A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF POST-GADDAFI LIBYA

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This project report has examined and approved by the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Master of science (M.Sc) inPolitical Science (International Relations).

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DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to Almighty God, for without Him I can do nothing.

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ABSTRACT

The studyassessed critically the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya. It interrogated the domestic and external actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi as well as the political, diplomatic and other consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi. Overtime, researchers have contributed on the aforementioned topic with fundamental interest on the root causes of the crisis. Most of them anchored their explanation on Centre-Periphery and dependency analysis from the Marxian Political Economy approach. They pay less attention in interrogating the issue in terms of the aftermath or implications the crisis will have on the politics and diplomacy of Libya. This study shall employ theoretical foundation of complex interdependence theory. We relied on secondary data source to investigate our analysis. The study noted that the regime change in Libya has both positive and negative impact on the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya.The study therefore recommends that for the country to effectively reap the benefits of the regime change, the NTC should ensure a proper democratic transition processes which will enhance popular participation and economic integration and liberation.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1   BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

From 1969 to early 2011, the politics and diplomacy of Libya was determined *de facto* by Muammar Gaddafi, who had been in power since his overthrow of the Kingdom of Libya in 1969.Gaddafi abolished the post-1951 Libyan Constitution and introduced his own political philosophy, based on his *Green Book* published in the 1970s (Davis,1990:16). Gaddafi's system was known as *Jamahiriya* and was notionally legally based on the legislative General People's Congress (GPC), consisting of 2,700 representatives of Basic People's Congresses, and the executive General People's Committee, headed by a General Secretary, who reported to the Prime Minister and the President (Davis, 1990:16).

The "Jamahiriya sector" was overseen by the "revolutionary sector." This was headed by Muammar Gaddafi as "Brotherly Leader of the Revolution", the Revolutionary Committees, and the surviving members of the 12-person Revolutionary Command Council established in 1969. This "revolutionary sector" held office by virtue of having led the coup officially described as "the Revolution" and therefore was not subject to election. As a consequence, although Gaddafi held no governmental post after 1980, he maintained absolute control over the country until the collapse of his regime during the Libyan civil war (Liam Stack, 2012:87).

For the first seven years following the 1969 revolution, Colonel Gaddafi and 12 fellow army officers, the Revolutionary Command Council, began a complete overhaul of Libya's political system, society, and economy. On 2 March 1977, Gaddafi convened a General People's Congress (GPC) to proclaim the establishment of "people's power," change the country's name to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and to vest,

theoretically, primary authority in the GPC (Patrick, 1992:245).Gaddafi remained the *de facto*chief of state and secretary general of the GPC until 1980, when he gave up his office. He continued to control all aspects of the Libyan government through direct appeals to the masses, a pervasive security apparatus, and powerful revolutionary committees. Although he held no formal office, Gaddafi exercised absolute power with the assistance of a small group of trusted advisers, who included relatives from his home base in the Sirte region, which lies between the rival provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

During his rule, Gaddafi took increasing control of the government, but he also attempted to achieve greater popular participation in local government. In 1973, he announced the start of a "cultural revolution" in schools, businesses, industries, and public institutions to oversee administration of those organizations in the public interest. The March 1977 establishment of "people's power" with mandatory popular participation in the selection of representatives to the GPC was the culmination of this process.

In the 1980s, competition grew between the official Libyan Government and military hierarchies and the revolutionary committees. An abortive coup attempt in May 1984 apparently mounted by Libyan exiles with internal support, led to a short-lived reign of terror in which thousands were imprisoned and interrogated. An unknown number were executed. Gaddafi used the revolutionary committees to search out alleged internal opponents following the coup attempt, thereby accelerating the rise of more radical elements inside the Libyan power hierarchy (Eljahmi, 2006).After the 1986 bombing of Libya by the United States Air Force, Gaddafi decreed that the word "Great" should be appended to the beginning of the name, rendering its official name *Al Jumahiriyah al Arabiyah al Libiyah ash Shabiyah al Ishtirakiyah al Uzma*, or Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

In 1988, faced with rising public dissatisfaction with shortages in consumer goods and setbacks in Libya's war with Chad, Gaddafi began to curb the power of the revolutionary committees and to institute some domestic reforms. The regime released many political prisoners and eased restrictions on foreign travel by Libyans. Private businesses were again permitted to operate. Around the same time, Gaddafi began to pursue an anti-fundamentalist Islamic policy domestically, viewing fundamentalism as a potential rallying point for opponents of the regime. Ministerial positions and military commanders are frequently shuffled or placed under temporary house arrest to diffuse potential threats to Gaddafi's authority (Simons, 2003:281).

Despite these measures, internal dissent continued. Gaddafi's security forces launched a preemptive strike at alleged coup plotters in the military and among the Warfalla tribe in October 1993. Widespread arrests and government reshufflings followed, accompanied by public "confessions" from regime opponents and allegations of torture and executions. The military, once Gaddafi's strongest supporters, became a potential threat in the 1990s. In 1993, following a failed coup attempt that implicated senior military officers, Gaddafi began to purge the military periodically, eliminating potential rivals and inserting his own loyal followers in their place (Simons, 2003:281).

Meanwhile, the diplomacy and foreign relations of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1969ó2011) underwent much fluctuation and change. They were marked by severe tension with the West (especially the United States, although relations were normalized in the early 21st century prior to the Libyan civil war) and by other national policies in the Middle East and Africa, including the Libyan government's financial and military support for numerous paramilitary and rebel groups.(Coker, 2012)

Beginning in 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi determined Libya's foreign policy. His principal foreign policy goals were Arab unity, elimination of Israel, advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside, particularly Western influence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes. After the 1969 coup, U.S.-Libyan relations became increasingly strained because of Libya's foreign policies supporting international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African governments. Gaddafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya (Smith, 1992:141).

Export controls on military equipment and civil aircraft were imposed during the 1970s.On 11 June 1972, Gaddafi announced that any Arab wishing to volunteer for Palestinian armed groups "can register his name at any Libyan embassy will be given adequate training for combat". He also promised financial support for attacks. In response, the United States withdrew its ambassador. On 7 October 1972, Gaddafi praised the Lod Airport massacre, carried out by the Japanese Red Army, and demanded Palestinian terrorist groups to carry out similar attacks. Gaddafi played a key role in promoting the use of oil embargoes as a political weapon for challenging the West, hoping that an oil price rise and embargo in 1973 would persuade the West, especially the United States to end support for Israel. Gaddafi rejected both Soviet communism and Western capitalism and claimed he was charting a middle course for his government (Smith, 1992:148)

Gaddafi fueled a number of Islamist and communist terrorist groups in the Philippines,as well as paramilitaries in Oceania. He attempted to radicalize New Zealand's M ori people in a failed effort to destabilize the U.S. ally. In Australia, he financed trade unions and some politicians who opposed the ANZUS alliance with the United States. In

May 1987, Australia deported diplomats and broke off relations with Libya because of its activities in Oceania.

Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union involved massive Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet bloc and the presence of thousands of east bloc advisers. Libya's useô and heavy loss of Soviet-supplied weaponry in its war with Chad was a notable breach of an apparent Soviet-Libyan understanding not to use the weapons for activities inconsistent with Soviet objectives. As a result, Soviet-Libyan relations reached a nadir in mid-1987.In January 1989, there was another encounter over the Gulf of Sidra between U.S. and Libyan aircraft which resulted in the downing of two Libyan jets.

Furthermore, in 1991, two Libyan intelligence agents were indicted by prosecutors in the United States and United Kingdom for their involvement in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Six other Libyans were put on trial in absentia for the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Chad and Niger. The UN Security Council demanded that Libya surrender the suspects, cooperate with the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 investigations, pay compensation to the victims' families, and cease all support for terrorism. Libya's refusal to comply led to the approval of Security Council Resolution 748 on 31 March 1992, imposing international sanctions on the state designed to bring about Libyan compliance. Continued Libyan defiance led to further sanctions by the UN against Libya in November 1993.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Libya concentrated on expanding diplomatic ties with Third World countries and increasing its commercial links with Europe and East Asia. Following the imposition of U.N. sanctions in 1992, these ties significantly diminished. Following a 1998 Arab League meeting in which fellow Arab states decided not to challenge U.N. sanctions; Gaddafi announced that he was turning his back on pan-Arab ideas, one of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy.

Instead, Libya pursued closer bilateral ties, particularly with Egypt and Northwest African nations Tunisia and Morocco. It also has sought to develop its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to Libyan involvement in several internal African disputes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Libya also has sought to expand its influence in Africa through financial assistance, ranging from aid donations to impoverished neighbors such as Niger to oil subsidies to Zimbabwe. Gaddafi has proposed a borderless "United States of Africa" to transform the continent into a single nation-state ruled by a single government. This plan has been moderately well received, although more powerful would-be participants such as Nigeria and South Africa are skeptical.

In 1999, less than a decade after the UN sanctions were put in place, Libya began to make dramatic policy changes in regard to the Western world, including turning over the Lockerbie suspects for trial. This diplomatic breakthrough followed years of negotiation, including a visit by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to Libya in December 1998, and personal appeals by Nelson Mandela. Eventually UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook persuaded the Americans to accept a trial of the suspects in the Netherlands under Scottish law, with the UN Security Council agreeing to suspend sanctions as soon as the suspects arrived in the Netherlands for trial. Libya also paid compensation in 1999 for the death of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, a move that preceded the reopening of the British embassy in Tripoli and the appointment of ambassador Sir Richard Dalton, after a 17-year break in diplomatic relations(Hubbard, Ben; Laub, Karin , 2011)

As of January 2002, Libya was constructing another chemical weapons production facility at Tarhuna. Citing Libya's support for terrorism and its past regional aggressions the United States voiced concern over this development. In cooperation with like-minded

countries, the United States has since sought to bring a halt to the foreign technical assistance deemed essential to the completion of this facility.

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Gaddafi decided to abandon his weapons of mass destruction programs and pay almost 3 billion euros in compensation to the families of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772. The decision was welcomed by many western nations and was seen as an important step toward Libya rejoining the international community. Since 2003 the country has made efforts to normalize its ties with the European Union and the United States and has even coined the catchphrase, 'The Libya Model', an example intended to show the world what can be achieved through negotiation and diplomacy, rather than force, when there is goodwill on both sides. By 2004 George W. Bush had lifted the economic sanctions and official relations resumed with the United States. Libya opened a liaison office in Washington, and the United States opened an office in Tripoli. In January 2004, Congressman Tom Lantos led the first official Congressional delegation visit to Libya. The release, in 2007, of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, who had been held since 1999, charged with conspiring to deliberately infecting over 400 children with HIV, was seen as marking a new stage in Libyan-Western relations.The United States removed Gaddafi's regime, after 27 years, from its list of states sponsoring terrorism. On 16 October 2007, Libya was elected to serve on the United Nations Security Council for two years starting in January 2008.

The progress made by Gaddafi's government in improving relations with the Western world was swiftly set back by the regime's authoritarian crackdown on protests that began the following month. Many Western countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and eventually Italy condemned Libya for the brutal crackdown on the dissidents. Peru became the first of several countries to sever diplomatic relations with Tripoli on 22 February

2011, followed closely by African Union member state Botswana the following day.Libya was suspended from Arab League proceedings on 22 February 2011, the same day Peru terminated bilateral relations. In response, Gaddafi declared that in the view of his government, "The Arab League is finished. There is no such thing as the Arab League."

On 10 March 2011, France became the first country to not just break off relations with the *jamahiriya*, but transfer diplomatic recognition to the rebel National Transitional Council established in Benghazi, declaring it to be "the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people". As of 20 September 2011, a total of 98 countries have taken this step. On 19 March 2011, a coalition of United Nations member states led by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States began military operations in Libyan airspace and territorial waters after the United Nations Security Council approved UNSCR 1973, ostensibly to prevent further attacks on civilians as loyalist forces closed in on Benghazi, the rebel headquarters. In response, Gaddafi declared that a state of "war with no limits" existed between Libya and the members of the coalition. Despite this, he sent a three-page letter to US President Barack Obama imploring him to "annul a wrong and mistaken action" and stop striking Libyan targets, repeatedly referring to him as "our son" and blaming the uprising on the terrorist group al Qaeda.

Protests beginning in Benghazi on 15 February 2011 sparked tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrations throughout Libya in the days that followed, mirroring the turmoil in the Arab world. The escalating unrest represented an unprecedented challenge to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's 41-year reign, and he responded by ordering Libyan security forces to move against protestors in a harsh and violent crackdown. By 20 February, protestors had taken control of Benghazi, as demonstrations spread across the country, beginning to coalesce into an anti-Gaddafi rebel force (Birch, 2011).

The Obama administration condemned Gaddafi's use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrators on 20 February, as did the European Union (EU), calling for an end to the violence.The escalating conflict in Libya marked the unrest as the most deadly of any of the uprisings sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East. Gaddafi urged his supporters to attack those that challenged his rule, prompting Libya's deputy United Nations (UN) ambassador, Ibrahim Dabbashi, to reject Gaddafi on 21 February and say that the speech would trigger genocide. Dabbashi also claimed that the regime was using mercenaries to attack demonstrators, called for a no-fly zone, and requested that the Security Council refer the Gaddafi regime to the International Criminal Court (ICC).Libya's representative to the League of Arab States (LAS) also resigned (Eleiba, 2011).

On 22 February, Gaddafi vowed to track and kill protestors õhouse by houseö as he moved to tighten his grip on Tripoli while the eastern part of Libya appeared to be slipping beyond his control. The UN Security Council (UNSC) met in a closed session to discuss Libya, and issued a statement calling for õan immediate end to the violence.ö(Fahim, 2012)In an emergency meeting in Cairo on 22 February the LAS released a statement condemning the Libyan regime's use of force against civilians and suspended Libya's participation in the organization (Mozgovaya, 2011)The following day the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council met in a closed-door meeting on Libya with Libya's ambassador defending the government's use of force. The communiqué, viewed as more cautious in tone than the LAS and UN responses, nonetheless õstrongly condemn(ed) the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peace protesters.ö Unlike the LAS, the AU stopped short of expelling Libya. Gaddafi served as AU chairman in 2009 and Libya is among five nations that contribute nearly two-thirds of the AU's funds (Heinlein, 2011).

By 22 February, governments rushed to evacuate their citizens from Libya as the security situation there continued to deteriorate, though they differed in their assessments of

the level of threat, and in their evacuation plans. For example, while the Germans advised all their citizens to depart Libya, the Italians initially expressed a willingness to help all who wished to leave, but did not require them to depart. Some countries chartered military and civilian planes, while others deployed military ships to rescue stranded citizens (Rachel and Arsu, 2011).There was also a divide between citizens of wealthier nations, who benefited from the rescue efforts of their home governments, and migrant workers from poorer nations, whose home countries lacked the resources to coordinate their rescue. While China evacuated its 30,000 citizens rapidly, India struggled to do the same with far fewer people. Governments scrambled to evacuate their nationals, and some were criticized for the shortcomings in their efforts. The British government, for one, came under fire for Britainøs difficulties in evacuating its citizens, prompting an apology from British Prime Minister David Cameron (Wintour andWatt,2011).

On 22 February, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton described the Libyan governmentøs use of violence against its citizens as õcompletely unacceptable.ö She added that the UNSC was an appropriate venue to consider further action against Libya.US president Barack Obama demanded an end to the violence in Libya in a speech the next evening. French president Nicolas Sarkozy proposed on 23 February that the EU õswiftly adopt concrete sanctions to ensure that all those involved in the ongoing violence are aware that they will have to assume the consequences of their actions.ö His proposal found support from Britain and Germany, although Italy, Malta and Cyprus were said to be reluctant about sanctions, because of business relationships in Libya and concern that ongoing violence in Libya would cause a wave of immigrants to seek refuge in Europe. Italy in particular has historical and commercial ties to Libya, which resulted in hand-wringing in Rome as to what approach to take toward the Gaddafi regime. After stating on 19 February that he did not wish to õdisturbö Gaddafi, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi shifted course on 21

February, condemning the õunacceptableö use of force by Gaddafiøs security forces (Krause-Jackson, 2011).

The US levelled unilateral sanctions against Libya and shuttered its embassy in Tripoli on 25 February. At a UNSC meeting on peace and security in Africa, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon encouraged the UNSC to act on Libya, saying that õit is time for the Security Council to consider concrete actionö and end the killing that had led to more than 1,000 deaths.[18] And France and Britain called on the international organization to approve an arms embargo and sanctions. During a special meeting of the alliance, NATO said it was ready to help evacuate refugees. The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) convened a special session in Geneva, recommending Libyaøs suspension and ordering a commission of inquiry (Arsu and Erlanger, 2011).It was the first special session in the Counciløs history devoted to a situation in the territory of one of its members. NATO held an emergency meeting in Brussels, but took no action, with its secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen indicating that it had no plans to intervene. French president Nicolas Sarkozy visited Turkey the same day, and met with criticism from Ankara about Europeøs limited reaction to the unfolding refugee crisis in Libya and other parts of North Africa. During a joint news conference with Turkish president Abdullah Gul, Sarkozy called for Gaddafi to resign and be tried before the ICC. Sarkozy also dismissed the possibility of a military intervention in Libya, asking: õWhat kind of credibility would such intervention bring to the people there?ö (Arsu and Erlanger, 2011).

Ahead of the UNSC meeting on 26 February to consider imposing international sanctions, American, French, German and British diplomats distributed a draft resolution to refer the conflict in Libya to the ICC. Britain, France and Canada also closed their embassies in Tripoli.[24] Hours before the UNSC meeting; Turkeyøs Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan argued that international sanctions would do greater harm to Libyaøs people than to

Gaddafi, adding: "We call on the international community to act with conscience, justice, laws and universal human values – not out of oil concerns."Yet it was Erdogan who was a personal recipient of the al-Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights. Moreover, prior to the conflict in Libya, there were 30,000 Turks working on $1.5 billion worth of construction jobs for Libya's government; Ankara had an economic rationale for keeping up good relations with the Gaddafi regime (Cook, 2011).

On the evening of 26 February, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1970, which using the language of "Responsibility to Protect" – demanded an immediate end to the violence, levelled sanctions against Gaddafi and advisers close to him and referred Libya to the ICC, calling for a war crimes investigation by the body into "widespread and systematic attacks" against Libyan civilians. The unanimous support for UNSC Resolution 1970 was of note. It seemed to indicate that emerging powers like China were moving away from an international posture of non-interference. On the American side, US president Barack Obama said during a phone call with German chancellor Angela Merkel following the vote that Gaddafi should relinquish power, the most forceful statement a US official had made against Gaddafi by that point in the conflict (Wyatt, 2011).

The following day, Italy's foreign minister suspended a nonaggression treaty with Libya, because the Libyan state "no longer exists."The decision was perceived as allowing Italy to play a role in any future peacekeeping operations, or serve as a base of operations for any intervention against the Libyan regime. Clinton described how the US was in contact with Libyan rebels to "offer any kind of assistance." The Libyan rebels announced the formation of the Interim Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi. US, European and NATO officials also held talks on 27 February that included discussions about – and planning for – the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya. Meanwhile, the Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees deemed the Libyan crisis a humanitarian emergency.

On 28 February, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton confirmed after a special meeting of the UNHRC in Geneva that the US and its allies were discussing the imposition of a no-fly zone: õNo option is off the table,ö she said, adding õthat includes a no-fly zone.ö British prime minister David Cameron seemed to send a similar message: õWe must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own peopleö he said, õIn that context I have asked the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Defense Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone.öThe Pentagon also began moving military aircraft and ships closer to the Libyan coast, in anticipation of a role in a humanitarian relief effort in Libya, where refugees were fleeing Libyaøs conflict-plagued cities. The EU announced further sanctions, including an arms embargo. While the sanctions were more stringent than those agreed to in UNSC Resolution 1970, they were less so than US unilateral measures.

Also on 28 February, Franceøs Prime Minister Francois Fillon voiced doubts about an international military intervention in Libya, which Western diplomats asserted that France opposed during NATO discussions and at the UN. Fillon argued that a no-fly zone over Libya would require a UNSC resolution, as well as NATO involvement. According to Fillon, õIt would be necessary to involve NATO, and I think that has to be thought about. Should NATO get involved in a civil war to the south of the Mediterranean? It is a question that at least merits some reflection before being launched.ö

US secretary of defense Robert Gates minimized the possibility of a US military intervention in Libya in remarks on 1 March, pointing to a lack of consensus within NATO, among other reasons. This appeared to be a retreat of sorts from Clintonøs forceful comments the week before that a no-fly zone in Libya was under õactive consideration.ö Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the idea of a no-fly zone, calling it an õabsurdity.ö

Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov also rejected the possibility. And asked to comment on a no-fly zone, a French government spokesman said: "It's not a priority. The priority is humanitarian aid; it's no longer diplomacy."Cameron seemed to retreat from his earlier proclamations about a no-fly zone, focusing instead on employing EU "soft power" in Libya; his aides said the no-fly zone was only a "contingency plan." Cameron told British officials to team up with officials in Paris to craft proposals for an EU response in anticipation of an emergency summit in Brussels on 11 March. And on 1 March, the UN General Assembly removed Libya from the UNHRC, in a move adopted by consensus in the Assembly. Obama repeated his call for Gaddafi to immediately relinquish power on 3 March, and said that a no-fly zone was one of the options under consideration to hasten Gaddafi's departure. On 5 March, in a letter to the General Assembly, the TNC declared itself the "sole representative of all Libya," and called for the international community to protect the Libyan people "without any direct military intervention on Libyan soil."

On 7 March, the British government gave a detailed explanation of an embarrassing British mission that was intended to strengthen ties with Libyan opposition leaders, but instead resulted in eight Britons from SAS and MI6 being detained on a military base in eastern Libya for two days. The botched mission heightened British fears about both a loss of British credibility, and damage done to UK Prime Minister David Cameron's efforts to rally support in the EU against the Gaddafi regime. As the no-fly zone debate continued in world capitals, Obama reiterated on 7 March that the US was in talks with NATO allies about military options in Libya, and also authorized an additional $15 million for relief operations there. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) "demanded that the UN Security Council take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly-zone over Libya," and said that "those responsible should be brought to justice."The GCC declaration in support of a no-fly zone was the first major foreign policy decision taken by the regional body since

1991. It was also the first regional bloc to demand a no-fly zone for Libya, creating momentum toward international action.

In late February 2011, after initial hesitations, NATO allies, acting under a mandate from the United Nations (UN) Security Council, attacked the regime and began a seven month, low-intensity air campaign that eventually resulted in the demise of the regime. In August, Tripoli fell, and in October, Qaddafi was captured and killed by rebel forces. After its war, Libya had a good deal going for it compared with other post conflict countries. The rebels had been largely unified, democratic political transitions in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt looked conducive to Libyaøs transition to peace, and Qaddafi had been utterly defeated. There seemed to be little risk that a pro-regime insurgency would develop, as it had, for example, in Iraq in the wake of Saddam Husseinøs defeat.

The fact that Libya is a quarter of the size of Iraq in population and many times wealthier than Afghanistan also played to its favour. It had oil to sell and was close to Europe, which together should have helped ensure it did not drop completely off the radar in western capitals. Damage to its economic infrastructure was relatively light and even if regional, tribal, and other tensions existed, Libyaøs civil war differed from those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria, and other cases where ethnic or sectarian fighting had pitted citizens against each other in a fury of violence. This should have made post war reconciliation easier. There was in fact fairly little violence immediately after the fall of Tripoli, and most indicators pointed to high levels of public support for the transition to peace. In part because Libyaøs outlook seemed so positive after the war, the international strategy for post-conflict stabilization differed from that taken in all of NATOøs prior military interventions in one important way: No peacekeeping or stabilization forces were deployed after the war. In general, the international footprint in Libya would be very limited, by historical standards. A small UN mission was given responsibility for coordinating international post-conflict

stabilization support. Although many countries, including the United States, sent diplomats to help with the transition from war to peace, Libyans were largely left to fend for themselves. (Gumuchian, Marie-Louise, and Hadeel Al Shalchi, 2012)

The situation since then has been tumultuous and violent. Although there were some positive developments, including successful elections in July 2012, these were overshadowed by mounting violence that stunted efforts to establish functioning political institutions through which the Libyan people could realize their aspirations for self-rule. Jihadist groups, some linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an al Qaeda affiliate meanwhile, made use of the security vacuum to establish a foothold nationwide. Libya today is thus in a very precarious situation, as are conditions in the broader Sahel and Maghreb regions. Jihadist activities in Mali, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt do not favour a rapid improvement in the outlook, although they are also not a reason to abandon Libya altogether. Indeed, these threats are one of the reasons the international community needs to take a more proactive approach to Libya's own evolution.

On one level, post-conflict Libya looks more and more like a cautionary tale of the inherent challenges post war societies face. But given the very limited international contribution to post-conflict reconstruction, it should not be misrepresented as evidence of the futility of post war reconstruction efforts themselves, much less of the initial military intervention or military intervention altogether. Political climate in the United States and many allied countries is unfortunately primed, after the challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, to misinterpret the Libya experience in precisely this way with potentially adverse consequences for policy in Libya and future cases, such as Syria. The dissolution of the Gaddafi regime marks zero hour for a new Libya. There is a real danger that in the absence of the former leader's authoritarian grip, the country will experience a high level of

instability. However, the actions of the Transitional Council so far, as well as Libyaøs basic socio-economic parameters, give reason to hope for a successful transition.

However, the õnewö Libya is confronted with tremendous challenges. In addition to addressing the humanitarian emergency, the war damage, and economic reconstruction, the question of political reform is of particular urgency. In view of Gaddafiøs momentous legacy, the heterogeneity of the opposition, and the lack of functioning state structures, many observers believe that the country may be faced with lasting instability. The main concern is that the disunity of the opposition will trigger new fighting, resulting in a fragmentation of Libya or even a complete breakdown of all central power similar to Somalia ó with predictable negative effects for regional and European security. Although this development cannot be excluded, there are several factors to suggest that Libyaøs new beginning can be a success. Western countries can contribute to a positive outcome, provided that they are ready to rethink and adapt their role.

Libya is the third Arab country in which an authoritarian regime has been overthrown by internal popular pressure. However, when compared with the situations in Tunisia and Egypt, it is obvious that the political transition in Libya must begin from a fundamentally different starting point. While the political transformation in Cairo and Tunis was ultimately brought about by the decision of the armed forces not to oppose the will of the people, or even to extend active support to the uprising, the upheaval in Tripoli is the result of a NATO-backed military success of the rebel opposition as part of a civil war. Compared to the other two cases, the transition process in Tripoli will be marked less by an antagonism between revolting masses and the remnants of the former oligarchic ruling class.

Another difference is that in Libya ó unlike in its Arab neighbours, the regime and the state were practically indistinguishable. The country has no constitution that might serve as a foundation, nor does it have stable or reliable institutions on which a new order could be

based. Furthermore, the comprehensive repression apparatus of the old regime prevented the establishment of any meaningful civil society elements.

This state of play in Libya, together with the lack of security, the impression of deep political, social, and ethnic rifts within the society, and the looming conflicts over the distribution of oil resources, nourishes concerns about a progressive destabilisation of the country. However, pessimistic assessments of Libya's future tend to ignore structural factors and current developments that give rise to hope for a positive outcome of the transition. Starting over with a clean slate also has advantages. Unlike its revolutionary neighbours, Libya has in many ways shaken off the cumbersome burden of the past and thus has the chance to build a stable foundation for a free and just society from scratch. The new order yet to be constructed can also draw on a reservoir of legitimacy generated by the collective experience of the war against Gaddafi.

At least to some degree, the lack of central political institutions in Libya is offset by the existence of a National Transitional Council, the de-facto government of the liberated areas. The Council had already constituted itself in February 2011 in Cyrenaica, the eastern heartland of the revolt, and now constitutes the nucleus of a transitional government for the entire country. It was formally responsible for the implementation of the military strategy leading to the capture of the capital Tripoli. Despite its heterogeneous composition, which includes representatives of diverse opposition groups, early regime defectors, and regional actors, the Council has succeeded in rapidly restoring public order and provisions in the eastern part of the country, which was liberated at an early stage (Gumuchian, Marie-Louise, and Hadeel Al Shalchi, 2012).

The end of the Gaddafi regime has obviously deprived the Council of a unifying element. Although disagreements between secularists and Islamists or between former regime supporters and the younger revolutionary generation seem unavoidable, they need not

necessarily be carried out violently. The opposition's plans for transition, which have already been worked out in detail, anticipate elections for a transitional parliament within eight months and the elaboration of a constitution that would then be voted upon in a referendum. A key condition for successful transition towards the aspired free and democratic order will be the integration of the broad range of political and social actors in the new Libya. Despite the obvious widespread popular support for the rebels, it must be assumed that there is a significant minority of adherents of the old regime. Their medium-term integration into the new system is a fundamental prerequisite for stability in the new Libya. On the one hand, in view of the egregious human rights violations of the old regime, calls for punishment and justice must be heeded but at the same time, the new leaders must avoid giving the impression that the former Gaddafi minions are being persecuted mainly in order to exact revenge, especially since their technocratic and administrative knowledge will be needed in the future.

In the light of the above, our preoccupation in this study is to critically assess the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya with emphases on Libya's democratization process and economic relations as regards the West.

1.2   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The politics of personal interest has long been the nature of leadership in most Third World countries, Libya is not exempted. This was evident in Gaddafi's sit-tight regimes style. The politics of interests has produced autocratic leaders in the country. However, Gaddafi's regime and his unfriendly regime style were accompanied with pockets of violence, anger and protests; the problem of not meeting the needs of the people has been a chronological issue. Thus, this ugly situation in Libya climaxed with most unprecedented uprising that brought down reign of Gaddafi.

Since the 2011 overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, Libya's path has been tumultuous. Despite a number of advantages compared with other post-conflict societies, progress on political, economic, diplomacy and security fronts has fallen far behind, generating frustration and threatening the recovery altogether. Libya has teetered on the brink of a relapse into civil war on more than one occasion in the past year. In the absence of a functioning state, jihadist groups have made inroads. The broader Sahel and Maghreb regions, meanwhile, are becoming more and more fragile and southern Libya verges on becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda–linked groups recently chased from Mali by French military forces. The right international approach to Libya could nevertheless still help avert a more serious breakdown and real damage to U.S. and European regional and global interests above all counterterrorism and the stability of world energy markets.

Having promoted global radicalism and regional rejectionism, engaged in terrorism, and pursued weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for years, Libya has shifted away from its õrogue stateö policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie terrorism case and by abandoning its programs for the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (Castillo, 2008:18). The key policy changes started in 1999, when Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects for trial in The Hague, and culminated in 2003 with the settlement of the Lockerbie case that August and particularly Libya's December 19 announcement that it had agreed to abandon its WMD programs and allow international inspections. The debate over who deserves credit for these important changes in Libyan policy is a lively one politically and a challenging one analytically. Among the questions that analysts have sought to answer are: to what extent was Libyan leader Muammar Qadda intimidated by the George W. Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq and the broader Bush doctrine of pre-emptive force? How important was diplomacy, especially the secret talks between Libya and the United States that started late in Bill Clinton's administration

and continued into the Bush administration, with the British playing a significant role? What other factors, including Libya's internal politics and economy, came into play? And what are the lessons for dealing with other terrorism-supporting, WMD-seeking, and otherwise aggressive states?

Positions in this debate have been sharply staked out.

õI hope to never have to use force,ö President Bush stated, õbut speaking clearly and sending messages that we mean what we say, weøve affected the world in a positive way. Look at Libya. Libya was a threat. Libya is now peacefully dismantling its weapons programs. Libya understood that America and others will enforce [the Bush] doctrine.ö (Balaam & Veseth, 2001:6-7)

Vice President Dick Cheney cast Libyaøs concessions on WMD as õone of the great by-products of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan,ö stressing that just õdays after we captured Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qadda came forward and announced that he was going to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States.ö Others found this timing less significant and gave more credit to diplomacy. These included key Clinton officials such as Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, who led the 1999ó2000 secret talks and contended that õLibyan disarmament did not require a war with Iraqö; Bush administration officials such as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, for whom Husseinøs capture õdidnøt have anything to doö with Libyaøs concessions; and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who stressed that õproblems of proliferation can, with good will, be tackled through discussion and engagementö and that õcountries can abandon programs voluntarily and peacefully.ö(Balaam & Veseth, 2001:6-7). Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem asserted that his government based its decision on an independent assessment of its national interests, on õa careful study of the countryøs future in all its domains, conforming to the aspirations of the

Libyan leadership and people.ö Qaddaøs son Seif el-Islam el-Qadda said that the December 19 agreement was a õwin-win dealö for both sides: õ[Our] leader believed that if this problem was solved, Libya would emerge from the international isolation and become a negotiator and work with the big powers to change the Arab situation.öThis debate is enormously significant in its own right. For close to thirty years, Libya has been a major concern for the United States, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the international community more generally. The Libya case also has significance in two broader respects. First, it bears upon other key policy debates about WMD proliferation and rogue states, particularly as manifested in such pressing cases as Iran and North Korea as well as in the context of continuing debates about U.S. intervention in Iraq. Second, the Libya case is relevant to debates over theories of force and diplomacy, particularly work on coercive diplomacy (Burrows, 2005:481).

Coercive diplomacy can be a õbeguilingö strategy, as Alexander George and William Simons warn, seeming easier to do than analysis shows it to be and then it has proven to be.8 As the strongest case of coercive diplomacy success since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Libya case provides useful insights for more general propositions about the scope and limits of this balancing of force and diplomacy that õcan help bridge the gap between theory and practice.ö

Contributing on tribes and politics during and after Gaddafi, Von Rohr (2011) observed that despite a belated realization of the importance of the tribes in Libyan social and political affairs, tribal dynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper place as a major theme of discussion and analysis during and after the civil war. The political role of tribes cannot be understated in determining the future shape of Libya. New political elites are currently discussing the feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes in the future political system, while tensions along tribal lines remain a risk factor likely to complicate political transition in post-Gaddafi Libya (Von Rohr, 2011).

There are more than 100 tribes and clans across Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab, Berber, and African. But it is important to stress that only a few are truly influential, and have dominated the political and social scene for decades. The leading tribes are the following:

- **Warfala**: the largest tribe in the country, with members spread across different Libyan cities, but considering Bani Walid as its home base;

- **Magarha**: the second most populous of Libyan tribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadi al-Shati and Sebha;

- **Zintan**: concentrated in the Nafusa mountains region in the western part of Libya. Most of its members belong to the Amazigh minority;

- **Obeidat**: located in the northeastern cities;

- **Zawiya**: located in the oil-rich southeast;

- **Qadhadhfa**: Gaddafi's own tribe, based in Sirte and Sebha regions (Anderson, 1990:288-302).

With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic, there are few studies available that provide up-to-date detailed information on the tribes. One of these few was written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at the University of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose empirical study described the tribe as a still important element shaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areas but also in urban centers (Obeidi, 2001).This runs counter to common expectations that the role of the tribe would have diminished among the youth or in the major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference to tribe remains current and popular among young urban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. In particular, the role of Libya's tribes in allocating socio-economic benefits and security in the absence of effective state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism across all Libyan regions (Al-Achibi, 2010).

Making sense of the ambivalent political situation of the tribes requires a brief review of Libya's political history since its independence. The relation between tribes and politics was cemented in the early days of Libya's struggle for independence. The power base for the rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance between the Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes; the tribal nobility constituted a significant part of the King's cabinet, serving as advisors and confidants (Hajjar, 1980:181-200).

Over the course of the years following Gaddafi's arrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he made attempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in place by the previous regime. Gaddafi replaced tribal notables who had occupied administrative positions at regional level with young technocrats (Hajjar, 1980).The undermining and marginalization of the role of the tribes in the early days of Gaddafi's revolutionary regime was driven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tactically, the aim was to remove any remaining elements loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nationalism was a strong ideological driver to move on from tribalism to a political system ready to embrace not only all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Gaddafi for years saw himself as successor to the late Egyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arab nationalist movement. Thus, when Gaddafi referred to õthe tribeö in his Green Book, the distillation of his political views published in stages throughout the 1970sô and omnipresent required reading in Libya under Gaddafiô it was without any distinct political connotation. Gaddafi envisaged the tribe as a key component of Libyan society in the same manner as the family, providing natural social protection to its members (Fathaly and Plamer, 1980:247-261).

Fathaly and Plamer (1980) assert that, this attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Libyan politics did not succeed for long. Several factors pushed Gaddafi to use the tribes politically in order to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most important of these factors was a disagreement over key policy orientations and rifts among comrades of the

Revolutionary Command Council, the supreme executive and legislative body that governed Libya after the 1969 coup and during the 1970s.In an open letter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one of Gaddafiøs close confidants who had served in several important positions in the 1970s before defecting to Egypt in 1975, described Gaddafiøs manipulation of the tribal factions. He noted that the tribal infighting of the past had been buried after independence, but that Gaddafi had revived these social divisions again in order to strengthen his grip on power (Anderson, 1990:77).

Furthermore, Vandewalle (2006:149) noted that a number of attempts to seize power prompted Gaddafi to accentuate tribalization still further. Most significant among these was the 1993 rebellion and coup attempt by military forces in Misratah, which led to incidents in other Libyan cities including al-Zawiya and Sirte. In addition to arresting a number of army officers, Gaddafi responded by turning to his tribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposition.Gaddafi appointed several blood relatives and in-laws to key security and military positions, including Brigadier Ahmad Qadhaf al-Damm and Abdullah Sanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively. Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic positions including, finally, special envoy and representative of Qadhafi to some Arab countries. Sanoussi had an extended tenure as head of internal security. Several members of Qadhafiøs tribe also took senior positions in the armed forces (Vandewalle, 2006:149)

However, manipulating tribes and building informal tribal alliances thus became an important part of Gaddafiøs internal political maneuvering. The small size of the Gaddafi tribe, and its light political and economic weight, led Gaddafi to seek informal and tacit alliances with other key tribes in the country such as the Warfala and Magarha (Mattes, 2004). Nepotism and favoritism became the pillars sustaining Gaddafiøs informal political al-liances. Appointing family members and key figures from allied tribes in important and leading positions was the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by the regime. Gaddafi

strengthened his power by effectively playing the tribes against each other, promoting one tribe over the other in different parts of the country (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:21).

In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in public life was reinforced still further with the establishment of a nationwide system of People's Social Leadership Committees. Tribal and regional notables were the main members of these new committees, which took a number of social and bureaucratic functions over from the central state (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:21).These Committees provided welfare services to the local population, and served as a judicial forum to settle local conflicts. They also oversaw the implementation of socioeconomic programs in their own regions and localities.

The military provides a case study demonstrating the importance of tribalism in Gaddafi's political system. In addition to the appointments of relatives and members of loyal tribes to key military positions in response to failed attempts to topple the regime, particularly the one in 1993, Gaddafi created a parallel security system made up of several special military units that were assigned to persons of trust, including his sons. These units, known as "Kataeb al-Amnia" ("Security Brigades"), were well-trained and equipped compared to the regular army.27 The best-known unit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade, known as the "Khamis Brigade," led by Gaddafi's son Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi, a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and revolts against Gaddafi's regime over the previous four decades as well as being at the source of the most recent one, which eventually ended Gaddafi's rule (Rahim and Kataib, 2011).In the event, Gaddafi's security calculations were proved entirely correct. In the early days of the February 17 revolution, several senior army officers defected and joined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff Abu-Bakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amnia constituted the main fighting elements opposing the rebels over the 8 months of the civil war.

The civil war period saw tribal leaders convening to discuss the security and political situation. A number of loyalty statements were issued, in favor either of Gaddafi's regime or of the rebels. Tribal notables were keen to show their importance on the political scene, and that they were still a political force not to be ignored (Sheridan, 2011).Furthermore, in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delegations travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatari rulers for their support during the fighting. These visits have continued during the establishment of the new Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nationalists and a political elite aspiring to build a modern and unified democracy (Mahumud, 2011).

Pier (2011), examines the key transitional challenges that lie ahead for the interim government in moving from the old order to a new, possibly democratic, system. He also highlighted the problem of armed groups in post-Gaddafi Libya and the challenges they represent to the authority of the new political leadership and to the country's stability. Stephen (2011), focus on the daunting task of building the fundamental pillars of democracy in a country that for more than four decades was run by an opaque political system, with limited civil institutions and no political parties. As a corollary, Stephen (2011) opined that drawing up a constitution for Libya will not be straightforward. Political infighting between secularists and Islamists has already surfaced on varying issues of political significance to Libya's future, including vital elements such as the structure and religious identity of the state.

Ensuring continued security in the broad sense is a critical concern for the new regime in building the foundation on which advances can be made in the political and socioeconomic spheres. Yet, at the time of this writing, the new interim government remains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and the inability to enforce security is still a critical challenge (Chayadhmi, 2011). Threats to security arising directly from the remaining

supporters of the Gaddafi regime receded after the arrest of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi.Saif al-Islam had been a source of concern to Libya's new political leadership and to the international community, because of his ability to seek contacts with his own tribe and other loyal groups to launch attacks on the new government(Chayadhmi, 2011).

In addition to his importance within the old regime as detailed above, Saif al-Islam was his father's õsecrets keeper,ö which afforded him intimate knowledge of the power dynamics of the regime. It would thus have been easy for him to gather support, particularly among those Gaddafi loyalists who suffered from reprisal atrocities perpetuated by the rebel forces during the civil war and after the death of Gaddafi. He could have easily exploited revenge calls from the Warfala tribe in Bani Walid against the National Transitional Council (NTC) and rebel forces (Chayadhmi, 2011).

Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by the NTC was intended to provide security in the capital of Libya, and to be the first step in setting up a professional national army. But the Council, led by commander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is not even able to exercise control over military affairs within Tripoli, let alone across the country (Gerard, 2011).

Hundreds of armed fighters belonging to different militias moved to Tripoli in September 2011. Dozens of separate armed groups took control of Tripoli's key neighborhoods; as well as strategic infrastructure, such as ports, airports, and border crossings across the country. The militias still patrol the capital, setting up their own checkpoints in defiance of the government-appointed authorities. For example, the Zintan militia is in control of the city's airport and other areas within Tripoli. With the aim of maximizing their political power, some brigades have extended control to landmark buildings

within Tripoli, such as those containing the diplomatic representations of important countries (Walts, 2012).

Consequently, Walts (2012) maintains that the large number of distinct militias arose during the civil war because of the regional and tribal divisions within the country. The rebel forces were not all unified under a single command during the fights against pro-Gaddafi forces.Even in eastern Libya, where the NTC controlled the most organized rebel force, relations between rebel groups were far from cordial, and some militias continued their intention to act independently. The assassination of rebel leader General Abdelfattah Younes on July 28, 2011, by a radical faction of the rebel forces highlighted discord among the rebels, which constituted a major challenge to NTC cohesion. This issue remains unresolved, as the details of Younesøs murder have still not been released, nor any suspects named.

Nonetheless, Munoz (2012) argues that the militias, initially an instrument of liberation, very swiftly became a source of concern to the NTC and to the residents of Tripoli. Some of the militias are accused directly of the violence and vandalism that took place after the fall of the capital, and frequent clashes between members of the different brigades have become a norm there. During the first week of December 2011, Tripoliøs inhabitants protested, demanding the departure of armed militias from their city. A few days after these protests, gun battles erupted between members of the Zintan militia, who aimed to demonstrate their independence from the interim government and its institutions, and followers of Brigadier Khalifa Haftar, a commanding officer of the yet-to-be-built Libyan National Army.Renewed fighting between militias in the first week of January 2012 led NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil to warn of the risks of another civil war.

Munoz (2012) contend that all of these factors cause continuing significant disruption to the lives of ordinary citizens, and dealing with the issue is a stated priority for the interim government. The establishment of the National Armyøs monopoly on the legitimate use of

force is seen as the solution. Mahmud Jibril, the former interim head of the NTCøs executive board, who resigned on October 23, 2011, listed a series of options to solve the issue of the rebel brigades. He suggested that the thousands of rebel fightersô most of whom joined the revolution with no military trainingô would be offered the chance to join the army or the Interior Ministry, which oversees the police. Another option would be to form Libyan security companies, which would help guard businesses and oil facilities (Munoz, 2012).

Conversely, Mansour (2012) argues that most of the brigades are not willing to hand over their weapons or to leave Tripoli. They claim that their armed presence is necessary for the security of the state at this crucial moment, since they maintain security in view of the potential for insurgencies led by the remnants of the Gaddafi regime. In addition, the militias are concerned about their marginalization from the new political order learning from observation of the experiences of neighboring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) where the youth movements that led the revolutions were subsequently excluded from power. Maintaining an armed presence in Tripoli is to be used as political leverage to secure a role in the new Libya.

Without the formation of a new army and the collecting of weapons, security will remain loose, and the NTC will remain a political formation without levers to implement its will. The inability to act and to control state affairs has been a source of frustration to many of the NTCøs members. Mahmud Jibril publicly listed several reasons for his resignation, including his lack of control not only of military but also of civilian affairs. In an interview with the pan-Arab news channel Al-Arabiya, he cited an example to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of NTC control: After the liberation of Tripoli, militias went into public institutions, banks, oil entities and other public companies and changed their boards of directors, without consultation with the NTC or its executive office. Jibriløs frustration also stemmed from the lack of strong support for secularists, compared to the Islamic factions of the NTC, which have the backing of Qatar. Decisions were made with no clarity as to who

was behind them or how they were going to be implemented, such as the introduction of visa requirements. The current interim government has very limited administrative capacity to perform its duties as a sovereign and effective state. At the time of this writing, the interim governmentøs precise strategy with relation to the armed groups remains unclear. A number of attempts to persuade the armed groups to hand over their weapons appear to have convinced NTC leader Mustapha Abdejalil that the demilitarizing of these groups may not be as easy as first thought. He then decided to delay the collection of arms for the foreseeable future, in order, paradoxically, to avoid a renewed breakout of political violence (Mansour, 2012)

Yet, as time passes, the risk of increased low-level violence and criminal activities increases. The armed groups require sources of income to maintain their stay in Tripoli. The question then becomes how they are to generate the money. It is considered probable that at least some of the militias will become involved in further illegal activities, such as levying protection fees, trading in narcotics, or kidnapping for ransom. The security risks of Libyaøs uncontrolled armed militias are not restricted to within the countryøs national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts, clashes between militias or between militias and gov-ernment authorities threaten to undermine the security of neighboring countries and the international community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee flows to Tunisia, Egypt, and across the Mediterranean to Italy and beyond, and disruption to oil productionô depriving the international market of Libyan oil once again and harming the economic interests of U.S. and European companies (Mcleary, 2011:32).

Furthermore, the current lack of a capable national army leaves Libya an open playing field to be exploited by international criminal groups active in the region. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or other Jihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and Europe are expected to establish training camps in uncontrolled Libyan territory, as well as developing

links with some of the militias to acquire arms. During several months of fighting, the revolutionary fighters had access to weapon storages. Late-2011 saw media reporting the trafficking of Libyan arms in the Sahel region (Mcleary, 2011:32).

Uncontrolled stocks of weapons include systems that could be of immediate interest to terrorist groups and other entities hostile to the United States and its allies, such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including SA-24 Igla (GRINCH) missiles. Securing these systems should be treated as an immediate priority for both the Libyan government and its foreign partners (Krauss, 2011). Armed militias are already directly affecting relations with Libya's neighbors. In early-December 2011, as a response to continuous assaults on its citizens and territorial integrity by Libyan armed groups, Tunisia closed two crossing points and deployed additional military personnel to control its borders with Libya.

Sullivan, McQuinn and Purushotham (2011:490-492) posit that the ambitions of the interim government are constrained by its lack of authority and capacity to influence the armed groups. But they are also inhibited by the lack of a clear security reform strategy that includes specific measures for the disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of legacy armaments in general. The sooner the interim government launches its security reform plan, the better the chances of success for political transition. Assistance to the interim authorities in implementing security reform in order to mitigate the risks outlined above should therefore be a key priority of the United States and other foreign partners.

Charting a new course for the political transition of Libya, McQuinn and Purushotham (2011) suggest that the recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in political transition. In both countries, post-revolution consolidation was not peaceful.

The ousting of former leaders and the establishment of interim political bodies were not sufficient to appease public anger. The Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as the guardians of their popular revolutions, regularly took to the streets presenting political demands. Growing disenchantment with the political performance of the Military Council in Egypt has led to new riots and political violence 10 months after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.

The circumstances of each country define precisely how political instability will manifest itself. This phenomenon is not limited to North Africa nor the Arab world: Examples are available from Europe, including the case of Portugal, whose transition toward democracy was full of societal tensions for 2 years following the military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only when the constitution was finally enacted and the first elections were held (Sullivan, McQuinn and Purushotham, 2011).

In the case of Libya, the experience will be shaped by the lack of ordinary political institutions, a long civil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In September 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its political roadmap for the transitional period, with a program resembling Tunisia's post-revolution transition. The Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its first elections for a constituent assembly in June 2012.Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the country's constitution and hold parliamentary elections in 1 year's time a very ambitious program that perhaps fails to take into account the special situation of Libya.

There are many hurdles that are likely to make the transition lengthy and difficult, if not prevent its success altogether. Libyans could discover that they are facing an incomplete, õrotten-doorö transition. Political scientists and experts in political transitions Steven Levitsky and Lucan define rotten-door transitions as those that õoccur in a context of state, party, and civil society, weakness [where] new governments are often filled with elites from the old regime.ö(Levitsky and Lucan, 2010:25-26). They argue that the collapse of autocratic

regimes often does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results in little real institutional change, Levitsky and Way argue, with post-transition governments often being led by politicians with no strong commitment to democracy. Although the overthrow of Gaddafiøs regime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents a prime example of a state that lacks political parties, state institutions, and civil society.

In the light of the above and to address the issue of politics and diplomacy of post Libya Gaddafi that scholars such as Fletcher (2009), Bruce (2002), Zapita (2010), Nayiri (2010), Fathaly and Plamer (1980), Al-Achibi (2010), Anderson (1990), Obeidi (2001), Mattes (2004), Vandewalle (2006), Von Rohr (2011), Otman and Karlberg (2007) Rahim and Kataib (2011) and several others have studied the issues and challenges of politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya. However, while these groups of scholars and existing literature on the politics and diplomacy of post Libya Gaddafi largely succeeded in providing insight and descriptive analysis on the subject matter, it contains neither a thorough discussion of the post Libya politics and diplomacy nor its relations to the democratic process in Libya and diplomatic relations with the west.

Against this background, therefore, attempt is made here to transcend the existing analyses to closely interrogate and critically assess the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya; meanwhile, our task and thrust of the study is to establish the link between politics and democratization in Libya; as well as the diplomacy and economic relations with the west within the period under study.

Therefore, on the strength of the above, we state the following questions for further investigation:

- Did the post Gaddafi Libya politics enhance democratization in Libya?

- Did the post Gaddafi Libya diplomacy enhance economic relations with the west?

1.3   OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study has both broad and specific objectives. To this end, the broad objective aims generally at arriving at a rigorous, systematic and in-depth explanation and understanding of the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya. Specifically, the study is oriented towards achieving the understated objectives:

- To ascertain whether the politics of post Gaddafi Libya enhanced democratization process and peace in Libya

- To determine whether the diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya enhanced economic relations with the west.

1.4   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study is at two principal levels: practical and theoretical. Practically, this study will be of importance to the policy makers in Libya. The study will equip us with facts on the conditions that instigate the formation of National Transition Committee in Libya. It will help to derive new strategies to enhancing even, reciprocal and mutual relations between Libya and the international community. Finally, the study shall be beneficial to foreign policy makers, statesmen and diplomats who will examine critically the implications of policies and their executions in relations with other countries.

The theoretical relevance of the study stems from the fact that, it will extend the frontiers of knowledge on the issue under discussion. It will also enable the students of social sciences in general and political science in particular to have more access to current data on the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya. Lastly, it will open new vistas of

knowledge and add to the pull of literature on the subject and create a new paradigm in the study.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1   **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The focus of this literature review is on the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi

Libya**.** Hence, based on the focus and in consideration cum relation to the nature of the work

as well as topic understudy, our review of the existing literature shall be categorized and

grouped into the following themes:

- Empirical Literature

- Theoretical literature

2.2   **EMPIRICAL LITERATURE**

Prior to Libya, NATO military interventions had normally been followed by post-

conflict operations of significant size. In 1995, NATO deployed forces in Bosnia to safeguard

the Dayton Accords. Soon thereafter, international actors set up an Office of the High

Representative with executive authority to intervene in Bosnian politics to help implement

the Accordsø civilian aspects. In Kosovo in 1999, NATO followed up its air campaign with

the deployment of peacekeeping forces and the UN set up a large civilian administrative

structure to help manage postwar Kosovoøs many challenges (Burrows, 2005).

In the past two decades, the UN has also deployed peacekeeping forces and

significant civilian post-conflict missions around the world. At the time the war in Libya

ended, there were no fewer than 14 UN peacekeeping operations underway worldwide,

varying in size from4 Libya After Gaddafi under 1,000 personnel in Cyprus to over 20,000 in

the Democratic Republic of Congo. For several reasons, however, the international role in

Libya was limited and the majority of post-conflict reconstruction was left up to the Libyans

themselves. First, because NATO adopted an air power heavy strategy, ground forces were

limited to small numbers of Special Forces from Europe and the Gulf States. Precision airpower allowed NATO to avoid large numbers of civilian deaths, keep costs down, and ensure it was the rebels themselves who took the capital. The limited number of ground forces, however, also greatly reduced the extent of control and influence that NATO and its partners could exert after Qaddafi was gone. The question was whether to deploy forces, not whether to withdraw them.

Second, in contrast with NATO operations in Afghanistan and U.S. coalition operations in Iraq, the impetus for the intervention in Libya came in large part from France and Britain. Although President Obama supported the operation, he emphasized to his French and British counterparts that they would be expected to take the lead and bear as much of the cost as they could. The United States would support the effort, but provide only those capabilities it õuniquelyö possessed. This arrangement also set the stage for a much-reduced U.S. role after the war (Chivvis, 2014:53-55).

Third, within NATO, the operation was controversial. Allied participation was very low and seemed to be declining, despite the political approval from the North Atlantic Council, NATOøs highest political body. Only half the alliance made military contributions and less than a third of the allies contributed to strike operations. Germany, one of the allies best placed to contribute to the intervention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, voiced strong objections, abstained from the UN Security Council vote in protest, and ultimately opted out of military operations, even though it did not try to stop them(and eventually offered some diplomatic and financial support). This controversy reduced the chances of a post-conflict role for the alliance (Chivvis, 2014:59ó64).

Fourth, at the UN, fissures emerged on the Security Council over NATOøs interpretation of the UN mandate soon after military operations began. Russia, China, and South Africa argued that NATO was exceeding the mandate approved in Resolution 1973

and had crossed the line between civilian protection and regime change. The resolution only provided for limited strikes to prevent violence against innocent civilians, they argued, but NATO was now actively seeking to overthrow Gaddafi. Although it was difficult to believe that these countries were as shocked as they claimed by NATO operations, the discord made further UN action on Libya and for that matter Syria difficult (Chivvis, 2014:175ó179).

Fifth, after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, appetite for post-conflict deployments was very low in most western capitals. Europe was in the midst of a financial crisis and the United States was just emerging from one. Electoral cycles likely also played a role, and the Obama administration was no doubt wary of the risk that a quagmire in Libya could turn one of its main foreign policy victories into a target for reproach from Republicans, especially of the Tea Party, during a presidential election year.

Sixth, when it came to the specific question of a foreign troop presence, the Libyan interim authorities objected. During the war, the rebel leadership was largely opposed to foreign ground force deployments, calling only for air support and weapons. This pattern continued after the war. Many postwar rebel leaders were deeply concerned with their legitimacy, which they feared a foreign troop deployment would undermine. The last thing they wanted was to be seen as NATOøs patsies. To complicate matters, Resolution 1973 specifically ruled out an õoccupying force.ö When leaders on Libyaøs National Transitional Council (NTC) objected to post-conflict peacekeepers, discussion in NATO capitals fizzled.

These factors, combined with unexpected calm in Tripoli immediately after the war, resulted in a very limited overall international approach to post-conflict reconstruction in Libya. On September 16, 2011, Security Council Resolution 2009 mandated the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), under the leadership of UN Special Representative Ian Martin. The mandate called the mission to õassist and supportö Libyan efforts to establish security, undertake political dialogue, extend state authority, promote and protect human rights, take

steps to restart the economy, and coordinate the international effort. UNSMIL thus had no mandate to engage directly in Libyan politics, and with 200 total staffô many of which supporting the mission itselfô it was limited in what it could accomplish (Aghazarm *et al,* 2012)

In keeping with its wartime policy of focusing only on those areas where it had special capabilities, the United States took on special roles in certain areas, such as tracking and securing Qaddafiøs weapons of mass destruction or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which were believed to number several thousand. Like the UN, the European Union (EU) established a political mission only, rather than the far more robust civilian-military missions that it had deployed, for example, in Kosovo and elsewhere under its common security and defense policy. France, Britain, Italy, and other countries also established missions. Some of these deployed staff to help organize the now chaotic Libyan ministries. The essential tasks of establishing security, building political institutions, and restarting the economy, however, were left almost entirely up to Libyaøs new leaders themselves, who were also expected to foot most of the bill for reconstruction, not surprisingly given the countryøs oil wealth (*Agence France Presse*, 2011.)

The need to establish a safe and secure environment after the war was widely recognized both by international actors and by the Libyan rebelsø own postwar planning documents. A report undertaken under the auspices of the international contact group for Libya during the war, for example, noted the paramount importance of ensuring that õanti-Qaddafi militias do not evolve into armed wings of political factions, but are either merged into new, democratically accountable national security organizations or disarmed and demobilized.ö Similarly, the UNøs own initial study of the post-conflict planning environment noted the imperative that Libya õavoid chaos and ensure a sufficiently enabling environment for the fragile transition process to take hold.ö UN Special Representative Ian

Martin testified to the Security Council in December 2011 that õUnless the security situation is addressedquickly and effectively, interests of various stakeholders may become entrenched, undermining the legitimate authority of the State.ö Sadly, foreknowledge of the challenge did not translate into effective action and security gradually deteriorated (Black, McGreal and Sherwood, 2012)

Achieving a secure environment had three basic parts. First, the armaments from the regime and the war needed to be cleaned up and Libyaøs borders had to be secured. Second, Libyaøs national security sector needed to be reformed and rebuilt so that the armed services would be effective and support the transition to representative government. Third, the rebel militias that had won the war needed to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated, either into civilian society or into Libyaøs new armed services.

The country was awash in small arms and light weapons, including MANPADS, anti-tank missiles, Grad rockets, and mortars. France, Qatar, and other countries had also supplied the rebels with weapons during the war, with Qatar contributing more than 20,000 tons of weapons, including assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and other small arms (Dagher et al, 2011). Qatar and France both also supplied the rebels with Milan anti-tank missiles. More important were Qaddafiøs own weapon stocks, most of which had been let loose during the war. The UN estimated that, at the time of Gaddafiøs overthrow, Libyaøs armed forces held between 250,000 and 700,000 firearms, the majority of which (70ó80 percent) were assault rifles.MI6 estimated that there were a million tons of weaponry in Libya, more than the entire arsenal of the British army (Hookham, 2013). These weapons now threatened Libyaøs security. Large numbers of MANPADS and the remnants of Gaddafiøs nuclear weapons program, meanwhile, posed a threat beyond Libya. Qaddafi had purchased as many as 20,000 Soviet MANPADS, a stunning number that would be a major challenge to track down and

collect. The United States funded the program to recover the MANPADS, although it was reportedly run by South African contractors (CBS News, March 25, 2013).

Meanwhile, there were 6,400 known barrels of partially processed uranium (yellowcake) stored in Libya in a facility near Sabha in the south, loosely guarded by a Libyan army battalion (Loyd, 2013). Libya also had not completed the process of destroying its chemical weapons stocks, and only51 percent of its original mustard gas stockpile of 24.7 metric tons had been destroyed by the time the regime was overthrown. Although this task was successful completed in early 2014.Because Libya's borders were so long and porous, these loose weapons were a threat to the broader region and beyond. Getting control of Libya's 1,680-mile southern border was an enormous task, however (Bremner and Crisp, 2013:37). Qaddafi had sought to control or perhaps influence the border largely by establishing alliances with tribes that regularly moved back and forth across it. Building a modern border system required not only technological capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and other monitoring systems, but also staffing, effective administrative structures, and good inter-governmental coordination. Libya might hope to use its oil wealth to acquire the necessary technologies, but those a power and administrative needs for effective border control were a bigger challenge given the disarray of Libya's state institutions.

The Libyan state was in no position to provide security for its population after the war. Before it could do so, it needed far-reaching security sector reform coupled with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel forces. This has proven impossible. Ideally, security sector reform takes place according to a top down blueprint that lays out priorities and determines how the institutions that govern the security sector at the highest levels will be organized. Libya's postwar leaders had had no time to consider such questions, however, and in most cases lacked any background necessary for thinking through issues

such as how to ensure civilian control of the armed forces and whether to establish a national security council for decision making.

Indeed, in the prevailing conditions after Qaddafi's fall, the salience of such issues was fairly distant. Civilian control of the military was surely desired by most, if not all, Libyans, but how exactly that would work or even what it meant was still to be determined. Building a national security framework to support peaceful transition was especially difficult, given the absence of any certainty about what Libya's governing political institutions would look like. As a result, rational, top-down security sector reform was nearly impossible. Moreover, the institutions of the security sector were extremely weak or non-existent administratively. The Ministry of Interior was weak to start with and would weaken further after the war. Worse, the Ministry of Defense had actually been disestablished by Qaddafi decades ago. The military had been run by the Chief of Staff, creating an inherent tension in efforts to build a more standard Ministry of Defense.

The prewar military staff was also extremely weak. Ever wary of possible coup threats, Qaddafi constantly shook up the ranks, moved officers around arbitrarily, and doled out posts by patronage requirements rather than merit. Promotions from the lower ranks were preformed and very few new officers were added after the 1993 coup attempt. As a result, the upper ranks were badly bloated (Vandewalle, 2012:119ó150). Only a few were allowed to rise above Qaddafi's own rank of colonel. There was no capacity for decision making, strategic analysis, or planning, all of which are needed for successful security sector reform.

Defeated in battle and neglected under Qaddafi, what remained of the military forces themselves were also very weak. Prewar Libyan security services were estimated to number some 76,000, but in reality totaled only 20,000. The Qaddafi military had been designed for armored warfare in the desert and included large numbers of Soviet tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles. In addition to being of questionable need for the threats now facing Libya,

most of this equipment was in poor condition. The navy was barely operational and had been damaged by NATO during the war. The air force had a variety of fixed-wing aircraft, but it lacked training. Training for the regime's helicopter squadron was only somewhat better. The most sophisticated weapon systems had gone to Qaddafi's 32nd Brigade, headed by Qaddafi's son Khamis. This brigade had been responsible for most of the regime fighting during the war and had therefore been the most heavily targeted by NATO. Training and development programs that could strengthen the force, especially at the lower levels, were non-existent, as were systems for budgeting and other critical procedures (Ithaat, 2011).

The state of Libya's legal and penitential system was almost as bad, and a major backlog of court cases soon developed. There were over 5,000 people in various forms of custody nationwide, according to Human Rights Watch. The police were functioning minimally, but in many areas officers were afraid to go out in uniform. Others simply didnot show up for work at all, especially in eastern towns such as Benghazi and Derna, where recriminatory assassinations of police soon were soon to become common (Perito and Laporte-Oshiro, 2012). A Misratan leader, Fawzi Abdel Al, took control of the Ministry of Interior, while a powerful Zintani militia leader, Osama al-Juwaili,became minister of defense. The Chief of Defense position went to Yousef al-Mangoush, a high-ranking regime defector (Gaub, 2013). These individuals and their successors enjoyed varying degrees of support for their efforts, but political support for security sector reform in general was weak, given the stakes involved and growing uncertainty about Libya's future. Without a constitution or a clear vision of what Libya's future would look like and who would be in power, willingness to make bold decisions about the security services was almost non-existent. Meanwhile, the committees within the postwar government charged with responsibility for security-related issues operated in an uncoordinated manner and were often at odds with each other, further slowing reform efforts.

The UN has done what it could to help the security situation, but with very limited results. It helped the Ministry of Defense develop a white paper on security sector reform, but while the paper likely helped to build some limited awareness of the challenges the country faced, the implementation of any of the recommendations contained therein— for example, regarding doctrine, organization, training, etc.— face immense obstacles. As one international official put it, UNSMIL was "mandated to provide advice and assist the Libyan government in developing professional and sustainable security institutions under civilian oversight and in accordance with democratic principles. UNSMIL did this quite well in terms of the provision of advice, but without either viable state security forces or an international stabilization force to maintain security, the implementation of security sector reform initiatives proved ineffective."

Some European countries undertook to build capacity within the security ministries through partnering arrangements, but these efforts were small scale and would only yield results over the long term. There was a program to train Libyan police in Jordan, but it got off to a rough start when rioting and infighting between the recruits broke out and many had to be sent back to Libya.18Libya thus needed— and still needs— a far-reaching overhaul of its security institutions if it were to become a functioning modern state. Providing security to the Libyan people and preventing violence between armed groups fell to the revolutionaries' brigades that had fought in the war and other groups that sprung up in its aftermath— these groups, however, were also a major source of insecurity.

By the end of 2013, disaffection with the GNC had become widespread, and formal politics in Libya was becoming less and less relevant. The two major groups in parliament had failed to reach political compromises on the big issues and opted to use boycotts (or the threat of boycotts) rather than engage in real debate. This gave the impression that the GNC's major political parties were simply posturing for the next elections. The GNC lacks

credibility as a result of having overstepped its mandate on the one hand, and accomplished little on the other. It is telling that all three of the GNC members interviewed for this study conceded that the assembly was held in such low esteem by the public that it would not be possible for the body to select the õCommittee of 60ö that will draft Libyaøs constitution. Rather, the interviewees supported direct election of the drafters to avoid the taint that would come from their association with the GNC, should the GNC select them as initially conceived by the NTC.

The mandate of the GNC expired in February 2014. At the time of this writing, it had issued a very controversial decision extending its mandate until the end of 2014. In a state in which militias are becoming more entrenched, where insecurity persists, and where the state exercises little control in entire regions of the country, the relevance of the formal political process has been questioned by many observers. The real power brokers in post-Qaddafi Libya are the militias that control key strategic transit points, self-anointed clerics that challenge the Muftiøs religious authority, and tribal leaders nationwide. The democratic political process that many Libyans believed they were fighting for, in other words, is dangerously stalled.

2.3   THEORETICAL REVIEW

Fletcher (2009:29) noted that, rather than arising overnight, discontent with the pace and depth of political reform among Libyan intellectuals, and even some entrenched political elites, had been a constant factor characterized by skepticism over the promises by the regime to introduce greater democracy. The democratization efforts of Saif al-Islam, Gaddafiøs second eldest son, clashed continuously with the authoritarian policies of the old guard. Reform-oriented transition toward democracy is by nature a lengthy process, requiring constant negotiation of changes to be introduced between the regime and democratizing

elites; but after decades of Gaddafiøs authoritarian rule, patience for a lengthy process was exhausted (Fletcher, 2009:38).

The regimeøs hardliners were concerned that large-scale and rapid changes could undermine the countryøs political stability. These groups included those who had benefited from the system economically and politically. The tussle between the two groups was demonstrated through various public events, such as the sidelining of ministers and senior officers or the closure of newspapers. Several journalists working for Saif al-Islamøs publishing company, al-Ghad, were arrested by the Libyan authorities and later released by Qadhafi in late 2010 (*Agence France Presse*, 2011).Tom Malinowski, director of Human Rights Watch in Washington, believed he observed the struggle between the reformers and hardliners first hand during an event organized to launch a report on the human rights situation in Libya in 2009. He commented that, õThere are clearly forces pressing for greater openness. Thatøs why weøre here. But there are also powerful forces who donøt want this process to succeed.ö(UNDP, 2010:109).

Bruce (2002:129-130) contends that Gaddafiøs unwillingness to change the political system not only frustrated broad sectors of the ordinary Libyan population, but also upset his former close collaborators from various periods of his rule. His one-man style of leadership left room for few friends around him. Many of his revolutionary colleagues, senior officers, and technocrats rebelled or quit their positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, some abandoned the country and joined opposition groups abroad. Key issues of disagreement between Gaddafi and his close associates varied over the years, but the most important ones included:

ÉSpending on financing and training insurgencies abroad;

É Direct intervention in other countriesø internal affairs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by supporting coups and rebel groups over the course of decades;

É The building of a large man-made river in the Libyan desert, seen as an irrational diversion 6 of resources at a time of financial constraints in the 1980s;

É Plans for the succession and repeated long-term speculation over the possible appointment of one of Gaddafiøs sons to take his position.

However, Obeidi (2001) posits that, the limited market economy reforms introduced by Gaddafi in the late-1990s and during the 2000s were not sufficient to relieve poverty for a large number of ordinary Libyans, and instead were perceived as benefiting a small number of Gaddafiøs family members and his inner circle of loyal friends. This bred pessimism with regard to any likelihood of positive economic change in Libya under the former regime.

Unemployment was a significant long-term issue in Gaddafiøs Libya. Official sources placed Libyaøs 2009 unemployment rate at 20.74 percent; with the youth unemployment rate higher, at 27 percent; at the time, 65 percent of the countryøs population was less than 35 years old. In parallel with other Arab oil-rich countries, high unemployment in Libya results largely from a long-term mismatch between the education system and the skills needed by the growing private sector, further complicated by high job expectations by graduates. A high proportion of Libyan graduates lack the adequate job-related skills required in a variety of sectors and industries (Goodman, 2012).As a consequence, a large number of nationals, especially young ones, remained unemployed, despite the positive economic growth that followed the lifting of the United Nations (UN) sanctions in September 2003. The public investment spending of recent years on major infrastructure facilities, transport, housing and other construction, coupled with private investment in the oil and gas sectors, generated new job opportunities, but mainly in the low-skill sector that does not appeal to Libyans. Hence, until February 2011, some 2.5 million foreign migrants worked in construction and agriculture jobs (UNDP, 2010).In addition, the scarcity of technical skills among Libyans meant that most of the limited available skilled jobs went to foreigners. To rectify this

situation, Libyan authorities launched a package of incentives and measures for foreign companies to increase the number of Libyans in skilled positions. During a meeting of oil companies operating in Libya in 2009, Shukri Ghane, former Chairman of the Libyan National Oil Company, stressed the importance of training Libyan engineers for future tenders. The development of skilled human resources remains a priority for the Libyan government to achieve its economic development and diversification plans (Zapata, 2010).

High inflation rates caused by increasing food and housing prices, coupled with the unbalanced distribution of income, led to a deterioration of living conditions for many Libyan families and among unskilled foreign laborers. Libyans were particularly frustrated over the fall in standards of living, while the country had generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon exportsô many of which had been spent on Gaddafiøs foreign policy adventures of fighting imperialism or the unification of Africa. Ordinary citizens argued that a country rich in energy resources, with a relatively small population, should be able to offer high living standards to its population, in the same manner as in the rich Gulf States (Nayiri, 2010). To prevent the spread of food riots that hit Tunisia and Algeria in the first week of January 2011, the Libyan government lifted taxes and import tariffs on basic food staples. Further measures were also announced, including granting loans for new businesses and housing projects. This, however, was not enough to preempt dissent. Shortly after the flight of Tunisian president Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, protests erupted in Libyan cities. Socioeconomic grievances triggered riots in Benghazi and al-Baydaa. With the lack of affordable housing an acute problem in Libya for years, corruption and the governmentøs inability to deliver promised subsidized housing units in the scheduled timeframe had angered a broad section of the Libyan population in these cities and served as the direct trigger for protest action (Goodman, 2012:84).

Contributing on tribes and politics during and after Gaddafi, Von Rohr (2011) observed that despite a belated realization of the importance of the tribes in Libyan social and political affairs, tribal dynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper place as a major theme of discussion and analysis during and after the civil war. The political role of tribes cannot be understated in determining the future shape of Libya. New political elites are currently discussing the feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes in the future political system, while tensions along tribal lines remain a risk factor likely to complicate political transition in post-Gaddafi Libya (Von Rohr, 2011).

There are more than 100 tribes and clans across Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab, Berber, and African. But it is important to stress that only a few are truly influential, and have dominated the political and social scene for decades. The leading tribes are the following:

É*Warfala*: the largest tribe in the country, with members spread across different Libyan cities, but considering Bani Walid as its home base;

É*Magarha*: the second most populous of Libyan tribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadi al-Shati and Sebha;

É*Zintan*: concentrated in the Nafusa mountains region in the western part of Libya. Most of its members belong to the Amazigh minority;

É*Obeidat*: located in the northeastern cities;

É*Zawiya*: located in the oil-rich southeast;

É *Qadhadhfa*: Qadhafiøs own tribe, based in Sirte and Sebha regions (Anderson, 1990:288-302).

With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic, there are few studies available that provide up-to-date detailed information on the tribes. One of these few was written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at the University of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose

empirical study described the tribe as a still important element shaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areas but also in urban centers (Obeidi, 2001).This runs counter to common expectations that the role of the tribe would have diminished among the youth or in the major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference to tribe remains current and popular among young urban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. In particular, the role of Libya's tribes in allocating socio-economic benefits and security in the absence of effective state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism across all Libyan regions (Al-Achibi, 2010).

Making sense of the ambivalent political situation of the tribes requires a brief review of Libya's political history since its independence. The relation between tribes and politics was cemented in the early days of Libya's struggle for independence. The power base for the rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance between the Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes; the tribal nobility constituted a significant part of the King's cabinet, serving as advisors and confidants (Hajjar, 1980:181-200).

Over the course of the years following Gaddafi's arrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he made attempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in place by the previous regime. Gaddafi replaced tribal notables who had occupied administrative positions at regional level with young technocrats (Hajjar, 1980).The undermining and marginalization of the role of the tribes in the early days of Gaddafi's revolutionary regime was driven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tactically, the aim was to remove any remaining elements loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nationalism was a strong ideological driver to move on from tribalism to a political system ready to embrace not only all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Gaddafi for years saw himself as successor to the late Egyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arab nationalist movement. Thus, when Gaddafi referred to "the tribe" in his Green Book, the distillation of his political views published in stages throughout

the 1970sô and omnipresent required reading in Libya under Gaddafiô it was without any distinct political connotation. Gaddafi envisaged the tribe as a key component of Libyan society in the same manner as the family, providing natural social protection to its members (Fathaly and Plamer, 1980:247-261).

Fathaly and Plamer (1980) assert that, this attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Libyan politics did not succeed for long. Several factors pushed Gaddafi to use the tribes politically in order to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most important of these factors was a disagreement over key policy orientations and rifts among comrades of the Revolutionary Command Council, the supreme executive and legislative body that governed Libya after the 1969 coup and during the 1970s.In an open letter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one of Gaddafiøs close confidants who had served in several important positions in the 1970s before defecting to Egypt in 1975, described Gaddafiøs manipulation of the tribal factions. He noted that the tribal infighting of the past had been buried after independence, but that Gaddafi had revived these social divisions again in order to strengthen his grip on power (Anderson, 1990:77).

Furthermore, Vandewalle (2006:149) noted that a number of attempts to seize power prompted Gaddafi to accentuate tribalization still further. Most significant among these was the 1993 rebellion and coup attempt by military forces in Misratah, which led to incidents in other Libyan cities including al-Zawiya and Sirte. In addition to arresting a number of army officers, Gaddafi responded by turning to his tribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposition.Gaddafi appointed several blood relatives and in-laws to key security and military positions, including Brigadier Ahmad Qadhaf al-Damm and Abdullah Sanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively. Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic positions including, finally, special envoy and representative of Qadhafi to some Arab countries.

Sanoussi had an extended tenure as head of internal security. Several members of Qadhafi's tribe also took senior positions in the armed forces (Vandewalle, 2006:149)

However, manipulating tribes and building informal tribal alliances thus became an important part of Gaddafi's internal political maneuvering. The small size of the Gaddafi tribe, and its light political and economic weight, led Gaddafi to seek informal and tacit alliances with other key tribes in the country such as the Warfala and Magarha (Mattes, 2004). Nepotism and favoritism became the pillars sustaining Gaddafi's informal political alliances. Appointing family members and key figures from allied tribes in important and leading positions was the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by the regime. Gaddafi strengthened his power by effectively playing the tribes against each other, promoting one tribe over the other in different parts of the country (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:21).

In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in public life was reinforced still further with the establishment of a nationwide system of People's Social Leadership Committees. Tribal and regional notables were the main members of these new committees, which took a number of social and bureaucratic functions over from the central state (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:21).These Committees provided welfare services to the local population, and served as a judicial forum to settle local conflicts. They also oversaw the implementation of socioeconomic programs in their own regions and localities.

The military provides a case study demonstrating the importance of tribalism in Gaddafi's political system. In addition to the appointments of relatives and members of loyal tribes to key military positions in response to failed attempts to topple the regime, particularly the one in 1993, Gaddafi created a parallel security system made up of several special military units that were assigned to persons of trust, including his sons. These units, known as "Kataeb al-Amnia" ("Security Brigades"), were well-trained and equipped compared to the regular army.27 The best-known unit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade, known as

the õKhamis Brigade,ö led by Gaddafiøsson Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi, a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and revolts against Gaddafiøs regime over the previous four decades as well as being at the source of the most recent one, which eventually ended Gaddafiøs rule (Rahim and Kataib, 2011).In the event, Gaddafiøs security calculations were proved entirely correct. In the early days of the February 17 revolution, several senior army officers defected and joined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff Abu-Bakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amnia constituted the main fighting elements opposing the rebels over the 8 months of the civil war.

The civil war period saw tribal leaders convening to discuss the security and political situation. A number of loyalty statements were issued, in favor either of Gaddafiøs regime or of the rebels. Tribal notables were keen to show their importance on the political scene, and that they were still a political force not to be ignored (Sheridan, 2011).Furthermore, in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delegations travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatari rulers for their support during the fighting. These visits have continued during the establishment of the new Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nationalists and a political elite aspiring to build a modern and unified democracy (Mahumud, 2011).

Pier (2011), examines the key transitional challenges that lie ahead for the interim government in moving from the old order to a new, possibly democratic, system. He also highlighted the problem of armed groups in post-Gaddafi Libya and the challenges they represent to the authority of the new political leadership and to the countryøs stability. Stephen (2011), focus on the daunting task of building the fundamental pillars of democracy in a country that for more than four decades was run by an opaque political system, with limited civil institutions and no political parties. As a corollary, Stephen (2011) opined that drawing up a constitution for Libya will not be straightforward. Political infighting between

secularists and Islamists has already surfaced on varying issues of political significance to Libya's future, including vital elements such as the structure and religious identity of the state.

Ensuring continued security in the broad sense is a critical concern for the new regime in building the foundation on which advances can be made in the political and socioeconomic spheres. Yet, at the time of this writing, the new interim government remains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and the inability to enforce security is still a critical challenge (Chayadhmi, 2011). Threats to security arising directly from the remaining supporters of the Gaddafi regime receded after the arrest of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. Saif al-Islam had been a source of concern to Libya's new political leadership and to the international community, because of his ability to seek contacts with his own tribe and other loyal groups to launch attacks on the new government (Chayadhmi, 2011).

In addition to his importance within the old regime as detailed above, Saif al-Islam was his father's "secrets keeper," which afforded him intimate knowledge of the power dynamics of the regime. It would thus have been easy for him to gather support, particularly among those Gaddafi loyalists who suffered from reprisal atrocities perpetuated by the rebel forces during the civil war and after the death of Gaddafi. He could have easily exploited revenge calls from the Warfala tribe in Bani Walid against the National Transitional Council (NTC) and rebel forces (Chayadhmi, 2011).

Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by the NTC was intended to provide security in the capital of Libya, and to be the first step in setting up a professional national army. But the Council, led by commander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is not even able to exercise control over military affairs within Tripoli, let alone across the country (Gerard, 2011).

Hundreds of armed fighters belonging to different militias moved to Tripoli in September 2011. Dozens of separate armed groups took control of Tripoli's key neighborhoods; as well as strategic infrastructure, such as ports, airports, and border crossings across the country. The militias still patrol the capital, setting up their own checkpoints in defiance of the government-appointed authorities. For example, the Zintan militia is in control of the city's airport and other areas within Tripoli. With the aim of maximizing their political power, some brigades have extended control to landmark buildings within Tripoli, such as those containing the diplomatic representations of important countries (Walts, 2012).

Consequently, Walts (2012) maintains that the large number of distinct militias arose during the civil war because of the regional and tribal divisions within the country. The rebel forces were not all unified under a single command during the fights against pro-Gaddafi forces. Even in eastern Libya, where the NTC controlled the most organized rebel force, relations between rebel groups were far from cordial, and some militias continued their intention to act independently. The assassination of rebel leader General Abdelfattah Younes on July 28, 2011, by a radical faction of the rebel forces highlighted discord among the rebels, which constituted a major challenge to NTC cohesion. This issue remains unresolved, as the details of Younes's murder have still not been released, nor any suspects named.

Nonetheless, Munoz (2012) argues that the militias, initially an instrument of liberation, very swiftly became a source of concern to the NTC and to the residents of Tripoli. Some of the militias are accused directly of the violence and vandalism that took place after the fall of the capital, and frequent clashes between members of the different brigades have become a norm there. During the first week of December 2011, Tripoli's inhabitants protested, demanding the departure of armed militias from their city. A few days after these protests, gun battles erupted between members of the Zintan militia, who aimed to

demonstrate their independence from the interim government and its institutions, and followers of Brigadier Khalifa Haftar, a commanding officer of the yet-to-be-built Libyan National Army. Renewed fighting between militias in the first week of January 2012 led NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil to warn of the risks of another civil war.

Munoz (2012) contend that all of these factors cause continuing significant disruption to the lives of ordinary citizens, and dealing with the issue is a stated priority for the interim government. The establishment of the National Armyøs monopoly on the legitimate use of force is seen as the solution. Mahmud Jibril, the former interim head of the NTCøs executive board, who resigned on October 23, 2011, listed a series of options to solve the issue of the rebel brigades. He suggested that the thousands of rebel fightersô most of whom joined the revolution with no military trainingô would be offered the chance to join the army or the Interior Ministry, which oversees the police. Another option would be to form Libyan security companies, which would help guard businesses and oil facilities (Munoz, 2012).

Conversely, Mansour (2012) argues that most of the brigades are not willing to hand over their weapons or to leave Tripoli. They claim that their armed presence is necessary for the security of the state at this crucial moment, since they maintain security in view of the potential for insurgencies led by the remnants of the Gaddafi regime. In addition, the militias are concerned about their marginalization from the new political order learning from observation of the experiences of neighboring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) where the youth movements that led the revolutions were subsequently excluded from power. Maintaining an armed presence in Tripoli is to be used as political leverage to secure a role in the new Libya.

Without the formation of a new army and the collecting of weapons, security will remain loose, and the NTC will remain a political formation without levers to implement its will. The inability to act and to control state affairs has been a source of frustration to many of the NTCøs members. Mahmud Jibril publicly listed several reasons for his resignation,

including his lack of control not only of military but also of civilian affairs. In an interview with the pan-Arab news channel Al-Arabiya, he cited an example to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of NTC control: After the liberation of Tripoli, militias went into public institutions, banks, oil entities and other public companies and changed their boards of directors, without consultation with the NTC or its executive office. Jibriløs frustration also stemmed from the lack of strong support for secularists, compared to the Islamic factions of the NTC, which have the backing of Qatar. Decisions were made with no clarity as to who was behind them or how they were going to be implemented, such as the introduction of visa requirements. The current interim government has very limited administrative capacity to perform its duties as a sovereign and effective state. At the time of this writing, the interim governmentøs precise strategy with relation to the armed groups remains unclear. A number of attempts to persuade the armed groups to hand over their weapons appear to have convinced NTC leader Mustapha Abdejalil that the demilitarizing of these groups may not be as easy as first thought. He then decided to delay the collection of arms for the foreseeable future, in order, paradoxically, to avoid a renewed breakout of political violence (Mansour, 2012)

Yet, as time passes, the risk of increased low-level violence and criminal activities increases. The armed groups require sources of income to maintain their stay in Tripoli. The question then becomes how they are to generate the money. It is considered probable that at least some of the militias will become involved in further illegal activities, such as levying protection fees, trading in narcotics, or kidnapping for ransom. The security risks of Libyaøs uncontrolled armed militias are not restricted to within the countryøs national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts, clashes between militias or between militias and gov-ernment authorities threaten to undermine the security of neighboring countries and the international community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee flows to Tunisia, Egypt,

and across the Mediterranean to Italy and beyond, and disruption to oil productionô depriving the international market of Libyan oil once again and harming the economic interests of U.S. and European companies (Mcleary, 2011:32).

Furthermore, the current lack of a capable national army leaves Libya an open playing field to be exploited by international criminal groups active in the region. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or other Jihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and Europe are expected to establish training camps in uncontrolled Libyan territory, as well as developing links with some of the militias to acquire arms. During several months of fighting, the revolutionary fighters had access to weapon storages. Late-2011 saw media reporting the trafficking of Libyan arms in the Sahel region (Mcleary, 2011:32).

Uncontrolled stocks of weapons include systems that could be of immediate interest to terrorist groups and other entities hostile to the United States and its allies, such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including SA-24 Igla (GRINCH) missiles. Securing these systems should be treated as an immediate priority for both the Libyan government and its foreign partners (Krauss, 2011).Armed militias are already directly affecting relations with Libyaøs neighbors. In early-December 2011, as a response to continuous assaults on its citizens and territorial integrity by Libyan armed groups, Tunisia closed two crossing points and deployed additional military personnel to control its borders with Libya.

McQuinn and Purushotham (2011:490-492) posit that the ambitions of the interim government are constrained by its lack of authority and capacity to influence the armed groups. But they are also inhibited by the lack of a clear security reform strategy that includes specific measures for the disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of legacy armaments in general. The sooner the interim government launches its security reform plan, the better the chances of success for political transition. Assistance to

the interim authorities in implementing security reform in order to mitigate the risks outlined above should therefore be a key priority of the United States and other foreign partners.

Charting a new course for the political transition of Libya, McQuinn and Purushotham (2011) suggest that the recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in political transition. In both countries, post-revolution consolidation was not peaceful. The ousting of former leaders and the establishment of interim political bodies were not sufficient to appease public anger. The Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as the guardians of their popular revolutions, regularly took to the streets presenting political demands. Growing disenchantment with the political performance of the Military Council in Egypt has led to new riots and political violence 10 months after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak.

The circumstances of each country define precisely how political instability will manifest itself. This phenomenon is not limited to North Africa nor the Arab world: Examples are available from Europe, including the case of Portugal, whose transition toward democracy was full of societal tensions for 2 years following the military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only when the constitution was finally enacted and the first elections were held (McQuinn and Purushotham, 2011).

In the case of Libya, the experience will be shaped by the lack of ordinary political institutions, a long civil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In September 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its political roadmap for the transitional period, with a program resembling Tunisia's post-revolution transition. The Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its first elections for a constituent assembly in June 2012. Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the country's constitution and hold parliamentary elections in 1 year's time a very ambitious program that perhaps fails to take into account the special situation of Libya.

There are many hurdles that are likely to make the transition lengthy and difficult, if not prevent its success altogether. Libyans could discover that they are facing an incomplete, õrotten-doorö transition. Political scientists and experts in political transitions Steven Levitsky and Lucan define rotten-door transitions as those that õoccur in a context of state, party, and civil society, weakness [where] new governments are often filled with elites from the old regime.ö(Levitsky and Lucan, 2010:25-26). They argue that the collapse of autocratic regimes often does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results in little real institutional change, Levitsky and Way argue, with post-transition governments often being led by politicians with no strong commitment to democracy. Although the overthrow of Gaddafiøs regime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents a prime example of a state that lacks political parties, state institutions, and civil society.

2.4   Gap in the Literature

What seems to emerge from the extant literature reviewed above on the interface between politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya and democratization process in Libya are attempts to establish positive or inverse relationship between politics and diplomacy of Gaddafi and politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya. Levitsky and Lucan (2010), argue that the collapse of autocratic regimes often does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results in little real institutional change.McQuinn and Purushotham (2011) suggest that the recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in political transition. In both countries, post-

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As the corollary of the above, it could be affirmed that scholars such as Levitsky and Lucan (2010), McQuinn and Purushotham (2011), Krauss (2011), Mcleary (2011), Mansour (2012), Munoz (2012), Walts (2012), Gerard (2011), Chayadhmi (2011), Stephen (2011), Pier (2011), Mahumud (2011), Sheridan (2011), Otman and Karlberg (2007), Mattes (2004), Vandewalle (2006), Anderson (1990), Fathaly and Plamer (1980), Hajjar (1980), Al-Achibi (2010), Obeidi (2001), Von Rohr (2011), Goodman (2012), Nayiri (2010), Zapata (2010) and several others are yet to adequately highlight and establish the link and relationship between politics and diplomacy under Gaddafi and politics and diplomacy in the post Gaddafi Libya. It therefore becomes germane to chart the course as presented above.

CHAPTER THREE

3.1   **METHODOLOGY**

In this chapter, we shall explore the theoretical framework, hypotheses, research design, method of data collection and method of data analysis. Methodology in the words of Kaplan (cited in Cohen and Manion, 1980) is used to describe and analyze methods, throwing light on their limitations and resources, clarifying their presuppositions and consequences, relating their potentialities to the twilight zone at the frontier of knowledge. It ventures generalizations from the success of particular techniques, suggesting new applications and to unfold the specific bearings of logical and metaphysical principles on concrete problems, suggesting new formulations. In brief, Kaplan posited that the aim of methodology is to help us to understand, in the broadest possible terms, not the products of scientific enquiry but the process itself.

On the other hand, Cohen and Manion (1980:26) defined methods that range of approaches used in research to gather data which are to be used as basis for inference and interpretation, for explanation and prediction. Traditionally they continued, the word refers to those techniques associated with the positivistic (scientific) model such as eliciting responses to predetermined questions, recording measurements, describing phenomena and performing experiments. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we shall explore them one after the other.

3.2   **Theoretical framework**

In analyzing the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya, we shall adopt as the theoretical foundation of complex interdependence theory as a viable tool of analysis in this study.The Complex interdependence theory in international relations is the idea put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, that states and their fortunes are inextricably tied together.

The concept of economic interdependence was popularized through the work of Richard N. Cooper. With the analytical construct of complex interdependence in their critique of political realism, õRobert Keohane and Joseph Nye go a step further and analyze how international politics is transformed by interdependenceö (Crane & Amawi 1997: 107-109).

The theorists recognized that the various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies were increasing, while the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing but remain important. In making use of the concept of interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1997: 122-132) also importantly differentiated between interdependence and dependence in analyzing the role of power in politics and the relations between international actors.

From the analysis, complex interdependence is characterized by three characteristics, involving

- The use of multiple channels of action between societies in interstate, trans-governmental, and transnational relations,
- The absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues prioritized and the objective of
- Bringing about a decline in the use of military force and coercive power in international relations.

Nye and Keohane thus argue that the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. The work of the theorists surfaced in the 1970s to become a significant challenge to political realist theory in international politics and became foundational to current theories that have been categorized as liberalism (international relations), neo-liberalism and liberal institutionalism. Traditional critiques of liberalism are

often defined alongside critiques of political realism, mainly that they both ignore the social nature of relations between states and the social fabric of international society. With the rise of neoliberal economics, debates, and the need to clarify international relations theory, Keohane (2002: 2-19) has most recently described himself as simply an institutionalist.

The relevance of this theory to the understanding of the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya cannot be overemphasized. The theory will help us to dispel the general belief and misguided applications of Centre-Periphery and Dependency theory from the Marxian Political Economy Approach in the treatment of relations between nations.

Moreover, the theory is relevant in the explanation of the contemporary world in which no country can be an island unto itself, since no nation is naturally equipped or endowed with all the resources that it requires to sustain itself, hence nations must relate with one another in order to survive. The basic contribution of this theory is that it directs attention to the fact that nations are intricately dependent on one another, to the extent that no nation can decide for others. Though this does not dispel the fact that in every relations that there must be winners or losers.

Application of the Theory

In applying the theory to the study, we noted that the politics and diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya is borne out of the fact that no country possesses all the resources that it requires in its quest to produce and reproduce the material means of its existence, hence, it has to enter into some form of interdependence and relations with other countries to secure these scarce and unevenly natural resources. For instance, the politics and diplomacy of Libya under Gaddafi was hostile to major countries of the west and to its citizens, hence the uprising that ousted his regime. It therefore becomes imperative that countries interact and transact across borders.

3.3   **HYPOTHESES**

The study was guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The politics of post Gaddafi Libya has not enhanced the democratization process and peace in Libya

2. The diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya has enhanced the economic relations with the west.

3.4   **RESEARCH DESIGN**

A research design is a blueprint that tells how to reach unassailable and plausible answers to research problems. It is the plan, the structure and the strategy of the investigation, so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions or problems (Kerlinger, 1986). The research design thus provides the framework for the generation and analysis of data according to the priorities set by the researcher (Bryman, 2001). It spells out the relationship between and among the variables clearly and unambiguously. It shows the function of each variable in the problem whether it is intended to be an independent variable, an intervening variable.

Hence, in this study, we shall adopt the õOne Group Pre-Test-Post-Test Designö. This type of design is essentially common in the *ex-post-facto* experiment based on aggregate data (Leege and Francis, 1974:71). In this case, a single group is compared with itself. This requires a measurement to be taken before an experimental variable or causal event has occurred. The difference between the first and second observations is attributed to the experimental variables; while a test of significance is commonly used to see whether the observed difference is beyond what might be obtained by chance. The One Group Pre-Test-Post-Test Design is represented in this form: $\mathbf{O_1XO_2}$, where:

$\mathbf{O_1}$ = First Observation

X= Experimental Variable

O_2 = Second Observation

In the above form, O_1 stands for the first observation, which is the first hypothesis for our study; the rate and nature of during Gaddafi. **X** stands for the experimental variable or causal factor, that is, the Libyan civil war. While O_2 stands for the second observation, that is, the rate and nature of politics in post Gaddafi Libya..

For our second hypothesis, O_1 stands for the first observation; the nature of the diplomacy during Gaddafi Libya. **X** stands for the experimental variable or causal factor, that is, the Libyan civil war. While O_2 stands for the second observation, which is the nature of diplomacy in post Gaddafi Libya.

The careful application of the One Group Pre-Test-Post-Test research design to the investigation of our research problem no doubt provides a veritable tool for validating our hypotheses that:

- The politics of post Gaddafi Libya has not enhanced the democratization and peace in Libya
- The diplomacy of post Gaddafi Libya has enhanced the economic relations with the west.

As we have already noted, the difference in the first and second observations is attributed to the experimental variable. The adoption of this type of research design enabled us to identify the most severe threats (internal and external) to the validity and reliability of the topic under study. The issue of validity and reliability of data is so crucial that no worthwhile scientific investigation should ignore it. Hence, to enhance scientific utility of this

study, the problems associated with its validity and reliability needs to be adequately addressed. A rigorous use of secondary method to ensure reliability and validity will be applied. Relying on one group pre-test-post-test enabled us to structure our observation since it is applicable in *ex-post-facto* experiment. Again, a theoretical framework of analysis based on the theory of complex interdependence will help to link the theoretical base of this research with the observable consistent interactions.

3.5   METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

For the purpose of data collection, we relied on secondary sources of data. This is principally due to the nature of the study as well as the type of data required to test and validate our hypotheses. According to Ikeagwu (1998:211) and Asika (2006:27), secondary sources of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, usually, data from the available data, archives, either in the form of documentation or survey results and code books. In this light, Selltiz *et al* (1977:317), has articulated the advantages of secondary sources of data to include that of economy. Again, it is a fact that much information of this sort is collected periodically thereby making the establishment of trends overtime possible. More importantly, is the obvious fact that the gathering of information from such sources does not require the cooperation of the individual about whom information is being sought.

Therefore, the study relied on institutional, official documents and publications of international organizations such as the UNDP that contain information as regards the Nigeria economy. In addition, documents, statistics, graphs and tables were sourced from the University of Nigeria library and the Centre for American Studies (CAST) on Nigeria's economic advancement and human development statistics.

The aforestated institutional and official documents were complemented by other secondary data sources like textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, articles and other

written works. Finally, this study extensively utilized materials sourced from the internet that burden on the same subject matter.

3.6   **METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS**

The analysis of data generated in the course of this study was done using qualitative descriptive analysis. Asika (2006:118) noted that qualitative descriptive analysis is used to verbally and visually summarize the information gathered in research. Qualitative research relates to aspects of enquiry that are more philosophical and argumentative (Obasi, 2007:367). Generally, it involves a systematic transformation of quantitative data with a view to situate the pattern or events in their historical context and establish their subsequent development. Moreover, tables and figures were used to enable us organize the information gathered in a concise and coherent manner. The adoption of the foregoing analytical method is necessary because the study principally relied on the secondary sources of data.

3.6   Logical Data Framework

RESEARCH QUESTION	HYPOTHESES	MAJOR VARIABLES OF HYPOTHSES	EMPIRICAL INDICATORS OF VARIABLES	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION	METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS
Did the post Gaddafi Libya politics enhance democratization in Libya?	The post Gaddafi Libya politics did not enhance democratization and peace in Libya	(X) Post Gaddafi Libya politics	• Inauguration of National Transition Council (NTC) • Assassination of rebel leader General Abdelfattah Younes on July July 28, 2011 • Establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by NTC to provide security in the capital of Libya • Decentralized military forces • Springing up of various Islamic militias in the country	• Text books and journal publications. • Official documents • Internet sources.	Qualitative method of data collection based on documented evidences	Qualitative descriptive method using event history analysis
		(Y) Democratization and peace in Libya	• Internal apathy towards democratic reforms • Elections for General National Congress (GNC), an interim legislative body tasked with overseeing the work of a new government on July 7,2012 • Electoral violence during the GNC election	• Text books and journal publications. • Official documents • Internet sources.	Qualitative method of data collection based on documented evidences	Qualitative descriptive method using event history analysis
RESEARCH QUESTION	HYPOTHESES	MAJOR VARIABLES OF HYPOTHSES	EMPIRICAL INDICATORS OF VARIABLES	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION	METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS
Did the post Gaddafi Libya diplomacy enhance economic relations with the west?	Post Gaddafi Libya diplomacy enhanced economic relations with the west	(X) Post Gaddafi Libya diplomacy	• An aggressive posture towards governments it accused of supporting Gaddafi in the civil war, especially that of Algeria which it claimed allowed Gaddafi's government to transport mercenaries and military equipment through its territory • Libya officially recognized Kosovo as an independent state on 25 September, 2013 which Gaddafi was opposed to during his reign • Establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland during the visit of Polish foreign	• Text books and journal publications. • Official documents • Internet sources.	Qualitative method of data collection based on documented evidences	Qualitative descriptive method using event history analysis

			minister to Benghazi, when he announced the recognition of the NTC as "rightful interlocutor for the international community			
		(Y) Economic relations with the west	- In late august 2011, France unblocked 20 percent of frozen assets held in the country - Italy's recognition of the NTC as a negotiating party in early April 2011 - Qatar announced the first trade agreement with Libya on 27 March, 2011 that it would market Libyan oil exports from eastern terminals controlled by anti-Gaddafi's elements - Turkey provided $300million in aid to the NTC as well as several fuel shipments via the Turkish petroleum international company - The U.S. government has provided $170 million in transitional aid to Libya to help confront humanitarian and security challenges.	- Text books and journal publications. - Official documents - Internet sources.	Qualitative method of data collection based on documented evidences	Qualitative descriptive method using event history analysis

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1   DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE OVERTHROW OF GADDAFI

In this chapter, we shall explore the interplay and link between the domestic and external actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi; the nexus and the correlation between the two actors shall be highlighted. Nonetheless, the following issues:domestic actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi, tribes and politics during and after Gaddafiøs rule, external actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi, the Arab League and the overthrow of Gaddafi, United Nations and the overthrow of Gaddafi, African Union and the conflict in Libya, NATO and coalition campaign in Libya, European Unionøs military intervention in Libya, Resolution 1973 and the Responsibility to Protect shall also constitute critical point of analyses in this study. However, in other to enhance clarity, we shall examine these issues one after the other.

4.2   DOMESTIC ACTORS IN THE OVERTHROW OF GADDAFI

Since December 2010, the Arab world has been turned upside down. Ossified political structures that had held for decades have been cracked open. Rapid success of revolts in Tunisia and Egypt helped to dispel the fear of state repression and encouraged largely young people across the region to carry their grievances onto the streets. Against the backdrop of similar problems in many places, protests affected almost all the Arab countries over the course of 2011, with mass demonstrations in many.

However, after the toppling of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak and the initiation of transformation processes in Tunisia and Egypt, other Arab leaders dug their heels in. in most cases, this initially meant ad hoc measures addressing socio-economic demands, but some also initiated broader reform processes in response to political grievances. Others went in the opposite direction, seeking to defend the status quo by violently suppressing dissent or

applying a combination of repression, minimal reforms and sweeping financial handouts. Thus, even below the threshold of regime change the protests, uprising and revolts are having a huge impact on Arab political systems. The leeway enjoyed by those in power has greatly narrowed and they are more dependent than ever on public acceptance of their policies. In those states where the old leaders have been driven from power has opened up opportunities for transitions to political systems that are more just, inclusive and participatory.

The Libyan revolution began in mid-February 2011 as an uprising in the north-east of the country and in the Nafusa Mountains in the north-west, triggered by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as well as smaller local protests in Benghazi over the detention of a lawyer. Departing from the pattern of many weeks of protest in Tunisia and Egypt, government buildings on fire right from the outset in Libya. Within days, the unrest also spread to the capital Tripoli and other cities in the North-west.

Unlike in the neighboring countries, social movement, opposition parties and trade unions played no role here because no such organizations had been allowed to exist under Gaddafi. The actors of the uprising's first days were unorganized young men acting spontaneously, whose level of education and access to information technology is likely to have been significantly below those of their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia. Nor could they be identified as representatives of a growing middle class. The Libyan private sector is comparatively weak. Beyond the narrow elite, income differences are small within the rest of the population, which is characterized by underemployment and reliance on badly paid public sector jobs. The working class is made up almost exclusively of migrants.

Two developments were decisive for the revolt to escalate into revolution. The first was the regime¢s violent response to the protests. The more protesters were killed by the security forces, the more quickly political, military and tribal leaders joined the revolt to protect their families and cities. Civilians armed themselves and whole army units defected. The reason for this development lay in the strength of local, family and tribal loyalties. The defections of ministers, senior diplomats and army officers also underlined the weakness of state institutions. As a result, the country found itself in a state of civil war within two weeks of the protest erupting. The second key development was the establishment of the NTC in Benghazi in early March. With the NTC, an elitist leadership comprising of coalition of regime defectors and dissidents placed itself at the head of an initially unorganized uprising, vowing to bring down the regime.

The precedent set by the successful ousting of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, gave weight and focus to a wide range of other factors that pushed Libyans to begin mass protests in the eastern cities of Benghazi and al-Baydaa in February 2011. Both economic grievances and resentment of the autocratic nature of the Gaddafi regime lay behind the rapid development of the protests and eventual open insurrection.

The revolution that finally toppled Gaddafi was not the first uprising that Libya had experienced during his rule. Protests against his oppressive regime were relatively frequent, particularly in the eastern region of the country. These protests were always brutally quelled by military and security forces. Over more than 4 decades, Gaddafi faced several instances of serious political challenge by internal groups, foreign governments, and even from close colleagues aiming to overthrow him. He survived several failed *coups d'état* from the 1970s onward. The failed attempt with the most significant long-term consequences came in 1993,

leading Qadhafi to make major changes in his security apparatus and to marginalize most of the remaining comrades-in-arms from his own 1969 revolution (Yasin, 2011).

Rather than arising overnight, discontent with the pace and depth of political reform among Libyan intellectuals, and even some entrenched political elites, had been a constant factorô characterized by skepticism over the promises by the regime to introduce greater democracy. The democratization efforts of Saif al-Islam, Gaddafiøs second eldest son, clashed continuously with the authoritarian policies of the old guard. Reform-oriented transition toward democracy is by nature a lengthy process, requiring constant negotiation of changes to be introduced between the regimes and democratizing elites; but after 4 decades of Gaddafiøs authoritarian rule, patience for a lengthy process was exhausted.

The regimeøs hardliners were concerned that large-scale and rapid changes could undermine the countryøs political stability. These groups included those who had benefited from the system economically and politically. The tussle between the two groups was demonstrated through various public events, such as the sidelining of ministers and senior officers or the closure of newspapers (Walt, 2011:67). Several journalists working for Saif al-Islamøs publishing company, al-Ghad, were arrested by the Libyan authorities and later released by Gaddafi in late 2010.Tom Malinowski, director of Human Rights Watch in Washington, believed he observed the struggle between the reformers and hardliners first hand during an event organized to launch a report on the human rights situation in Libya in 2009. He commented that, õThere are clearly forces pressing for greater openness. Thatøs why weøre here. But there are also powerful forces who donøt want this process to succeed.ö(Zapita, 2010:89).

Gaddafiøs unwillingness to change the political system not only frustrated broad sectors of the ordinary Libyan population, but also upset his former close collaborators from

variousperiods of his rule. His one-man style of leadership left room for few friends around him. Many of his revolutionary colleagues, senior officers, and technocrats rebelled or quit their positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, some abandoned the country and joined opposition groups abroad. Key issues of disagreement between Gaddafi and his close associates varied over the years, but the most important ones included: Spending on financing and training insurgencies abroad;Direct intervention in other countriesø internal affairs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by supporting coups and rebel groups over the course of decades;The building of a large man-made river in the Libyan desert, seen as an irrational diversion of resources at a time of financial constraints in the 1980s;Plans for the succession and repeated long-term speculation over the possible appointment of one of Gaddafiøs sons to take his position (Frank, 1970)

Over the last decade of Gaddafiøs rule, the prominent role of Saif al-Islam in public life and political spheres was perceived as a strong indication of his future political role. In addition to Saif al-Islamøs ownership of the al-Ghad media company, his position as head of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation had allowed him to engage in political initiatives nationally and internationally. In 2009, a call by Gaddafi on Libyan regional and tribal leaders to find an official job for his son was well received: Saif al-Islam was appointed head of the Popular Social Leadership Committees, a position that allowed him broad legislative and executive powers. Following his election, he commented that this official position would allow him to deliver his political and economic reform plan entitled õLibya of Tomorrow.ö(Von Roh, 2011).

At the same time, the lack of clarity over Gaddafiøs plans for succession of power created enemies among both his close collaborators and ordinary Libyans. Silence over the succession plan, combined with the rising star of Saif al-Islam, created animosities within Gaddafiøs inner

circle of friends, known as the õmen of the tentö since the unspoken rule for decades had been that if Gaddafi were to disappear from the political scene, it would be one of his revolutionary colleagues who would be his successor. Saif al-Islamøs new political prominence was envied, because no other political figure was afforded the same opportunities; Gaddafiøs one-man style of leadership naturally precluded the emergence of any other leader in public spheres. The fact that Saif al-Islam was allowed to introduce new political initiatives and criticize his fatherøs regimeô in a context in which even Gaddafiøs close colleagues refrained from questioning his ideasô was perceived as a further implicit signal of Gaddafiøs intention to designate him as successor.

The limited market economy reforms introduced by Gaddafi in the late-1990s and during the 2000s were not sufficient to relieve poverty for a large number of ordinary Libyans, and instead were perceived as benefiting a small number of Gaddafiøs family members and his inner circle of loyal friends. This bred pessimism with regard to any likelihood of positive economic change in Libya under the former regime. Unemployment was a significant long-term issue in Gaddafiøs Libya. Official sources placed Libyaøs 2009 unemployment rate at 20.74 percent;6 with the youth unemployment rate higher, at 27 percent;at the time, 65 percent of the countryøs population was less than 35 years old. In parallel with other Arab oil-rich countries, high unemployment in Libya results largely from a long-term mismatch between the education system and the skills needed by the growing private sector, further complicated by high job expectations by graduates. A high proportion of Libyan graduates lack the adequate job-related skills required in a variety of sectors and industries (Stephen, 2011).As a consequence, a large number of nationals, especially young ones, remained unemployed, despite the positive economic growth that followed the lifting of the United Nations (UN) sanctions in September 2003.

The public investment spending of recent years on major infrastructure facilities, transport, housing and other construction, coupled with private investment in the oil and gas sectors, generated new job opportunities, but mainly in the low-skill sector that does not appeal to Libyans. Hence, until February 2011, some 2.5 million foreign migrants worked in construction and agriculture jobs.In addition, the scarcity of technical skills among Libyans meant that most of the limited available skilled jobs went to foreigners. To rectify this situation, Libyan authorities launched a package of incentives and measures for foreign companies to increase the number of Libyans in skilled positions. During a meeting of oil companies operating in Libya in 2009, Shukri Ghane, former Chairman of the Libyan National Oil Company, stressed the importance of training Libyan engineers for future tenders (Nayri, 2010).The development of skilled human resources remains a priority for the Libyan government to achieve its economic development and diversification plans.

High inflation rates caused by increasing food and housing prices, coupled with the unbalanced distribution of income, led to a deterioration of living conditions for many Libyan families and among unskilled foreign laborers. Libyans were particularly frustrated over the fall in standards of living, while the country had generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon exportsô many of which had been spent on Gaddafiøs foreign policy adventures of fighting imperialism or the unification of Africa. Ordinary citizens argued that a country rich in energy resources, with a relatively small population, should be able to offer high living standards to its population, in the same manner as in the rich Gulf States (Sheridan, 2011).

To prevent the spread of food riots that hit Tunisia and Algeria in the first week of January 2011, the Libyan government lifted taxes and import tariffs on basic food staples.Further measures were also announced, including granting loans for new businesses and housing

projects. This, however, was not enough to preempt dissent. Shortly after the flight of Tunisian president Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, protests erupted in Libyan cities. Socioeconomic grievances triggered riots in Benghazi and al-Baydaa. With the lack of affordable housing an acute problem in Libya for years, corruption and the governmentøs inability to deliver promised subsidized housing units in the scheduled timeframe had angered a broad section of the Libyan population in these cities and served as the direct trigger for protest action (Sharqieh, 2011).

4.3   TRIBES AND POLITICS DURING AND AFTER GADDAFI'S RULE

Despite a belated realization of the importance of the tribes in Libyan social and political affairs,tribal dynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper place as a major theme of discussion and analysis during and after the civil war. The political role of tribes cannot be understated in determining the future shape of Libya. New political elites are currently discussing the feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes in the future political system, while tensions along tribal lines remain a risk factor likely to complicate political transition in post-Gaddafi Libya.

There are more than 100 tribes and clans across Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab, Berber, and African. But it is important to stress that only a few are truly influential, and have dominated the political and social scene for decades. The leading tribes are the following:

É *Warfala*: the largest tribe in the country, with members spread across different Libyan cities, but considering Bani Walid as its home base;

É *Magarha*: the second most populous of Libyan tribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadi al-Shati and Sebha;

É*Zintan*: concentrated in the Nafusa mountains region in the western part of Libya. Most of its members belong to the Amazigh minority;

É*Obeidat*: located in the northeastern cities;

É*Zawiya*: located in the oil-rich southeast;

É*Qadhadhfa*: Qadhafiøs own tribe, based in Sirte and Sebha regions (Shalgam, 2011:102).

With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic, there are few studies available that provide up-to-date detailed information on the tribes. One of these few was written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at the University of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose empirical study described the tribe as a still important element shaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areas but also in urban centers.This runs counter to common expectations that the role of the tribe would have diminished among the youth or in the major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference to tribe remains current and popular among young urban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. In particular, the role of Libyaøs tribes in allocating socio-economic benefits and security in the absence of effective state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism across all Libyan regions (Rahim, 2011).

Making sense of the ambivalent political situation of the tribes requires a brief review of Libyaøs political history since its independence. The relation between tribes and politics was cemented in the early days of Libyaøs struggle for independence. The power base for the rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance between the Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes; the tribal nobility constituted a significant part of the Kingøs cabinet, serving as advisors and confidants.Over the course of the years following Gaddafiøs arrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he made attempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in place by the previous regime. Gaddafi replaced tribal notables who had occupied administrative positions at regional

level with young technocrats (Hajjar, 1980).The undermining and marginalization of the role of the tribes in the early days of Gaddafiøs revolutionary regime was driven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tactically, the aim was to remove any remaining elements loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nationalism was a strong ideological driver to move on from tribalism to a political system ready to embrace not only all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Gaddafi for years saw himself as successor to the late Egyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arab nationalist movement. Thus, when Gaddafi referred to õthe tribeö in his Green Book, the distillation of his political views published in stages throughout the 1970sô and omnipresent required reading in Libya under Gaddafiô it was without any distinct political connotation. Gaddafi envisaged the tribe as a key component of Libyan society in the same manner as the family, providing natural social protection to its members (Frank, 1970).

This attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Libyan politics did not succeed for long. Several factors pushed Gaddafi to use the tribes politically in order to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most important of these factors was a disagreement over key policy orientations and rifts among comrades of the Revolutionary Command Council, the supreme executive and legislative body that governed Libya after the 1969 coup and during the 1970s.In an open letter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one of Gaddafiøs close confidants who had served in several important positions in the 1970s before defecting to Egypt in 1975, described Gaddafiøs manipulation of the tribal factions. He noted that the tribal infighting of the past had been buried after independence, but that Gaddafi had revived these social divisions again in order to strengthen his grip on power (Hajjar, 1980).

A number of attempts to seize power prompted Gaddafi to accentuate tribalization still further. Most significant among these was the 1993 rebellion and coup attempt by military forces

in Misratah, which led to incidents in other Libyan cities including al-Zawiya and Sirt. In addition to arresting a number of army officers, Gaddafi responded by turning to his tribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposition.Gaddafi appointed several blood relatives and in-laws to key security and military positions, including Brigadier Ahmad Gaddaf al-Damm and Abdullah Sanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively. Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic positions including, finally, special envoy and representative of Gaddafi to some Arab countries. Sanoussi had an extended tenure as head of internal security. Several members of Gaddafi¢s tribe also took senior positions in the armed forces.

Manipulating tribes and building informal tribal alliances thus became an important part of Gaddafi¢s internal political maneuvering. The small size of the Gaddafi tribe, and its light political and economic weight, led Gaddafi to seek informal and tacit alliances with other key tribes in the country such as the Warfala and Magarha. Nepotism and favoritism became the pillars sustaining Gaddafi¢s informal political alliances. Appointing family members and key figures from allied tribes in important and leading positions was the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by the regime. Gaddafi strengthened his power by effectively playing the tribes against each other, promoting one tribe over the other in different parts of the country.

In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in public life was reinforced still further with the establishment of a nationwide system of People¢s Social Leadership Committees. Tribal and regional notables were the main members of these new committees, which took a number of social and bureaucratic functions over from the central state.These Committees provided welfare services to the local population, and served as a judicial forum to settle local conflicts. They also oversaw the implementation of socioeconomic programs in their own regions and localities (Altajuri, 1999).

The military provides a case study demonstrating the importance of tribalism in Gaddafiøs political system. In addition to the appointments of relatives and members of loyal tribes to key military positions in response to failed attempts to topple the regime, particularly the one in 1993, Gaddafi created a parallel security system made up of several special military units that were assigned to persons of trust, including his sons. These units, known as õKataeb al-Amniaö (õSecurity Brigadesö), were well-trained and equipped compared to the regular army.The best-known unit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade, known as the õKhamis Brigade,ö led by Gaddafiøs son Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi, a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and revolts against Qadhafiøs regime over the previous 4 decadesô as well as being at the source of the most recent one, which eventually ended Gaddafiøs rule (Altajuri, 1999).In the event, Gaddafiøs security calculations were proved entirely correct. In the early days of the February 17 revolution, several senior army officers defected and joined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff Abu-Bakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amnia constituted the main fighting elements opposing the rebels over the 8 months of the civil war.

The civil war period saw tribal leaders convening to discuss the security and political situation. A number of loyalty statements were issued, in favor either of Gaddafiøs regime or of the rebels. Tribal notables were keen to show their importance on the political scene, and that they were still a political force not to be ignored.Furthermore, in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delegations travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatari rulers for their support during the fighting.These visits have continued during the establishment of the new Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nationalists and a political elite aspiring to build a modern and unified democracy.Thus, in the interests of stability and the avoidance of

further conflict, the management and mitigation of Libya's tribal dynamics in the post-revolution environment is every bit as important as it was during the reigns of King Idris and Gaddafi himself, and the key nature of this challenge should not be underestimated by foreign partners engaging with the new Libyan regime (Pier, 2011).

4.4   EXTERNAL ACTORS IN THE OVERTHROW OF GADDAFI

Following the anti-establishment movements in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia, Libya too witnessed anti-regime rallies and protests, especially in the city of Benghazi located in the eastern Cyrenaican region of Libya. Eastern Libya, even in the past, has been at the forefront of rebellions against Ottoman and Italian rule. The legendary Omar Mukhtar, who fought the Italians, hailed from the region (Prashad, 2011). From Benghazi, the revolt spread quickly and Gaddafi ordered troops loyal to him to quell the rebellion. He announced the intention to õfight to the last drop of bloodö and in one of his idiosyncratic moods suggested that the rebels were õnothing more than Al Qaeda extremists, addled by hallucinogens slipped into their milk and Nescaféö. Meanwhile, the rebels set up a local governing council for Benghazi and also announced the formation of aNational Transitional Council, claiming to be the legitimate government of Libya. With this, Gaddafi intensified his crackdown aided by loyaltroops, special-forces under the command of his son Khamis as well asmercenaries from neighboring states. The issue of mercenaries haslingered long and there were also reports about atrocities committed bythe rebels against African migrant workers and black Libyans accusingthem to be part of the mercenary forces loyal to Gaddafi (Nkrumah, 2012:95).

4.5   UN INTERVENTION AND THE OVERTHROW OF GADDAFI

As the counter-offensive by Gaddafi intensified, most countriesevacuated their citizens from Libya. On 26 February, the UN SecurityCouncil passed resolution 1970 condemning Gaddafi's crackdown,putting in place an asset freeze and travel embargo of top officials,

andreferring the regimeøs actions to the International Criminal Court.Undeterred, Gaddafi proceeded with characteristic nonchalance targetingthe rebels and their sympathizers. France and Britain pushed for furtheraction against Gaddafi. French President Nicholas Sarkozy led from thefront in the campaign to intervene more forcefully in Libya. The primaryaim was to get the UN to declare a no-fly zone to protect the rebeløs underheavy bombardment from Gaddafiøs air-force. (The no-fly zone proposaldid not muster enough support to be included in resolution 1970). TheAnglo-French initiative with American support received the backing ofthe Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and on17th March, the Security Council passed resolution 1973 with ten votesin favor while five members (Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany)abstained from the vote. As soon as the resolution was passed, Gaddafiproposed a ceasefire but this was ignored as insincere (Munoz, 2011:44).

India decided to abstain from the vote since the report of the Secretary-Generaløs Envoy on Libyan situation had not yet been received andtherefore the õresolution was based on very little clear information,including a lack of certainty regarding who was going to enforce themeasuresö. India stated that it was in favour of giving priority to politicalefforts than military efforts in finding a solution in Libya. Brazil felt thatthe resolution went beyond the goal of enforcing the no fly zone. TheBrazilian envoy argued that the use of force as provided for in theresolution will not achieve the õimmediate end of violence and theprotection of civilians,ö and may õhave the unintended effect ofexacerbating the current tensions on the ground. Russia criticized thatthe õwork on the resolution was not in keeping with Security Councilpractice, with many questions having remained unanswered, includinghow the resolution would be enforced and by whom, and what the limitsof engagement would beö. China, while explaining its abstention stressedthe importance of respecting the UN charter and solving the crisisthrough

peaceful means. The Chinese envoy felt that õhis delegation hadasked specific questions that failed to be answered and, therefore, it hadserious difficulty with the resolutionö. Germany felt that the interventionposes great risks and there is the õlikelihood of large-scale loss of lifeö.The German envoy warned that the implementation of the resolution maylead to a protracted military conflict that could draw in the wider region (Mansour, 2011).

While the reasons cited for abstention by all the countries remain valid,the real reasons may be slightly different. None of the countries hadimmediate and sensitive stakes in Libya warranting an urgentintervention. China and India which had thousands of citizens in Libyamanaged to evacuate them several days before the resolution. With noclear indications about a future structure in Libya, these countries didnot want to risk Gaddafiøs ire if he manages to stay in power, especiallywith access to its oil wealth. At the same time, an abstention, whichensured that the resolution was not vetoed, suited the interests of therebels as well. Moreover, Russia and China are loath to set suchprecedents for intervention on the basis of humanitarian principles.

Therefore, these two countries crying hoarse over the coalition bombingsappeared to be nothing more than theatrics. Both Russian and Chinesemedia were scathing in their criticism of the bombing, convenientlyforgetting that their countries could have vetoed the resolution if theywanted. In Russia however, the coverage subsequently changedbecoming more neutral in tone.

French President Nicolas Sarkozyøs leadership in forging the coalitionand winning support for the UN resolution has not been surprising. It isno secret that France retains considerable interest in North Africa. It isalready involved in five African countries in some capacity at presentô Ivory Coast, Mali, Somalia, Burkina Faso and now Libya. The

Frenchreputation took a hit when the Tunisian revolution was in its nascent stages. The French foreign minister Michele Alliot-Marie suggested thatFrench riot police may be sent to Tunis to suppress the protestors. Eventhough she resigned soon, the damage was already done. So Libyaoffered Sarkozy a chance at redemption. Moreover, the FrenchPresidential election is due in 2012 and Sarkozyøs popularity is low. In spite of his strident rhetoric on multiculturalism8 and immigration, hisratings have been in a free fall. Perhaps there are people in Sarkozyøsinner-circle who hope that õLibya can do for Sarkozy what the Falklandsdid for Margaret Thatcheróanoint [Sarkozy as] a successful war leaderdeserving of re-electionö (Cooper, 2012). However, Sarkozyøs party UMP (*Union pour unMouvement Populaire*) performed badly in the local elections held afterthe interventions started in late March.

If Sarkozy led the campaign for intervention, the United States underPresident Barack Obama appeared to be hesitant in being a part of thecoalition. While Obama repeatedly made it clear that Gaddafi has lost hislegitimacy, he was non-committal on American intervention. ObamaøsDefense Secretary Robert Gates, his National Security Advisor ThomasDonilon and Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough arguedagainst getting involved militarily in a third Muslim country. The mostprominent voice on the other side of the fence favouring an active role inLibya was that of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Initially Obamaøsreluctance to be part of the coalition was so palpable that during theannual Gridiron Club dinner in Washington on March, the Presidentjoked about Hillary Clintonøs activism in the Middle East. Obamacommented, õThese past few weeks, itøs been difficult to sleep withHillary out there on Pennsylvania Avenue, shouting and throwing rocksat the windowsö. However, support for intervention also came fromObamaøs Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice (also former President BillClintonøs advisor on Rwanda), and Samantha Power, an influentialadvisor in Obamaøs

national security team (who also wrote a Pulitzerprizeówinning book on American responses to genocides) and thePresident finally decided to be a part of the coalition in Libya (Barigaba and Isaak, 2012).

Interestingly, President Obamaøs first formal announcement about themission was made not from Washington, but in Chile during his five dayLatin American trip. While confirming the American engagement, Obamareiterated that American role will be as brief as possible and that he plans to cede the leadership of the campaign at the earliest to someoneelse. Clearly, the US is also worried about putting boots on ground inLibya. Back in Washington, the President addressed the nation on Libyafrom the National Defense University on March 28. In his speech,Obama underscored the reasons behind his decision to participate in the coalition against Gaddafi and stressed on the humanitarian nature of theintervention in the light of the possible massacre in Benghazi. Obamaalso laid down a few parameters for this engagement as well asinterventions in future. He said that the US will act swiftly õif vitalnational security interests were at stake. He would consider it ifeconomic interests were threatened, or if there was a humanitarian crisisso deep that it could not be ignored. But in those two instances, hewould hesitate unless there was international participation, and the costwas not too highö (Goodman, 2012).

4.6   THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE OVERTHROW OF GADDAFI

The Arab Leagueøs position vis-à-vis the Libyan situation was crucial. Byvoting in favor of an intervention in Libya, it provided a helpfulnarrative to the United States, added the much needed local flavour andlegitimacy to the coalition and also smoothed the passage for a toughresolution in the Security Council. The UNSC resolution 1973unequivocally highlighted the importance of the Arab League in theformulation and implementation of the resolution.

Ironically, even as theLeague was passing a resolution stating that Gaddafi had completely lost his legitimacy because of the excesses he committed on his own people,Saudi Arabian and Emirati forces, aided by mercenaries were violentlyputting down anti-regime protestors in Manama. Moreover, there havebeen contradictory reports about the unanimity of the Arab Leagueresolution. Official statements and some reports suggested that thedecision was unanimous, but some others revealed that only eleven outof the twenty-two countries participated in the meeting and that Algeriaand Syria expressed their opposition to the intervention. For example,according to the *Al Jazeera* channel, there were in fact two resolutions atthe League meetingóone calling for a no fly zone and a second oneagainst foreign military intervention aimed at placating the dissenters (Mahmud, 2011).

Meanwhile the official Syrian news agency SANA had reported that Syria,Algeria and Mauritania registered their protest against sanctioningunilateral attacks on Libya. Or perhaps, as *The Telegraph* suggested, it is quite possible that theõArab leaders are deliberately saying one thing to the West and anotherto their subjectsö and therefore contradictions in the reports from Cairois understandable. Matters became worse once the coalition airstrikesbegan as the chief of Arab League Amr Moussa, roundly condemned theattacks, much to the chagrin of the allied leadership. According toMoussa, õwhat is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing ano-fly zone and we want is the protection of civilians and not the shellingof more civilians.ö(Madi, 2011). It was evident that there were cracks in the Arabworld. Moussa, being a consummate politician has been more sensitiveto the voice in the Arab street as he has an eye on the forthcomingPresidential elections in Egypt. Moussa, however, clarified the very nextday that he fully respects the Security Council Resolution, thuscompleting a series of political somersaults (Krauss, 2011).

4.7   THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE LIBYAN CONFLICT

Another regional organization, the African Union (AU) kept a low profile in the initial phases of the crisis. Many African leaders have been receiving generous financial support from Gaddafi, which is probably a reason that none of them came out openly against him. Moreover, Libya has close business ties with many African states with considerable investments. The African leaders are also wary about concepts like õhumanitarian interventionö and õregime changeö. South Africa, which voted in favour of the UN resolution after Jacob Zuma received a personal phone call from Barack Obama, came out strongly against the coalition airstrikes as soon as they began. Jean Ping, chairman of the Standing Commission of the AU, said that they were not consulted about the crisis before the UNSCR 1973 was passed and air strikes started (Johan, 2011). Not that the AU has a great record in resolving humanitarian crises and conducting cease-fire negotiations but it would have been appropriate to give the organization a chance before the start of the bombing campaign.

Many AU leaders feel aggrieved by the way in which the African response tothe Libyan conflict was thwarted and misrepresented. These complaints are notwithout justification. Speaking at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) heads of statemeeting in January 2012, South African President Jacob Zuma said:

> ÷Your Excellencies,it is the view of the AU that the 1973 Resolution of the
> UN SecurityCouncil was largely abused in some specific respects.Ø The
> resolution, adoptedon 17 March 2011 as Gaddafiøs forces closed in on the
> city of Benghazi, authorizedUN member states to take ÷all necessary
> measuresø to ÷protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas under threat of

attackø, provided only that they act in cooperationwith the UN secretary general and keep him and the Security Council informed(para. 4). The resolutionøs previous paragraphs also called for a ceasefire and accessfor humanitarian relief, and acknowledged the AU peace initiative (paras 1ó 2).

Zumaøs complaint was that the leading western nationsô France, Britain and theUnited States (collectively the ÷P3ø at the UNSC)ô selectively implemented onlythe provisions favourable to their objectives, ignoring the others, and moreoverexpanded the reference to ÷all necessary measuresø to include taking militaryactions beyond protecting civilians, leading directly to forcible regime change.Zumaøs complaint was all the more poignant because South Africa had been amember of the UNSC in March 2011, and had voted in favour of the resolution.Had South Africa led the three African nations on the Council to abstainor vote against the resolution, it would not have been passed. Zuma was advisedby his Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the words ÷all necessary measuresø threatenedto negate the AU initiative, being open to very flexible interpretation. Zuma÷therefore explicitly took the risk of voting in favour of Resolution 1973 with thefull knowledge that it might be a pretext for regime change on the part of someWestern powersø(McLeary, 2012).

The P3 leaders were aware of the fragility of the international consensus insupport of their military action, and knew that openly pursuing regime changewould endanger that consensus. They tried to resolve this by claiming that theywere simultaneously pursuing a military track for protecting civilians, and aparallel non-military track for democratic transformation. President BarackObama said:

Now, just as there are those who have argued against intervention in Libya, there are otherswho have suggested that we broaden our military mission beyond the task of protectingthe Libyan people, and to do whatever it takes to bring down Qaddafi and usher in a newgovernment.Of course, there is no question that Libyaô and the worldô would be better off withQaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal,and will actively pursue it through non-military means. But broadening our militarymission to include regime change would be a mistake í If we tried to overthrow Qaddafiby force, our coalition would splinter (McLeary, 2012).

The subsequent actions of the P3 indicate that such disavowal of regime changewas an exercise in dissimulation.When presented with the options of doing nothing or imposing a no-fly zone,President Obama had ruled out a no-fly zone on the basis that it would not besufficient to halt an impending massacre by Gaddafiøs ground forces should theyenter Benghazi. He knew that a military commitment to destroy those groundforces would bring the intervening powers into a state of war in Libya, whichcould end only with regime change. At no time did the United States or the UNpresent a plan for a negotiated political settlement (Aghazarm, 2012).

Official and media narratives in the West depicted events in Libya partly as arerun of the Tunisian uprising under a NATO umbrella, and partly as Iraq revisitedwithout the costs and risks of invasion. Africans saw the conflict throughother lenses. They saw popular pressure for democracy but also recognizedfeatures familiar from other African civil wars, threatening lawless mercenariesthat could easily spill across borders. Whether Gaddafi stayed or went, they

knewit would be important to engage politically.Africaøs approach was derided by most international commentators. Forexample, the BBCøs Will Ross wrote:

> The African Union does not have a good reputation when it comes to solving crises í anyintervention which does not involve the removal from power of Col. Gaddafi will be seenby some as the AU saving the Libyan leader. It has often been accused of standing up forthe incumbents and is criticized as being a club which serves the interests of the continentøspresidents more than the people. The situation is muddied by money. Col. Gaddafi hasbankrolled the AU for years and he has bought friends in Africa (Ross, 2012).

Barak Barfi of the New America Foundation made a similar charge, writingthat Gaddafi had ÷throw[n] in his lot with Africaø and ÷lavish[ed] his countryøsoil wealth on the continentøs impoverished nations í Today, Qaddafiøs Africanlargesse has paid off.ø In a *New York Times* article under all three of their names,President Obama, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozymentioned the Arab Leagueøs call for intervention but made no reference to theAU proposal that they had recently endorsed at the UNSC.The AU response went through several stages. The first protests in Libyaoccurred in the wake of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and the AU responsewas framed accordingly. Its guiding principle was the Constitutive Act of theAfrican Union (2002), which condemned unconstitutional changes in government.The drafters had not foreseen the possibility of democratic uprisings. Butthe AU chose not to invoke these principles to buttress the status quo againstpopular protest, but rather to stress the democratic nature of the uprisings. TheAU Peace and Security Council (PSC)

condemned the repression of demonstrationsin Tunisia and Egypt, in each case calling for democratic change (Hunter, 2011).

The first AU discussion on the Libyan crisis took place at the PSC meeting of23 February 2011, and focused on the Libyan authoritiesø repression of demonstrationsand Gaddafiøs threats against the opposition. The Libyan Ambassador inAddis Ababa spoke at length but did not sway the Council, whose communiquécondemned excessive use of force against demonstrators (Karim, 2011). But over the next weekit became clear that the uprising was turning into a civil war, and by the time ofthe next PSC meeting, two weeks later, the AU was thinking differently.The PSC meeting of 10 March, held at the presidential level, forged the Africandiplomatic response to the Libya crisis. The Council recommended that headsof state lead the initiative, anticipating that only they would have the requiredstanding to confront Gaddafi and rally the international community behind theAUøs efforts. The meeting was chaired by the Mauritanian President, MohamedOuld Abdel Aziz. At this very early stage, many African leaders privately recognizedthat the Arab Spring meant that Gaddafi could not remain in power. But,in the words of President Déby, they should also ÷beware of opening the LibyanPandoraøs boxø. Libyaøs Saharan neighbours were aware that if Gaddafiøs grip onthe sundry transnational armed groups present in Libya were to be relaxed, at justthe same time as the vast arsenals in his many military bases were opened; instabilitycould rapidly spread across the region.

The meeting discussed a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance (including the protectionor evacuation of African migrant workers), and an inclusive peace agreementcombined with a democratic transition. The PSC communiqué emphasizedthe Libyan peopleøs legitimate aspirations to democracy, political reform, justice,peace and security, and reiterated the AUøs ÷strong and unequivocal condemnationof the indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons,

whoever it comes from,resulting in the loss of life, both civilian and military, and the transformationof pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellionø (Gaddafi later expressed hisoutrage at this language).The most substantive element was paragraph 7, which became known as the-roadmapø:

> The current situation in Libya calls for an urgent African action for: (i) the immediatecessation of all hostilities, (ii) the cooperation of the competent Libyan authorities tofacilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations, (iii) theprotection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya, and (iv) theadoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the elimination of thecauses of the current crisis.

Although Gaddafiøs leaving office was not explicitly mentioned, the roadmapwas designed as a way for the Brother Leader to step down in a timeframe ofmonths, handing over to an inclusive interim government that would pave theway for elections. The PSC set up an ad hoc high-level committee to implementthe roadmap, including the presidents of Mauritania (in the chair), Republic ofCongo, Mali, South Africa and Uganda (Habboush, 2011).

The roadmap and the ad hoc committee emerged from hard-won compromise.The AU recognized that it needed to engage in the Libyan conflict if it wasto remain a relevant actor. But it was handicapped by divisions among memberstates. Thus the membership of the ad hoc committee signaled that all points ofview would be accommodated, and the language of the roadmap remained inspirational.Given the pressures on the AU leaders to do the minimum, the subsequentactivities of the ad hoc committee were remarkably robust.The first meeting of the ad hoc committee was scheduled for the Mauritaniancapital Nouakchott on 19 March, after which

its members would fly to Libya.Much happened in the intervening week, including the rapid reversal of theLibyan oppositionøs initial gains and Gaddafiøs uttering his threat to Benghazi andits inhabitants. On 17 March, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973. South Africaproposed the language in paragraph 2, which made positive mention of the AUinitiative, and all three African members voted in favour.

The meeting in Nouakchott on 19 March coincided with President Sarkozyøs summit for the support of the Libyan peopleø, and AU leaders interpreted thetiming of that meeting as a snub to them. Amr Moussa, secretary general of theArab League, went to Paris; Ping declined to go, later commenting that he wassurely right not to attend for a lunch and a photo opportunity, lending legitimacyto anotherøs agenda.22The Nouakchott meeting was hosted by President Aziz; others presentincluded Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, Amadou ToumaniTouré (widely known as ÷ATTø) of Mali, ministers representing presidents YoweriMuseveni of Uganda and Zuma of South Africa, and senior AU officials. Mauritaniaprovided a plane for the planned flight to Tripoli the following day, but onthat same day the P3 air forces began military operations to enforce the no-flyzone. Aziz received a curt message from the US and the UN saying that, shouldthe Africans proceed with their flight, their security could not be guaranteed. Hedecided to postpone their visit.None of the African leaders travelled to London for the meeting on 29 March offoreign ministers and leaders from the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference,the European Union and NATO. At that meeting, the Libya Contact Group(LCG) was established, without the AU. The LCG called for Gaddafi to relinquishpower and expressed support for the National Transitional Council (NTC).By this time, one of the AUøs biggest failings was becoming apparent: itsnear-total lack of public diplomacy. The AU did not provide briefings to theinternational press and specialist groups which were important in forming

internationalopinion, even though some of theseô notably the International CrisisGroups were skeptical about P3 military action. Eusebius McKaiser has called theAU initiative ÷a decent plan lost due to poor public diplomacyø As has often beenthe case, the AU allowed others to tell the story, and those others did not presentthe AUøs role in a positive light, or at all (Mckaiser, 2012).

The PSC met again on 31 March and started technical consultations that resultedin a proposal for a UN peacekeeping force. The ad hoc committeeøs next attemptat a mission to Libya began ten days later. Four presidents convened in Nouakchotton 9 April: Aziz, Sassou Nguesso, ÷ATTø and Zuma. This time the UN gave themclearance to fly to Tripoli and they met with Gaddafi the following day.At that meeting, Gaddafi insisted that his country was a victim of aggressionand that Africa should stand on his side. He spoke at length about his unhappinesswith the 10 March PSC communiqué and rejected accusations that his armyand security services had killed civilians. Instead, he accused the demonstrators ofbeing drug addicts, criminals and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists. Gaddafi adamantlyopposed any visit to Benghazi by the AU leaders. In response, the four presidentsinsisted that the communiqué was fair and that attacks against civilians had to stop.Touré reminded Gaddafi that he had advised other African leaders to enter intodialogue with opposition groups, and said that the Libyan government similarlyhad no choice but to negotiate with the NTC. The African leaders emphasizedthat any solution had to be based on democracy and human rights. They alsoargued that Libya lacked the means to stand up to the international coalition andthat its leader should therefore be realistic about his options.

Finally, they toldGaddafi that they would continue to Benghazi whether he liked it or not.Gaddafi accepted, in principle, the AU roadmap, including the ceasefireand negotiations. The next day the committee (with the significant absenceof President Zuma) flew to Benghazi, where the NTC leadership rejected theplan outright. Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the NTC,

announced that theroadmap was unacceptable because it did not include Gaddafi's immediate departure. "Gaddafi must leave immediately if he wants to survive," he said. "Any initiativethat does not include the people's demand, the popular demand, essentialdemand, we cannot possibly recognise … We cannot negotiate with the blood ofour martyrs."(Mcleary, 2011).

Stopping bloodshed was the AU's immediate objective. It was also the statedpriority of the UN under Resolution 1973. The AU leaders' principal diplomatic advantage was that they could credibly make the case to Gaddafi that he shouldboth stop his assault on civilian populations and step down. In other circumstances,western powers might well have pressed the NTC to compromise andaccept a ceasefire. In other conflicts, the AU had worked well with P3 diplomatson comparable proposals, jointly providing credibility and operational modalities.On this occasion, there was not even symbolic support for the AU's efforts.At this stage, the AU's proposals were general. The nature of Gaddafi's departurewas not specified. The AU began discreet talks with leaders across Africa tofind a country willing to receive him. Another idea floated was that Gaddafi couldretire to Sirte or Sebha, where African soldiers could guard him (Felter and Fishman, 2011). However, whilethe AU had made proposals for a ceasefire, including monitors (in particular inMisrata) or an inter-positioning force (e.g. on the front line near Benghazi), membercountries did not volunteer to send the military observers and troops needed.Because of its lack of capacity, the AU canvassed the idea of UN peacekeepers.

Most significantly, Africa was divided. While most of the continent wantedGaddafi gone with minimal disruption, a few leaders were sympathetic to the "Brother Leader". Chad and Niger, fearful of spillover, leaned towards Gaddafi.Algeria took a strict non-interventionist position. Some other African leaderswere so antipathetic to Gaddafi that they would have no truck with compromise.Sudan and Tunisia were heavily involved in supporting the NTC. The

EthiopianPrime Minister Meles Zenawi not only nurtured a personal dislike of Gaddafi,but was also furious over Libyan support to Eritrea.29 These divisions enabled P3diplomats to ignore the AU.The AU convened an extraordinary summit meeting on 25 May, at which itcalled for an immediate pause in fighting, for ceasefire monitors, and for a frameworkagreement for a political solution, including a transitional period culminatingin elections. The chairperson's report reflected anger at the P3's selectiveinterpretation of Resolution 1973:

> It is becoming increasingly clear that the pursuit of the military operations will not onlyundermine the very purpose for which resolutions 1970 and 1973 (2011) were adopted, i.e.the protection of civilians, but also compound [*sic*] any transition to democratic institutions,while adding to the threats facing the countries of the region in terms of securityand terrorism and the socio-economic burden resulting from the repatriation of migrantworkers. This is all the more urgent as the military campaign is significantly expandingbeyond the objectives for which it was in the first place authorized, raising questions aboutthe legality and legitimacy of some of the actions being carried out and the agenda beingpursued.

The AU's position reflected a fear that if members of the UNSC could interpreter solutions in such a manner, then Africa would be at risk of other foreign interventions.As a politically weak continent, Africa's interest lies in strict compliancewith international law.Five days later, after consulting with the Russians, President Zuma flew toTripoli to present the AU's proposals and deliver a clear message to Gaddafithat he had to leave. The African leaders were convinced that Gaddafi remainedcommitted to the roadmap, including his promise not to be part of the transition.Zuma held a lengthy meeting at which Gaddafi disappointed him: the

Libyanleader restated his commitment to ‑not being part of the negotiation processes,but also insisted that he was not ready to leave the country. Family membersand close supporters of Gaddafi had reportedly vetoed the plan for transition.The next day in Benghazi, Abdul Jalil repeated that there was no possibility oftalking to Gaddafi. A week later, President Aziz said publicly that Gaddafi ‑canno longer lead Libya. His departure has become necessary í He must be made toleave without causing more damage.ø(Watkins, 2011).

By June, however, the war appeared to have descended into stalemate, whichencouraged those pushing for a negotiated solution. Russia dispatched its specialenvoy, Mikhail Margelov, to consult with African leaders and to speak to bothsides in Libya. And finally Gaddafi began sending out feelers to western countries,intimating that he might indeed talk to France and the NTC about steppingdown.The AU spelled out its framework agreement for a political solution to thecrisis in Libya at a meeting in Pretoria on 26 June. When the framework waspresented at the AUøs regular summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the followingweek, the debate was heated. Britain and France sent emissaries who met privatelywith African leaders and said that they would object to any mention of a ceasefirein the resolutions. Ethiopia agreed: Prime Minister Meles argued that Africaneeded Gaddafi gone, and although it would have been preferable for Africa to dothe housecleaning, it could not object if someone else was ready to do the job onAfricaøs behalf. Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal supported the Ethiopian position.But the ad hoc committee reported on sufficient progress with both Libyan partiesto gain the summitøs endorsement of the framework (Micheal, 2013).

The P3 were uninterested in real negotiations. At the same time, albeit ina different context, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the USposition in the starkest terms: ‑But the bottom line is, whose side are you on? Areyou on Qaddafiøs side or are you on the side

of the aspirations of the Libyan peopleand the international coalition that has been created to support them?øß8 Relationswere further soured by the request from the prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) on 27 June, just days before the Malabo summit, that arrestwarrants be issued for Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and Abdalla al-Sanussi, headof military intelligence. This move from the ICC, which had never before actedwith such speed, jeopardized the option of Gaddafiøs going quietly into exile. TheAU summit resolved that Africa would not cooperate with the ICC warrants, adecision derided by the international press as further evidence of the AUøs preferencefor siding with rich dictators (Micheal, 2013).

The framework called for a cessation of hostilities and a ̶humanitarian pauseøin NATO military activities (the latter a Libyan government demand), leadingto a comprehensive ceasefire with a UN peacekeeping operation. Alongside theceasefire, it envisaged immediate negotiations, facilitated by the AU and the UN,with the aim of establishing an inclusive, consensual interim government, leadingto democratic elections. The AU framework received strong backing from Russia.The UN special envoy, Abdel Elah al-Khatib, had comparable ideas, but the AUhad the only comprehensive plan on the table.Despite formal references to a ceasefire and negotiations with Gaddafi, the LCGhad no serious plans for either. Meeting in Istanbul on 15 July, it recognized theNTC as the ̶legitimate governing authority in Libyaø and demanded that Gaddafirelinquish power. In a snub to the AU, the LCG ̶reaffirmed the leading role ofthe United Nations in facilitating dialogue and supporting an inclusive politicaltransition processes, and mentioned the AU only in passing. This snuffed outany NTC interest in the AU plan. The next day, a US delegation met Libyangovernment officials to repeat the message, offering Gaddafi just one concession:that he could remain in Libya, but only if the NTC were to agree. After that, it is unsurprising that Gaddafi did not reply to the AU.Events on the war front accelerated: on 21

August NTC fighters entered Tripoliand the war swung decisively in their favour. Key African governments such asthose of Nigeria and Ethiopia recognized the NTC at once, and called for theAU to do the same. Thereafter, the AUøs diplomatic efforts were at best remedial,reiterating its proposal for a national dialogue and an all-inclusive transitionalgovernment.

While the AU was pursuing a negotiated settlement, one member stateô Sudanô was actively involved in providing military support to the Libyan opposition, indiscreet coordination with Qatar and NATO. Sudanese involvement has not beenfully documented and assessed, but undoubtedly played an important role in theNTC victory. This section of the article draws upon information from Sudanesemilitary and intelligence sources, where that information can be verified independently. Sudanøs own claims are more ambitious and remain unverified.One of the elements of the ÷Obama Doctrineø, as evident in the US administrationøssupport for the Anglo-French initiative on Libya, was that the UnitedStates should not act alone. However, the US President was careful in the friendshe chose to name (Goodman, 2012).

In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strongand growing coalition. This includes our closest alliesô nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkeyô all of whom havefought by our sides for decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar and the UnitedArab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.Obamaøs reasons for not naming the country that provided the biggest militarycontribution on the groundô Sudan are not difficult to fathom. The mostoutspoken proponents of US military action against Gaddafi were members of theadministration who had also entertained or advocated similar action against theSudanese government, invoking the principle of the ÷responsibility to protectø (Goodman, 2012).The fact that Sudan has also been reticent about explaining its activities illustratesthe

extent to which it has given up on expecting any reward from leading westerncountries. Nonetheless, the role of Sudan constitutes an important piece of theuntold story about Africa and the Libyan conflict.

Active Sudanese security preparation for action against Libya began in 2010,as soon as it became clear that Libya was not going to support the Sudanó Chad *rapprochement* and would continue to back JEM. Sudanese intelligence had alreadypenetrated its Libyan counterpart, which was reputedly the least efficient in theArab world. Sudan built a new military base in the northern Sudanese desert, forsurveillance of the Libyan border, including a landing strip for drones and a supplybase for human and electronic ground surveillance. Meanwhile Sudanese intelligenceofficers became more active inside Libya and along its southern borders.As soon as the uprising against Gaddafi began, Sudan took notice. It mobilizedmilitary units towards the Libyan border, ostensibly to contain the threat of aproliferation of weapons from the opening of Libyaøs arsenals. The director ofthe National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) spoke to his counterpartsin Egypt and Chad, seeking a joint alliance in favour of the opposition. Chad wasleery of taking sides against Gaddafi and Egypt was worried both about reprisalsagainst Egyptian migrant workers in Libya, and about arms falling into the handsof Islamists. So Sudan went it alone (Blake, 2011).

The initiative to escalate the Sudanese role came partly from the Benghazigroup of Libyan rebels, which even before the formation of the NTC dispatchedan emissary to meet with President Omar al-Bashir. This was Dr Ahmed Zwaee,a native of Benghazi, part of whose tribe lives in Kufra, the main town in thedesert on the road to Sudan. He asked for assistance, and Bashir offered him asmuch as he wanted. Zwaeeøs delegation took more than enough to liberate

Kufra,reportedly 44 vehicles with heavy and light weapons. This was the first of severalshipments of supplies (Blake, 2011).

In addition, the Sudanese army dispatched an infantry battalion and a tankcompany to help take control of Kufra. After occupying the town, the Sudaneseforces withdrew, leaving a small number of technicians to assist the opposition.However, Kufra remained insecure and control changed twice before the NTCgained definitive control by the end of April. Units from JEM fought on behalfof Gaddafi. Because of the problems in Kufra, the Sudanese opened a secondroad across the desert, cutting across the south-western corner of Egypt at Jebel Uweinat. This became the major overland supply route to the NTC, allowing astream of foreign military supplies to reach the NTC.Supporting the NTC was a major logistical operation by the Sudanese army,especially at a time when it was mobilizing to confront threats from the SudanPeople's Liberation Army in the run-up to South Sudan's independence on 9 July.Sudan provided weapons and ammunition, communications equipment, intelligenceofficers and trainers. Though few in number, the trainers were importantin enhancing the NTC's battlefield capabilities, enabling its forces to use weaponssystems and coordinate actions. The Sudanese gave us anything and everything,'said a former Libyan general who assisted the NTC with training (Williams, 2012:195). Sudan alsosent 20 forward air controllers, hoping to direct NATO air strikes onto loyalistforces in southern Libya. Although Sudanese requests for air strikes were not met,the real-time intelligence on the movement of Gaddafi's forces in southern Libyawas valued by NATO.

By June, as the war threatened to descend into a de facto partition of Libyabetween west and east, the Sudanese joined Qatar in supporting the NTCmilitary effort to take Tripoli from the western part of the country. PresidentBashir made no secret of Sudanese support for the NTC. In

October 2011 hetold a public rally: ‑Our weapons reached the revolutionaries in Misrata, Al-Jabalal-Gharbi and Zawiya í the forces that liberated Tripoli were armed 100 percentby Sudan.ø Allowing for Bashirøs hyperbole, the essence of the claim was notuntrue. Abdul Jalil confirmed the support when he welcomed Bashir to Tripoliin January 2012 (Micheal, 2013).

Therefore, ironically for an intervention that began with invoking the ‑responsibilityto protectø, the P3øs military operations were conducted in coordinationwith Sudan. Whether or not Sudanese claims about the crucial nature of theircountryøs assistance are correct, there is no question that Sudanese military andintelligence cooperation was important to the success of the NTC ground forcesand the P3óNATO air campaign.

After the NTC victory, the Sudanese continued to cooperate with their Libyancounterparts. This includes joint monitoring of the southern borders of Libya.Reportedly, Sudanese intelligence located Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi in the desert,enabling NTC forces to apprehend him. However, Sudan did not follow up onits military and intelligence successes by appointing a senior diplomat or politicalfigure to represent it in Libya, thereby squandering much of the political capital itmight otherwise have gained. This failure arose from the internal political difficultiesof the Sudanese government in the wake of the secession of South Sudan, andthe inability of the leadership to develop and implement a new strategy for thisnew era in the nationøs history (Gerrad, 2011).

4.8   THE NATO AND COALITION CAMPAIGN IN LIBYA

The first wave of the coalition attacks in Libya came predictably fromFrance (Operation Harmattan) with the Dassault Rafael bombersdestroying Libyan tanks attacking the rebels. Soon after, the UnitedStates (Operation Odyssey Dawn), the UK (Operation Ellamy),Canada(Operation Mobile) and a few other countries joined the coalition inenforcing the

UNSCR 1973.In the first few days of the coalition intervention, Gaddafiøs forcessuffered considerable setbacks and the rebels made some headway intaking control of a few key cities and installations. However, as theattacks went on, Gaddafi altered his tactics, kept his tanks andarmoured columns well camouflaged and managed to thwart rebeladvances. The United States on 31st March ceded leadership of thecoalition forces and NATO formally assumed charge of the mission, nowrenamed as Operation Unified Protector. The present mission iscommanded by the American four star admiral James G. Stavridis who isNATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR). He is assistedby the Canadian Lt. General Charles Bouchard who serves as theOperational Commander, Lt General Ralph J. Jodice II (United States) as Air Commander and Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri (Italy) who serves as theMaritime Commander. As NATO took over, the US started withdrawingits combat jets, missile ships and submarines. Since the American A-10Thunderbolt tank-busters and AC-130 Specter gunships are pulled back,the British and French forces leading NATO have been finding itincreasingly difficult to summon effective firepower to counter Gaddafiøsforces. Understandably, the situation appears to be heading towards astalemate with both Gaddafiøs army and the rebel fighters struggling togain the upper hand. There have also been instances in which NATOforces mistakenly targeted the rebel fighters resulting in severalcasualties and vociferous protests.

A couple of peace initiatives were also proposed during this period.Gaddafiøs son Saif proposed a plan õwhich would limit the role of hisfather and include opposition figures in an interim government. Electionswould be held in the near future and a reconciliation process put inplace.ö This was rejected by the rebels and another peace mission wasinitiated by the African Union (AU) under South African President JacobZumaøs leadership. The AU delegation managed to meet Gaddafi inTripoli on 10th April and conveyed the key elements of their planó

immediate ceasefire, relief supplies and negotiation between the twogroups. While Gaddafi appeared to be in agreement with the plan, therebels rejected it as it did not ensure the immediate ouster of Gaddafi (Pier, 2011).

On the political front, a Libya Contact Group was formed on March 29th in London with representatives from 40 nations to oversee the emergingsituation in Libya and to act as a political liaison with rebel councilsoperating out of Benghazi. The group met in Doha on April 13th, and themeeting felt that the õmilitary impasse between the Gaddafi regime andthe rebels has turned into a long haulö. This belief has been reaffirmedby the decision of the group to meet once a month, with the next sessiondue in Italy. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General has appointedAbdullah al Khatib of Jordan as his representative to Libya, who isscheduled to meet the representatives of the rebels as well as Gaddafi (Chonuh, 2011).

4.9   EUROPEAN UNION'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

The primary motive for the joint action by France and United Kingdom was to speedup the democratization process of the Arab and its adjacent countries so as to realize theEuropean long-term strategic interests and promote its values there. Put it simply, thereare three key points underlying the military operation.First, from the geopolitical, economic and security perspectives, theMediterranean-rim countries headed by France used to attach their core strategicinterests to North Africa, West Asia, therefore the õNew Neighborhood Policyö advocatedby EU - whilst France is fully committed to setting up õMediterranean Coalitionö ó setsout to consider the stability in that region as their overriding objective in order to realizeits own and European interests there.

Second, in view of the great impact brought about by the õArab Springö since thebeginning of the yearmany European countries have finally agreed that regional stabilitywas

seriously endangered and the development of the situation was of great historicsignificance especially to Europe and it would have a lasting impact once thedemocratization process has been started. Hence a directional readjustment has to bemade in EUøs policyô a change from an emphasis on maintaining regional stability to thepromotion of õin-depth democracyöô so that it would help the EU realize its objective ofmaintaining long-term stability in the southern part of Mediterranean sea in the future.

Third, in the eyes of the EU, the development of situation in Libya, which stands incontrast to the peaceful transition of power in Tunis and Egypt has posed a seriouschallenge to the directional adjustment of European strategy. The ruthless crackdownagainst the disadvantaged rebels by Gaddafiøs government forces would not only destroythe latter and derail the democratization process in Libya but also have demonstrativeeffect for other countries in the region, and thus spell doom for the õcolor revolutionö inArabian countries. Therefore it has become EUøs irrevocable and clearly stated politicalobjective to õcompel Gaddafi regime to renounce power to make Libya quickly embark onthe road toward democratic transition in an ordered wayö. And what precisely propelledthe EU countries to take military action was Gaddafiøs hard and uncompromising attitudetowards the West.

Undoubtedly, France and UK have played an irreplaceable role in the Libyan crisis,which means that without their joint intervention in the crisis it is inconceivable toachieve the desired results, hence it is worthy of our attention probe into the reasons andthe effect behind the military intervention.Here are the main reasons for the Anglo-French alliance in the intervention:First, both countries were of the opinion that military strike against Libya was notonly militarily feasible but also in their own strategic interests. Geopolitically, historicallyand realistically, France has always regarded Africa and North Africa in particular (countries around the

Mediterranean Sea)as their traditional sphere of influence, and soFrance has always been a strong advocate for õNew Neighborhood Policyö andõMediterranean Coalitionö (Gaddafi was opposed to the latter). Situated at thestrategically important juncture, which France considered pivotal to its interest, Libyaøsinternal development has always been accorded with due attention by the SarkozyAdministration that has maintained a close relationship with the rebels in Libya.

Todemonstrate its status as big power and its leadership role in the crisis, France thusbecame the ardent proponent for military action against Libya. And it is also the case withUK, which stresses õthe importance of North Africa to the strategic interest of the EUöand that õthe military strike against Libya is in full accordance with its own nationalinterestö. As for their comprehensive national strength and political status, both countriestop the rest of EU countries in terms of defense capability, whose defense budget rankthird and fourth respectively with their combined defense expenditure half of the Europe.Whatøs more, both UK and France are the standing members of the UN Security Councilwith nuclear deterrence capability. Both of them wish to be at the strategic forefront ofEurope and regard themselves as õglobal powers ready to commit their military forces ontheir ownö

Second, with the development of the both internal and external situation, France andthe UK has found converging security interests, which have further promoted their effortsin defense cooperation. Both sides share the opinion that õit is inconceivable that the coreinterest of one side will remain intact if the strategic interests of the other side areseriously jeopardized.ö (This actually constitutes the basis of their cooperation.) In recentyears, With the resolve of France to return to NATO command structure to develop EUøsown defense diminishing and cost of hi-tech weapons research skyrocketing, bothcountries have set out to create a framework of cooperation, by which they signed a treatyof Defense Cooperation in November 2011, clearly stating that they

would undertake jointnuclear tests, coordinate the operation of aircraft carriers and establish a õjoint taskforceö and carry out other mutually supportive missions. That treaty, so to speak, affordsa system arrangement for their eventual joint action the Libyan crisis. At the same timeboth countries also admit that it is very difficult for each side to accomplish the mission atone stroke, which as one British newspaper aptly put, õMr. Sarkozy would not go it alone.He always reckons his alliance with Cameron critically important.ö

Third, it is very difficult to reach a consensus on the military intervention amongEuropean countries. European security and defense cooperation, which belongs to thehigh-end realm of European integration process, usually involves sensitive issues andcomplex issues and is therefore hard to come by, as is evidenced in the crisis. As is knownto all, since the Kosovo War, the EU has decided to quicken its pace to put forward theirõcollective security and defense policyö, but it was mainly confined to peace-keeping andhumanitarian missions with no substantial progress made for some reasons or other. Andas for the Libyan Crisis though all member states of the EU agreed that Gadhafi regimehas lost its legitimacy and should be removed from power, they still could not reach aconsensus on military strike initiated by the UK and France. Germany, for instance, wereclearly in favor of a political settlement (which cast a vote of abstention on the UNResolution 1973 and forbade all its ships to enforce the arms embargo against Libya).Italy and some other member states in the Middle and Eastern Europe also hadreservations about the military strike. It was under such circumstances that France andthe UK had but to rely on their coordination and cooperation efforts to undertake themission.

Specifically, the primary functions France and the UK performed before and after theintervention are as follows:

(1) In order to secure the legitimacy of their military campaign they have conductedan all-round diplomacy. The key points of European security and strategic orientationafter the Cold War involves an emphasis on õeffective multilateralismö, the importance ofinternational organizations and regulations, which have been clearly laid out in therelevant documents of the EU, France and the UK. Therefore, while busy preparing forthe military operation; France and the UK have conducted a flurry of lobbying activitiesin order to secure the consent of international community.To this end, they first emphasized the necessity and urgency of õhumanitarianinterventionö in Libya. In a joint letter to the chairman of European Council(it is a veryimportant letter in which they made known their attitudes and stance on the crisis), Mr.Sarkozy and Cameron emphasized that Gaddafiøs use of force to crack down on theLibyans has practically constituted a crime against humanity and it was totallyunacceptable and should be condemned. They also called for UN concern about thecritical humanitarian situation in Libya. (At the same time they also supported the idea ofan inspection by the International Criminal Court.) In their joint letter to the UN theyexpressed willingness to provide any kind of support ranging from õthe enforcement ofno-fly zone to the air strike so as to put an immediate to Gaddafiøs suppression of its owncivilians.ö Proceeding on this basis both countries suggested that the key points coveredby the UN resolutions should include the necessity of protection of Libyan civilians andurgency of humanitarian intervention.

In order to carry out their mission successfully they have to secure the sanction ofthe parties involved including the Arab League and the UN. Given the complexity of thesituation of North Africa and West Asia, it is very important for them to obtain theconsent of Arab countries so as to avoid the unanimous condemnation of other countriesas was demonstrated in the case of Iraq War. So time and again both France and the UKhas reaffirmed that Arab countries should

õtake the initiative to ask forö foreignintervention so as to accord due legitimacy for their mission and gain the eventualauthorization of the UN. To this end, both countries began to launch a series ofdiplomatic activities on three levels.

The first level pointed directly to the rebels, which already has an intimaterelationship with France. Against this background, Mustafa Abdul JalilChairman of theNational Transitional Council made a request to the international community to set upthe no-fly zone (which was later regarded as the legal basis for the military campaign byFrance, the UK and the USA). The second level involves an effort to rally the support ofthe Arabian countries, whose importance has been repeatedly emphasized by France,and has been subject to its lobbying at the very beginning of the intervention. It wasunder Sarkozyøs strenuous efforts that the Arab League appealed to the UN on 12 Marchto take measures to protect the Libyan people. (French foreign minister Alain Juppemaintained that the campaign was quite different from the Suez Canal War since theLibyan intervention gained the approval of the Arabian countries.) The last level involveslobbying for approval among the UN security members in order to secure the eventualpassage of Resolution 1973 and the setting up of õno-flyö zone. The resolution, whichcalled for the protection of Libyan people and õthe use of all means necessaryö (which wasonly limited to air strike without committing ground forces), has been regarded as aõlegitimate authorizationö of the UN and a diplomatic victory for France and the UK.

(2) Formation of the õcoalition of the willingö to ensure the successful carrying out ofthe strike. It is necessary to form the so-called õcoalition of the willingö because the key tothe success of their joint operation would closely hinge on the participation of the UnitedStates, whose ambiguous attitude towards their military intervention may even backfire.So Cameron, by taking advantage of the special relationship with the U.S., went to greatlength to persuade the Obama

Administration to agree to take part in the campaign.When the headquarters of the rebel forces was in imminent danger, the three countries(France, the UK and the USA)immediately launched the air attack (on 19March,2011)against Libya in less than 48 hours shortly after the passage of the UN Resolution 1973.During the strike, France bombed the government forces of Gaddafi forestalling the fall ofBenghazi, while the UK and US forces were responsible for the bombing of air defensefacilities, and the no-fly zone was set up in less than a week.

(3) A strong politically propelling power and the key force in the military strike.Both the UK and France have managed to assemble all the forces they could to ensure thesuccess of the operation. Even against the background of shrinking budget deficit for bothcountries, the UK, for example, still managed to dispatch dozens of fighters and onesubmarine and several escort warships (the maximum number it could ever deploy,according to one senior officer of the UK); as for France it has committed even moretroops, including its naval air force and the aircraft carrier de Charles de Gaulle, which,according to the British press, has greatly strained its military might. Among the eightcountries that took part in the air strike since NATO took over the command, France wasthe most resolute one in pushing for the air strike and undertook most of the airoperations against Libya. Three months after the air campaign, most the EU countrieswere bogged down by their own financial resources. (Norway decided to scale down itsforces and would pull out on 1 August.) In spite of that, the governments of the UK andFrance still declared to the world that õGadhafi must step downö and that the operationthat has lasted for several moths proved to be effective and would be õintensifiedö in thedays to come and they would not set a deadline for the whole operation. Shortly afterward,they stepped up their attack both in scale and intensity and even bombarded the groundtargets with precision by using attack helicopters. According to related reports by the endof the operation in the first half of September, NATO has made a total

of 22,000 bombingsorties, of which one third were undertaken by France and the UK. Of the 5000 destroyedmilitary targets, 40% of which were bombed by the fighters of UK and France.

To this, US ambassador to NATO admitted that the UK and France had played anõunprecedentedö role in the air strike against Libya. NATO Secretary-general also pointedout that õapart from the US, Europe can still boast the most advanced and formidablemilitary capability in the worldö, which has enabled it to õplay a pivotal role in carryingout a complex military operation.ö President Sarkozy reaffirmed the historic significanceof the joint intervention by France and the UK to Europe. He indicated with triumphantpride that õfor the first time in history Europe is fully adequate to decisively intervene inany conflict that may occur in the vicinity. As Libya is adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea,it naturally falls under the sphere of influence of Europe first before it becomes the preyof the U.S.

Despite a strong resolve to launch a joint attack against Libya, it is yet very difficultfor them realize their goals solely on account of the military strength of the two countries,it is therefore essential for them to garner support from other western allies. Theconditions to conduct the military operation depend on an appropriate organizationalstructure, an effective command and coordinating system, which figure prominently intheir decision to launch the attack. With the gradual development of the situation in andoutside Europe, there emerges widening difference with regard to the strategic objectivesamong the EU countries especially between Europe and the U.S.A. Though consensus ishard to come by, agreement was finally reached after heated discussion and coordinationefforts among them. As the eventual development of crisis demonstrated, it isinconceivable to use force against Libya without the full support of the U.S. and the U.S.backed NATO.

As for the choice of organizational structure among the EU members, they firstopted for the õCoalition of the willingö and then decided to accept the framework ofaction headed by NATO - a result of repeated negotiations and consultations among thecountries with different strategic interests and objectives. In fact, France and the UK alsohad their own opinions of the military campaign in Libya, with the UK steadfastly holdingthat the intervention should be carried out under the command of NATO. (The UK waseven opposed to the French idea of implementing arms embargo by the naval force underthe leadership of the EU, while France held a contradictory attitude for fear of beingaccused by the Arab countries as the instrument of power politics.) So Francemaintained it was not suitable for NATO to bear the brunt of the strike but at the sametime emphasized the role of the United States in the formation of the so-called õcoalitionof the willingö, whose presence is fundamental to carry out the air strike against Libya.

However the United States, out of its own interest, was not quite enthusiastic inpursuing a military interventionist approach against Libya nor was it interested inplaying a leading role in the air strike. This can be explained in the following reasons:first of all, after the Cold War the strategic concern of the U.S. have switched from Europeto the Middle East, South Asia and the emerging China to the exclusion of Libya, whichshould be left to the security affairs of EU; secondly, the U.S., deeply mired in theAfghanistan and Iraq war, has run a soaring defense budget deficit and so tried to avoidgetting bogged down in the Libyan crisis. Thirdly, there is a heated debate in the U.S.about the feasibility of military intervention in the crisis, which would greatly curtail itsleverage of action. Though the U.S. initially agreed to join the õcoalition of the willingöand provide the necessary support of firepower, it later insisted on transferring theõcommand and controlö authority to NATO. At the same time, most of the EU and

NATOmembers like Italy, Luxemburg, Norway all agreed to carry out the operation under theframework of NATO.

The above divisions and divergences that characterize the heated discussion withinNATO members has eventually led to õone of most intensive diplomatic confrontationssince the outbreak of Iraq War. (French Ambassador even walked out of the meeting ofNorth Atlantic Council to show its protest.）ö But finally France backed down on his planand acceded to NATOøs full control and command of the forces. According to theagreements reached, NATO made a decision on 24 March to participate in the õcoalitionof the willingö, whereupon some coordination efforts were made between the two sides.On 27 March, NATO agreed to take part in the military campaign (with a code nameõOperation Unified Protectorö), reaffirming its commitment to õprotect the civilians fromattackö. The campaign was organized under the Allied Joint Force Command by CanadianAir Marshal Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard based in Naples. On 31 March NATOtook over command of the operation, indicating that the military strike started by the UKand France has now been integrated into the operation system of NATO. Of the 28 EUmember states, half of them have provided military logistic support with 8 of themdirectly involved in the air strike against Libya. (Actually, those who played a role in theoperation were encouraged to participate on a voluntary basis.)

As for the choice of intervention mechanism and later development of the situationindicates that U.S. and NATO have played pivotal role in the military campaign, whichcan be attributed to the following reasons:First, it is a result of adjustment of NATO. As an organization of collective defenseundergoing continuous enlargement in response to the changed situation in the post coldWar, NATO has put forward threeö Strategic New Conceptsö, with

regard to the changesand reform in the direction and approaches of its security strategy. The main pointsrelated to the intervention include:

- A transition from aö nuclear deterrenceö of formerSoviet Union to a reliance on conventional forces to cope with regional and crisis andconflicts;

- An expansion of military action to the territories of member states and beyond;

- An emphasis on upholding the shared interests and values of the member states;

- A õcoalition of the willingö can be formed among the member states withoutbeing obstructed from the outside if no consensus can be reached within NATO. All ofthese adjustments together with UKøs traditional practice of following the U.S. in NATOøsoperations and the return of France to the command structure of NATO in 2009 haveprovided the basic framework for their dependence upon the United States and the NATOin particular.

Second, militarily speaking, U.S. and NATO participation are conducive to theoperation at least on three dimensions. First it calls for unified command and control. Asan air strike involves a joint operation of multinational air forces, it is therefore necessaryto set up a unified control and command system to avoid the omission of targets,repetitive strikes and injuries of friendly fighter planes, wherein lies the shortage ofexperiences for France and UK. At the initial stage of the formation of the õcoalition ofthe willingö, the U.S. has committed itself to taking charge of the command of theoperation, aided by the battleship of Mount Whitney in Mediterranean, which isequipped with such an operating system and commanded by U.S. officers. Later it wastransferred to the command of NATO but the U.S. still played a critical role in it. Second,it needs the direct participation of the U.S. in the military campaign. With so many highlysophisticated weapons and equipment it is quite necessary to need the support of the

U.S.,which in the words of U.S. ambassador to NATO, õthe U.S. has provided us with thecritically important resources to ensure the success of the air strike.ö Of all the airoperations carried out in Libya the U.S. has provided 3/4 of the tanker aircrafts,reconnaissance planes and the information on targets for precision attacks by drones. U.S.fighter planes and guided missiles also played a fundamental role in destroying theair-defense system of Libya and the numbers of combat sorties carried out by U.S. planesare much higher than other country. (According to a report by Pentagon on 22 August,the U.S. has altogether undertaken 5316 combat sorties, accounting for 27% of theoperations carried out by NATO.)

All in all, France and the UK are the main initiators and participants in the militaryintervention, there is no denying the fact that NATO headed by the U.S. has alwaysplayed a pivotal supporting role that can never be substituted in the whole militaryoperations. Apart from voicing his strong grievances against the insufficient militarystrength of EU that still needs massive input of the U.S., U.S. Secretary of Defense alsoexpressed his serious about the future of NATO.

RESOLUTION 1973

Resolution 1973 by all means was a sweeping document with itslanguage, scope and range, leaving too much to interpretation. Theresolution õauthorizes Member States acting nationally or throughregional organizations or arrangements to take all necessary measures,notwithstanding paragraph 9 of 1970, to protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas under threat of attack, while excluding a foreignoccupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territoryö. Theresolution appears to be in conflict with the spirit of the U.N. Charter,especially Articles 2(4) and 2(7), which prohibit the use of force andintervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Moreover,intervention under chapter VII is mandated for

situations involving thebreach of *international* peace and security. And even in such cases,Article 42 permits use of force only after exhausting all the measuressuggested in Article 41 like õcomplete or partial interruption of economicrelations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other meansof communication, and the severance of diplomatic relation.ö As thecoalition intervention in Libya is progressing on the basis of resolution1973, there are a few questions which need to be answered.

The foremost challenge is about defining the ultimate objective of theinterventionóis it the enforcement of a no-fly zone and protection ofcivilians or is it regime change? The issue lacks clarity because theresolution while õauthorising military action does not legally allow regimechange as a motive for the operationö. However, several senior leadersof the coalition have made it clear that they want Gaddafi to go. On 20thMarch, after a bombing raid on Gaddafiøs living quarters, the BritishDefence Secretary Liam Fox indicated that Gaddafi could be a legitimatetarget. Fox, however, was immediately rebuked by many othersincluding his American counterpart Robert Gates. Of late, however, aconsensus seems to have emerged among the leaders of the coalition. Ina joint op-ed published in leading newspapers including the *InternationalHerald-Tribune*, the *Times of London* and *Le Figaro* on 15th April,Presidents Obama and Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron madeit clear that they want Gaddafi to go. The three leaders declared that õitis impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in powerö and itis "unthinkableö that he õcan play a part in the future government.ö Soit remains to be seen how the coalition forces can legally bring about thepurported regime-change in Libya.

Confusion also prevails whether the rebels merit protection under theresolution since they are armed and are involved in fighting. Thisessentially makes them combatants in a civil war and the resolutionøsmandate is to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. But in manyinstances

the NATO led coalition by default has ended up as the air-forceof the rebel fighters. The coalition is also uncertain about its stance inthe event of a direct engagement between pro-Gaddafi fighters and therebels. Another issue is whether NATO will interfere if Gaddafiøs forcesengage the rebel fighters. Similarly what can NATO do if the rebel forcesattack civilians who are supporters of Gaddafi or if they kill black people,suspecting them to be mercenaries? A few such instances have alreadybeen reported.

The following comments by Gen. Carter Ham, Commander of AFRICOMillustrates some of these dilemmas. On 21st March, in a video pressconference with Pentagon reporters from his headquarters in Stuttgartthe General said:

> õWe do not provide close air support for the opposition forcesí The mission is to protect civilians. If civilians are attacked, we have anobligation under Security Council resolution and the mission that's beengiven to me to protect those civilians. We have no mission to supportopposition forces if they should engage in offensive operations. There arealso those in the opposition that have armoured vehicles and that haveheavy weapons. To me, that says that those entities and those parts ofthe opposition are -- I would argue -- no longer covered under thatprotect-civilian clause. So it's not a clear distinction, because we're nottalking about a regular military force. It's a very problematic situation.Again, you know, sometimes these are situations that brief much betterat a headquarters than they do in the cockpit of an aircraftö.

Providing arms to the rebel fighters will be another major area ofconfusion. Obama said he is not ruling it out, but he is also not ruling itin. British Foreign Secretary William Hague and

U.S. Secretary of StateHillary Clinton have argued that there is nothing illegal about arming therebels. However, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussenøs viewis that NATO is not in Libya to arm people. US Defense Secretary RobertGates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, have made it clear that in case it is decided to arm the rebels, theUS should not do it and let other countries take charge. After reportssurfaced about jihadist connections of the rebels, even Hillary Clintonhas been quoted as being reluctant to õsend arms to the rebels becauseof the unknowns about who they are, their backgrounds andmotivationsö (Dabrowski, 2013).

Meanwhile Steven Vanackere, Belgiumøs Foreign Ministerquestioned the legality of arming the rebels and argued that it is õa steptoo far under existing UN resolutions and providing weapons toinsurgents would cost the support of the Arab worldö. There is also adebate on the legality of arming the rebels. The two Security Councilresolutions 1970 and 1973 can be interpreted differently as far as armingthe rebels are concerned. Paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 prohibitsarming any group in Libya and clearly spells out that an arms embargois in place. According to the resolution:

> õAll Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures toprevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan ArabJamahiriyaí .. of arms and related materiel of all types, includingweapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitaryequipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technicalassistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to militaryactivities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and relatedmateriel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnelí ..ö

However, paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 while authorizing õall necessarymeasuresö to ensure the protection of civilians also permits that it can bedone õnotwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970ö. Resolution 1973later on (in paragraphs 13ó16) reiterates the significance of enforcing thearms embargo. Those who support the arming of the rebels argue thatthe provision õnotwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970ö providesleeway to supply rebels. This debate still continues (Dabrowski, 2013).

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)

The most impressive defence for international intervention in Libya hasbeen the responsibility to protect-R2P doctrine. This was initiallyformulated by the International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty (ICISS) set up in 2000 which was an attempt to identifymeasures to intervene in individual countries in case of violation ofhuman rights without compromising the concept of sovereignty. In the2005 World Summit, R2P was discussed and it was made a part of theSummit Outcome document (paragraphs 138 and 139) adopted by theUN General Assembly. The Security Council through resolution 1674 inApril 2006 made R2P an enforceable concept. This makes collective action possible if õnational authorities manifestly fail to protect theirpopulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimesagainst humanityö. While the principle is noble, it certainly requiresexemplary standards of implementation primarily because of thesensitivity of the issues involved. As it permits international interventiondefying the principles of national security, there should be an objectivemechanism to identify the instances in which the merits of intervention outweigh the risk of undermining the sovereignty of the nation. It isdoubtful whether such a careful evaluation has been done in the case ofLibya.

Moreover, what the world witnessed in Libya was an act ofselective intervention. The US, France, Britain and other leaders of thecoalition turned a blind-eye towards several dictators across the regionwhose actions were not too different from Gaddafiøs. The decision mayhave been pragmatic for them and there is also some merit in theargument that it is better to intervene at least selectively rather than notintervening anywhere at all. However, selective application of the R2Pprinciple eventually corrodes its importance and effectiveness. As thePolish Prime Minister Donald Tusk argues, õif we want to defend peopleagainst dictators, reprisals, torture and prison, that principle must beuniversal and not only when it is convenient, profitable or safeö.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1   POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOWNFALL OF GADDAFI

We shall start by interrogating the political, diplomatic and other consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi. Most fundamentally, emphasis shall be laid on the political consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi, diplomatic consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi, economic and social consequences of the downfall of Gaddafi.

5.2   POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOWNFALL OF GADDAFI

The central problem for state-building in Libya is the need for a centralized army that answers to civilian leaders in government. In Libya two large militias have emerged: the Libya Shield (led by Hafiz al-Agouri) and the Rafallah Sahati brigade (led by Ismail al-Salabi) (Wehrey 2012).3 The Libyan government has undertaken limited attempts to establish a central army that answers to its control but in Libya's immediate post-revolt environment, the government has determined that it needs to keep the young members of the operative militias quiet. The government has chosen for the present to pay these militias and their members to provide order on the streets. In today's Libya, militias employ increasing numbers of persons, with approximately 8 percent of the country's work force working for militias (Michael 2013).

Even while we recognize that the Libyan government for practical reasons has had to pay to sustain these militias, we need economic context. Governmental reform and the creation of a centralized army in Libya have been delayed because the government has enjoyed the tremendous rebound of Libya's economy. During 2012, Libya's economy was the fastest growing in the world. Its GDP per capita expanded at a rate of 76.3% (Dabrowska 2013). This

explosive rate of expansion occurred after GDP drastically fell (by 61%) during the 2011 civil war (Global Finance 2013; The Economist 2013). Hydrocarbon production in Libya has vigorously returned. Current production now exceeds pre-revolutionary levels. It has become ironic; however, that Libya's present regime has become as dependent upon hydrocarbon exports for government revenue as the previous Qaddafi regime had been. Presently, the Libyan government receives 90 to 95% of its income from hydrocarbon exports.

With Gaddafi now ousted, the new rulers of Libya have resorted to using petroleum and natural gas sales income to fund the militias to maintain order. Substantial governmental revenues have actually made it easier for the government to transfer funds to the militias and the inflow of revenue as decelerated progress towards establishing a centralized army that answers to a civilian elected leadership. In this context we can assert that the new Libyan government may actually be in a worse position than that enjoyed by Qaddafi. Qaddafi's militias and military forces were loyal to him; the militias in Libya today answer to themselves and secondarily to their paymaster government.

The recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in political transition. In both countries, post-revolution consolidation was not peaceful. The ousting of former leaders and the establishment of interim political bodies were not sufficient to appease public anger. The Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as the guardians of their popular revolutions, regularly took to the streets presenting political demands. Growing disenchantment with the political performance of the Military Council in Egypt has led to new riots and political violence 10 months after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak. The circumstances of each country define precisely how political instability will manifest itself. This phenomenon is not limited to North

Africa nor the Arab world: Examples are available from Europe, including the case of Portugal, whose transition toward democracy was full of societal tensions for 2 years following the military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only when the constitution was finally enacted and the first elections were held.

In the case of Libya, the experience will be shaped by the lack of ordinary political institutions, a long civil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In September 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its political roadmap for the transitional period, with a program resembling Tunisia's post-revolution transition. The Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its first elections for a constituent assembly in June 2012.Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the 23 Country's constitution and hold parliamentary elections in 1 year's timeô a very ambitious program that perhaps fails to take into account the special situation of Libya. There are many hurdles that are likely to make the transition lengthy and difficult, if not prevent its success altogether. Libyans could discover that they are facing an incomplete, õrotten-doorö transition. Political scientists and experts in political transitions Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way define rotten-door transitions as those that õoccur in a context of state, party, and civil society, weakness [where] new governments are often filled with elites from the old regime.öThey argue that the collapse of autocratic regimes often does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results in little real institutional change, Levitsky and Way argue, with post-transition governments often being led by politicians with no strong commitment to democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2011).Although the overthrow of Qadhafi's regime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents a prime example of a state that lacks political parties, state institutions, and civil society.

A key challenge confronting the interim government in Libya is the creation of political institutions to provide for the functioning of an effective democratic state. The interim government is in effect inheriting a stateless state. After seizing power, Qadhafi dismantled all the political institutions that were in place under King Idris, and replaced them with people's committees.This dismantling of the state was more of a process than a single event, with the latest development as recent as 2008, when Qadhafi announced a controversial plan to abolish most of the ministries as a measure to fight corruption. Instead, he promised to establish a system of wealth transfer directly into the hands of the people. This promise never came to fruition.

In fact, the dismantling of the state went as far as abolishing the actual position of the head of state. With the effect from the replacement of the Revolution Command Council by the General People's Council in the late-1970s, Qadhafi claimed to hold no official position. His official title was õLeader of the Revolution.ö In reality, this allowed him to run the country with no formal responsibility or accountability whatsoever. Nonetheless, denial of any official position did not prevent Qadhafi from being represented as, and treated as, head of the Libyan state by the international community. In addition, Libya's political system has known no constitution or political parties under Qadhafi's rule. No separation of powers, or discussion thereof, has been attempted since the country's independence. Several of Qadhafi's political committees combined executive and legislative powers, with commonly overlapping powers and responsibilities and no clear division of agencies. The system of political accountability was unclearô which is not to say that it did not existô and was manipulated to serve the interest of the ruling elite. Freedom of the press was absent for decades, with the only permitted media serving as an integral part of the regime's propaganda machinery.

Carciana del Castillo, an economist with expertise on post-crisis state building, argues that countries in Libya's situation are confronted with a õmulti- prongedö transition. All aspects of this transition are closely interrelated and reinforce each other. Violence must give way to public security. Lawlessness, political exclusion, and violations of human rights must give way to the rule of law, inclusive and participatory government, and respect for human rights. Polarization among different groups must give way to national reconciliation. Castillo notes: õFailure in any of these areas will put the others at risk. Planning, management, coordination, and financing of this multi-pronged transition are highly burdensome.öThe current lack of capacity of the interim government, therefore, is dangerous when it attempts to address all these challenges and create all these institutions, simultaneously. Even reconstruction of the public healthcare system in Libya is a pressing issue: In December 2011, an article in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine identified that rebuilding the public health system, seriously degraded during the civil war, had not even reached the stage of initial evaluation research of what exists and what is needed.

Gaddafi's regime opposed the idea of political parties from the very start of the revolution. Mahmoud al-Maghribi, Libya's prime minister after the 1969 revolution, noted during a press conference that õparty organisations are unlikely to have any role in the Libyan Arab Republic.öThis approach received ideological backing when Qadhafi published his political thoughts, known as the õThird Universal Theory,ö which purported to pass power directly to the people without any need for other political agents. Abubaker Altajuri, a Libyan opposed to Qadhafi, described the situation eloquently in a letter commenting on a *Foreign Policy* magazine article in 1999. He noted: õIn Libya, people are not only prevented from expressing independent

opinions, they are prevented from even conceiving of them.öThis situation remained unchanged, even during talks on political openness during the 2000s (Altajuri, 1999).

As result, there was no authorized opposition force in the country for 4 decades, and, in fact, the only organized political forces that opposed and threatened Qadhafiøs regime within Libya were illegal Islamist groups: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The regimeøs response to this threat was brutal, including direct military intervention in 1996-97 to quell the Islamist threat in eastern Libyan cities.

Meanwhile, outside the country, several opposition groups and parties were formed in Egypt, Switzerland, the UK, and other Western states with the aim of campaigning against Qadhafiøs regime. Toppling the regime was the primary focus of all Libyan opposition groupsø activities.There is a consensus within Libya that one of the emblematic features of the new democratic era is going to be the establishment of political parties. At the time of this writing, several groups and movements are preparing to form political parties, and waiting for the appropriate law to be passed.But because the opposition to the previous regime had worked either clandestinely or from exile, its contact with and impact on the masses within Libya was extremely limited. As a consequence, most Libyans now have no experience or knowledge of the political dynamics of a democracy. Furthermore, the absence of freedoms of association and the press inhibited the development of any form of democratic culture among Libyans. This absence of culture will inevitably have an impact on the political transition and on state-building efforts.

Some Libyan intellectuals say they are seeking democratization in its broad sense, limited not only to elections, but also to include freedom of expression, political plurality, promotion of civil society, and protection of human rights.There is a keen interest in avoiding the emergence of another authoritarian regime, or what Levitsky and Way call a õhybrid regime,ö which

combines elections with various degrees of authoritarianism.Achieving all these goals requires, in addition to good intentions, a change in people's ways of thinking. International experience shows that a change in the behavioral patterns of the past is the most difficult part of political transition. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian politician, eloquently explained the difficulty of moving from communism to democracy in Hungary during the 1990s. He said the õthe bricks of the Berlin Wall have been snapped up by Japanese and American tourists, while here the remains of the wall have remained in the people's spirits, in their way of thinking, in the economy, in the social system, in the education system, and in many other areas of social life.ö(Levitsky and Way, 2012).

Despite the important role of the tribes in Libyan society, there is only a narrow base of support among the new Libyan political eliteô constituted of members of the NTC, opposition abroad, and some academicsô for a tribal-based political system. Despite the youth attitudes cited above, urban Libyan intellectuals are wary of tribal politics, as representing a regression to primordial political structures and an obstacle to creating a united and democratic Libya where all Libyans are treated equally. For many urban elites, a tribal system connotes dominance by elderly males, inhibiting societal development. Many Libyan intellectuals instead have expressed wishes for political allegiance in Libya to be based on the state and on the basis of citizenship, seeing the tribe instead as a social umbrella with only a limited role in national politics over the long term. This, however, remains a minority elite view.

The early days of the revolution saw clear manifestations of this divergence in thinking. The statements of the NTC leaders and the slogans of protesters across Libyan cities, including Tripoli, were calling for a united Libya. These calls came also in reaction to Saif al-Islam's warning of the country's possible split into different regions in a controversial speech on Feb-

ruary 20. In that speech, Saif al-Islam warned Libyans and the international community that Libya is a tribal society and that clashes could escalate into civil war, with a risk that the country would split into its three pre-independence regions. Calls for a united Libya appear to be based on strong political belief shared by nationalists, secularists, and Islamists(Dabrowski, 2013).

Furthermore, building a political system that is focused on tribalism rather than ideologies carry a risk of creating a societal hierarchy and territorial divisions. It creates tensions between those who are inside the political system and those who are not. In the view of the new political elite, the citizenship principle, regardless of tribal and ethnical affiliations, must be embodied in the new constitution. No political formation or other civil society institution should make reference to tribes or regions.However, the challenges of the political transition, and the strong role of the tribes as detailed above, dictate that the new interim government must necessarily take into account the demands of certain tribes and regions. Abdul Alhakim al-Feitouri, a Libyan academic, argues that failing to accommodate the tribes in the transitional period could lead to the õBalkanization of Libya.ö(Dabrowski, 2013).

The new interim government formed on November 21, 2011, has implicitly attempted to balance tribal, regional, and armed groupsø representations. It did not accommodate every faction that exists in the country, but managed to achieve a balanced distribution of ministerial posts. All political persuasions are represented in the interim government, including both Islamists and secularists. The important ministerial positions of Defence and Interior were allocated to Osama Al-Juwali and Fawzi Abdelalai, representatives from the Zintan and Misrata militias, respectively.These two militias are considered the largest and best-armed in comparison with other groups.

The outcome of the interim-leadership work in forming the new government did not satisfy all the factions. Several protests erupted again in Libyan cities. The Berber groups, long oppressed under Qadhafiøs regime, resented their exclusion from power. The perception among Berbers was that their significant numbers and substantial contribution during the civil war were not taken into account. Other protests over marginalization and the failure of the new government to recognize contributions to the toppling of Qadhafiøs rule took place in Benghazi and Ajdabya.

In sum, tribes play an important role in the daily life of many Libyans, and are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Under a new regime that does not favor tribal politics, tribal leaders might agree to take a limited role at the national political level, but will likely want to keep their political influence at the regional level. Leading tribes in different areas of the country will have great aspirations to play an important role in their respective regions. It is likely that they will call for a decentralized political system that will accommodate their demands and aspirations. Any attempt to ignore and marginalize the tribesø demands is certain to exacerbate the fragile transitional process toward a modern and democratic Libya. Once again, the United States and other foreign partners engaging with the new Libyan state need to be aware of the limitations on the power and reach of that state imposed by the tribal nature of its society.

Observation of political discussions among Libyan intellectuals in late-2011 only confirmed that political transition there is going to be laborious and intense. Opinions differ on the form of the state, its identity, and the administrative structures that have to be included in the countryøs first constitution. The current debates among Libyans have revived memories of similar discussions that took place before Libyaøs independence under the auspices of the UN. At that time, the main issue of discussion within the UN Council for Libya was over adopting a

federal or unitary form for the state of Libya.The federalist voices, calling for the country's division into three states, Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania, lost the debate.

One could argue that differences of opinion are a healthy sign for a democracy in the making. But the lack of institutions and processes that regulate political debate in any country make political discord a risky undertaking. Different groups are wary of each other, and suspect each other of following foreign agendas. These fundamental differences are not limited to academic circles and intellectuals, but also exist within the provisional government. Factional infighting emerged in the early months of the existence of the NTC. As an interim political body for the rebels, the NTC included members from different political persuasions, including both those representing the opposition abroad, and those who had served their entire lives under Qadhafi's regime. The entity thus lacked any cohesion among its members in the early stages. But the main division that has emerged at the time of this writing is ideological and/or religious: frictions between secularist- and Islamist-dominated NTC discussions in late-2011.

The unifying factor that had kept the NTC from fissure was the fight against Qadhafi, with the result that a leadership battle resurfaced after the fall of Tripoli. The announcement by NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil that Islam was to be the basis for legislation brought divisions within the Council to the surface.Several secularist figures voiced grievances publicly, complaining of their alienation by the Islamist wing backed by external players. Libyan diplomat Abdulrahman Shalgam voiced his dissatisfaction with Qatar's support of one side against other factions.

4.3   DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOWNFALL OF GADDAFI

In its 5 March 2011 "Founding Statement", the council stated, "We request from the international community to fulfill its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any further genocide and crimes against humanity without any direct military intervention on Libyan soil." Ali Al-Issawi was designated the Council's foreign affairs spokesperson in March 2011. Mahmoud Jibril later replaced Ali Al-Issawi and was designated as the Head of International Affairs.The NTC has also called on the international community to render assistance to its efforts to dislodge Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the ruler of Libya since 1969, and his loyalists. Officials have asked for medical supplies, money, and weapons, among other forms of foreign aid. In late June 2011, it proposed using internationally based frozen assets belonging to Gaddafi and his inner circle as collateral for loans, with Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni warning that his government is virtually out of money. The NTC has previously asked for those assets to be unfrozen and transferred to Benghazi, a request officials of the Obama administration in the United States indicated they would try to fulfill.NTC officials have said that they intend to reward countries that have been early to recognise the council as the legitimate representative of Libya, as well as countries that have been involved in the international military intervention to suppress Gaddafi's forces. Among the incentives the council has offered to these countries, which it considers to be allies, are favorable oil contracts and other economic ties. On 15 July 2011, a council spokesman told members of the Libya Contact Group meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, that his government would not forge any new oil contracts and that an elected government must be in place before new deals could be made.

After anti-Gaddafi forcesstormedTripoli, the Libyan capital city, the information manager at NTC-run oil firm AGOCO said on 22 August that once Libya resumed oil exports, its new government "may have some political issues with Russia, China and Brazil" and favor Western and Arab countries that supported the uprising against Gaddafi when awarding oil contracts. However, on 23 August, Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota said his government had been assured that if the NTC took power in Libya, "contracts will be respected" and Brazil would not be punished for its stance. On 1 September, an NTC representative in Paris claimed that the new Libyan government would not award oil contracts based on politics, though he said that a number of Western companies, including BP, Total, Eni, and "major American companies", had a particularly "good track record in the Libyan oil sector"

The NTC occasionally took an aggressive posture toward governments it accused of supporting Gaddafi in the civil war, especially that of Algeria, which it claimed allowed Gaddafi's government to transport mercenaries and military equipment through its territory.The NTC reacted harshly after several members of the Gaddafi government, including members of his family, entered Algeria and were granted political asylum in Algiers. On 29 August 2011, it said that Algeria sheltering Gaddafi or his family members would be viewed as an "act of aggression". However, while the Algerian government permitted Gaddafi's relatives to remain in the country, it warned Aisha Gaddafi at least twice over political comments she made criticizing the NTC while in Algeria.On 16 April 2012, Libyan leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil met with Algerian President Abdulaziz Bouteflika in Algiers. After the meeting, he expressed confidence "that [Algeria] would not shelter those who represent a threat for Libyaøs security", an apparent reference to members of Gaddafi's family who were granted asylum in Algeria the previous year. Libyan and Algerian officials also discussed cooperation on border security.

During the Libyan civil war, it was rumored that Egypt had sent Unit 777, a Special Forces division, to clandestinely aid Libyan revolutionaries on the eastern front. These reports were never confirmed, but established an early narrative that the post-revolutionary government of Egypt was seeking to aid a revolution in neighboring Libya as part of a North African solidarity effort.Egypt supported the Arab League's readmission of Libya under the NTC in August 2011, officially recognizing the NTC on the same day, 22 August, as the pan-Arab organization, headed by former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Elaraby, voted to do so.

In the aftermath of the Libyan civil war, Malian troops engaged in sporadic battles with Tuareg ex-mercenaries returning from fighting on Gaddafi's side.[25] Authorities in Mali recognized the danger as early as October 2011.After the death of Muammar Gaddafi, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré said he accepted the NTC's authority and, together with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, expressed his hopes for "a rapid settlement of the crisis in this country, in line with the aspirations of the Libyan people". In January 2012, Mali became the first African nation to agree to accept prisoners convicted by the International Criminal Court, which wants to try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and several other former Libyan regime officials being held by ex-revolutionary groups in Libya.

The unilaterally declared secession of Azawad from Mali, the military victory of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, Ansar Dine, and other rebel groups in the vast Malian north, and the coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in 2012 were attributed in part to the outflow of weapons from Libya after the war, which purportedly increased instability in the Sahel.

Libyan relations with Niger since the formation of the National Transitional Council have been somewhat tenuous, though Niger recognized the NTC as Libya's legitimate governing authority on 27 August 2011.[31]In early September 2011, a large convoy of Libyan military vehicles that the NTC said included stockpiles of gold bullion belonging to the Libyan treasury, as well as members of the Gaddafi government, crossed into Niger, allegedly with assistance from Nigerien Tuaregs. The NTC called on the Nigerien government to stop the convoy and arrest wanted members of the government, warning of consequences for LibyaóNiger relations if it failed to do so. However, after briefly denying the convoy's presence in Niger, the Nigerien government later said it was considering granting refugee status to the Libyans, including military commanders Ali Kana and Mansour Dhao, both wanted by the NTC on charges of crimes against the Libyan people, as they were not sought by the International Criminal Court. A similar scenario played out when Al-Saadi Gaddafi, one of Muammar Gaddafi's sons and a top military commander during the war, entered Niger and was placed under house arrest by the government but was then granted refuge in the country, over the protests of the NTC and its allies. On 1 October, Nigerien Justice Minister Marou Amadou reiterated his government's refusal to extradite Al-Saadi Gaddafi, but said the NTC was welcome to interrogate him in Niamey, Niger's capital. The Nigerien government has officially acknowledged receiving 32 wanted members of the government, but refuses to turn them over to the NTC on humanitarian grounds. On 11 November, Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou said his government officially decided to grant Al-Saadi Gaddafi asylum.

After Saadi Gaddafi made comments calling for an uprising against the NTC in Libya, a spokesman for the Libyan interim authority said on 11 February 2012 that Tripoli demanded Niger extradite the Gaddafi son and other ex-regime officials to face trial in Libya. The Nigerien

government must send the fugitives from justice back to their home country, the NTC spokesman warned, in order for Niger to "preserve its relationship and interests" in Libya. However, Nigerien government officials rejected the demand, citing the country's policy of not extraditing anyone who could face capital punishment.

The relationship between Libya and South Africa was historically friendly prior to the civil war, and the South African government maintained a policy of neutrality during the conflict by refusing to recognize the NTC until after the UN General Assembly voted to do so. South Africa did, however, vote for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, though President Jacob Zuma later said he would have instructed the South African representative to vote against it if he had known that it would lead to a NATO-led bombing campaign. South African officials met with representatives of both the NTC and the Gaddafi government during the war. As an ostensibly neutral party, the South African government championed the African Union "roadmap" to peace, designed in part by Zuma, a member of the AU *Ad Hoc* High Level Committee on Libya. It ultimately recognized the NTC under considerable international pressure in September 2011, just a month before the war's end. In early 2012, months after the collapse of Gaddafi's regime, Zuma complained to the United Nations Security Council that the crisis in Libya had "now grown to be a regional problem" as a result of the UN failing to work with the AU during the war.

During the war, it was repeatedly rumoured that South Africa would offer Muammar Gaddafi and members of his family asylum, and during the Battle of Tripoli, some outlets reported that South African aircraft were on standby to whisk the Libyan leader and members of his government out of the country. The South African government denied these reports. It also

denied allegations that surfaced the week after Tripoli fell claiming it was ready to facilitate Gaddafi's exile to Burkina Faso. After Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 2011, the South African government issued a statement saying it hoped the fall of Sirte would bring about peace in Libya.

During the civil war, Tunisia remained officially neutral. However, as a neighbouring state, it took in tens of thousands of Libyan refugees fleeing the conflict, setting up camps along the international border. On 20 August 2011, the interim government of Tunisia recognised the NTC as Libya's legitimate authority.After the 2011 Tunisian elections, *ad interim* Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki vowed to build close relations with Libya's post-revolutionary government. At a conference in Benghazi in late 2011, Libyan officials agreed to give Tunisia preferred status above all other nations in business and commerce. Marzouki's first official international trip as president was to Tripoli in early January 2012, where he met with Libyan leaders. Although the *Financial Times* reported on the state visit as a sign of deepening ties between the two countries, Libyan authorities reportedly complained to Marzouki's delegation over the presence of wanted ex-officials of the Gaddafi government in Tunisia, and Marzouki insisted the Libyans do more to secure the international border.

The Czech Republic was relatively slow, among European Union member states, to establish full diplomatic relations with the NTC. Meetings between Czech and Libyan officials of the NTC began in mid-June 2011, and by the end of the month, Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg was quoted as saying, while visiting Benghazi to deliver a shipment of medical supplies, that the Czech Republic recognised the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. However, Schwarzenberg later clarified that he had not expressed his

government's recognition of the NTC as a legitimate government, a position he maintained until the end of the Battle of Tripoli.On 21 September 2011, the Czech Republic joined the Friends of Libya Conference, a group of countries and international organisations committed to helping rebuild a democratic, internationalist Libya.

France was the first country to recognise the NTC as Libya's sole legitimate representative, doing so on 10 March 2011. Just over a week later, France co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, and the French Air Force was the first military coalition component to engage Gaddafi-loyal forces on the ground in Libya, intervening to turn the tide at the Second Battle of Benghazi on 19 March by destroying advancing columns of Libyan Army tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery pieces.In late August 2011, France unblocked 20 percent of frozen Libyan assets held in the country. President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Tripoli on 15 September, becoming (together with British Prime Minister David Cameron) one of the first world leaders to make a state visit to Libya since the conquest of the capital.

As Italy was a relatively strong supporter of Muammar Gaddafi prior to the 2011 civil war, as well as Libya's largest international trade partner, Rome's decision to reject Gaddafi as a negotiating party and recognise the NTC in early April 2011 was seen as a major diplomatic coup for NTC envoy Mahmoud Jibril. Although Italy joined international military efforts to weaken Gaddafi's grip on the country, granting the use of military bases in Italian territory and participating in Operation Unified Protector, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini called for an "immediate cessation of hostilities" in June 2011 to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid, a suggestion that NATO ignored.

In late August 2011, Frattini vowed that Italian oil company Eni would "play a number one role in the future" in Libya and resume oil production as soon as Libya's oilfields reopened for business. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also announced the release of $505 million in frozen Libyan assets as a "first payment" to Libya's new government as its forces battled to secure Tripoli.[66]Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, a former Eni executive, was named oil minister in the caretaker government of Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib on 22 November.

On 21 February 2011, days before the establishment of the NTC in Benghazi, two Libyan Air Force fighter jets defected to Malta rather than bomb the restive eastern cities. The Maltese government's refusal to extradite the pilots or return the aircraft to Libya swiftly established the island state as an unfriendly neighbour of the Gaddafi government amidst the Libyan uprising.After the fall of Tripoli to anti-Gaddafi forces in late August 2011, Maltese Foreign Affairs Minister Tonio Borg announced on 10 September that Malta would become the first EU country to reopen its embassy in the Libyan capital. The following day, Libyan Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni commissioned an investigation into companies with joint Libyan and Maltese shareholding, with the intent of locating businessmen both in Libya and in Malta who had assisted the Gaddafi government during the war, such as by facilitating the importation of oil to Gaddafi-loyal ports in defiance of the UN embargo. A spokesman for Tarhouni's office said that "all honest businessmen have no need to worry" and indicated the probe was not a critique of the Maltese government.

Poland at the mid-2000s like the rest of West countries started to turn its eyes back on Libya after almost 20 years of absence. At the beginning of the civil war, the Polish government was not eager to participate in any military action in Libya, but called the other members of

NATO and European Union to use other ways, but prime minister Donald Tusk assured that Poland would take part in some "community activities." At the same time, Polish NGOs started the preparations to help eastern Libya. The position of government concern Libya has not changed with the beginning of Military intervention in Libya.

The diplomatic relations with NTC were established during the visit of Polish FM Radosław Sikorski to Benghazi on 11 May, when he announced the recognition of the NTC as "rightful interlocutor for the international community in Libya" Poland was the only country that opened its embassy in Benghazi. On 8 July, the Minister noticed the Polish recognition of NTC as the "legitimate government of the Libyan people". Poland was also member of Libya Contact Group, where it offered to launch a humanitarian help and trainings for state officials and new law and order services. There are unofficial reports that Poland was sending weapons and officers of Polish Special Forces. Ahmed El-Mallul, a Libyan surgeon in Poland, was a mediator between the NTC and the Polish government. On 15 September Poland reopened its embassy in Tripoli and started to prepare ground for humanitarian help, which arrived on 3 October in Misrata. Also Libyan representatives were in Poland at the parliamentary elections on 6611 October 2011.[91][92] Next visit of foreign minister took place on 24 October in Tripoli. Three days later Libyan decedents decided to strengthen bilateral relations and notify Polish MFA about upgrading its Economic Cooperation Bureau in Warsaw to the rank of Embassy and establish a joint Libyan-Polish commission headed by its Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Russia sharply criticised the NATO-led military intervention in the Libyan civil war, though it chose not to use its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to block it. On 27 May 2011, Russian PresidentDmitri Medvedev said that although Moscow opposed the

military operations, it believed Gaddafi should leave power.In early June 2011, Russian envoy Mikhail Margelov was received in Benghazi, the *de facto* headquarters of the Libyan opposition. Margelov's stated objective was to broker a truce between anti-Gaddafi forces and the Gaddafi-led government. He left Benghazi with an invitation from the NTC for Russia to open a representative office in the city, though it opted not to do so before recognising the council as Libya's sole legitimate representative, which it did on 1 September 2011.

The United Kingdom co-sponsored UNSCR 1973 and was one of the largest contributors to Operation Unified Protector, the NATO-led intervention to degrade the military strength of Muammar Gaddafi's forces, though it carried out considerably fewer strike missions than fellow coalition partners France and the United States.In early September 2011, the Royal Air Force flew crate loads of unfrozen Libyan funds in the form of dinar banknotes to Benghazi, the location of the NTC's interim central bank. On 15 September, Prime Minister David Cameron visited Tripoli together with French President Sarkozy to meet with leaders of the NTC.

Relations between Cyprus and Libya have always remained strong especially due to the relations of the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives Yiannakis Omirou with Libyan politicians. Libya was a key investor to Cyprus after the invasion of the island by Turkey and was a source of jobs for Cypriots working under the Cypriot multinational company Joannou & Paraskevaides. The latest state visit between the two countries was of Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis to Tripoli in 2011 after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.

Democratic Party of Libya figure Ahmad Shabani said on 23 August that the Libyan opposition wanted the support of the international community, including Israel, despite the state's current lack of diplomatic relations with Libya. When asked if a democratically elected Libyan

government would recognise Israel, Shabani responded, "The question is whether Israel will recognize us." He said his party supports a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. The DPL is not an official organ of the NTC, but it supports the council's transitional role.On 16 September 2011, Israel voted in the United Nations General Assembly to accredit the NTC as Libya's legal representative.

Qatar was the second country to recognise the NTC and the first to announce a trade agreement with it, declaring on 27 March 2011 that it would market Libyan oil exports from eastern terminals controlled by anti-Gaddafi elements. It was also the first Arab country to join international military operations in Libya, sending interceptors to help enforce the no-fly zone starting on 25 March. The Qatari government is also closely tied to Al Jazeera, one of the first international news networks to begin covering the 2011 civil war.

The NTC faced one of its first diplomatic quandaries after Iman al-Obeidi, a Libyan woman who accused Gaddafi-loyal militiamen of beating and gang-raping her at a checkpoint in a high-profile appearance before journalists at the Rixos Al Nasr in Tripoli, was granted asylum in Qatar. Despite the protests of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Qatar then forcibly deported Obeidi back to Benghazi on 2 June 2011 for unknown reasons, and Obeidi publicly blamed the NTC for her deportation. Despite this incident, Qatari cooperation with the NTC remained close throughout the war, with close consultations between officials of the two governments in Doha becoming so frequent that some anti-Gaddafi fighters complained that their leadership was spending too much time in Qatar and not enough time in Libya. Qatari military advisers also reportedly accompanied some anti-Gaddafi brigades in the Nafusa Mountainsand

during the coastal offensive in Tripolitania, even helping to direct some fighters in the storming of Gaddafi's Bab al-Azizia compound in central Tripoli.

On 16 October 2011, the Qatari and Libyan governments signed a memorandum of understanding in Doha for cooperation between the justice ministries of the two states. Officials said the fledgling government of Libya could benefit from Qatar's experience in establishing justice, law and order.Despite the close relations between Qatar and the transitional authorities in Libya, Libyan UN Ambassador Abdurrahman Shalgham sharply criticised the Qatari government in early November, accusing it of attempting to manipulate affairs in Libya and comparing its leaders to Muammar Gaddafi. "Let us decide our own destiny," said Shalgham. "We do not consider them as neutral. We want neither Qatar nor the U.S."

President Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian head of state, responded to the Syrian civil war in a manner frequently compared by protesters to Muammar Gaddafi's crackdown in February 2011 and beyond. Syria voted at the United Nations General Assembly to accredit the NTC as representative of Libya on 16 September 2011. However, Assad's government has allowed Al-Rai TV, a Syrian station, to broadcast pro-Gaddafi propaganda since the leader's fall from power, including audio messages from Gaddafi, members of his family, and former Information Minister Moussa Ibrahim.

On 10 October 2011, Libya became the first country to recognise the Syrian National Council, an umbrella group of opposition leaders within and outside Syria formed as an alternative to the government in Damascus, as "the sole legitimate government in Syria", according to NTC official Mussa al-Koni, who serves as a representative of the Tuareg of Libya. Koni said the NTC also ordered the Syrian Embassy in Tripoli to be shuttered until further

notice. NTC also promised the representatives of SNC to hand them over the embassy of Syria in Tripoli.

Turkey was a prominent backer of the Libyan opposition during the civil war, although it was initially strongly opposed to the international military intervention and expressed concern about the violence. However, Turkey became a strong advocate for a leading NATO role in Libya by the end of March and joined in operations to enforce an embargo on Gaddafi-held ports.With Turkey's reversal on the international military mission, as well as its decision to recognise the NTC in early July 2011, it gained considerably more influence with the ultimately victorious rebels. It also provided $300 million in aid to the NTC prior to the start of Ramadan, as well several fuel shipments via the Turkish Petroleum International Company. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto lu visited Benghazi in late August, just as Tripoli was being taken by anti-Gaddafi forces. When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an visited Tripoli the following month, he received a rock star welcome from gratified Libyans. The Turkish Air Force also worked with the NTC to airdrop humanitarian aid to Waddan, and the Libyan South near Qatrun in mid-September 2011, delivering at least 14 tons of food to the areas selected by Libyan and Turkish officials.

Australia was a major non-military backer of the revolutionaries during the Libyan civil war, sending more humanitarian aid to Libya than any other single country after the United States. It was relatively early to recognise the NTC, doing so on 9 June 2011, months before the capture of Tripoli.In December 2011, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Kevin Rudd traveled to Libya to meet with Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib. Rudd ceremonially hoisted the flag of Australia at his country's consul-general in Tripoli and pledged Canberra's support for

efforts to remove unexploded landmines in Libya, as well as advice on Libya's planned transition to democratic governance.

China initially did not support the Libyan uprising, instead urging Muammar Gaddafi's government to work quickly to "restore social stability and normalcy". However, as the conflict dragged on, PRC officials began to meet with their NTC counterparts, inviting Mahmoud Jibril to Beijing in late June 2011 for bilateral talks.The PRC opposed the 2011 military intervention in Libya throughout the civil war, accusing the West of using force in an attempt to bring Libya into its sphere of influence and seeking to counter by gradually giving more diplomatic standing to the NTC, culminating in full diplomatic recognition in mid-September 2011, which Beijing's state news agency Xinhua defended as "a mature decision made at the right time". Both governments expressed desire for Chinese participation in rebuilding the country and resuming suspended construction projects. However, relations between the NTC and the PRC were shaken by reports that state-controlled weapons manufacturers in Mainland China met with a high-level delegation from the Gaddafi government in July 2011 in defiance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The PRC claimed ignorance of the meeting, which several NTC officials openly questioned.

On 3 September 2011, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Marty Natalegawa said his government supported the NTC "in carrying out the peaceful transition towards democracy". However, he stopped short of expressing Indonesian recognition of the NTC as the country's legitimate authority, and at the United Nations General Assembly vote on accrediting the representative of Libya designated by the council on 16 September, Indonesia abstained.Indonesian energy firm MedcoEnergi reopened its Tripoli office in mid-September

2011 and said later in the month that it would resume oil exploration and production in the Area-47 block of the Libyan oilfields in October 2011. Medco President-Director Lukman Mahfoedz said that under the terms of a new contract between Libya's provisional government and the company, Tripoli would subsidize half the cost of Medco's operations in the Ghadames Basin, while the remaining 50 percent of costs would be split between Medco and the Libyan Investment Authority, one of the corporation's largest shareholders.

The United States was a major ally of the NTC during the war against Gaddafi, launching Operation Odyssey Dawn on 19 March 2011 after Susan Rice, its ambassador to the UN, successfully persuaded skeptics of the proposed Libyan no-fly zone on the United Nations Security Council to abstain from voting on the resolution rather than voting "no" or exercising veto power.[142] The United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy played an instrumental role in suppressing Libyan air defences in late March before shifting toward a supporting role in Operation Unified Protector.The US took longer than other leading NTC allies to formally recognise the council as Libya's legitimate authority, but it ultimately handed over the Libyan Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the NTC in early August 2011. Later that month, the US led an effort at the United Nations to repeal parts of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 in order to allow unfrozen Libyan assets to be transferred to the interim government.

At first glance, recent U.S. diplomatic success with the Libyan government seemed easy. Aftertwo decades of international pariah status, Libya committed in 2003 not only to forswear terrorism and abandon its weapons programs but also to reveal those programs to U.S.inspectors. In the process, Libya divulged secret procurement networks and allowed U.S. andBritish intelligence specialists to compare their analysis of Libyan proliferation against actualfacts on

the ground.The operation looked like the type of success that Washington might seek to repeat withother regimes that aim to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons: Syria and Iran inthe Middle East, and North Korea farther afield. Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state forverification and compliance, expressed hope. õWe only hope that states with even moreadvanced nuclear programs like Iran and North Korea will learn from Libyaøs example and agreeto rejoin the community of civilized nations and give up these terrible weapons,ö she told theSenate Foreign Relations Committee.1 But how relevant is the Libyan model to these othercases? An understanding of the factors leading to Libyaøs change of policy suggests the Libyanexperience is not as applicable as some would argue.

Although not obvious at the time, Libya represented an unusually attractive target forU.S. engagement. Unlike with Tehran and Damascus, Washingtonøs grievances against Tripoliwere discrete and not especially urgent. U.S. and Libyan officials could sequence resolution oftheir differences so as to build confidence, and the prospective rewards were large enough tocreate an incentive to resolve the outstanding differences. Agreement with the United Stateswould also open the way to renewed foreign investment in Libya and a huge financial gain forthe Libyan state. With regard to Damascus and Tehran, Washingtonøs concerns are less isolatedand more difficult to sequence, and the rewards less clear. In addition, significant domesticconstituencies in the United States, Iran, and Syria have complex and often hostile attitudestoward these bilateral relationships. The politics surrounding rapprochement with Iran and Syriawould be far more difficult to manage than were those with Libya.

Libya was not always considered hostile and unpredictable. After independence fromItaly in 1951, the Libyan government allowed both the United States and the United Kingdom

tomaintain their military bases at Wheelus Field and Cyrenaica. As the Cold War developed in the

Middle East, King Idris cast his lot with the Western powers rather than join the rising anti-Western, pan-Arabist tide. The discovery of large quantities of oil in the late 1950s drew theLibyan monarchy even closer to the West. Oil wealth proved a mixed blessing, though. Itwidened the gap between rich and poor and raised some Libyansø aspirations more than theirincomes. The windfall overwhelmed the state and led to the kingøs downfall.

On September 1, 1969, the Free Officersø Movement toppled the monarchy and installed29-year-old Colonel Muøammar Qadhafi as head of a Revolutionary Command Council. Thenew Libyan government cast aside Libyaøs relationship with the West, expelled U.S. and Britishforces from its bases, and embraced a Nasserist path. The Libyan government declared itselfneutral in superpower conflicts, pledged its support for the Palestinians, and vowed to act againstany form of colonialism or imperialism at home or abroad.Yet, it was Qadhafiøs hostility to the United States rather than his neutrality that led to hisisolation. Libyaøs loose ties to an alphabet soup of terrorist groups from around the world, aswell as his governmentøs sanction of the December 1979 attacks on the U.S. embassy in Tripoli,led the Carter administration to designate Libya as a õstate-sponsor of terrorö when it created thelist later that month. In August 1981, two Libyan jets fired at U.S. aircraft in the Mediterranean;U.S. fighters shot them down in response. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan ordered an airstrike on Libya after investigators tied the Libyan government to a bombing that killed two U.S.soldiers in a Berlin nightclub.

What provided focus to the U.S.-Libyan tensions for more than a decade, though, wasanother, more audacious attack: the 1987 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,Scotland. The attack killed 270 people, including several U.S. government employees

and astudent group from Syracuse University. The investigation found numerous ties to two Libyanintelligence agents, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. Internationalinsistence that Libya accept responsibility for the bombing and hand over the two men to aninternational court for trial became the basis for a durable set of United Nations-imposed

sanctions.

Though Qadhafi later distanced himself from direct support for terrorism, he was afrequent thorn in the side of U.S. administrations. He pursued work on a range of weapons ofmass destruction programs, the parameters of which remained unclear to the U.S. intelligencecommunity. While Qadhafi claimed that Bill Clinton's 1992 electoral victory would mark a newchapter in U.S.-Libyan relations, he spoiled any rapprochement when he announced that Libyandissidents who moved to the United States were worthy of slaughter. In 1993, Libyan agentskidnappedô and presumably killedô one such oppositionist, Mansur Kikhia. Qadhafi's refusalto extradite the Lockerbie suspects remained a constant irritant in its relations with the UnitedStates and Europe. Qadhafi's unrepentant and unpredictable behavior became one inspiration forthe State Department's õrogue regimeö moniker.

With so much bad blood between Washington and Tripoli, diplomatic re-engagementbegan slowly in the late years of the Clinton administration and resumed with renewed vigorafter the 9-11 terrorist attacks. The fundamental diplomatic challenge faced by both the U.S. andLibyan sides was how to build trust. To many U.S. observers, Qadhafi was as erratic as he wasdangerous, and many feared that any effort to conclude an agreement with him would only be aprelude to embarrassment. Qadhafi had his own fears. Libya had remained for two and a halfdecades on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror. While the secret talks aimed at

rapprochementwere being held in London, senior officials such as John Bolton, undersecretary of state for armscontrol and international security, described Libya as a õrogue state intent on acquiring weaponsof mass destructionö and reiterated the Presidentøs warning, õAmerica will do what is necessaryto ensure our nationøs securityí   I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not standby as peril draws closer and closer.ö Qadhafiøs government, therefore, sought guarantees that

U.S. gestures were not a trick to subvert and destroy the regime.

Yet, despite these problems, Libyan and U.S. negotiators enjoyed several advantages. Bythe time George W. Bush came to office, impediments in the bilateral relationship wererelatively straightforward. Negotiators had already worked out a compromise whereby Libyawould turn over intelligence operatives implicated in the Lockerbie bombing for an internationaltrial. That trial had concluded. The remaining issues in that file were Libyan acceptance ofresponsibility for the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and payment of compensation to thevictimsø families.Other concerns revolved around Libyaøs illicit weapons programs. Varying reportscirculated about activities at Rabtaô once described as the largest chemical weapons factory inthe worldô and Tarhuna. Despite uncertainty about their scope, they were thought to be ofsufficient scale to warrant repeated mention in Congressional testimony delivered by directors ofCentral Intelligence John Deutch and George Tenet.

These baskets of concerns shared several attractive characteristics. First, they lentthemselves to clear metrics. Paid compensation can be measured, as can weapons systems anddocumentation. There is little qualitative judgment involved. Secondly, they were verifiable.Libyan compliance on these issues could be judged with relative confidence by both

overt andcovert means. Third, the bilateral issues were discrete. Difficult though these issues were, theydid not contain references to vague issues like õpolitical opennessö or human rights.

In addition, a period of relative bilateral calm also facilitated rapprochement. Libya hadretreated enough from supporting acts of international terrorism that a White House officialcould confide to this author in the spring of 2004 that Libya had been õout of the terrorismbusinessö for approximately a decade. Libya had ended direct support and military training forgroups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization by the late

1990s; its relations with other groups such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines were harder tofathom, and therefore less objectionable to many. In any event, as Qadhafi often complained tovisiting Americans, the groups he had once supported had all abandoned armed struggle, joinedpolitical processes, and made their journey to the White House while he remained internationallyisolated. While some aspects of Libyan behavior remained objectionable, such as meddling in

African politics, it never challenged U.S. strategic interests. Concerns over such activitieswould color ongoing diplomatic discussions, but they would not derail discussions over thestrategic relationship.

Another advantage the negotiators had was the luxury of time. U.S. and Libyannegotiators could sequence the resolution of their differences, and the resolution of each distinctproblem built confidence and eased agreement on the next. The issues resultant from Libyaøsbombing of Pan Am 103 could come first to mitigate the U.S. political environment; weaponsissues could follow. Issues related to Libyaøs actions in the Middle East and Africa could waitlonger. Libya, meanwhile, could space out its compensation payments to the Pan Am

103victimsø families to ensure that the U.S. and international community complied with theirobligations as well.

Years of cool detachment also provided a window of opportunity. Libyaøs maintenanceof a consistent negotiating team created a channel to the Libyan leadership in which confidencegrew with time. Both Washington and London came to understand that their Libyaninterlocutorsô Intelligence Chief Musa Kusa, ambassador to Rome Abdul-Ati al-Obeidi, andambassador to London Muhammad al-Zwaiô enjoyed Qadhafiøs support, and that the Libyanleader would abide by their commitments. Such confidence was important since U.S. negotiatorshad experience with insincere or impotent mediators in the 1980s in Iran and in the 1990s in the Palestinian Authority.

The Libyan leadership also enjoyed growing trust in their interlocutors. In the mid-1990s, Britain negotiated an end to Libyan support for the Irish Republican Army and won Libyaøsacceptance of õgeneral responsibilityö for the shooting of a British police officer in front of theLibyan embassy in London in 1984. These steps, combined with Libyaøs turning over theLockerbie suspects for trial, prompted the British government to lead efforts in 1999 to suspendUnited Nations sanctions on Libya. Throughout the negotiations between the U.S. and Libyangovernments, the British governmentøs positionô and its actionsô stood as a testament to thenotion that adversarial relations could be reversed and as a guarantor that the U.S. would abideby its commitments.

In addition, the clear and consistent benchmarks outlined by the U.S. and British sidehelped convince the Libyans that demands by their negotiating partners were directed towarddiscrete goals, not part of a covert effort at regime change. Rewards for positive Libyan behaviorbuilt further confidence that the outcome of the negotiating process would be the

positivepathway forward outlined by the governments.Contributing to the window of opportunity for U.S.-Libyan rapprochement was therelative quiescence of U.S. domestic politics. Congress had rushed to add Libya to a 1996 billaimed at sanctioning Iran, and until the end of their term, Clinton administration officials werefearful of the political consequences if word of their contacts leaked out. Yet, through morethan two years of negotiations during the Bush administration, Congress remained on thesidelines.

Much of the credit in this regard goes to Libya's success at outreach among the familiesof the victims of Pan Am 103. The families were a disparate group with varied interests anddiverse goals. Libya won these families' acquiescence by coming forward with a generouscompensation package of $10 million per victim, albeit one with a twist. The Libyan governmentwould tie payments to diplomatic normalization: Tripoli would pay $4 million upon the lifting of

U.N. sanctions, $4 million upon the lifting of U.S. sanctions, and the remainder when the U.S.State Department took Libya off its list of state sponsors of terrorism. While many familiesremained angry, the prospect of a multi-million dollar settlement, combined with the Libyans'acceptance of responsibility, represented a form of closure that most families supported. Somefamilies even began to lobby the U.S. government, which, while not a party to the settlementcould, nevertheless, influence how much the families were paid.Were the families to unite against rapprochement, or were they to split on the issue, itwould have been hard to pursue a U.S.-Libyan track without a Congressional outcry. Instead,strong and ongoing bipartisan support for a settlement kept the broader political process on track.In point of fact, many of the families seem to consider the $8 million they have already receivedas adequate and are happy to keep Libya on the terrorism list as punishment for their loss.

Also contributing to an environment ripe for rapprochement was the financial value ofany deal. On the financial side, Libyaøs pariah status was a persistent obstacle to modernizing itseconomy and developing its oil industry. Durable international sanctions may have cost theregime a total of $33 billion in lost revenue, and rising oil prices through the early years of thisdecade made the opportunity costs of isolation increase steeply. Large though its $2.7 billionsettlement to the Pan Am 103 families was, Libyan officials say that they will recover the fullamount in just a few months of renewed economic activity. Such a situation was also beneficialto the U.S. government. Washington would not have to reward Tripoli directly. The privateforeign investment would be enough.Two additional elements helped set the stage. First, a growing set of common interestsdrove Washington and Tripoli together. Principal among these was the global war on terrorism,in which Qadhafi felt as much of a threat from radical rejectionist groups as did Washington.Both the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Islamic Martyrsø Movement sought to replaceQadhafiøs regime with an Islamist state. The latter injured Qadhafi in a 1998 assassinationattempt that may have been linked to Al-Qaeda. It was no coincidence that the Libyangovernment unleashed a flurry of approaches to the Bush administration in the month following9-11. Washington and Tripoli were coming to have the same enemies.

Second, the Libyans were keenly aware of overwhelming U.S. power, both in terms ofintelligence capacity and military might. The U.S. interception of a German ship carryingMalaysian-made nuclear centrifuges from Dubai to Libya in October 2003 was a clearindicator to the Libyans that they could not be sure of what Washington knew about theirproliferation networks. In such an event, trying to õgameö the United States would likely fail.U.S. military success in Iraq was a further demonstration of capabilities, and while much of

thenegotiation process began long before even a potential military action against Iraq, U.S. militarycapacity could not have been in doubt.

As the Libyan interim government continues to struggle to maintain law and order while simultaneously facing the daunting tasks of state-building *ab initio*, the United States and other leading actors in the international community can assist in maintaining stability by engaging and providing vitally needed help. This assistance is essential to avoid destabilization and deterioration within Libya, gravid with consequences not only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and energy consumers both in North Africa and Europe.

The involvement of the international community should be focused on what Libya needs in order to perform its functions as an effective sovereign state, both at a national and international level. U.S. and UN expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed fighters in post-conflict situations could be of pivotal help to Libya at this critical juncture, but such support should be provided carefully. Although the situation on the ground at the time of this writing suggests that the interim government in Libya would appreciate external help with the armed militias, any level of visible foreign military presence in Libya, particularly from the West, risks igniting more political instability than it resolves. Any DDR assistance would be best provided through diplomatic channels in the form of continuous advisory and monitoring support. Contributions could also be delivered in the form of special training courses to middle- and high-ranking military officers, provided in U.S. and/or European military colleges. The United States could also work in conjunction with other Arab countries such as Jordan and Morocco to train Libyan rebel fighters and integrate them into the national army. Training in other Arab countries seems a viable solution. In April 2012, Jordan started the training of 10,000 policemen at its International Police Centre near the capital of Amman.But use

or deployment of visible military assets by the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would have limited, or no, support within Libya and in the wider Arab region, and would serve only to fuel conspiracy theories about interest in Libyan oil and new colonialism.

Preventing hostile exploitation of Libyaøs vast territory and largely uncontrolled borders remains a key task for the international community while Libya still lacks a national army. The new Libya needs well-equipped and well-trained military forces to protect and secure its approximately 4,000 kilometer (km)-long land border, shared with six countries, and its national territory. The new security apparatus that will be put in place should be trained to play a neutral role in internal political life, and specifically avoid domination by or favoritism toward specific tribes or clans over others. A new security system will reduce the risk of intimidation and violence during Libyaøs political transition. The United States and other international partners with experience in building security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offer this experience to Libya. The United States and the international community can provide assistance in building state institutions and processes, once the political ambitions of the leading revolutionary commanders are satisfied or mitigated and the process of reintegration of ex-combatants is in an advanced stage.

International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have much scope to support the nascent democratic political culture and civil society in Libya. The new Libya requires the establishment and strengthening of a party system, elections, media, and an independent judiciary. Technical assistance in setting up legal systems on political and economic fronts is an essential prerequisite for Libyaøs transition towards democracy.

Libya occupies a strategically important position in the Maghreb and the Sahel, a region that is considered of increasing importance to U.S. global security strategy. In March 2012, the Libyan government hosted a regional conference on border security, with the aims of setting up collaboration mechanisms and procedures with neighboring countries and conveying a message to the international community that Libya takes its border issues very seriously.However, given the lack of financial and human resources primarily in countries like Chad and Nigeria, it is likely that the collaborative efforts with Libya's southern neighbors will be less than fully effective.

The porous state of Libyan borders is not only a threat to Libya's stability, but also to other countries in its vicinity and beyond. Immigration, international terrorism, and transnational organized crime could affect the interests of European countries and the international community, in addition to their implications for Libya's internal stability. Yet, the Libyan security forces in their present form do not have sufficient professional personnel, equipment, or surveillance technology to control Libya's borders effectively.

This is not a task the new Libya can manage alone, and this is a key area in which international assistance is essential for Libya's state-building efforts. There is a potentially important enabling role in this area for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly in light of the improvement of the security environment in Africa being a key element of AFRICOM's mission. In June 2012, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno signaled increasing importance for the train and advise mission in Africa, in particular due to the fact that õterrorist elements around the world go to the areas they think [have] the least resistance . . . and right now, you could argue that's Africa.öLibya is a prime example of this potential, and AFRICOM should consider the case of Libya as a priority, given the security repercussions already felt by

neighboring countries. The flow of weapons and militants is increasingly destabilizing the Maghreb and Sahel regions, and prompt action to mitigate this situation would prove cost effective in restraining the further spread of instability.

The planned assignment of a Brigade Combat Team to AFRICOM in 2013 to act as a pilot program for the Regionally Aligned Force concept provides an opportunity to build on immediate mitigating action in conjunction with the Libyan authorities. Conversely, if AFRICOM fails to engage promptly in Libya, the credibility of AFRICOM as a reliable actor and partner for the security of Africa will come into question in the region. Given the U.S. concerns about international terrorism, many would find it incomprehensible if AFRICOM took no visible action to counter expanding instability resulting from Libya's challenges.The U.S. military is well-positioned to leverage its expertise and experience to design a comprehensive solution for border control and provide support in implementation. In particular, help could be offered to the Libyan authorities to control Libya's southern borders, while a collaborative effort involving European partners would be conceivable for Libya's sea borders with European neighbors.

The aim should be working together with the Libyan authorities in order to enhance their capabilities of providing for their own security. In addition to enhancing the security of neighboring states, a U.S. contribution of this type would strengthen the current fragile peace and help prevent any relapse into civil war. Time is of the essence in the case of Libya. Prompt engagement with and support for the current Libyan authorities is essential for a wide range of reasons. First, it will ensure that the continued confrontations among armed rival militants do not spread and develop into a second civil war. Second, engagement will curb the further spread of instability to other neighboring countries. Last, but not least, achieving political and economic

stability will have a strong positive impact not only on Libya, but also on neighboring countries in North Africa and Europe securing important long-term political and economic allies in a region key both for the United States and for long-term partners in Europe.

## 5.4 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOWNFALL OF GADDAFI

By any measure, 2011 was a momentous year for Libya. The fall of the Gaddafi government created, for the first time, an opportunity for the country to pursue the types of economic and social reforms that vested interests had previously prevented. Although the change is certainly an opportunity, the manner in which the revolution came about has had serious economic implications and created numerous challenges. Most importantly, Libya temporarily stopped producing and exporting oil, the country's main revenue source, while the freezing of the country's assets by the international community created significant obstacles. The conflict effectively brought the formal economy to a halt, resulting in an estimated 41.8% contraction in real GDP in 2011. Nevertheless, Libya's economy is expected to pick up as the political situation stabilizes, with growth projected at 20.1% in 2012 and 9.5% in 2013. The speedy return of foreign oil companies alongside the strong international support the country has received bodes well for Libya's post conflict recovery. A number of trends are evident. The interim government has taken necessary measures to build on the oil industry's strengths while mitigating the former government's mismanagement of the resource. Overall, the NTC intends to reform the economy

as part of a comprehensive approach to the countryøs reconstruction. Government spending faces major pressures as subsidies and other forms of wealth transfers are channeled to those most affected by the conflict. As a result, the budget is expected to show a deficit equal to 17.1% of GDP in 2011, compared with a surplus of 8.7% in 2010, but this is expected to improve by 2012 with a positive balance of 13.6%. Despite the many challenges Libya faces in such areas as economic management, structural policies, social inclusion and governance, it is expected thatthe country will be able to make important strides in its reconstruction efforts if the interim government is able to maintain stability (Dabrowski, 2013).

Libya will also have to confront the growing challenge of youth unemployment, an obstacle that has been aggravated by the economic difficulties created by the civil war. Libya has traditionally relied on the public sector to create employment, a measure that has proved unsustainable. At the same time, the countryøs inefficient private sector has been unable to compensate for the lack of jobs. Despite the governmentøs efforts to reform the private sector and create opportunities by supporting entrepreneurs and small businesses, the inefficiencies of Libyaøs economy stand in the way of tangible improvements in the business environment. At the same time, Libyaøs education system inadequately prepares students to meet the demands of the labor market, resulting in a negative return on education.

Figure 5.1: Real GDP Growth of Libya

Figure 1: Real GDP growth (Northern)

Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932619013

Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Real GDP growth	2.9	-41.8	20.1	9.5
Real GDP per capita growth	1.4	-42.8	19.4	8.9
CPI inflation	2.5	11.4	6	5.1
Budget balance % GDP	8.7	-17.1	13.6	12.2
Current account % GDP	11.4	-6	15.8	13.1

Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.

Libya's economy, previously known for impressive levels of growth driven by its oil and gas industry, was seriously disrupted by the 2011 civil war. In addition to the impact that the freezing of the country's assets had on liquidity, the economy was disrupted by the shutdown in oil production and exports, as well as the decline of productivity resulting from the loss of human capital and the destruction of infrastructure. Oil production and exports account for the

majority of Libya's GDP, approximately 70%. However, during the crisis, as foreign oil companies evacuated staff and facilities were attacked by the warring parties, production and exports came to a complete standstill between April and August 2011. As a result, Libya's economy contracted 41.8% in 2011 compared to growth of 2.9% in 2010.

Nevertheless, as the security situation improves and reconstruction takes hold, the revival of the oil sector and of the economy as a whole seems increasingly promising. Real GDP growth is projected at 20.1% for 2012 and 9.5% for 2013. OPEC has maintained Libya's official oil production quota at 1.47 million barrels per day and foreign oil companies have begun to return to the country. These include France's Total, Italy's ENI, Spain's Repsol and Occidental of the United States. Reflecting the commitment of foreign companies to return to pre-crisis levels of production, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) has ramped up output at the Sarir filed to 160 000 b/d and has begun pumping oil to the Tobruk terminal. ENI has committed USD 35 billion to double its Libyan oil and gas production by 2021.

Following the return of these companies, oil output reached 840,000 b/d in November 2011, leading the National Oil Corporation to claim that pre-crisis production levels could be reached by the end of 2012. Though OPEC's estimates have been equally positive, it should be noted that Libya's oil output had been stagnating prior to the conflict, suggesting that the pace of recovery in the industry could face setbacks. According to a number of oil industry analysts, Libya's fields are old and production from some wells may not be possible due to the damage done to the facilities by the shutdown between April and August.

Prior to the overthrow of the Gaddafi government, attempts had been made on numerous occasions to overhaul the economy. These efforts however always met with opposition from those whose interests would be compromised by the reforms. The transitional government has

recognised the importance of creating conditions that are more transparent and which support the integration of the economy into the global market. Given Libya's consistently poor performance on business environment surveys, the ability of the government to pursue genuine reform will determine the rate at which foreign investment returns. One of the important reforms that the NTC has taken includes the re-establishment of the oil ministry. The Gaddafi government abolished the oil ministry in 2006 and left the management of the industry to the National Oil Corporation (NOC). The new ministry will be responsible for national oil policy, while the NOC will retain its role in the commercial side of the industry. These efforts should make important strides in reducing the kinds of arbitrary decisions, sudden reversals of policy and lack of transparency that troubled the industry under the former government. Both the new Oil Minister, Abdulrahman Ben Yezza, and the head of the National Oil Corporation, Nouri Berouin, have indicated their intention to facilitate greater openness. In their efforts to increase transparency, and conscious of the fact that their positions are temporary given the transitional mandate of the government, both the NOC and the new Oil Ministry have agreed that all previous oil contracts will be respected, although those suspected of corrupt activities in the past will be investigated. The NTC has established a committee to investigate corruption in the oil sector with the aim of improving transparency in the industry.

Beyond reform efforts in the oil sector, policy for 2012 will focus on the reconstruction of the economy with the goal of rendering the economic system more business friendly. However, the chairman of the transitional governing body has expressed the aim of creating a more Sharia compliant economy. Although it is unclear to what extent the interim government is willing and able to do this, it is expected that the government will pursue efforts to make the financial services industry more compatible with Islamic banking practices, namely through the

abolition of interest rates in favour of other remuneration mechanisms. As a result of the perceived risks created by the conflict, foreign direct investment is expected to decline for 2011-2012. Yet there is potential for the non-oil sector to grow during the reconstruction of the country. Infrastructure programmes will support the construction, utilities, communication, transport and financial sectors. Lucrative infrastructure projects will likely attract foreign companies. Contracts associated with the reconstruction effort over the next 10 years have been estimated to be worth USD 240 billion which will be financed by the country's oil revenues.

In spite of foreign investment and foreign aid, Libya's reconstruction efforts face one important obstacle that is likely to affect growth in the coming years, namely the ability of the interim and future governments to create functional institutions. Libya's former political system, the Jamahiriya, encouraged a supposedly more participatory governing structure that favoured a multiplicity of profoundly inefficient self-governing local structures, the ‗Basic People's Congresses.' Now, the NTC is tasked with building a modern bureaucratic system for the first time since Libya's independence. International financial and technical assistance will contribute to building institutions but it is up to the interim government to take advantage of these opportunities which will be crucial to the country's long term ability to surmount its many economic challenges.

Macroeconomic Policy

The oil industry accounts for over 90% of the government's budget. As a result, in recent years Libya has benefited from the healthy budget surplus that accompanied high oil revenues, as well as the previous government's tendency to not fulfill its spending commitments. Due to the impact of the 2011 crisis on the economy, Libya's budget turned to deficit, at 17.1% of GDP due to the loss of oil production and exports. Government spending will continue to increase as it covers various infrastructure projects as well as the hike in public sector wages that was

implemented in the last days of the Gaddafi government. Although these factors will result in a decrease in the fiscal surplus compared to previous years, it is likely that the majority of these expenditures will be financed through debt secured against state assets and by the use of those assets that have been unfrozen.

Moreover, if the rate of oil production and exports continues to improve, the industry will be able to support the government's fiscal policy and ensure that the current account balance remains positive even as the government increases spending to support the country's post-war reconstruction efforts. Oil revenues are expected to remain the government's main source of funding. Up until 2010, Libya's tax base was very narrow, with most taxes being collected from external trade. While the government made efforts to simplify the tax code, by introducing a flat rate of 10% for individuals and 20% for corporations, it was never able to implement this policy fully. Overall, like much of Libya's government prior to the revolution, the tax administration was subject to discretionary measures.

In terms of the quality of the budget and general financial management, prior to the conflict, Libya implemented a number of reforms through the unification of the current and investment budgets, along with some improvements in budget classification and the streamlining of government entities' bank accounts. Even with these changes however, the framework governing the state budget remained cumbersome. Libya's new government has yet to create a public budget, although given its intention to break with the former government's policies it is expected that they will focus on improving the accountability and performance of government management, including public financial management.

5.5   Social Context & Human Development

Before the 2011 conflict, the majority of Libya's population had access to basic sanitation facilities and essential drugs. In 2009, Libya had the second highest UN Development Program Human Development Index (HDI) on the African continent, rising from 0.741 in 2005 to 0.760 in 2011. The government provided free basic health care through public hospitals and clinics, the main ones being in Benghazi and Tripoli. The government embarked on a variety of institutional reforms but the healthcare system continued to suffer from many deficiencies due to poor capacity, low financial remuneration of healthcare personnel and poorly-equipped facilities. As a result many Libyan nationals sought healthcare abroad, primarily in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom and Switzerland.

The state of public health provision deteriorated significantly during the conflict, with hospitals in contested cities faring particularly badly as staff in some cases were forced to flee the violence. The transitional government is currently addressing the most pressing infrastructure issues in healthcare provision but it is likely that the medical system will remain a challenge for some time to come. The authorities have paid more attention to HIV/AIDS but a lack of awareness about the disease and the social stigmas associated with it remain important challenges. Libya has about 11 000 people infected with HIV, or a prevalence rate of 0.13 percent. While the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Libya remains low by global standards, the ignorance and social stigmas surrounding the disease mean that people living with HIV are alienated while the general public is uninformed about the nature of their condition and the medical assistance available to them

In 2007, Libya achieved universal enrollment in primary education while gross secondary enrollment hit 94%. The adult literacy rate rose to 87% -- 94% for men and 78% for women. The curriculum, however, is of poor quality and teachers receive inadequate training. Libya's

problems of unemployment and youth unemployment in particular largely result from a miss-match between the skills developed by the education system and those demanded by the labour market. Given the role unemployment played in driving the uprising against the government and its potential for causing social unrest, Libya needs to address this issue in the interest of promoting promote economic and political stability.

Poverty Reduction, Social Protection & Labour

The former government provided large yet often inefficient subsidies to broad segments of the population, including healthcare and education, together with housing and price controls on several basic food products. The unrest in the county suggested these measures failed in their objectives and worse still, contributed to the abuse of public resources by the elite, leading to increased inequality. In February 2011, the government attempted to quell the growing protests by hiking salaries, cutting food prices and giving all households the equivalent of a USD 400 allowance, costing some USD 480 million in all. It is likely, given the economic hardship Libyans are currently facing, that some of these subsidies will be maintained. There is currently no data available on the specific poverty impact of these expenditures, their focus, or how the new government will move forward on this issue.

Libya's labour market continues to be regulated and its workforce protected. However, many of the country's labour laws have discouraged job creation in the formal sector specifically, their provisions on a minimum wage, working hours, night shift regulations, and dismissal procedures and training requirements. Laws governing dismissal are strict, favoring the employee. The 1980 Social Security Law requires employers to pay a severance benefit to laid-off employees equal to 100% of earnings for up to 6 months. It is unclear whether Libya's transitional government will address the deficiencies of the labor market in the near future but its

aim to expand the formal sector suggests it will consider addressing labor regulations deemed counterproductive.

Beyond the remit of the labor laws, there are concerns over protection for casual, family and household workers. Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable and suffered during the conflict from accusations that they were supporters of the former government or hired mercenaries. Most of these laborers fled to their home countries or are currently in refugee camps and it is unclear whether they will return to Libya once the political situation stabilizes.

Hydrocarbons have long dominated the Libyan economy, accounting for more than 70 percent of GDP, more than 95 percent of exports, and approximately 90 percent of government revenue. With about 3.5 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves, Libya has a prominent position in the international energy market. Before the revolution, its output was 1.77 million barrels per day of crude oil (equivalent to 2 percent of global output) and close to 0.2 million barrels-equivalent of natural gas. Following the lifting of earlier United Nations (UN) sanctions in 2003, economic activity increased steadily for seven years. During 2004‐10, average real GDP growth was approximately 5 percent, annual consumer price inflation averaged less than 4 percent, and official foreign assets increased from $20 billion at end-2003 to $170 billion at end-2010. While the nonhydrocarbon sectors grew rapidly, underpinned by an ambitious public investment program, Libya remained one of the most hydrocarbon-dependent countries, with its exports among the least diversified in the world; its small private sector was handicapped by the ubiquitous dominance of the state and by crippling institutional failures. Consequently, social and governance indicators remained poor, job creation was lackluster, and dependence on expatriate workers increased.

Violent protests in Libya erupted on February 17, 2011, escalating rapidly into conflict. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya on February 26, which was broadened on March 17 to include a mandate for limited foreign military intervention and a freeze on Libya's foreign assets. On October 23, the NTC declared liberation after defeating the military forces of the former ruler, Moammar Gaddafi. The NTC announced the formation of a new, transitional government on November 22 and plans to hold parliamentary elections by June 23, 2012. The bulk of Libya's foreign assets were unfrozen on December 16, clearing the way for normalization of the foreign exchange market.

As a consequence of the conflict, crude oil production fell to 22,000 barrels per day in July 2011, although output was restored rapidly in the last quarter of 2011 to half the pre-conflict level (Figure 1). Non-hydrocarbon economic activity was affected by the destruction of infrastructure and production facilities, disruptions to banking activity, limited access to foreign exchange, and the departure of expatriate workers. Consequently, with an estimated 50 percent contraction in non-hydrocarbon output, total real GDP in 2011 was 60 percent lower than in 2010.

Figure 1. Oil Production Collapsed
(In thousands of barrels per day, annual average)

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), lacking access to its foreign assets, was unable to sell foreign exchange; the parallel market value of the Libyan dinar (LD) fell, at one point reaching a low of half its official value. 3 With the unfreezing of foreign assets in late 2011, however, the spread between the official and parallel market exchange rates narrowed to less than 10 percent in early 2012. Even so, the consumer price index (CPI) increased significantly in 2011, reflecting physical constraints on imports, domestic supply limitations, and monetary expansion as well as exchange rate depreciation on the parallel market (Figure 3). Although the availability of consumer price data during the conflict was limited, estimates indicate that the CPI increased by about 20 percent in 2011. The loss of hydrocarbon income during the conflict reduced Libya⊘s current account surplus. Exports declined from $48.9 billion in 2010 to $19.2 billion in 2011, while imports dropped from $24.6 billion to $14.2 billion during the same period. As a result, the

current account surplus narrowed from 21 percent of GDP in 2010 to less than 4½ percent of GDP in 2011 (Figure 4). The 2011 budget was reallocated to address the drop in hydrocarbon revenues, humanitarian needs, and a disruption of most capital expenditures, as well as first-quarter policy changes, including increased salaries. Revenue is estimated to have declined by 69 percent in nominal terms, from 57 percent of GDP in 2010 to 39 percent of GDP in 2011. Spending on wages rose by approximately 60 percent, driven by a March 2011 public-sector wage increase. The 2011 budget was financed by domestic borrowing of LD 13.5 billion, as well as arrears estimated at LD 6 billion (Table 2).

Figure 2. Revolution Had a Devastating Effect on the Economy
(Annual percentage change)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Table 1. Economic Shock from the Revolution is Expected to be Temporary

	2010	2011	Proj. 2012
Real GDP, annual percentage change	2.9	−60.0	69.7
Non hydrocarbon	7.0	50.0	20.0
Hydrocarbon	−1.2	−70.9	163.3
CPI inflation			
End-period	3.3	19.2	−10.4
Period average	2.5	14.1	1.9
Overall budget balance, percent of GDP	4.9	−42.8	−6.8
External current account, percent of GDP	20.8	4.4	11.2
Total foreign assets ($ billion), of which:	172	174	174
Gross official reserves	103	106	82
Oil production, millions of barrels per day	1.77	0.51	1.35

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

## Figure 3. Supply Bottlenecks Pushed Prices Higher
(Consumer price index, 2003 = 100)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

During and immediately after the revolution, the financial situation of the public sector was precarious, with the government financing expenditures by borrowing from the CBL and by drawing down deposits at the CBL. The money supply increased due to monetization of the budget deficit; currency in circulation doubled from LD 7.5 billion at end-2010 to LD 15.4 billion at end- 2011. Although currency in circulation doubled, demand for cash increased even more, resulting in a shortage of liquidity in the banking system, which the CBL addressed by imposing a limit on cash withdrawals by individuals from the banking system.4 The economic upheaval in Libya has also had significant spillovers globally and regionally. Prior to the conflict, Libya accounted for 2 percent of global crude oil production, and the loss of Libyan oil exports created a temporary shortfall in the international market. In addition, Libya had hosted approximately 1.5 million migrant workers; an abrupt exodus of expatriate workers reduced remittances and added to the already large pool of unemployed in Libya's neighboring countries More generally, the intensification of regional turmoil due to the Libyan conflict further contributed to deterring tourism and foreign investment.

Figure 4. Loss of Hydrocarbon Income Worsened Fiscal and External Accounts
(In percent of GDP)

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

Table 2. Loss of Hydrocarbon Revenues Hits Public Finances

	Est. 2010	Est. 2011	Proj. 2012
	(In billions of Libyan dinars)		
Nominal GDP	102	46	96
Revenue and grants	58	18	56
Expenditure, *of which:*	53	37	62
Wages and salaries	9	15	18
Subsidies and transfers	12	12	15
Overall balance	5	−20	−7
	(In percent of GDP)		
Revenue and grants	57	39	58
Expenditure, *of which:*	52	82	65
Wages and salaries	9	32	19
Subsidies and transfers	12	26	16
Overall fiscal balance	5	−43	−7
External current account	21	4	11

Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary and Conclusion

The study critically assessed the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya. Indeed we tried to provide plausible answers to the following research questions:

- Did the post-Gaddafi politics enhance democratization in Libya?

- Did the post-Gaddafi diplomacy enhance economic relations with the west?

However, the study has six (6) chapters; chapter one focused on general introduction, chapters two to six discussed the following issues: Literature review, methodology, the domestic and external actors in the overthrow of Gaddafi and the political, diplomatic and other consequences of the fall of Gaddafi. Therein, we critically assessed the politics and diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya, while other specific objectives were:

- To ascertain whether the politics of post-Gaddafi Libya enhanced democratization process and peace in Libya.

- To determine whether the diplomacy of post-Gaddafi Libya enhanced economic relations with the west.

In the findings, the study noted thaton October 20, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was killed by opposition forces following a NATO strike on his convoy, essentially ending a nine-month civil war for control over Libya. Many media outlets hailed the death of Colonel Qaddafi and his regime as the end of an oppressive dictatorship and a victory for human rights in the Arab World. The transition to a new government was to be popular and democratic. However, this narrative conceals a much more complicated and chaotic reality.

There were undoubtedly many people who took part in the demonstrations that rocked Libya in the early days of the revolt, and in the war against Qaddafi, who saw the role of the revolution as liberating the Libyan people from an autocrat. But the cultural, political and religious rifts that sparked the rebellion did not begin with Qaddafi's rule. In fact, Libya had historically been not one but three distinct nations ó Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan ó each with its own history and cultural affiliations. When the UN created the unified state of Libya in 1951, King Idris, formerly the Emir of Cyrenaica, was put in charge of the whole country, but his popularity with Libyans never made it far beyond the borders of Cyrenaica. Likewise, when an Army officer from Tripolitania led a successful coup in 1969, fewer people cheered in Cyrenaica than in the rest of the country. After attempting to foster greater cultural and national unity, Qaddafi soon reverted to ethnic and tribal politics to strengthen his grip on power. Qaddafi faced simmering unrest in Cyrenaica, particularly in its old capital, Benghazi, during his entire reign. It was this historical rivalry that exploded in February, 2011, paving the way for a civil war that would plunge Libya into turmoil.

The consequences of the civil war have been devastating to human security in Libya, and to security in the broader region. An unknown number of civilians, probably many thousands, lost their lives in the conflict, and many more were internally displaced or fled to neighboring countries as refugees. Furthermore, there were widespread reports of extreme violence on the part of NTC troops against Qaddafi loyalists, rival ethnic groups, and black African immigrants, including extra-judicial detention, torture, rape and murder. The shock waves of the civil war have gone far beyond the borders of Libya. Arms and refugees have poured across Libya's borders with Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Egypt. Nearby Mali has fallen into a crisis following the seizure of most of their country by Tuareg rebels ó many of whom had been

trained and employed by Libya ó and the subsequent military coup in the capital of what remains of Mali. Weapons from Libya have found their way as far as Somalia and Egypt, and armed Libyan fighters from elsewhere in Africa have scattered across the region.

These consequences ó lawlessness and chaos, widespread human rights abuses, economic turmoil and regional instability ó were entirely foreseeable, because they are almost universal symptoms of war. In fact, these consequences *were* predicted by foreign policy experts from major think tanks, and by countries like Germany, India and Brazil, all of which refused to endorse NATO-coalition intervention in Libya based on their foresight regarding the impact of such an intervention on domestic and regional security. These outcomes were especially predictable in the case of Libya, where it was well known throughout the conflict that the fledgling rebel leadership was far from cohesive, and lacked the resources and legitimacy to control the rebel forces, let alone the general population. No matter how righteous their cause might have been, the Libyan opposition was clearly unprepared to govern the whole of the country. The transition to a new government has been violent and tumultuous. Since the NTC was never able to gain control over large swaths of the country, let alone govern effectively or defend Libya against external threats, the new government is at best inheriting a partially unified country.

The members of NTC are certainly culpable for the crimes that were committed on their watch. Many members of the NTC were responsible for convincing the international community to train and equip forces over which the NTC had no real control, and to provide them with decisive support in overthrowing the government of Libya. They also made commitments to restore law and order to the country, and to stop atrocities from occurring, and they failed on both counts. Human Rights Watch has pointed out that the ICC has ongoing jurisdiction in

Libya, and that any crimes against humanity could be referred there. However, the NTC and its allied militias treated the ICC with disdain, and at times, open hostility. For example, the ICC and the NTC both attempted to put Seif al-Islam Qaddafi on trial for war crimes, but the NTC virulently disputed the ICC¢s claim to jurisdiction. Since the NTC so clearly failed to establish a fair and functional justice system, the ICC could not yield jurisdiction over Seif al-Islam¢s case to them. When the ICC sent a team to interview Seif al-Islam, in part to ensure that his legal rights are protected, the ICC staff were arrested and detained for a month. The incident õraised further doubt about the government¢s competence and its understanding of the legal process.ö

Conclusion

It invites little controversy to say that removing Muammar Gaddafi was the easy part in Libya¢s fight for liberation, compared with the daunting tasks of building a state in the post-Gaddafi era. Libya¢s interim government is facing as difficult a moment as any other country in the region that has experienced a revolution. The new Libyan leadership inherits a distinctly messy political situation, with multiple, simultaneous, and urgent major challenges. In addition to building political institutions, maintaining security, withdrawing weapons, and creating a new national army, Libya has also to meet urgent demands to rectify both the crimes and the mistakes of the old regime. Initiating a truth-recovery process is essential to ensure victims that the crimes of Gaddafi¢s regime or of the civil war will not go unaddressed or unpunished.

The Libyan people have high expectations following the end of authoritarian rule by Gaddafi, but the provisional government is constrained by the absence of institutions to meet all the demands at once. One of the key challenges is the lack of experienced politicians who can lead a democratic transition. With the exception of those few figures who defected from Qadhafi¢s regime, there is even a dearth of national figures with any experience in managing

state affairs. Under Qadhafi, state affairs were managed by a handful of technocrats, who occupied, in rotation, ministerial and management positions in state-owned companies.

The government not only needs to build basic state institutions that allow it to exercise its duties as a provider of services to its own citizens, but it has yet to establish itself as the sole user of legitimate violence. In the aftermath of the fall of Tripoli, the interim government has announced its road map to democracy; a series of laws, procedures and institutions have to be put in place for the next elections. But simultaneously, a solution to the fundamental security issue has to be provided. Demilitarizing the armed militias and building a national army is a prerequisite not only for strengthening state capacity and credibility, but also essential for the achievement of other transitional reforms.

One final and crucial point is that any exclusion of the reality of Libyan tribalism from the political calculus will be highly damaging and will inevitably trigger more tensions. Libya's tribes are conscious of their importance and aspire to play a political role, at least on a regional level. The conventions of tribes in late-2011 to debate the future structure of the state and to discuss federation, central government, and a bicameral parliamentary system among other key issues, send a strong signal that the tribes want a political place in the new Libya. However progressive the instincts of the new government, it would be unwise to attempt to deny it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommends the following:

- Far-reaching reform of the police and SSC is a priority. Libya needs a gendarmerie-like component tocarry out the front line duties a regular police forcecannot manage. One lesson learned from the SSC'sshortcomings is that recruiting brigades wholesale

andrelying on unit commanders to act in the nation's bestinterests cannot work; instead, individuals from variousbrigades should be intermingled. To succeed, the interiorministry will have to overcome its current predilectionfor inexperienced youth. As in the case of thenew army corps, gendarmerie officers should be selectedfrom among the most adept, least politically controversialmembers ofthe SSC, interior ministry, police andarmed groups registered with the interior ministry andthen placed in an appropriately mentored, rigoroustraining course.

- Another important step would be for the governmentto set up a Crisis Management Unit answerable to theprime minister and that would include representativesfrom the military, police, interior and defence ministersas well as the LSF, SSC and border guard (as longas these remain operational). Other armed groups shouldparticipate, as appropriate, formally or informally.

- Both the new army corps and gendarmerie will haveto complete the transition from entities whose constituentunits serve only in their towns of origin to a fullynational, mixed force. This will take time. In the beginning,the intermingling likely should be limited toregions and areas without a history of communal conflicts.Efforts should focus on promoting leaders fromminority or oppressed communities, with deploymentof genuinely national mixed brigades coming later.

- The international community has an important role toplay in supporting these changes. The UN has providedsome technical advice and coordination to the policeand military; it

also has helped produce a defencewhite paper with the chief of staff and six countriesselected by him. Assuming Libyan governmental approval,the UN could extend its work to carry out a fulltechnical review of the army, LSF and border guardactivities in military zones, including the status andorigins of their respective weapons supplies and theirrecruitment from and relations with local armed groupsand local communities. Likewise, the UN could helpmonitor ceasefire implementation and identify politicaland logistical impediments they face. The EU, followingLibyan authorities'request, produced a detailedreport (mentioned above) outlining the legal, technicaland operational obstacles faced by the government insecuring its borders and stopping illegal trafficking.It could continue to help with a border managementstrategy and, assuming it is set up, support the CrisisManagement Unit.

- On the civilian side, notables have proved effective attending hostilities; the weakness lies in the vaguenessof their peace settlements and loose ties between notablesand the central government. Dealing with this problemcould help ensure that commitments made duringceasefire talks are implemented and that grievances atthe root of many disputes – regarding citizenship status,land ownership, property rights and black-marketcommercial interests – are properly addressed. Inprinciple, coordinating bodies already exist: one underthe prime minister's authority, the other, the NationalReconciliation Body (*hay'at musalaha al-wataniyya*),established in June 2012 by the NTC. That said, neitherhas truly bridged the gap between agreements on paperthat are reached by local notables and lack of implementationby central authorities; rather, they have invokedlocal notables' overconfident assessments ofsuccess as a pretext for inaction.

- It is crucial that agreements be in writing. A corollary isthat any local agreement must be sufficiently detailedand realistic; reflecting commitments the governmentcan put into practice rather than, as at present, ad hoc,vague and often unimplementable promises that generateambiguity, misunderstandings and discontent.Although notables should continue to lead negotiations,the large councils they convene – in which LSFand army observers periodically participate – shouldas a general matter also include central governmentobservers attached to the police force and prime minister's office. The observers should study and be awareof the protocols and customs that the notables use; optimally,their primary role should be to act as consultantsfor the notables, with a direct line to the prime minister's office, to ensure that peace agreements are bothimplementable and implemented.

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