perhaps for a male liberation

theologian in a Latin America still weighed down by the ôspirit of gravityô of the Catholic Church in matters of sex and gender. Nevertheless, he continues to stress the importance of moving analectically towards the recognition of the ôfaceô of the other.ò[80] The point here is that the face of the other cannot be a direction that threatens life in whatever form. This note of ethical indifference threatens the tenability of the transmodern position. At other points, there are cases for the validity of gay and lesbian rights within the transmodern project. In making the case for a geo/body-politic of knowledge and how it aids in decoloniality, Mignolo even cites some examples including lesbian cases. In his words,

> é It is precisely at this point that Gloria Anzaldu´aôs conceptualization of ô*the conciencia mestiza*ô (in terms of gender and race), becomes the platform of another de-colonial project emanating from the local histories of Chicano/as in the US; a project that continues and complements previous ones (e.g., Waman Puma, Mahatma Gandhi, Frantz Fanon, Rigoberta Menchu´). Both the body- (Chicana, lesbiana) and the geo-politics (la frontera as subaltern epistemic perspective) of knowledge are at work here deepening and enlarging the decolonial shift.[81]

From the context above, one wonders how issue of lesbianism deepens and enlarges the decolonial shift. This kind of emphasis within the transmodern project gives the impression that the entire work of these groups of thinkers is merely reactionary, as such everything counts. It is the opinion of this research, therefore, that laudable as the project of wanting to give a voice to the voiceless is, some voices do not demand entry into the debate. Such voices will only trivialize the enormity of the debate. Michael Bauber also contends thus: ñI do agree with Schutte that Dusselôs ethics in particular tends to repudiate church teaching and does not adequately take account of the implications of a theory of exteriority for woman and homosexuals.ò[82] However, ôsuch errors do not undermine an ethics of alterity, but require that that ethics be more rigorously applied.ôIt is the contention of the current research that despite the foregoing, raising these voices within the transmodern project is indeed a weakness.

It is also important at this juncture to observe that there is a point of contradiction within the transmodern project. Given the role of the geo/body-politic of knowledge within the transmodern project, they emphasize that coloniality should be the point of reference for scholars within the colonial regions of the world; they problematize the colonial heritage of colonial spaces on the grounds that the geo/body-politic of knowledge justifies it. This obviously means that philosophic and scholarly concerns must originate from local spaces and not foreign spaces. Thus, since coloniality constitutes the core of the issues in colonial spaces, coloniality should condition philosophy and scholarship within such spaces. What then becomes the basis for the criticisms of the likes of Habermas and Taylor on the grounds that their philosophies do not incorporate elements of coloniality within their schemes? Since philosophic and scholarly concern are conditioned by the geo/body-politic of knowledge, why should there be any expectation that scholarship and philosophy from spaces not suffering from coloniality contain issue about coloniality? If scholars like Habermas and Taylor do not have coloniality as part of their geo/body-politics of knowledge, why will one expect them to be dealing with such issues in their philosophy? On this note, this research avers that it is quite an unfair appreciation of Habermas and Taylor to expect of them to deal with issues of coloniality when coloniality does not constitute part of their geo/body-politic of knowledge. This does not in any way suggest that they are not complicit in the promulgation and propagation of the coloniality of power as the transmodernists suggest. The point here rather is that for the transmodernists to consider the lack of the discussion on colonial issues within their philosophy as a defect in their philosophies sounds like a contradiction in terms.

6.3.1 On Native agency and the Making of the Coloniality of Power

This section focuses on the issue of native agency in the making of the coloniality of power and based on this establishes that colonial subjects cannot be totally exonerated from the

ills of the coloniality of power. This is yet another weakness within the transmodern project. This perspective is quite unique in this direction in that it presents the African as against the Latin American perspective on the issue of the coloniality of power. The point being made here is well expressed in the fact that though external factors and influences weigh on the making of the coloniality of power, the internal factors are also paramount particularly in Africa. This perspective can be gleaned better from a study of how ideologies function within human groups. Writing on the value of ideology/worldviews in human communities Agbakoba contends that ñideology basically provides people with an internal control mechanism which places barriers on certain types of behaviours while encouraging or simply allowing other types. It also follows that an ideology has to be very well internalized before it can fully contribute in the formation of a personôs character.ò[83] Within the context of this value of ideology, it is also important to note the demarcation between the realms of universality and particularity in the expression of these ideologies. The point here is that possessing an ideology is a universal human tendency and phenomenon. This is the case because every human community must possess a worldview, must possess an internal mechanism of control which places barriers on certain types of behaviour while encouraging or simply allowing other types. Often times at this level, these worldviews are most effectively internalized from childhood, but some can even be internalised at adulthood.

The realm of particularity, in this regard, has to do with the modes of expressing these ideologies. Here then we have a demarcation between ideological modes of expression based on spiritualistic ontologies and those based on materialist ontologies. Those ideological expressions with spiritualistic ontological base stem from postulates and/or are in search of states, conditions etc whose truth does not depend necessarily on materiality or on direct sense observation and material well-being. In a sense, these are ótother-worldly directedô modes of ideological expression. For ideological expressions with a materialistic ontological base, there is the

tendency not to focus on eternal and essential qualities. Material well-being is of the essence here and hence these modes of ideological expression depend on direct sense observation for the evidence of its claims. Here, too, it will not be out of place to observe that these ideological expressions are this-worldly directed modes of ideological expressions. It will also be right to note within this context that spiritualistic modes of ideological expressions tend to possess more rationality than materialistic ones and; hence, tend to possess more potency and force than materialistic ones.

Given these orientations, it becomes clear that some modes of ideological expression have the ability to better withstand the changing material conditions due to military, economic and political pressures and domination. In line with this Agbakoba correctly observes that, ñin this regard, we could note that people are conquered militarily and/or ideologically. That people conquered militarily can, if their ideology is sufficiently strong, subdue their conquerors ideologically.ò[84] The Jews and the Japanese are good examples of human communities who have ideological expression with the strength of spiritualistically based ontologies. This is the case because the Jews were conquered militarily by the Romans, but subdued Rome ideologically through Christianity a religion that sprang from the Jews. This is also the case with Japan. Since 1853 when Capt. Perry and his ships from America bombarded Tokyo and forced Japan to open up to foreign trade/relations, Japan has lost a series of military conflicts with the West. But the Japanese ideology survived these conflicts. More importantly this ideological orientation enabled those with it develop technical disposition/entrepreneurship rapidly as well as the peculiar Japanese managerial and productive techniques, which have enabled them to outstrip the West in productivity/efficiency; and which the West has had to copy. These are some examples of ideological expressions with spiritualist ontological base.

African Traditional Religion and Thought represent a good example of an ideological mode of expression with a materialistic ontological base. The emphasis on material well-being in these worldviews engenders what can be termed religious pragmatism. This is the case because with the proliferation of deities/objects of worship, peoples approach them for benefits and when they do not get them, they believe that the deities do not serve their purpose, so they try elsewhere. There is no resolute commitment to a particular deity; trusting in such a deity whole and entire. This hampers honest desire for the truth, and truth here, is often confused with efficacy. Agbakobaôs words describe this orientation best when he writes that,

> because the ideology (ideological base) is a material one, there is no distinction between efficacy in terms of benefits and rewards and the truth; consequently, the ethical life is lived not because of its intrinsic worth but because of the benefits it ought to bring. This has the effect of enforcing ethical life from the outside ï people obey the ethical code not so much because they are convinced in their innermost being about the truth and soundness of these norms, but because of the dreaded immediate responses of the gods, the keepers of the cults or society. The result is that the internal control mechanism does not function when fear is removed or when there is no material benefits to gain.[85]

Fear is of the essence in keeping human communities where this kind of ideological expression is prevalent. This mode of ideological expression gives in immediately when it comes in contact with a system of force and rewards/benefits. On this ground, Africa lost both militarily and ideologically at the onslaught of colonization and its aftermath; the coloniality of power. As a result Africaôs indigenous ideological expression has been unable to produce personality types that can get her on her feet after her fall to colonialism and now the coloniality of power.

Olufemi Taiwo expresses similar sentiments within the context of his analysis of Achebeôs *Things Fall Apart* and Soyinkaôs *Death and the King's Horseman*. In Taiwoôs opinion these ñworks contain philosophies of history in which issue of agency, historical change and causes thereof are articulated.ò[86] Furthermore, these works óplace indigenous agency at the basis of historical transitions described in their texts. As a result, their explanation of change in African societies turns on endogenous causal processes on which external factors had merely

catalytic impact.ô For Taiwo, the white manôs takeover of traditional society was not as a result of his cleverness. The killing of Ikemefuna by Okonkwo and the reprimand from Obierika, Ezeundu and Nwoye despite the fact that the instruction came from the oracle shows there was disparity of opinion even among traditional people on their basic beliefs. This division of opinion was simply exploited by the white man when he came. As such, those who had issues with traditional practices found it easy to join the missionaries upon little persuasion. This does not mean that the white man did not have cunning and dubious intentions. On this Taiwo writes, ñwe do not want to minimize the play of outside factors. It is just that such forces have their greatest impact where there already are cracks in the wall and the members of the society are willing to become vehicles for the operations of the exogenous forces.ò[87] This fact of the triumph of the external agency as a result of the easy susceptibility of indigenous agency has not been properly dealt with in the transmodern project.

With regard to Soyinkaôs *Death and the King's Horseman*, the general impression is that Elesinôs detention by the resident colonial officer was responsible for his not taking his life as the tradition demands after the demise of the Oba. As such foreign agency was disturbing the normal cause of traditional events. For Taiwo, Elesin did not fail because of the intervention of the Colonial Resident rather, óthe Resident was able to intervene because Elesin had already failed.ô Elesin had failed because of his personality type. Thus,

> é his penchant for women, his affliction with the *ko-to-n-mo-jeyi-ko-to-n-mo-toyu-wo* syndrome, his incorrigibility and his lack of judgment in prospecting for ants while in possession of an elephant trophy, combined to deflect him, delay and ultimately open a wedge for the intervention of the agency represented in the Resident.[88]

All of these raise the concern that native agency indeed had a role to play in the making of the coloniality of power.

This point is also important because it connects very essentially with the transmodern project. This is the case because it deflates the Eurocentric invisibility and omnipotence in the

making of the current global order and as far as taking charge of traditional people is concerned. This is the case because, ócthe success of the missionaries, therefore, had less to do with their genius at persuading the native and more to do with the nativesô belief even if wrongheaded that what the missionaries came with held promise of a solution to their predicament.ô Furthermore, given the breakdown of the relationship between Nwoye and Okonkwo his father, due to the killing of Ikemefuna, Taiwo still contends that, ñit would be giving too much credit to the white missionary agency to say that it was responsible in this particular case for turning son against father.ò[89] Thus, the missionary agency only played appropriately with their opportunity and this was the crack in the wall; the materialistic ontological base of African Traditional Religion and Thoughtôs mode of ideological expression. They took advantage of this weakness in the African personality type to plunder Africa, but then is there any moral justification in taking advantage of the weak? The obvious answer to this question indeed shows the point the transmodern project wants to underscore. But the obvious absence of any mention of the role of native agency in facilitating this process is a weakness in the transmodern scheme.

6.4 From an Ontology of Polarized Units to an Ontology of Complementarity

This section and the next explore some of the applications of Gadamerôs and the transmodern ideas within contemporary society; particularly within the context of ócreating a world in which all worlds fitô. A lot of value will be placed on the idea of plurivesality as an appropriate base upon which to build óa world in which all worlds fitô. The value of plurivesality here rests on the underside of the ontology of polarized. A core dimension of this underside is outlined quite succinctly in Derridaôs assessment of what he calls the óMetaphysics of Presenceô. Commenting on this, Bradley submits that

> the ómetaphysics of presenceô historically operates by erecting a series of binary oppositions between concepts, values or terms where, in each case, one concept is identified as the bearer of presence itself whereas the other is identified with the falling away, or loss of, that presence: the transcendental is privileged as

> more present than the empirical, the ideal is championed over the material, the soul over the body, the masculine over the feminine and so on ad infinitum.[90]

From the above, one discovers that reality has been erected into binary poles and without any possibility of a meeting point between these poles. The point that is identified as the bearer of presence is considered to be universals in which those considered to be falling or have fallen away from presence cannot participate. This creates a situation of perpetual struggle and a constant triumph of presence over absence. Universality within this context works via the exclusion of absence; hence this universality is exclusivist. Given the aim of creating óa world in which all worlds fitô, an adoption of any form of exclusivist orientation will be a contradiction in terms. The ontology of polarized units which was considered as the ontology of the modernity project in the literature portends this kind of exclusion and cannot serve the purpose here.

As against the ontology of polarized units as it grounds the universality of the modernity project in philosophy, this research suggests a move to an ontology of complementarity as the basis for creating óa world in which all worlds fitô. Complementarity in the first place has to do generally with the ideas of various components operating together within a system. What this suggests is that these components must be taken together for the system to function normally. In describing complementary relationship between evolved proclivities and cultural paradigms in human interaction, Fiske opines that, ñthe evolved proclivities and cultural paradigms are complementary: Both are necessary but neither is sufficient to permit complex social coordination. People cannot use either their socially transmitted paradigms or their evolved proclivities independently of each other. Combining them, humans devise and depend on diverse, flexible social adaptations.ò[91] The operating manner of these components within the complementary system is very close. These components do not influence one another; rather ñthey rely on each other, presuppose each other, operate by virtue of each other, and are

functionally incomplete without each other.ò[92] Thus, components cannot function without their complements in a complementary system.

Bringing this idea into ontology and the conceptualization of the realities of substance and accidents at the most basic level of existence, Asouzu contends that he wants to ñshow how any ontology that should be adjudged credible today must be articulated within a framework of mutually complementing units. This mood underlies the idea of a new complementary ontology, as that ontology that seeks to grasp the idea of being as being from the preceding conditions of its complementary comprehensive interrelatedness.ò[93] In contrast to this kind of ontology is the Aristotelian ontology and its focus on polarized units. This ontology has its key problem and it is due to the weakness of this kind of ontology that the new complementary ontology is suggested as an alternative. The major issue with the Aristotelian metaphysics ñis its abstract abstruse construction and its tendency to polarize units within any given framework.ò[94] The rigidity with which he places the difference between substance and accidents is good example here. Within the context of this distinction, it becomes so obvious that one of the difficulties of the Aristotelian metaphysics is its inability to ñoffer enough grounds to mediate successfully in situations of conflict that demand equilibrating those tensions caused by difference, disparities or asymmetries.ò[95] And so we end up with situations where accidents are elevated to the point of becoming substances and are considered purely and simply as such. In concrete terms, this is the case when such things as social standing, achievement, colour of the skin, nationality, race, tribe and indeed most things that the mind isolates as reasons for discrimination play very decisive roles, get extraordinary new meanings in our lives and dealings with other people. Thus, ñin those cases where we discriminate based on such categories, the mind easily fails to grasp the intrinsic mutual relationship between substance and accidents, such that it treats them as if they belong to diverse regions of being. Unless this illusion is detected, addressed and eliminated, the

ontology of Aristotle would always offer the very instruments with which its basic assumptions can be undermined.ò[96]

Besides the above, this ontology of polarized units still structures out the pedagogical merit of Aristotleôs Metaphysics. Within this context, one begins to understand the extent to which Eurocentric ethnocentrism has its roots in the Aristotelian ontology of polarized units. Here, a ñmajor portion of the Metaphysics were a series of school texts or logoi, which Aristotle used as the basis for his lectures. Each could be worked through independently, yet each presupposed the preceding stage in the course through which the students of the Lyceum were moving, step by careful step, from their logical and physical studies to the acquisition of wisdom.ò[97] The nature of the wisdom that is acquired here becomes the focus of discourse for Fred Dallmayr and on this count he contends that there is deep connection between Aristotleôs pedagogical ambitions and the militarism of his pupil, Alexander the Great. He claims that ñAristotleôs statement as recorded in his *Politics*: ôMeet it is that barbarians should be governed by the Greeksô, furnished welcome support to his Macedonian pupil, Alexander when he embarked on his far-flung military conquest and imperial ventures.ò[98] In contemporary politics, it is still the same mindset that is operative; where Western powers seek to be in control of nuclear weapons under the supposition that they alone have the higher rationality and needed self-control to use them properly. Writing on the implication of this kind of mentality, Asouzu says

> this is that type of mindset that believes that it has the obligation to teach and instruct all, that its prerogative is to set the pace for others to follow. It is a mindset that is very conscious of differences, inequalities between units, in the sense of negation of an inherent mutual complementary relationship between substance and accidents. In this case, human relationship turns out to be one of deep division and not of reconciling, harmonizing forces. Here, units are always challenging each other in a relationship of mutual antagonistic exclusiveness devoid of mutual complementarity.[99]

The mentality here is that of opposing units and considering some as being more rational, universal and objective than others, hence suggesting an elimination of these other positions from the nexus of discourse.

A repudiation of exclusivist attitude is also prevalent in Philosophical hermeneutics. With the rejuvenation of the hermeneutic tradition within philosophy, the aim is to establish the equal worth of the human sciences just as the natural sciences. But then, it is Gadamer and his idea of philosophical hermeneutics that represents this move the most. This is the case because while Dilthey sought to establish that there is a different methodology for the human science with the same status as the natural sciences, he eventually falls into the same perspective as likening the human sciences exactly to the natural sciences. This is the point where Gadamer begins his critique of Diltheyôs adaptation of Schleiermacherôs divinatory romanticism in his historical schemes. According to Gadamer, the problem Dilthey faces in the operation of the historical consciousness within his schemes concerns moving from valid knowledge at the individual level to valid knowledge of meaningful structures within history itself. To accomplish this he must introduce ólogical subjectsô instead of órealsubjectsô. These subjects are collective groups of individuals that create meaningful, historical structures. Dilthey contends that individual life is able to understand life in general and historical consciousness can understand tradition, since both are founded on life. Due to a basic similarity in human beings, one can relive the historical world through a type of ñuniversal sympathy.ò[100] Gadamerôs critique is that if the historian is embedded in history, and this means within the hermeneutic circle of understanding, she cannot escape this circle to attain a standpoint of reflection that would permit methodologically justified knowledge. For this reason, Diltheyôs use of Schleiermacherôs concept of congenial understanding and divinatory interpretation to escape the hermeneutic circle, according to Gadamer, makes the same false presuppositions as Schleiermacher did.[101] The point, for

Gadamer, here is that rather than imagine a logical point for objectivity within historical consciousness, he rather advocates for dialogic intersubjectivity which enhances the fusion of horizons and this is same as the idea of complementarity as suggested here.

Another key point for the discussion here is the fact that while the hermeneutic tradition does not in any way undermine the natural sciences, all they advocate is that the human sciences also have an equal stake in the structuring of lifeworld. Thus, while the natural sciences replicate the attitude of the ontology of polarized units by considering the human sciences as inferior in method and outcome, the advocates of the human sciences claim rather that the human science has an equal stake in influencing life as the natural sciences do. While the one seeks to denigrate the other, the other seeks to establish its equal status with the one. While the one seeks to exclude the other from the realm of relevance in human affairs, the other opens itself up for dialogue with the other on the grounds of equality with the aim of the mutual enhancement of life. Within the context of how technology negatively affects life and how this can be averted by the mutual function of reason and wisdom in human affairs, Asouzu makes a point that aptly captures the sense being expressed here. In his words, ñeven if technological advancement can be rated as a sign of intelligence, it does not always translate to a sign of wisdom. Wisdom starts to emerge the moment the ego has the capacity to place intelligence at the service of humanity beyond mere promptings of impulse.ò[102] This is what the hermeneutic sentiment seeks against the scientific one, while the natural sciences seek to keep moving on based on the desire to invent and to discover, the human sciences seek to humanize this excessive display of intelligence by the natural sciences for the service of humanity. This is a kind of dialogue that can only be engendered by an ontology of complementary comprehensiveness and this is the ontology this research suggests is needed in this global age. The ontology of polarized units has reached its limits; the ontology of complementarity is the ontology for the new era.

Similar sentiments are expressed by Kenneth Gergen in his idea of co-creative confluence over and above the ideas of causal explanation and voluntary agency in the discourse on understanding human actions. This narrows specifically into the redefinition of metaphysics in the sense that it redefines the understanding and value of the idea of cause and effect within the metaphysical spectrum. A primary reason for this redefinition of the ideas of cause and effect for Gergen bear a similar mark as that in the foregoing; that is, the idea of cause and effect as presently conceived favours the ontology of polarized units. In his words,

> in significant ways the concept contributes to the ideology and institutions of bounded being. When we search for causal explanations for a personôs actions, we begin to split the world into independent entities. There are causal conditions on the one hand and their effects on the other. Thus, we treat acts of aggression, altruism, and prejudice as effects, and search for an independent set of conditions that bring these about. In effect, we define the individual as fundamentally separated from the surrounding world, alone, and subject to its vicissitudes.[103]

Here then the idea of cause and effect does not just create the fragmentation of the world but also creates what he calls the óbounded beingô. This being is that whose essence is conditioned by the boundaries within which he or she is brought to the person. Such a being thinks there are no relations in the world. This ñideology of bounded being places primary value on the self and its development; simultaneously we become suspicious of others and the constraints they may place on our lives. It is an ideology that invites us to see ourselves as uncaused causes. On this view, we wish to see ourselves as origins of othersô behavior, but not as pawns to theirs. Thus, the question hovers over every relationship, óAm I in control, or is the other controlling me?ô We resent those who wish to exert control over us, and we lose respect for those over whom we have control.ò[104] The mentality here is best expressed by the epithet used in the discourse óin a world of cause and effect; everyone clamours to be a causeô. The beauty of Gergenôs work is that he does not just criticize the essence of the idea of causality, but also lays bare the deficiencies of its alternative and suggests a better alternative.

For him voluntarism as an alternative to the idea of causal explanation is also faculty in the sense that, ñthe concept of voluntary agency is similar to the concept of cause-and-effect in its support for the ideology of bounded being. For the voluntarist, we are the sole origins of our actions. We function as gods in miniature, the originators of our futures.ò[105] To this form of understanding and explaining the behaviour of men in the world, he suggests the alternative of a relational being and relational understanding of the world. For him, ñthe relational being, seeks to recognize a world that is not within persons but within their relationships, and that ultimately erases the traditional boundaries of separation. There is nothing that requires us to understand our world in terms of independent units; we are free to mint new and more promising understandings.ò[106] This relational being works through co-action; through collaboration. This collaboration engenders the emergence of all meaning. In this, the bounded being is now unbounded. Here then, the emphasis is on confluence rather than influence. This suggests that one thing is not directly responsible for another, but that things work together with one another in order to make a whole. Two examples for this from within Gergenôs work are the examples of billiard balls and baking or chemistry. On this he writes that,

> in attempting to explain and predict human action, let us replace the metaphors of billiard balls and unmoved movers with the metaphors of baking or doing chemistry. The concern now shifts from isolated entities to the combination of ingredients. With a combination of flour, butter, eggs, milk, and a griddle, we bring about a pancake. By compounding hydrogen and oxygen we have water. From this standpoint, a lighted match does not cause the combustion of gasoline; rather the combustion is the achievement of a particular combination of flame and gasoline. In the same way, what scholars might define as an intellectual attack does not cause another to argue; the argument is achieved only when another responds with a defense.[107]

Here then there is more of a working together rather than an isolation of the various components. These components work together to arrive at a given end. This is the confluence in question and an aversion to the metaphysics of polarized units.

One of the advantages of this concept of relational being is the fact that it emphasizes that the best way to predict the future is to invent it. Rather than following laws and rules that are

isolating in dealing with the future, the advocacy is for innovative creation of the future and concerted effort to implement such inventions. The logic in all these discourse is quite simple. Since everything in reality serves a missing link, it means every entity in reality is suffused with enough presence to be respected in their irreducibility. For this reason, the disposition to consider any position as reducible to another cannot be the basis for óa world in which all worlds fitô. The discourse here place before us then the necessity of moving from an ontology of polarized units to an ontology of complementarity.

6.5 Towards An-*other* Principle for Cross-Cultural Evaluation/Interaction

As the title rightly suggests, this section is a consideration of an-*other* principle for cross-cultural evaluation. This means there have been principles of cross-cultural evaluation. These are: the pragmatic and the logical principles of cross-cultural evaluation. But the quest here is to show that some of these principles are based on the ontology of polarized units and its exclusivist undertone. To the foregoing will be added the ethical-hermeneutic principle of cross-cultural evaluation based on inspirations from Gadamerôs philosophical hermeneutics and the transmodern project with a view to establishing it as an ideal for creating óa world in which all worlds fitô.

6.5.1 The Pragmatic Principle of Cross-Cultural Interaction/Evaluation

The pragmatic principle developed first a coherent system of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction within anthropology. In this discipline, its basic presuppositions were laid out by Henry Bagish in his essay ñThe Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativistò. Commenting on this Dennis Bartels writes that ñHenry Bagish also proposed a way of evaluating cultural practices; but, unlike Hippler, Kroeber, Kluckhohn and Bidney, he specifies conditions under which such evaluation might be universally accepted. In doing so he rejects cultural relativism.ò[108] For Bagish, people since time immemorial have been judging various cultural practices to be better or worse than others according to a pragmatic principle. In this regard ñany

belief or practice that enables human beings to predict and control events in their lives, with higher degree of success than the previous beliefs or practices did, can be said to work better.ò[109] Thus, if you value being able to chop down trees and to chop up wood with a minimum of human efforts, then the steel axe is better than the stone adze. In his opinion, there is no ethnocentrism inherent in this, for the greater efficiency and utility of steel axes has never gone unnoticed by those peoples who had been using stone axes. In every case then, ñé once they have learned about steel axes, they have eagerly sought the more efficient steel toolsé ò[110] Based on this principle, Bagish goes ahead to submit emphatically that this principle falsifies hidden assumption of cultural relativism ñthat there is no specifically valid way to compare cultures, rate or rank them, to say one is better or worse than another.ò[111] Despite this seemingly emphatic rebuttal of cultural relativism, there seems to be a qualification of the extent to which this pragmatic principle can be used. Writing on this qualification Bartels opines thus:

> Bagish seems to qualify this claim, however, when he states that the pragmatic principle cannot be used to judge entire cultures or all cultural practices. While the pragmatic principle produces a degree of cross-cultural consensus regarding the desirability of various cultural practices, such as vaccination to prevent childrenôs diseases, a complete consensus cannot be achieved because of differences in values held by various groups and individuals. In addition, values in any culture are hierarchically ordered. In North America, compassion, Bagish suggests, ranks higher than tolerance. Despite a relativist tolerance of a range of cultural practices, compassion for the victims leads to rejection of actions such as Nazi genocide.[112]

This represents one phase of the pragmatic principle of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction. In this regard, that which works is the basis for cultural adaptation and appreciation.

In recent times, there is a further adaptation of this principle in what Fred Dallmayr calls the pragmatic-strategic communication principle. Here each partner seeks to advance his or her own interests in negotiation with other parties. To the extent that one can describe such communication as ódialogue,ô it takes the form mainly of mutual bargaining, sometimes involving manipulation and even deception. This kind of communicative exchange is well known in international or intersocietal relations and constitutes the central focus of the so-called

realist and neorealist schools of international politics. Prominent examples of such communication are trade or commercial negotiations, negotiations about global warming and ecological standards, disarmament negotiations, settlement of border disputes, peace negotiations, and the like. Much of traditional diplomacy is in fact carried on in this vein.[113] Here, too, one sees that workability is the underlining principle, hence that which works in the manipulation process carries the day; such becomes the norm.

There are some objections to this principle particularly in its initial form. Bartels makes some crucial comments about the form of this principle. In this connection Bartels wants to establish that it is not always true as Bagish contends that people always go for the better option in the use of things. In this regard, ówhile Bagishôs examples concern instances where non-industrial peoples have accepted products of industrial technology or scientific medicine, there are also rejections of technological innovations consistent with Bagishôs pragmatic principleô. He then quotes from Asch to further establish this case,

> In the feudal period it proved virtually impossible to introduce new and more efficient scythes. Although these would have lightened the labour of serfs, the latter strongly resisted their use. The reason was the scythesô very efficiency ófor, by cutting crops close to the ground, less would be left for gleanage which was a widely established right of serfsô. In this case, rights of gleanage were valued more than a labour-saving innovation, at least by serfs.[114]

In this case, it is the efficiency of the system that plunges it into reproach. The efficiency of a particular innovation can be the reason for its massive adoption; it can also be the reason why it could be rejected. Another example is the resistance of the Mamluk knights of the Ottoman Empire to the adoption of field artillery.[115] It becomes clear therefore, that Bagishôs pragmatic principle may not immediately engender universal applicability. Furthermore, this principle elevates the convenient option, but such an option may not be the right option. This is yet another weakness of this principle.

At a deeper level, this principle as indicated by Bagish may not immediately be a justification for the universality in the true sense of the word. Within the discourse on universalism, Tong Shijun makes a distinction between ógenerality and universalityô based universalism. In his opinion,

> these two types of universalism can easily be mistaken for each other. Hegel, for example, derived the conclusion that Western philosophy is a philosophy of universal validity from the fact that, in his mind, Western philosophy is better than any other kind of philosophy in grasping universality. There is, in my view, a middle term between the premise and the conclusion, that is, the more general a concept is in extension, the more universal is its validity. Here I use the term ógeneralô and the term óuniversalô deliberately in different senses. In everyday life we usually use these two terms interchangeably, but I think it important to make a distinction between them here. The universality in validity and the generality in extension are two different things. ó The Earth is ellipticalô, for example, is not general in its extension, since it refers to only one object; but this proposition is valid universally, on Mars as well as on the Earth.[116]

Thus, that a concept or innovation has a generality in extension does not immediately suggest it is universally valid. With regard to Bagishôs pragmatic principle of universality, it only suggests that an idea can have a generality in extension, but it does not show the universal status of such a concept or idea as far as validity is concerned. This vital objection is properly dealt with in the logical principle of cross-cultural evaluation.

6.5.2 The Logical Principle of Cross-Cultural Interaction/Evaluation

The logical principle of cross-cultural evaluation began to develop within the Afro-constructivist school of thought within African philosophy. It is, in the first place, a universalist project within African philosophy and philosophy in general. The critical elements that this school of thought presents have the Integrated Approach (or development hermeneutics) as its most systematic approach. This approach proceeds with the following steps: identifying and classifying social phenomena and imperatives, philosophical analysis and evaluation of these phenomena and imperative, and establishing the hierarchy of causal efficacy about these phenomena. But the bulk of the work is done at the second stage: philosophical analysis and evaluation of social phenomena and imperatives. The tools adopted in this analysis are the

principles of ácthe internal consistency of the worldviewô and ácthe horizon of consistency of the worldviewô. Logic is of the essence in the making and functioning of these principles. The basic presupposition is that ñthe formal quantification of any possible supreme belief can be schematically presented thus: any possible supreme belief (P) is such that it is either expressed universally in space (S) or not universally expressed in space (-S) ; its expression in space either includes itself (m) or does not include itself (-m); it is either expressed constantly in time T or not expressed constantly in time ï T; either it expresses commitment to constancy C or it does not express commitment to constancy ï C. Symbolically we have (x)(Px>(SxV-Sx)(Mx>-Mx)(TxV-Tx)(CxV-Cx). The structure for the maximal position or affirmative expression of a supreme belief symbolically is (x)(Px>SxVMxVTxVtxVCx).ò[117] Despite the scheme as presented above, the principle of internal consistency of a worldview, defined as a system in which each proposition implies, and is implied by others, taken alone is insufficient in evaluating worldviews. But when the second principle that ócof the horizon of consistencyô, defined as the scope (breath, depth, extent) of consistency, with regard to time and space such a system exhibits; the scope of reality such a worldview can actively or positively bring under its purview, the consistency theory of evaluating worldviews becomes totally complete.[118] The case here is hinged on the issue of commensurability and incommensurability if worldviews and when worldviews are incommensurable, this evaluation scheme should be applied to determine which should be upheld.[119] The kind of universality sought after here is formal universality.[120] This kind of universality seeks more the validity of the worldview than the mere generality in extension of the worldview.

There is yet another application of this principle in what Fred Dallmayr calls the moral-universal discourse or principle. Here partners seek consensus on basic rules or norms of behavior that are binding on all partners, potentially on a global level. Here, the legacies of

modern natural law and Kantian moral philosophy retain their importance. Basic rules of (potentially) universal significance include the rules of modern international law; the international norms regarding warfare, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; the Geneva Conventions; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One does not need to be a Kantian in a strict sense to recognize the importance and even the ócategoricallyô binding character of these norms (which have been accepted by the great majority of governments and endorsed by the vast majority of humankind). Surely, this is not the time to disparage or tamper with the mandatory quality of international norms. Thus, the rules of the Geneva Conventions are mandatory, no matter what nomenclature individual governments choose to adopt. Likewise, launching an unprovoked war is a crime against humanity, whether particular leaders choose to acknowledge it or not. So is the wanton killing of civilian populations. Here, the collective conscience of humanity has reached a certain level below which we dare not regress.[121] This category connects with the logical principle in that they both have the Kantian imperative and the natural law principles in view. And based on these they proffer grounds for the universal justification and validity of certain values.

The key advantage in this principle is that it moves the quest for a principle of cross-cultural evaluation from the level of mere generality in extension, to an honest search for universal validity. The major problem, on the other hand, here is its overt emphasis on universality. On this Dallymar still writes, ñin moral discourse, participants are expected to put aside their cultural and historical particularities (to the extent possible) and reach a general consensus on valid norms from a standpoint of impartiality. To this extent, moral discourse is more supracultural and universal in character than intercultural and transversal. Still, cultural particularity can rarely if ever be fully expunged.ò[122] Given the transmodern quest for an

intercultural dialogue that is transversal, there is a need for an-*other* principle of cross-cultural evaluation.

6.5.3 The Ethical-Hermeneutic Principle: An-*other* Principle of Intercultural Contact

The quest here is for an-*other* principle of cross-cultural evaluation. One also notices that the an-*other* is hyphenated and italicized. This signals the fundamental dimension this principle is supposed to attract. This is the case in that particular cultural experiences are brought into the dialogue in a genuine way, while still preserving the requisite openness to the ótherô. Hence, universal and particular dimensions intermingle or are held in balance and this justifies the designation of such dialogue as transversal[123]. Opposite poles can be held together in a fruitful tension and this is indeed a disobedence of the ontology of polarized units. The ultimate aim in this regard is to defy the ómonocultures of the mindô within Western imperial knowledge scheme, as well as its totalitarian and epistemically non-democratic implementations.[124]

This model is aptly designated by Dallmayr as the ethical-hermeneutic principle of cross-cultural evaluation/interaction. A description of this model in his words will warrant a long quote here. For him,

> in ethical-hermeneutical dialogue, partners seek to understand and appreciate each otherôs life stories and cultural backgrounds, including religious (or spiritual) traditions, literary and artistic expressions, and existential agonies and aspirations. It is in this mode that important cross-cultural learning takes place é *Ethics here is oriented toward the 'good life'—not in the sense of an abstract 'ought,' but as the pursuit of an aspiration implicit in all life-forms yet able to take on different expressions in different cultures.* Since ethics on this level speaks to deeper human motivations, this is the dimension that is most likely to mold human conduct in the direction of mutual ethical recognition and peace. Hence, there is an urgent need in our time to emphasize and cultivate this kind of ethical pedagogy.[125]

After this, he goes ahead to mention specific examples of some areas where this kind of dialogue is already in place. He talks about parliaments, and various forms of world forum where this kind of dialogue is already taking place. The aspiration of ethics is key in this regard and most important is the fact that this ethics moves towards an aspiration that is implicit in all forms of

life, yet is able to take on different expressions in different cultures. This, in the opinion of this research, is a classic statement of the idea of ócuniversality as a pluriversal projectô. Here then, universality does not have any meeting point with uniformity or homogeneity. What is demanded is that the ethical aspiration of such a position is made most clear. In this context, it becomes very reasonable to argue that economic interactions are implicit in very human community, hence economic interactions are universal, but capitalism is only a specific mode of economic interaction therefore capitalism is not a universal. As such it will be wrong to think every economy must liberalise for it to survive. The same argument can be made for the question of political structures within any human community. Every human community must have political organizations and structures, hence political structures are universal. But democracy is only a form of political organization within human communities therefore, it is not a universal. Instances can be cited on and on of examples where the West has valourized various aspects of its culture and made them into universals for others to follow in order to have eternal life as far as development is concerned. This should not be the case.

Dallmayr identified further another category of this ethical-hermeneutic principle of intercultural dialogue and evaluation. This he calls agonal dialogue or contestation. In the agonal dialogue Dallmayr contends that,

> é partners seek not only to understand and appreciate each otherôs life-forms but also to convey their experiences of exploitation and persecution, that is, grievances having to do with past or persisting injustice and suffering. Along with better understanding, agonal dialogue adds the dimension of possible retribution and rectification of grievances. Yet retribution does not necessarily involve the desire to ñget even,ò take revenge, and possibly repay injustice with injustice by turning the previous victimizers into victims. When the latter happens, the element of understandingð constitutive of genuine dialogueð is crushed in favor of sheer antagonism and possibly violent conflict. At that point, we reenter the domain of the ñclashò of cultures and societies that is at the margins of intercultural dialogue. This is why I prefer to list the agonal case as a subcategory within ethical-hermeneutical dialogue. In this context, confrontation and contestation are not ends in themselves but are placed in the service of ethical reconciliation and healing.[126]

He even goes ahead to mention some examples of the institutions that are aimed at arriving at this form of reconciliation. Some of these are the Truth and Justice or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in various parts of the world to investigate crimes committed during ethnic conflicts or by dictatorships. The point of these commissions was both to establish a record of past criminal actions and injustices and to promote a process of social healing that would prevent the recurrence of victimization. In light of the horrendous forms of oppression and injustice prevailing in the world today, one can only hope that humankind will someday have the wisdom and courage to establish a global Truth and Reconciliation Commission charged with exposing and rectifying existing abuses and laying the groundwork for a more just and livable global future.[127] For those within the transmodern school of thought retribution for the crimes of colonialism should also be part of the functions of this kind of commission.

Integral pluralism is also what helps this model of intercultural dialogue to perfectly identify that sphere of universality and how particularity can be disguised as a universal in this sense. What then is integral pluralism? Dallmayr calls this ótunity in diversityô and ñjust as in the case of hermeneutical dialogue, *the point of intercultural encounter is not to reach a bland consensus or uniformity of beliefs but to foster a progressive learning process involving possible transformation*. For this to happen, local or indigenous traditions must be neither jettisoned nor congealed (or essentialized).ò[128] Dallmayr further quotes extensively from Gadamer to establish this point. In Dallmayrôs words,

> in an interview with an Indian political thinker conducted a few years before his death, Gadamer clearly pinpoints the global significance of hermeneutical understanding. ôThe human solidarity that I envisage,ô he states, ótis not a global uniformity but unity in diversity [another name for integral pluralism]. We must learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities, cultural differences.ô As he frankly concedes, such an appreciation is in short supply and is actually undermined by the rampant power politics pursued by military-industrial complexes: ôThe hegemony or unchallengeable power of any one single nation . . . is dangerous for humanity; it would go against human freedom.ô Hence, the unity in diversity that has been a European legacy must today become a global formula; it must be extended to the whole worldð to include China, India, and

> also Muslim cultures. Every culture, every people has something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and wellbeing of humanityô.[129]

The last sentence re-echoôs the idea of Asouzu that everything in reality serves óa missing linkô, hence no culture can afford to be discarded within the context of this new discourse which seeks to found the new world order. The aim here is to touch and be touched and to be ready to revise our positions based on these touchings.

6.6 Summary and Conclusion

The research has progressed first by setting the problematique within the context of finding a basis for sustaining the identity and uniqueness of smaller-cultures in the face of the imposing presence of ósuper-culturesô. Gadamerôs revival of prejudice and its adoption within the transmodern project was considered as the right attitude to undoing this situation of the óclash of culturesô. The basis for this is that Gadamerôs direct appropriation of prejudice and its impact on the transmodern idea of the bio/geo/body-politics of knowledge challenges the idea of universality as is the case in the Euro-American cosmovision. This challenge is not in favour of subjectivism or relativism, but in favour of óintersubjective dialogueô and ópluriversality as a universal projectô. Following this is a consideration of repudiation as the fate prejudice has suffered within the history of philosophy. Within this context, the ontology of polarized units was unveiled as the predominant ontology within the history of philosophy and the modernity project in particular. This leads to a comprehensive discussion of Gadamerôs concept of prejudice and a transmodern reading of his philosophy, connecting him with the transmodern tradition in contemporary philosophy. The end point of all these was in the substantiation of the idea of pluriversality; a hybrid of Gadamerôs idea of the ófusion of horizons and the transmodern idea of ópluriversality as a universal projectô. This concept of pluriversality is considered as the basis upon which óa world in which all worlds fitô can be built.

Pluriversality is considered to serve this purpose more than universality because of the tendency of universality towards uniformization; the predisposition of universality to create a whole that looks alike in all forms. This penchant at uniformization is at the heart of the critique of the pragmatic and logical principles of intercultural contact/evaluation. But the appreciation of diversity as a core element in the ethical-hermeneutic principle makes it the preferred option. By virtue of this positive reception to diversity, the ethical-hermeneutic principle at once keys into the idea of pluriversality and also embraces the ontology of complementarity. No position should be looked down on; every position has something to offer within the socio-cultural network. No longer will any single culture be considered as holding all it takes for all cultures to survive. This kind of thinking will suggest that universality subsists in a particular culture and what is needed is for others to follow. But the expansion of this sense of universality to reside in all culture via the idea of pluriversality situates the locus of the universal outside the confines of particular cultures and places it at the level of that which makes us all human, our ability for dialogue. This is the justification for the adoption of the ethical-hermeneutic principle of intercultural contact/evaluation as that principle that can foreground ća world in which all words fitč. The principle reminds us that ćanother is indeed possibleč.

Endnotes

1. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics* (Durham: ACUMEN Publishing Limited, 2006), 133.
2. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 25.
3. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation*, 247.
4. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation*, 254.
5. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 141.
6. Yvonne Sherratt, *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 86-7.
7. Lorraine Code, ñIntroduction: Why Feminists Do Not Read Gadamer,ò in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-George Gadamer*, edited by Lorraine Code(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 5.
8. Robert Piercey, ñRicoeurôs Account of Tradition and the Gadamerï Habermas Debate,ò *Human Studies* 27: 2004, 260.
9. Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro. (Boston: Beacon Press,1971), 176.
10. Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 53.
11. Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 283.
12. Jurgen Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson and J. Stark. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1988), 170.
13. Jurgen Habermas, *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, 170.
14. Jürgen Habermas, ñA Review of Gadamerôs *Truth and Method,*ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990). 213ï 44), 235.
15. Hans- George Gadamer, ñOn the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflectionò, in Philosophical Hermeneutics,ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, translated by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 26.
16. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 146.
17. See, Jürgen Habermas, ñThe Hermeneutic Claim to Universality,ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 245ï 72.
18. See, Hans-Georg Gadamer, ñReply to My Critics,ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990), 273ï 97.
19. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics*, 150.
20. Robert Piercey, ñRicoeurôs Account of Tradition and the Gadamerï Habermas Debate,ò 262.
21. Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John Thompson. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 295.
22. Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action*, 297.
23. Robert Piercey, ñRicoeurôs Account of Tradition and the Gadamerï Habermas Debate,ò 267.
24. See, Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Vol. 3. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 219ff.
25. Robert Piercey, ñRicoeurôs Account of Tradition and the Gadamerï Habermas Debate,ò 273ff.
26. Hans George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum Press, 2004), 369.
27. Hans George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 356-371.
28. Lorraine Code, ñIntroduction: Why Feminists Do Not Read Gadamer,ò in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-George Gadamer*, 9.
29. Susan Hekman, ñActions as a Text: Gadamerôs Hermeneutics and the Social Scientific Analysis of Action,ò in *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 14: 3 October, 1984, 350.
30. Georgia Warnke, ñLegitimate Prejudices,ò *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, vol. 53, n° 1, 1997. p. 89-102. 92.
31. Georgia Warnke, ñLegitimate Prejudices,ò 93.
32. Georgia Warnke, ñLegitimate Prejudices,ò 95-6.

33. Yvonne Sherratt, *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century*, 100-101.
34. Yvonne Sherratt, *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century*, 110.
35. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (London: Fontana, 1973), 5.
36. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 453.
37. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 9-10.
38. Yvonne Sherratt, *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century*, 112.
39. Theophilus Okere, *African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 82.
40. Theophilus Okere, *African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility*, 88. This definition, however, leaves open the question of the status of non-philosophy. Is it a necessary evil (he calls it ôbaggageô, after all)? Is it the un-thought, the inchoate beginning of Hegel's dialectic? Is he suggesting that ethnophilosophy simply requires another step, that of reflection and rationalization? Or, is it simply the Enlightenment hope made African, that the irrationality of religion or culture will finally be overcome by the rationality of philosophy? (See, Bruce B. Janz, ñHermeneutics and Africana Philosophy: Is it Worth the Trouble?,ò 5. Accessed June 20th, 2013. http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/papers/36%20-%20Hermeneutics%20in%20Africana%20Philosophy.pdf)
41. Tsenay Serequeberhan, *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1994), 9.
42. Tsenay Serequeberhan, *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse*, 74. This does not undermine the criticism of the likes of David Spurrett and Oladapo Jimoh Balogun. Spurett does a review of Serequeberhanôs work and makes some criticisms of the work within the review. So too Balogun considers hermeneutics within African philosophy and also raises some objections to Serequeberhan and other philosophers within the hermeneutic school of thought in African philosophy. The concern here is not to respond to these criticisms but just to see the ways in which Gadamerôs philosophy has helped to expand the frontiers of knowledge within philosophy in general. For details of these criticisms see, Oladapo Jimoh Balogun, ñA Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy,ò in *Open Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.3, No.1A, 2013. 105-112 and David Spurrett, ñReview of The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse,ò in *Alternation*, 3, 1: 1996. 184-9.
43. D. N. Shalin, ñHermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger And Gadamer in Their Historical Setting,ò *Russian Journal Of Communication*, Vol. 3, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2010), 19.
44. Robin Pappas and William Cowling, ñToward a Critical Hermeneutics,ò in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, edited by Lorraine Code (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 203-30.
45. D. N. Shalin, ñHermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger And Gadamer in Their Historical Setting,ò 20.
46. Kieran Owens, ñEmbodied Understanding: On a Path Not Travelled in Gadamerôs Hermeneutics,ò in *Emergent Australasian Philosophers Issue* 4, 2011, 4.
47. D. N. Shalin, ñHermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger And Gadamer in Their Historical Setting,ò 20.
48. Gerald L. Bruns, ñOn the Coherence of Hermeneutics and Ethics: An Essay on Gadamer and Levinas,ò in *Gadamer Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics*, edited by Bruce Krajewski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 40.
49. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans by Alphonso Lingis, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 66.
50. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 213.
51. Gerald L. Bruns, ñOn the Coherence of Hermeneutics and Ethics: An Essay on Gadamer and Levinas,ò 39.
52. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. C. Smith, (New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), 192.
53. M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible,* trans. A. Lingis, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 135.
54. Kieran Owens, ñEmbodied Understanding: On a Path Not Travelled in Gadamerôs Hermeneutics,ò 5.

55. M. Merleau-Ponty, ñEye and mind,ò trans. C Dallery, in *The Primacy of Perception,* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) pp159-190, 166.
56. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, 455.
57. Kieran Owens, ñEmbodied Understanding: On a Path Not Travelled in Gadamerôs Hermeneutics,ò 10.
58. Mary Douglas, ñDo Dogs Laugh? A Cross-cultural Approach to Body Symbolism,ò in *The Body Reader. Social Aspects of the Human Body*, edited by T. Polhemus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), Pp. 295ï 303. 298.
59. Richard Shusterman, *Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life*. (London: Routledge, 1997), 31.
60. T. Csordias, ñEmbodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology,ò in *Ehos* 18: 1990, 146.
61. M. L. Lyon, and J. M. Barbalet, ñSocietyôs Body: Emotions and the óSomatizationô of Social Theory,ò in *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Grounds of Culture and Self,* edited by T. J. Csordias. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 63.
62. T. Turner, ñBodies and Anti-bodies: Flesh and Fetish in Contemporary Social Theory,ò in *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Grounds of Culture and Self* , 32.
63. Dmitri N. Shalin, ñSigning in the Flesh: Notes on Pragmatist Hermeneutics,ò in *Sociological Theory* 25:3 September 2007, 194.
64. D. N. Shalin, Hermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger And Gadamer in Their Historical Setting,ò 21.
65. Horacio Guldberg Cerutti, *Filosofia de la Liberacion Latinoamericana* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1983), 292, 308.
66. Ofelia Schutte, ñOrigins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought,ò *The Philosophical Forum*, 22 (1991): 291.
67. Michael Barber, *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation* (NewYork: Fordham University Press, 1998) 117.
68. Michael Barber, *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*, 117.
69. Michael Barber, *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*, 149.
70. Pheng Cheah, ñThe Limits of Thinking in Decolonial Strategies.ò Accessed June 22nd, 2013. http://town sendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies.
71. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñThe Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality,ò in *City*, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2004, 30.
72. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ñThe Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality,ò 30.
73. Marc Luyckx, ñThe Transmodern Hypothesis: Towards a Dialogue of Cultures,ò in *Futures* 31 (1999) 971ï 982, 980.
74. Claes G. Ryn, *A Common Human Ground: Universality and Particularity in A Multicultural World* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 9-10.
75. Claes G. Ryn, *A Common Human Ground: Universality and Particularity in A Multicultural World*, 54.
76. Marc Luyckx, ñThe Transmodern Hypothesis: Towards a Dialogue of Cultures,ò 980.
77. Marc Luyckx Ghisi, ñTowards a Transmodern Transformation of our Global Society: European Challenges and Opportunities,ò in *Journal of Futures Studies*, September 2010, 15(1): 39 ï 48, 40.
78. Mario Sáenz, "Review of The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of óthe Otherô and the Myth of Modernity,ò in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 31: 1998, 425-450, 427.
79. Mario Sáenz, "Review of The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of óthe Otherô and the Myth of Modernity,ò 427.
80. Mario Sáenz, "Reviw of The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of óthe Otherô and the Myth of Modernity,ò 433.
81. Walter D. Mignolo, ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality,ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007,488-9.
82. Michael Barber, *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*, 149.
83. J. C. A. Agbakoba, ñTowards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa,ò in *African Philosophy and Public Affairs*, edited by J. Obi Oguejiofor (Enugu: Delta Publications,1998), 30.
84. J. C. A. Agbakoba, ñTowards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa,ò 231.
85. J. C. A. Agbakoba, ñTowards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa,ò 234.

86. Olufemi Taiwo, ñOn Agency and Change: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and the Philosophy of History,ò in *Uche Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka*, Vol. 14: 2008, 1.
87. Olufemi Taiwo, ñOn Agency and Change: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and the Philosophy of History,ò 11.
88. Olufemi Taiwo, ñOn Agency and Change: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and the Philosophy of History,ò 23.
89. Olufemi Taiwo, ñOn Agency and Change: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and the Philosophy of History,ò 13.
90. Arthur Bradley, *Derrida's Of Grammatology,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 6-7.
91. Alan Page Fiske, ñComplementarity Theory: Why Human Social Capacities Evolved to Require Cultural Complements,ò *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 2000, Vol. 4, No. 1. 76
92. Alan Page Fiske, ñComplementarity Theory: Why Human Social Capacities Evolved to Require Cultural Complements,ò 91.
93. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions* (Zurich: LIT VerLag GmbH and Co. KGWien, 2007), 21.
94. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 18.
95. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 154.
96. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 155.
97. Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle cited in Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 159.
98. Fred Dallmayr, ñEmpire or Cosmopolis?ò 53
99. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 160
100. Hans George Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum Press, 2004), 233.
101. Lawrence K. Schmidt, *Understanding Hermeneutics* (Durham: ACUMEN Publishing Limited, 2006), 98.
102. Innocent I. Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*, 133.
103. Kenneth Gergen, *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 51.
104. Kenneth Gergen, *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community*, 51.
105. Kenneth Gergen, *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community*, 53.
106. Kenneth Gergen, *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community*, 54.
107. Kenneth Gergen, *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community*, 54-5.
108. Daniel Bartels, ñSome Recent Attacks on Cultural Relativism: A Critical Review,ò 43.
109. Henry Bagish, ñConfessions of a former cultural Relativist,ò *Annual Editions, Anthropology,* edited by Elvio Angeloni, (CT: The Dushkin Publishing Co., 1983-84), 26.
110. Henry Bagish, ñConfessions of a former cultural Relativist,ò 26.
111. Henry Bagish, ñConfessions of a former cultural Relativist,ò 26.
112. Dennis Bartels, ñSome Recent Attacks on Cultural Relativism: A Critical Review,ò 44.
113. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò *In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 250
114. Dennis Bartels, ñSome Recent Attacks on Cultural Relativism: A Critical Review,ò 43.
115. This is yet another example of the rejection of a technological innovation consistent with the pragmatic principle of Bagish. Ayalon has brilliantly shown that, ñHorsemanship and all it stood for were the pivot round which the whole way of life of the Mamluk upper class revolved and from which it derived its courtly pride and feeling of superiority.ò No Mamluk knight would have ever agreed to be deprived of his horse and to be reduced to the humiliating status of foot soldier. On the other hand, as long as the social structure of the kingdom remained essentially feudal, the backbone of the army was necessarily represented by the knights and there was no possibility of giving a major role to other corps. Artillery was left to the black slaves who were the most despised human element in the kingdom . . . (Carlo Cipolla, *Guns and sails,* (London: Collins, 1965), 92ff). In this case, the Mamluk knights valued their superordinate social position more than the military advantages field artillery might have conferred.
116. Tong Shijung, ñVarieties of Universalism,ò 452-3.

117. J. C. A. Agbakoba, ñLogical Quantification of Values, Religio-Ethical Systems and Globalization: A Preliminary Evaluation of the European Scene,ò in *Religion in Changing Europe: Between Pluralism and Fundamentalism Selected Problems*, edited by Maria Marczewska-Rytko, (Lublin: Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press, 2003), 47-49.
118. J.C.A. Agbakoba, ñPhilosophy and Development: Metatheoretical and Methodological Considerations,ò *Uche Journal of The Department of Philosophy University of Nigeria, Nsukka*, vol. 11: (2005), 39.
119. J.C.A. Agbakoba, ñBuilding Cultural Bridges in the Era of Globalization,ò *Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions*, 48-49.
120. J. C. Achike Agbakoba, ñTraditional African Political Thought and the Crisis of Governance in Contemporary African Societies,ò *Journal for The Study of Religions & Ideologies*, 140.
121. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò 250-1.
122. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò 252.
123. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò 252-3.
124. See, Vandana Shiva, *The Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives in Biodiversity* (London: Zed Books, 1993).
125. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò 251. Italics mine.
126. Fred Dallmayr, Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò 251-2.
127. Regarding truth commissions, see Bishop Desmond Tutu (with Douglas Abrams), *God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time* (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Mark R. Amstutz, *The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political Forgiveness* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); and Teresa G. Phelps, *Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth Commissions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
128. Fred Dallmayr, *Integral Pluralism: Beyond Culture Wars* (Kentucky: The University Press Of Kentucky, 2010), 115.
129. Fred Dallmayr, *Integral Pluralism: Beyond Culture Wars*, 116.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Gadamer, H. G., ñClassical and Philosophical Hermeneutics.ò in *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings*. Edited by Richard E. Palmer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007.

Gadamer, H. G., ñFriendship and Self Knowledge,ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer. Yale University Press, 1999.

Gadamer, H. G., ñOn the Possibility of A Philosophical Ethics.ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer. Yale: Yale University Press, 1999.

Gadamer, H. G., ñOn the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection.ò in Philosophical Hermeneutics.ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Translated by David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Gadamer, H. G., ñOn the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection.ò in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. & ed. David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Gadamer, H. G., *Philosophical Apprenticeship*. Translated by Robert R. Sullivan. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.

Gadamer, H. G., ñReply to My Critics.ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990.

Gadamer, H. G., ñSubjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person,ò *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 33, Issue 3, July 2000.

Gadamer, H. G., ñThe Ethics of Value and Practical Philosophy,ò in *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer. Yale: Yale University Press, 1999.

Gadamer, H. G., ñThe Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem.ò *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. & ed. David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Gadamer, H. G., *Platos dialektische Ethik*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1931; Hamburg, 1968, 1984.

Gadamer, H. G., *Reason in the Age of Science*. Trans. Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981.

Gadamer, H. G., *Truth and Method*. Translated and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. (London: Continuum Press, 1973.

Linge, D. E., *Editor's Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Palmer, R. E. (Ed.), *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet Of The Later Writings*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007.

Secondary Source

Alcoff, L. M., ñMignoloôs Epistemology of Coloniality.ò *The New Centennial Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007.

Barthold, L., *Prejudice and Understanding: Gadamer's Ontological Hermeneutics*. Thesis Submitted in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for Degree of Master of Arts in Department of Philosophy. Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, 1996.

Bruns, G. L., ñOn the Coherence of Hermeneutics and Ethics: An Essay on Gadamer and Levinas.ò in *Gadamer Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics*, edited by Bruce Krajewski. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Code, L., ñIntroduction: Why Feminists Do Not Read Gadamer.ò in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-George Gadamer*, edited by Lorraine Code. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.

Cole, M., ñTransmodernism, Marxism and Social Change: Some Implications for Teacher Education,ò *Policy Futures in Education* Vol. 3, 1: 90-105.

Dallmayr, F., ñThe Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel.ò *Constellations*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004.

Dostal, R. J., *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dussel, E., ñAnti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity.ò Accessed September 27th, 2011. http://enriquedussel.com/txt/Anti-Cartesianmeditations.pdf.

Dussel, E., ñDeconstruction of the Concept of ñToleranceò: From Intolerance to Solidarity,ò *Constellations* Volume 11, No 3, 2004.

Dussel, E., ñEurope, Modernity, Eurocentrism,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 1.3, 2000.

Dussel, E., ñTransmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Liberation,ò 19. Accessed 10th November, 2011. http://enrique dussel.com/txt/Transmoder nity%20and%20Interculturality.pdf.

Dussel, E., *Philosophy of Liberation.* Translated from the Spanish by Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky. New York: Orbis Books, 1985.

Dussel, E., *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, Translated and Edited by Eduardo Mendieta. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996.

Dussel, E., *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*.

Dussel, E., World-System and ñóTransô-Modernity,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 3.2, 2002.

Foucault, M., ñNietzsche, Genealogy, History.ò in *The Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.

Gonzalez de Allen, G. J., ñEnrique Dussel and Manuel Zapata Olivella: An Exploration of De-colonial, Diasporic, and Trans-modern Selves and the Politics of Recognition,ò *Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise,* Fall 2006.

Greer, M. R., Walter D. Mignolo, And Maureen Quilligan (Eds.), *Rereading The Black Legend: The Discourses Of Religious And Racial Difference In The Renaissance Empires*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Greider A., ñA Conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer,ò *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 26, 1995.

Grondin, J., ñHumanism and Hermeneutic Limits of Rationality.ò *Paru in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 16/1993.

Grosfoguel, R., ñA Decolonial Approach to Political Economy: Transmodernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality,ò *Kult* 6: (2009) Special Issue Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications.

Habermas, J., ñA Review of Gadamerôs *Truth and Method*.,ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur,* edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990: 213ï 44.

Habermas, J., ñThe Hermeneutic Claim to Universality.ò in *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur,* edited by Gayle Ormiston & Alan Schrift. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990: 245ï 72.

Habermas, J., *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

Habermas, J., *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson and J. Stark. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1988.

Hekman, S., ñActions as a Text: Gadamerôs Hermeneutics and the Social Scientific Analysis of Action,ò in *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 14: 3 October, 1984.

Hirsch, E. D. Jr., *Validity in Interpretation.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967.

Janz, B. B., ñHermeneutics and Africana Philosophy: Is it Worth the Trouble?,ò 5. Accessed June 20th, 2013. http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/papers/36%20-%20Hermeneutics%20in%20Africana%20Philosophy.pdf.

Lawn, C. and Keane, N., *The Gadamer Dictionary*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011.

Ludwig, C. L., ñHermeneuticsð The Path of The Hermeneutic-Ontological Shift and The Decolonial Shift.ò *Nevada Law Journal* Vol. 10, October, 2010: 629-645.

Luyckx, G. M., ñTowards a Transmodern Transformation of our Global Society: European Challenges and Opportunities,ò *Journal of Futures Studies*, 15(1), 2010.

Luyckx, M., ñThe Transmodern Hypothesis: Towards a Dialogue of Culture,ò *Futures* 31: 1999.

Makita, E., *Gadamer-Bibliographie: 1922–1944.* New York: Peter Lang, 1994.

Maldonado-Torres, N., ñEnrique Dusselôs Liberation Thought in the Decolonial Turn,ò *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1(2): 2011.

Maldonado-Torres, N., ñOn the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,ò *Cultural Studies*, 21:2, 2007.

Mignolo, W. D., ñ(Post) Occidentalism, (Post) Coloniality, and (Post) Subaltern Rationality,ò in *The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies*. Eds. Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

Mignolo, W. D., ñColoniality: the Darker Side of Modernity,ò *Cultural Studies*, vol. 21, nos. 2ï 3: 2007.

Mignolo, Walter D. ñColoniality: the Darker Side of Modernity.ò *Cultural Studies* vol. 21, nos. 2ï 3, (2007): 39-49.

Mignolo, W. D., ñCosmopolitan Localism: A Decolonial Shifting of the Kantianô Legacies.ò *Localities* Vol. 1: 2011.

Mignolo, W. D., ñCosmopolitanism and the De-colonial Option,ò *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 29: 2010.

Mignolo, W. D., ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality.ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007.

Mignolo, W. D., ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,ò *Theory, Culture & Society* Vol. 26(7ï 8): 2009.

Mignolo, W. D., ñImperial/Colonial Metamorphosis: from the Ottoman and Spanish Empires to the US and European Union,ò 99. Accessed February 16th, 2013. http://www.alati.com.br/pdf/2005/Separata_doLivro_de_Ankara_Istanbul/pdf117.pdf.

Mignolo, W. D., ñThe Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,ò *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101:1, 2002.

Mignolo, W. D., *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Mignolo, W. D., *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization.* Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Okere, T., *African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983.

Owens, K., ñEmbodied Understanding: On a Path Not Travelled in Gadamerôs Hermeneutics.ò in *Emergent Australasian Philosophers Issue* 4, 2011.

Pappas, R. and William Cowling, ñToward a Critical Hermeneutics.ò in *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, edited by Lorraine Code. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.

Piercey, R., ñRicoeurôs Account of Tradition and the Gadamerï Habermas Debate.ò *Human Studies* 27: 2004.

Quijano, A., ñColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,ò *Nepantla: Views from South* 1.3. Duke University Press, 2000.

Ricoeur, P., *From Text to Action*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John Thompson. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991.

Ricoeur, P., *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, Vol. 3. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Schmidt, L. K., *Understanding Hermeneutics.* Durham: ACUMEN Publishing Limited, 2006.

Serequeberhan, T., *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse*. London: Routledge, 1994.

Seshadri-Crooks, K., ñAt the Margins of Postcolonial Studies: Part 1.ò in *The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies*. Eds. Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

Shalin, D. N., ñHermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger And Gadamer in Their Historical Setting.ò *Russian Journal Of Communication*, Vol. 3, Nos. ½, Winter/Spring 2010.

Shalin, D. N. ñHermeneutics and Prejudice: Heidegger and Gadamer in Their Historical Setting.ò *Russian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 3, Nos. ½, W inter/Spring 2010.

Sherratt, Y., *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Sherratt, Y., *Continental Philosophy of Social Science: Hermeneutics, Genealogy and Critical Theory from Ancient Greece to the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Sullivan, R. R., *Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking of Hans-George Gadamer*. University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1980.

Taylor, C., ñGadamer on the Human Sciences.ò in *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. Edited by Robert J. Dostal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Tlostanova, M. and Mignolo, W. D., ñGlobal Coloniality and the Decolonial Option,ò *Kult 6 - Special Issue* Epistemologies of Transformation: The Latin American Decolonial Option and its Ramifications. Fall 2009.

Warnke, G., ñLegitimate Prejudices,ò *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, vol. 53, n° 1, 1997: 89-102.

Other Sources

Agbakoba, J. C. A., ñTowards a Philosophy of Technology and Development for Africa.ò in *African Philosophy and Public Affairs*. Edited by J. Obi Oguejiofor. Enugu: Delta Publications,1998.

Agbakoba, J.C.A., ñLogical Quantification of Values, Religio-Ethical Systems and Globalization: A Preliminary Evaluation of the European Scene.ò in *Religion in Changing Europe: Between Pluralism and Fundamentalism Selected Problems*, edited by Maria Marczewska-Rytko. Lublin: Maria Curie-Sklodowska University Press, 2003.

Agbakoba, J.C.A., ñPhilosophy and Development: Metatheoretical and Methodological Considerations.ò *Uche Journal of The Department of Philosophy University of Nigeria, Nsukka*, vol. 11: 2005.

Amstutz, M., *The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political Forgiveness*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*. Trans. W. D. Ross, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Benjamin Jowett. Princeton: Princeton University, 1991.

Aristotle, *On The Soul* (de Anima). Trans. by J. A. Smith in *Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Vol. I. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*. Trans. G.R.G Mura, in *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard Mckeon. New York: Random House, Inc. 1947.

Arturo, E., ñWorlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program.ò Paper presented to the International Conference of European Latin Americanists, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 3-6, 2002.

Asouzu, I. I., *Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions*. Zurich: LIT VerLag GmbH and Co. KGWien, 2007.

Audi, A., ñA Narrative Survey of Classical and Contemporary Positions in Epistemology.ò in *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings*, ed. Michael Huemer. London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2002.

Bacon, F., *The New Organon*, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Bagish, H., ñConfessions of a former cultural Relativist,ò *Annual Editions, Anthropology,* edited by Elvio Angeloni. CT: The Dushkin Publishing Co., 1983-84.

Balogun, O. J., ñA Redescriptive History of Humanism and Hermeneutics in African Philosophy.ò in *Open Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.3, No.1A, 2013: 105-112.

Barber, M., *Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation.* NewYork: Fordham University Press, 1998.

Bradley, A., *Derrida's Of Grammatology.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008.

Cerutti, H. G., *Filosofia de la Liberacion Latinoamericana*. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1983.

Cheah, P., ñThe Limits of Thinking in Decolonial Strategies.ò Accessed June 22nd, 2013. http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonialstrategies.

Copleston, F., S.J., *A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome*. Vol. I. New York: Image Books, 1993.

Csordias, T., ñEmbodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology.ò in *Ehos* 18: 1990.

Cunningham, G. W., *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System*. Ontario: Batoche Books Limited, 2001.

Dallmayr, F., Appendix B ñModalities of Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO at Sixty,ò *In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times*. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

Descartes, R., *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*. Trans. by Ian Maclean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Descartes, R., *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from Objections and Replies*, trans. Michael Moritarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Douglas, M., ñDo Dogs Laugh? A Cross-cultural Approach to Body Symbolism.ò in *The Body Reader. Social Aspects of the Human Body*. Edited by T. Polhemus. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978: 295ï 303.

Fiske, A. P., ñComplementarity Theory: Why Human Social Capacities Evolved to Require Cultural Complements.ò *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1. 2000.

Galilei, G., *The Assayer*, translated by Stillman Drake, in *The Controversy of the Comets of 1618*. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press 1960.

Frost, S. E., *Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers*. New York: Anchor Books, 1989.

Geertz, C., *The Interpretation of Cultures*. London: Fontana, 1973.

George, S., *Another World is Possible if…* London: Verso, 2004.

Gergen, K., *Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Ghisi, M. L., ñTowards a Transmodern Transformation of our Global Society: European Challenges and Opportunities.ò in *Journal of Futures Studies*, September 2010, 15(1): 39ï 48.

Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*. trans. Joan Stambaugh . Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996.

Heidegger, M., *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.

Hobbes, T., *Leviathan*, Prepared for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought, by Rod Hay. Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1651.

Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Hume, D., *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited with an Introduction by Peter Millican. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. L. W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.

Kant, I., *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. James Ellington: Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.

Kenny, A., *A New History of Western Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Claredon Press, 2004.

Kenny, A., *A New History of Western Philosophy: Philosophy in the Modern World*, Vol. 4. Oxford: Claredon Press, 2007.

Kenny, A., *An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Levinas, E., *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Lindsay, A.D., *Kant: The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1934.

Lyon, M. L., and Barbalet, J. M., ñSocietyôs Body: Emotions and the ósomatizationô of Social Theory.ò in *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Grounds of Culture and Self*. Edited by T. J. Csordias. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Lyotard, J., *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1979.

Locke, J., *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Edited by Peter Nidditch. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975.

Magda, R. M. R., ñGlobalization as Transmodern Totality.ò in *Transmodernidad,* Barcelona: Anthropos, 2004.

Maldonado-Torres, N., ñThe Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality.ò in *City*, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2004.

Maldonado-Torress, N., ñEnrique Dusselôs Thought in the Decolonial Turn.ò *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1(1), 2011.

Merleau-Ponty, M., ñEye and mind.ò Trans. C Dallery, in *The Primacy of Perception*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964: 159-190.

Merleau-Ponty, M., *Phenomenology of Perception.* Trans. C. Smith. New York: Routledge Classics, 2002.

Merleau-Ponty, M., *The Visible and the Invisible.* Trans. A. Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

Mignolo, W. D., ñDelinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality.ò *Cultural Studies* Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3, 2007.

Mignolo, W. D., ñEpistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom.ò *Theory, Culture & Society* Vol. 26(7ï 8): 2009.

Munroe, M., *Releasing Your Potential: Exposing the Hidden You*. Shippensburg: Destiny Image Publishers Plc., 2007.

Njoku, F. O. C., ñThe Low Morality of the Capitalist Economic Development and the Debt-Talk.ò in *Debt Burden and Development in Africa*. A Publication of the Whelan Research Academy for Religion, Culture and Society. Owerri: Assumpta Press, 2005.

Njoku, F. O. C., *Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy*. New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2004.

Phelps, T. G., *Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the Work of Truth Commissions.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Plato, *The Republic*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1896.

Pojman, L. P., *The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. 2nd ed. Belmort: Wardsworth Publishing Company, 1999.

Ranger, T., ócConcluding Remarksô, in *Zimbabwe International Book Fair Trust*, Indaba 2002: *The Impact of African Writing on World Literature*. Harare: ZIBF Trust, 2002.

Ryn, C. G., *A Common Human Ground: Universality and Particularity in A Multicultural World*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003.

Sáenz, M., *"*Review of The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of ócthe Otherô and the Myth of Modernity.ò in *Continental Philosophy Review*. 31: 1998, 425-450.

Santo, B. de S., ñThe World Social Forum: Toward a Counter-Hegemonic Globalization.ò At http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/bss/documentos/wsf.pdf, 2003.

Schutte, O., ñOrigins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought.ò *The Philosophical Forum*, 22: 1991.

Scruton, R., *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*. London: Taylor and Francis Group, 1995.

Seung, T. K., *Kant: Guide For The Perplexed*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007.

Shalin, D. N., ñSigning in the Flesh: Notes on Pragmatist Hermeneutics.ò in *Sociological Theory* 25:3 September 2007.

Sheehan, P., ñPostmodernism And Philosophy.ò in *The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism,* ed. Steve Connor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Shijun, Tong. ñVarieties of Universalism.ò *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, 4 (2009): 499-463.

Shiva, V., *The Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives in Biodiversity*. London: Zed Books, 1993.

Shusterman, R., *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Spurrett, D., ñReview of The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse.ò in *Alternation*, 3, 1: 1996.

Taiwo, O., ñOn Agency and Change: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and the Philosophy of History.ò in *Uche Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka*, Vol. 14: 2008.

Tutu, D., and Douglas Abrams., *God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for Our Time.* New York: Doubleday, 2004.

Ubuntu Forum Secretariat (Ed.), *Reforming International Institutions: Another World is Possible*. London: Earthscan Publishing, 2009.